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ABSTRACT 
 
THE SATRAPS OF WESTERN ANATOLIA AND THE GREEKS 
Eyal Meyer 
Jeremy McInerney 
This dissertation explores the extent to which Persian policies in the western satrapies 
originated from the provincial capitals in the Anatolian periphery rather than from the royal 
centers in the Persian heartland in the fifth century BC. I begin by establishing that the 
Persian administrative apparatus was a product of a grand reform initiated by Darius I, 
which was aimed at producing a more uniform and centralized administrative 
infrastructure. In the following chapter I show that the provincial administration was 
embedded with chancellors, scribes, secretaries and military personnel of royal status and 
that the satrapies were periodically inspected by the Persian King or his loyal agents, which 
allowed to central authorities to monitory the provinces. In chapter three I delineate the 
extent of satrapal authority, responsibility and resources, and conclude that the satraps were 
supplied with considerable resources which enabled to fulfill the duties of their office. 
After the power dynamic between the Great Persian King and his provincial governors and 
the nature of the office of satrap has been analyzed, I begin a diachronic scrutiny of Greco-
Persian interactions in the fifth century BC. Chapter four centers on a particular challenge 
the Persians faced in western Anatolia. On the one hand, the Persian conquest of Ionia in 
the middle of the sixth century BC triggered a gradual increase in the willingness of 
mainland Greeks to intervene in the affairs of Asia Minor, while on the other, Xerxes’ 
failure to subjugate European Greece resulted in a dramatic shift from a policy of westward 
expansion to a policy of entrenchment. The focus of chapter five is the limited interest of 
Artaxerxes I (r. 465-423 BC) in respect to the western satrapies. The last chapter deals with 
the machinations of the satraps Tissaphernes, Pharnabazus and Cyrus the Younger. I show 
that the alliance between Persia and Sparta was the outcome of satrapal action rather than 
royal initiative or intent. Accordingly, the satraps sought to exploit the power struggle 
between Athens and Sparta for their own favor while King Darius played a relatively 
secondary role in this conflict.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The encounter of the ancient Greeks with the Achaemenid Persian Empire had an enduring 
effect on the trajectories of Greek and Persian histories and their legacies. From the middle 
of the sixth century BC, following the Persian conquest of the Greek city-states of Asia 
Minor, the Greeks interacted, collaborated and at times waged war against the Persians. 
But while Greco-Persian relations have been explored from as early as the 19th century, our 
knowledge on the history of ancient Persia has improved dramatically only in recent 
decades. This most welcome achievement occurred primarily due to the Achaemenid 
History Workshop series, which began in the early 1980s and centered on various facets of 
the Persian Empire.1 The overarching goal of this scholarly effort was to adopt an 
interdisciplinary approach to the study of Achaemenid Persia instead of the predominantly 
Greek-centered approach. Consequently, distinguished scholars from various fields of 
study, e.g. Assyriology, Egyptology, archaeology, Biblical studies, and more, have 
broadened and deepened our understanding of the history, economy, administrative 
mechanism, ideology, along with numerous other aspects and themes of the history of 
ancient Persia.  
The Misconception  
But despite the outstanding work that has been done, a vast majority of seminal studies on 
Greco-Persian relations were produced at a time when our knowledge on the nature and 
character of the Persian Empire was incomplete. As a result, a particular misconception 
gained prominence in Achaemenid studies, whose origin can be traced back to the biased 
ancient Greek literary traditions. It is widely held that the Great Persian Kings were the 
driving force behind instances in which the Persians intervened in Greek affairs, both in 
Asia Minor and mainland Greece. This assumption, however, fails to take into 
consideration the nature of the Persian administrative mechanism and is predicated on a 
faulty understanding of the attitude of the Achaemenid Kings toward the western periphery 
of their Empire. On the one hand, the considerable reliance on the comparatively abundant 
literary sources, which originated almost exclusively from the Greek world, has obscured 
the fact that the western provinces of Asia Minor constituted a relatively unimportant 
frontier region, situated on the most western edges of the Persian Empire. On the other 
hand, Persian royal ideology, as articulated in royal inscriptions commissioned by the 
Persian Kings and put on display in Achaemenid royal capitals, demonstrates that the 
Persian Kings’ interest in the regions beyond the Persian heartland was limited to and 
centered on the demand for unquestioned obedience and tribute. Albeit these shortcomings, 
                                                 
1 These workshops were organized by Heleen Sancisi-Weerdenburg and Amélie Kuhrt. So far nine edited 
volumes has been published: Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1987; Sancisi-Weerdenburg and Kuhrt 1987; Sancisi-
Weerdenburg and Kuhrt 1988; Sancisi-Weerdenburg and Kuhrt 1990; Sancisi-Weerdenburg and Drijvers 
1990; Sancisi-Weerdenburg and Kuhrt 1991; Sancisi-Weerdenburg and Drijvers 1991; Sancisi-
Weerdenburg, Kuhrt, and Root 1994; Henkelman and Kuhrt 2003. In addition, five monographs on specific 
topics are affiliated with the Achaemenid History Workshop series: Garrison and Root 1996; Briant 2002; 
Kaptan 2002 (2 vols.); Henkelman 2008; Waerzeggers 2010. 
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the above mentioned misconception continues to function as an underlying assumption in 
numerous studies concerned with Greco-Persian relations, and as such has facilitated the 
production of inaccurate interpretations of the motives, aims, and interests of the Persian 
Kings and their officials in western Anatolia. 
The Aim 
Consequently, the present study endeavors to challenge and correct this misconception and 
to offer a reappraisal of Greco-Persian relations in the fifth century BC. In order to do so I 
suggest a different model for the power-dynamics between the Great Persian Kings and 
their satraps. While the relations between the Persians and their subject nations had been 
thoroughly explored,2 the extent of satrapal independence has been acknowledged but has 
yet to be systematically studied.3 Accordingly, my primary goal is to explore and assess 
the extent to which Persian policies in the western satrapies originated from the satrapal 
capitals in the Anatolian periphery rather than from the royal centers in the Persian 
heartland. 
The Model 
The model offered herein assumes that the satraps of western Anatolia had the prerogative 
to effect foreign policy as long as it acted in accordance with the interest of the Great 
Persian King. The satraps are envisioned as much more than obedient and unimaginative 
administrators who blindly followed royal directives. On the contrary, those appointed by 
the Persian King to administer the provinces were ambitious members of the Persian elite 
who wielded great power, economically and militarily, and sought to win over and maintain 
the King’s favor while promoting their own interests. The Great Persian Kings, on their 
part, were far from indifferent in respect to the state of affairs in the provinces. As we shall 
see, royal intervention, i.e. a scenario in which the Great King actively directed the 
particulars of a certain action, occurred when the satrapal authorities proved to be 
inadequate or incapable of solving a particular problem. Royal directives issued by the 
Great King were to be followed without hesitation. But royal decrees, more often than not, 
did not always specify the manner in which the Great King wanted a certain issue to be 
resolved. The scenario in which a certain satrap received orders which entailed specific 
aims but empowered the satrap to figure out how to accomplish his mission had been 
termed by Waters as ‘applied royal directive’.4 This term can be used to explain 
independent satrapal conduct at times when a royal directive was issued. Therefore, 
satrapal initiatives could occur whether a royal decree was issued or not. Therefore, as long 
as the tribute kept flowing and the King’s authority remained unchallenged, the satraps 
enjoyed considerable leeway which enabled them to act independently. 
The Approach 
In order to substantiate the suggested model for King-satrap relations, I apply a novel 
approach, one which places the satraps and their own particular viewpoint at the center. 
Such an approach allows us to differentiate the satraps’ viewpoint from that of the Great 
                                                 
2 E.g. Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1990; Frei and Koch 1996; Frei 2001; Briant 2003; Fried 2004; Dusinberre 2013.  
3 Cf. Grote 1852, 92, 290; Lewis 1977, 58; Weiskopf 1982, 41; Cook 1983, 176; Petit 1990, 168–69; 
Hornblower 1994, 58; Dusinberre 2003, 4 n. 4; Allen 2005, 100; Cawkwell 2005, 153; Rung 2008, 33. 
4 Waters 2010. 
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King instead of treating them as similar if not identical. The view from the satrapal seats 
at Sardis and Dascylium was very different from that of the royal court at Susa and 
Persepolis. We should not forget that the Great Persian King ruled a gigantic kingdom 
which stretched from the Indus Valley to western Asia Minor. The Persian Kings must 
have been preoccupied with problems in other parts of their vast empire which were not 
recorded by the ancient sources, and their attitude to events which occurred in the western 
fringes of his vast domains was almost certainly different than that of officials who 
governed these regions. It cannot be denied that the satraps shared similar goals with the 
Persian central authorities, i.e. the Great King and those at the royal court who advised him 
on matters of policy and strategy. Still, the local circumstances of each satrapy must have 
created particular challenges which with the satraps had to grapple. Nevertheless, the Great 
King had presumably little interest in or patience for a satrap who failed to fulfill his duties, 
regardless of the conditions of his office. 
The Western Satrapies  
The validity of the suggested model is demonstrated by a thorough analysis of the conduct 
of the satraps of western Anatolia in the fifth century BC. The Persian governors of the 
western satrapies, i.e. Lydia and Hellespontine Phrygia, had to cope with a particular 
challenge. While western Anatolia was situated on the western fringes of the vast Persian 
Empire, its coastal districts were inhabited by subject Greek communities which shared a 
bond of kinship with the dwellers of mainland Greece. Interestingly, the ties of kinship 
between the Asiatic and European Greeks were the main cause, or justification, for 
interventions of the latter in the affairs of western Anatolia, which undermined Persian 
authority in the region. As a result, the Persian governors of the western satrapies were 
expected to fulfill their satrapal duties while containing incursions staged by mainland 
Greeks with minimal support from the relatively unconcerned central authorities. Such 
particular geopolitical circumstances encouraged and at times forced the satraps to become 
more proactive by formulating and executing policies which were either independent or 
elaborations of Persian royal policies. In essence, the distinct conditions of western 
Anatolia provide us with an ideal case-study to examine King-satrap relations and the 
extent of satrapal independence.  
The Chronological Timeframe 
The chronological purview of the present study spans from the foundation of the Persian 
Empire by Cyrus the Elder to the end of the Peloponnesian War in 404 BC. Since the first 
three chapters endeavor to delineate and define satrapal prerogatives and royal supervision 
over the satrapies, it became necessary to utilize traditions which recount the history of the 
Persian Empire from its inception. The decision to end the discussion in 404 BC stems 
from the design to demonstrate a continuation in the attitude of the Persian central 
authorities toward the western satrapies throughout the fifth century BC. Accordingly, the 
last three chapters are devoted to the reign of a specific Achaemenid King, namely Xerxes, 
Artaxerxes I, and Darius II. I argue that the failed attempt to subjugate mainland Greece 
led Xerxes and his two immediate successors to abandon Persian imperialistic aspirations 
in the west, a strategic decision which had a profound impact on the conditions in which 
the satraps of western Anatolia operated. But the attempt of Cyrus the Younger to seize the 
throne in 401 BC must have triggered a change in the attitude of Artaxerxes II toward the 
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western satrapies. Therefore, since the rebellion of Cyrus constitutes an internal Persian 
affairs which was not the product of the circumstances in western Anatolia, I decided to 
end the present study before this watershed moment in Achaemenid history. Even still, I 
do draw on events and episodes which fall well outside the stated chronological scope, but 
it is done only in instances in which the particular historical context of the fourth century 
is not dominant. 
The Sources 
The formidable source problem with which modern historians of the Achaemenid Empire 
cope should also be addressed.5 Since there is no extant continuous Persian historical 
narrative, if such ever existed, we are compelled to rely on other imperfect categories of 
evidence. A good number inscriptions, which were commissioned by the Achaemenid 
Kings and inscribed in Old-Persian, Elamite, and Akkadian, have been preserved. In 
addition, we have at our disposal a rich archeological data, which derives primarily from 
the palatial complexes at Susa, Persepolis, Pasargadae, Ecbatana, and the royal necropolis 
at Naqsh-i Rustam. On the one hand, the Achaemenid royal proclamations, palaces, and 
awe-inspiring tombs constitute and an invaluable source on Persian royal ideology. On the 
other hand, there is little that that these monuments were used by the Achaemenid Kings 
as a medium to disseminate royal propaganda. Therefore, we have to be cautious when 
mining them for information. Furthermore, the available Achaemenid epigraphic record as 
well as the relevant archeological discoveries reveal very little on satrapal prerogatives or 
King-satrap relation.  
 The discovery of thousands of clay tablets inscribed in Elamite and Aramaic, better 
known as the Persepolis Fortification and Treasury, has enabled the reconstruction of 
Achaemenid imperial institutions, protocols, and practices, including the office of satrap. 
The knowledge contained by the administrative documents found in Persepolis is 
supplemented by additional private archives discovered in Babylonia, namely in the cities 
of Babylon, Nippur, Sippar, and Borsippa, as well as papyri in Aramaic from Egypt, 
especially the documents discovered at the site of the Jewish garrison of Elephantine. 
While these documents, which record commercial transactions, allocation of resources, and 
various other administrative interactions, reveal that the Persian imperial administration 
exercised a high degree of control over the provincial periphery and as such are 
indispensable for a better understanding of the interaction between the Persian authorities, 
royal and satrapal, with the subject peoples, they offer little information on the extent of 
satrapal authority and independence.  
The biblical sources are also a useful source for Ancient Persia. The books of Ezra, 
Nehemiah, I Esdras, Haggai, and Zechariah cover a considerable period of Persian 
dominance in ancient Yehud. Accordingly, these sources allow us to learn how the Persians 
were perceived by the Jewish community of Yehud and the manner in which the local 
ruling class interacted with the Persian King and his representatives. But while the satraps 
are mentioned on several occasions, the information that can be gleaned on their relations 
with the Persian central authorities is fairly limited. 
                                                 
5 For a succinct survey of the extant sources on the Achaemenid Persian Empire, see: Wiesehöfer 1996, 7–
28. 
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 The Greek sources are by far the primary literary source on the Persian Empire. But 
the image of the Persians in the ancient Greek traditions is predicted on prejudice, lack of 
knowledge, and numerous misconceptions. Even the meaning of the term ‘satrap’ varies 
from one source to the other,6 which underlines the limited knowledge of the ancient 
Greeks when it came to Persian customs, traditions, and institutions. But despite these 
shortcomings, any scholar who takes upon himself to study the history of Achaemenid 
Persia is compelled to base his reconstruction on the testimony of the ancient Greeks. 
Therefore, I follow Briant who suggests that “in reading the classical authors, we must 
distinguish the Greek interpretative coating from the Achaemenid nugget of information.”7  
But when seeking those nuggets of information, one must be cautious. In some 
cases the information provided by the Greek sources is partially corroborated by non-Greek 
accounts. But the similarities should not overshadow the differences, and it is necessary to 
carefully evaluate not only the extent to which the Greek account constitutes a distorted 
version of its Near-Eastern parallel but also the biases and limitations of the Near-Eastern 
source itself. When an episode which is recounted by the Greek sources cannot be 
corroborated by a non-Greek parallel, several factors must be taken into consideration: (1) 
the subject matter of the discussed episode, (2) the temporal proximity of the author to the 
event which he recounts, (3) the manner in which the author could have obtained 
knowledge on Persian matters, and (4) how the particular perspective and biases of the 
author may have distorted his account. For instance, Herodotus may have conversed with 
several witnesses who shared their own knowledge on Persian matters, while Xenophon 
had the opportunity to learn much about Persian institutions and customs when he 
accompanied the pretender Cyrus the Younger. But both authors provide extensive and 
fanciful accounts on the upbringing, rise to power, and reign of Cyrus the Elder. Therefore, 
it seems best to assess the historicity of any given episode on the basis of the 
aforementioned considerations and to adopt a minimalistic interpretation when the account 
seems probable but external validation is lacking. Fortunately, since I focus on the western 
satrapies, the information that can be gleaned from the biased Greek sources on the deeds 
and exploits of the satraps of Lydia and Hellespontine Phrygia is considerably more reliable 
and could be validated, in some case, by non-Greek traditions.  
It should also be noted that the Greek authors show a general tendency to ascribe 
agency to the Great Persian Kings whenever the Persians assumed an active role in the 
events which they recounted. The ancient Greeks, mainly due to their Hellenocentric 
perspective and limited understanding of the power dynamics between the Great King and 
the satraps presupposed that any Persian action was the outcome of a royal directive. 
Therefore, it is imperative, on the one hand, to tread carefully when consulting the Greek 
traditions and to be mindful of the agendas, biases, and intentions of each Greek author as 
well as the historical, political, and cultural contexts in which he composed his account on 
Persian affairs. On the other, when the King is mentioned, one must examine the evidence 
                                                 
6 On the various terms employed by the ancient Greek authors to designate the satraps, see: Schmitt 1976, 
379–83; Weiskopf 1982, 5–12; Petit 1990, 15–20; Tuplin 1987a, 114 with n. 22; Klinkott 2005, 28–37; 
Dusinberre 2013, 34–35. 
7 Briant 2002, 256. For a more cautious view, see: Harrison 2011, 19-37. 
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available to discern whether the King is mentioned since he was actually involved in the 
discussed episode or because the Greek author assumed that he was. 
Summary 
I begin by establishing that the Persian administrative apparatus was a product of a grand 
reform initiated by Darius I. This massive overhaul of the imperial administration, I argue, 
was a response to the chaos which engulfed the Persian Empire in the early years of Darius’ 
reign and was aimed at producing a more uniform and centralized administrative 
infrastructure. The new measures applied by Darius had a profound impact on the power 
dynamics between the Great King and his satraps, since the aforementioned reforms were 
also aimed at ensuring satrapal fidelity.  
In the following chapter I demonstrate that the Persian central authorities invested 
considerable resources and manpower in monitoring the satrapies. The Great Persian King 
kept a close eye on the state of affairs in the provinces through various means, e.g. the 
presence of military and civic officials of royal status in the satrapal courts and key strategic 
locations, regular inspections of the satrapies by the King or one of his trustworthy agents, 
and a network of royal informants. These measures facilitated a flow of reliable 
information from the provinces to the royal court regarding the security and welfare of the 
satrapies and allowed to Persian King to know whether royal directives were followed or 
not. The royal mechanism of provincial supervision enabled early detection of any signs of 
insubordination not only among the subject nations but also among the satraps.  
In chapter three I delineate the extent of satrapal authority, responsibility, and 
resources. The overarching aim of the chapter is to obtain a better understanding of the 
Great King’s expectations of his provincial governors and the categories by which satrapal 
performance was evaluated. By establishing the standard point of reference by which 
satrapal conduct can be compared and assessed, we can explain (1) why a certain satrap 
preferred a specific course of action or policy over another and (2) why the consequences 
of such actions were perceived as failure or success by the Persian royal authorities. In 
essence, I conclude that a satrap who wanted to garner and preserve royal favor had to 
maintain the peace, protect the King’s land, keep the tribute flowing, and pay the soldiers 
and administrators serving in his domain. In order to fulfill these duties, the satraps were 
furnished with considerable financial resources in addition to substantial civic and military 
manpower.  
After the power dynamic between the Great Persian King and his provincial 
governors and the nature of the office of satrap have been analyzed, I begin a diachronic 
scrutiny of Greco-Persian interactions in the fifth century BC. Chapter four centers on two 
opposing processes which produced a particular challenge to Persian rule in the western 
satrapies. On the one hand, the Persian conquest of Ionia in the middle of the sixth century 
BC triggered a gradual increase in the willingness of mainland Greeks to intervene in the 
affairs of Asia Minor on behalf of their Ionian brethren. On the other hand, Xerxes’ failure 
to subjugate European Greece resulted in a dramatic shift from a policy of westward 
expansion to a policy of entrenchment. Consequently, the satraps of western Anatolia were 
expected to fulfill their satrapal duties while grappling with incursions staged by mainland 
Greeks with minimal support from the disinterested Persian central authorities.  
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 The focus of chapter five revolves around the continuation of the Achaemenid royal 
policy of disengagement in respect to the state of affairs in the west during the reign of 
Artaxerxes I (r. 465-423 BC). The limited nature of the Great King’s responses to the 
Athenian involvement in the Egyptian uprising and Cimon’s Cypriot campaign 
demonstrates that Artaxerxes’ interest in western Anatolia continued to be confined to the 
issues of peace and tribute. Moreover, I argue that the conclusion of the peace treaty 
between Athens and Persia in 449 BC (the so-called Peace of Callias), which is envisioned 
as an unofficial agreement, resulted in a modus vivendi in western Anatolia. The truce 
between the Great Persian King and the Athenians endured throughout the reign of 
Artaxerxes I, albeit the attempts of Pissuthnes, the satrap of Lydia, to exploit political 
rivalries in several Ionian city-states to increase his influence, and small scale Athenian 
incursions.  
In the sixth and final chapter I argue that the detachment of the Persian royal 
authorities of to the affairs of western Anatolia in the reigns of Xerxes and Artaxerxes I 
provided the satraps with considerable leeway to formulate and execute policies which 
were either independent or elaborations of Persian royal policies. I maintain that the limited 
scope of Persian royal interventions in Greek affairs serves as an indication that King 
Darius II, just like his predecessors, was unconcerned in regard to the western frontier of 
his empire. Accordingly, I demonstrate that the machinations of the satraps Tissaphernes, 
Pharnabazus and Cyrus the Younger, who inserted themselves into Greek politics by 
promising to provide financial assistance to the Peloponnesians in their war against the 
Athenians, were satrapal initiatives through and through. 
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1. THE REFORMS OF DARIUS I 
 
The Achaemenid Empire came into existence through the conquests of Cyrus the Great. 
The ancient sources, however, name Darius I, son of Hystaspes, as the great reformer who 
consolidated the Empire and devised its administrative apparatus. But this grand reform 
occurred only after Darius eliminated his immediate rival Gaumāta, whether the true 
brother of Cambyses or not, and ruthlessly suppressed numerous rebellions in the core 
regions of the empire.8 In what follows I demonstrate that the massive overhaul of the 
imperial mechanisms was the outcome of Darius’ struggle for supremacy and that it had a 
profound impact on the power dynamics between the Great King and his satraps. More 
importantly, I argue that this pivotal and tumultuous period shaped and molded the nature 
and character of satrapal responsibilities and prerogatives. 
1.1 The Main Sources 
The Account of Herodotus 
The main source for the measures and regulations enacted by Darius is Herodotus. The 
Halicarnassian historian ascribes the establishment of the imperial tributary system and 
satrapal division to Darius, claiming that under Cyrus and Cambyses there had been no 
fixed assessment of tribute.9 He then provides what seems to be a catalogue of satrapies 
coupled with the enumeration of the annual tribute of each unit.10  There are, however, 
many discrepancies between the Herodotean catalogue and the list of tributary peoples in 
Darius’ Bisitun inscription.11 Therefore, the reliability of Herodotus’ Persian sources is at 
least questionable.12 It has been suggested that Herodotus derived his information directly 
from a written text of the Bisitun inscription rather than an oral tradition.13 This postulation 
                                                 
8 The main sources concerned with Darius’ rise to power are the famous Bisitun inscription, in which Darius 
himself recounts the events which led to his accession, and the colorful report of Herodotus (3.61-87). Darius’ 
accession and the Gaumāta/Bardiya/Pseudo-Smerdis affair have received ample scholarly attention, e.g.: 
Bickerman and Tadmor 1978; Wiesehöfer 1978; Balcer 1987; Dandamaev 1989, 83–113; Zawadzki 1994; 
Briant 2002, 107–38, 895–97; Shayegan 2006. For the publications of the various versions of the Bisitun 
inscription, see: Old-Persian: Kent 1950; Schmitt 1991; Elamite: Cameron 1960; Grillot-Susini, 
Herrenschmidt, and Malbran-Labat 1993; Vallat 2013; Babylonian: Von Voigtlander 1978; Aramaic: 
Greenfield and Porten 1982. See also the recent translation of Brosius (Asheri, Lloyd, and Corcella 2007, 
528–37) and the comparative analysis of all versions of the Bisitun inscription of Bae 2001. Regarding the 
spelling of Old-Persian names, I follow Schmitt 1991 and Schmitt 2000. 
9 Hdt. 3.89.1-2.  
10 Hdt. 3.88-97. It is widely held that Herodotus provides a list which represents a fiscal division into tributary 
or taxation districts rather than political units. See: Toynbee 1954, 583–84; Hornblower 1982, 19 n. 108; 
Graf 1985, 86–87; Balcer 1988, 1–2; Balcer 1989, 4; Stolper 1989b, 293; Descat 1989a, 79–80. In contrast, 
Cook (1983, 77–81) assumes that the Herodotean catalogue contains satrapies in a political rather than a 
fiscal sense. 
11 DB §6/1.12-17. For a comparison between Herodotus’ catalogue of satrapies and the Lists of peoples in 
Achaemenid royal inscriptions, see: Asheri, Lloyd, and Corcella 2007, 538–9 with references to previous 
scholarly discussions. 
12 For an analysis of the discrepancies between the Bisitun inscription and the account of Herodotus, see: 
Dandamaev 1976, 135–44; Armayor 1978; Wiesehöfer 1978, 115–22; Balcer 1987; Briant 2002, 99–101, 
895–96. 
13 Dandamaev 1976, 123; Köhnken 1978, 39–42; Balcer 1984, 3–4; Lewis 1985. 
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is at least possible since copies of Achaemenid royal inscriptions were certainly in 
circulation, as we know of two Neo-Babylonian copies of the Bisitun inscription that were 
discovered on stelae in Babylon along with two fragmented Aramaic copies which were 
found in the Jewish military colony of Elephantine in Egypt.14 Nevertheless, due to the 
aforementioned discrepancies it is more likely that Herodotus obtained the information 
recounted in the Bisitun inscription indirectly, relying on oral traditions conveyed by 
informants who had access to official Achaemenid documents.15 A Persian exile named 
Zopyrus might have constituted such a valuable source. This Zopyrus was the son of 
Megabyzus, the Persian general who defeated the Athenians in Egypt,16 and grandson of 
another Zopyrus, who aided Darius in his recapture of Babylon.17 The younger Zopyrus, 
as reported by Herodotus,18 fled to Athens, probably because he had joined his father’s 
rebellion against Artaxerxes I.19 If a high ranking member of the Persian elite such as 
Zopyrus was willing to share his own experience and knowledge with Herodotus, it 
probably enhanced Herodotus’ accuracy in regard to Persian matters,20 assuming that 
Herodotus’ critical capacity drove him to utilize all of the available sources to produce a 
more reliable account of Darius’ rise.21  
The Account of Darius in Bisitun 
In any case, the office of satrap was not an innovation of Darius but preceded his accession. 
Two satraps are mentioned in the Bisitun inscription,22 and the overall impression is that 
these officials were already in office when Darius seized the throne, and had dutifully 
followed Darius’ directives in squashing the many uprisings against Persian rule. We are 
also informed that Hystaspes, the father of Darius, suppressed a revolt in Parthia,23 and it 
is possible that his actions against the rebel forces were probably because of his capacity 
as the satrap of the region.24 This assumption is partially corroborated by Herodotus, who 
states that when Darius joined the conspiracy against the Magi, Hystaspes was the ὕπαρχος 
of Persis, a designation which, in this instance, denotes a satrap.25 Similarly, Nicolaus of 
Damascus, who probably derived his information regarding Eastern affairs from the 
                                                 
14 For the copy of the Bisitun inscription found in the form of a fragmentary stele in Babylon, see: Seidl 1999. 
For the Aramaic copy found in Elephantine, see: Greenfield and Porten 1982. The wide circulation of the 
text of Bisitun inscription is noted by Darius himself (BD §70), who says that the text of the inscription was 
copied onto clay tablets and parchment for the purpose of distribution. Shortly before (BD §60-61) Darius 
encourages his reader to spread the content of the inscription among his subjects.  
15 Balcer 1987, 22; Briant 2002, 896; Tuplin 2005, 236 with n. 47.  
16 Thuc. 1.109.3-4. 
17 Hdt. 3.150-159. 
18 Hdt. 3.160. 
19 Ctes. FGrH 688 F14 §45.  
20 Burn (1984, 109) believes that Zopyrus was Herodotus’ main source for Persian affairs. 
21 For a recent assessment of Herodotus’ account on Persian matters, see: S. R. West 2011; Rollinger 2012. 
22 DB §38/3.13-14 (Dādarshi, the satrap of Bactria); DB §45/3.55-6 (Vivanā, the satrap of Arachosia). 
23 DB §35/2.92-8. 
24 Koch 1993, 33–34; Briant 2002, 926.  
25 Hdt. 3.70.3. For Herodotus’ usage of the term ὕπαρχος to designate satraps, see: Tuplin 1987a, 127–28; 
Tuplin 1987c, 184; Petit 1990, 17; Klinkott 2005, 25–26.  
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account of Ctesias,26 states that Cyrus appointed Darius’ father, whose name was Artadates, 
as the satrap of all the Persians.27 In addition, Herodotus names two additional satraps who 
were appointed by Darius’ predecessors, Oroites, the satrap of Lydia, who was appointed 
by Cyrus,28 and Aryandes, the satrap of Egypt, who was appointed by Cambyses.29 
Therefore, it seems almost certain that the office of satrap was not an innovation of Darius 
but predated his rise to power. 
1.2 The Reformation of the Tributary System 
Darius’ Primacy 
Darius’ primacy in the establishment of the imperial tributary system is asserted by a slew 
of ancient sources.30 As mentioned above, Herodotus claims that Darius was the first to 
exact tribute according to a fixed assessment.31 Polyclitus of Larissa, a historian who 
flourished in the fourth century BC, states that Darius was the first to exact tribute.32 
According to Plato, it was Darius who divided the Achaemenid Empire into seven parts 
and regulated the collection of tribute.33 Similarly, Polyaenus claims that Darius was the 
first Great King to impose taxes on the subject nations and casts Darius as a moderate and 
just monarch who, after the taxes had been collected by the satraps, gave back half of the 
sum to his subjects.34 Lastly, according to the Chronicon Paschale, a work dated to the 
first half of the seventh century AD, Darius was the first to impose tribute.35 
                                                 
26 Cf. Jacoby 1926, 251; Wacholder 1962, 67; Drews 1974, 391; Bigwood 1976, 5 with n. 17; Bigwood 1980, 
196 n. 9; Stronk 2007, 29–31; Stronk 2010, 73–84. 
27 Nic. Dam. FGrH 90 F66 §10. 
28 Hdt. 3.120.1. 
29 Hdt. 4.166.1. 
30 The terminology used in Greek sources for tribute is somewhat nuanced. The term φόρος denotes tribute 
paid by subjects (as a collective) to a ruling state which constitutes an acknowledgment of submission. The 
designation δασμός signifies a compulsory payment, e.g. taxes, which was usually imposed by a certain 
authority upon individuals for public purposes. ταγή should be understood as a stipulated amount which is to 
be delivered. The Old-Persian term for tribute is baji, which is defined by Sancisi-Weerdenburg (1998, 23) 
as the ‘King’s share’, a definition which comprises (1) taxes for the maintenance of Persian officials and 
garrisons in the satrapies and (2) tribute and gifts, which were addressed to the Great King. Waters (2014, 
99) adds that tribute may include additional elements such as troop levies for satrapal or royal armies. 
31 Hdt. 3.89.3. 
32 FGrH 128 F3a [=Strabo 15.3.21]: τὸν δὲ διατάξαντα τοὺς φόρους Δαρεῖον εἶναι. Polyclitus also provides 
an elaborate description of the ways in which the Achaemenids stored the collected revenues.  
33 Pl. Leg. 696c-d: καὶ τὸν τοῦ Κύρου δασμόν, ὃν ὑπέσχετο Πέρσαις, εἰς τὸν νόμον ἐνέδει. Plato adds that 
Cyrus had made a promise to regulate the tributary system but apparently failed to fulfill his promise. Thus, 
I agree with Tuplin (1987a, 140) who states that in spite of the fact that Plato is not as explicit as Herodotus, 
he implies that Darius was responsible for the first tribute assessment in the history of the Persian Empire. 
34 Polyaen. Strat. 7.11.3. A similar tradition is recorded by Plutarch (Mor. 172f), who claims that Darius 
summoned the senior officials in the provinces (τοὺς πρώτους τῶν ἐπαρχιῶν), presumably the satraps, and 
asked them whether his tribute assessment was fair. After they replied that it was a moderate demand, he 
ordered them to reduce it by half.  
35 Chronicon Paschale [=Dindorf 1832, I 272]: Δαρεῖος φόρους ἔταξεν τοῖς ὑπηκόοις πρτῶρος. 
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The Contribution of Darius’ Predecessors: Cyrus the Great 
In spite of the dominant tradition which claims that Darius was the first to impose tribute, 
there is considerable evidence that a tributary system existed under Cyrus.36 In the famous 
Cyrus Cylinder, the founder of the Achaemenid Empire claims that while in Babylon he 
received tribute from the kings of all the subject nations,37 and as such indicates that a 
tributary system was in effect before the reign of Darius.38 But a different interpretation 
can be made in respect to Cyrus’ claim when taking into consideration the Babylonian 
context. For instance, Harmatta points out that the royal protocol employed by Cyrus and 
the titles he claims for himself rely heavily on the traditions and royal ideology of his 
Babylonian predecessors, especially Ashurbanipal.39 Moreover, Kuhrt maintains that the 
physical shape, the literary genre of Mesopotamian building text and the tradition of royal 
inscriptions, all position the Cyrus Cylinder well within Babylonian tradition.40 
Accordingly, Tuplin convincingly argues that Cyrus presented himself as the king of 
Babylon, and that his demand for universal acknowledgment, which was articulated 
through the payment of tribute, followed a preexisting Mesopotamian tradition.41  
Another source which attributes such a system to Cyrus is Xenophon. The Athenian 
historian credits Cyrus not only with the establishment of the tributary system but also with 
the appointment of satraps and garrison commanders, the setting of customary etiquette of 
both royal and satrapal courts, the institution of a royal inspection service and the 
establishment of the famous relay postal service.42 To ward off any doubts that Cyrus was 
the founder of the Achaemenid imperial apparatus, Xenophon declares time and again that 
the numerous institutions and regulations which were established by Cyrus were still in 
effect in his own time.43 In spite of Xenophon’s confidence regarding the role of Cyrus in 
the establishment of the various imperial institutions, his claim is probably far from 
accurate. First of all, Xenophon himself reluctantly acknowledges the possibility that the 
sources which claim that the present regulations go all the way back to Cyrus might be 
                                                 
36 The Achaemenid taxation and tribute system, of course, was not an ex nihilo creation, but rather relied 
heavily on preexisting Near Eastern traditions and practices. On the forms of taxation the Persians inherited 
from their imperial predecessors, see: Zaccagnini 1989a; Zaccagnini 1989b. 
37 Cyrus Cylinder, lines 29-31. For the Babylonian text, See: Schaudig 2001, 550–56; Finkel 2013. English 
translations: Brosius 2000, no. 12; Kuhrt 2007, no. 3.21. 
38 Ehtécham 1946, 92. 
39 Harmatta 1971. 
40 Kuhrt 1983, 88–9. 
41 Tuplin 1987a, 140. 
42 Xen. Cyr. 8.6.1-16. It should be added that Xenophon (Cyr. 8.1.9.) states that Cyrus appointed the tax-
collectors as well. 
43 Reisert (2009, 307–8) complied a catalogue of Achaemenid institutions and practices which Xenophon 
claims to have been innovations of Cyrus the Elder and endured until his own days: the equipment of the 
Persian cavalry (Cyr. 7.1.46); the usage of scythe-bearing chariots (Cyr. 6.1.30, 7.1.47); golden eagle with 
outspread wings as the mark of the Great King (Cyr 7.1.4); the employment of eunuchs as the King’s 
bodyguard (Cyr 7.5.70); the obligatory presence of courtiers at the royal court (8.1.6, 26); a daily sacrifice to 
the gods directed by the Magi (Cyr. 8.1.23-4); the custom in which the King’s favorites sat closest to him at 
the table (Cyr. 8.4.5); the custom in which the King gives a portion of his food to his favorites (Cyr. 8.2.4); 
the royal practice of giving with extreme generosity (Cyr. 5.21, 8.2.7); the procession from the royal palace 
(Cyr. 8.3.34); the appointment of garrison commanders in the satrapies (8.6.4); the establishment of a yearly 
inspection of the satrapies (Cyr. 8.6.11-16).  
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wrong.44 Second, the historicity of Xenophon’s account on the upbringing and exploits of 
Cyrus is doubtful. Since Cyrus is presented as a wise and just king, who was deeply 
concerned with the wellbeing and prosperity of his subjects, several scholars have argued 
that Xenophon fashioned a Greek model of ideal kingship, even at the expense historical 
accuracy.45 Therefore, Xenophon was probably more inclined to cast Cyrus as the founder 
of the Empire and author of its institutional regulations, whether it was true or not.46  
Further evidence can be found in Arrian’s Indica. The Nicomedian historian reports 
that the Indians paid tribute to Cyrus.47 This seems to be an explicit attestation that tribute 
was exacted by Cyrus. Arrian’s account, however, is dubious since the Achaemenid 
conquest of the Indus valley took place during the reign of Darius.48 
The Contribution of Darius’ Predecessors: Cambyses and Bardiya 
In the case of Darius’ immediate predecessors, Herodotus seems to contradict himself when 
he notes that Cambyses imposed tribute on the Libyans and Cyreneans and even demanded 
gifts,49 and that the usurper Bardiya, upon his accession, proclaimed that all of the subject 
nations were exempt from tribute and military service for a period of three years.50 These 
attestations seem to establish once again that an Achaemenid tributary system existed 
before the rise of Darius.51 
Solving the Discrepancy: Revision rather than Creation 
How could one resolve the discrepancy in the ancient sources regarding the identity of the 
founder of the Achaemenid tribute system? Herodotus’ lack of consistency might reflect 
two separate traditions that found their way into his account,52 and it is possible that later 
sources ascribed the imposition of tribute to Darius simply because they followed the more 
explicit tradition in Herodotus’ account.53 Be that as it may, the apparent discrepancy can 
be resolved by envisioning the emergence of a tributary system as the result of a long 
                                                 
44 Xen. Cyr. 8.6.16: κατενοήσαμεν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ὅτι Κύρου κατάρξαντος, ὥς φασι, καὶ νῦν ἔτι διαμένει. 
45 On the aspect of ideal kingship in the Cyropaedia, see: Knauth 1975, 8–31; Due 1989, 147–84; Gera 1993, 
280–300; Mueller-Goldingen 1995, 195–200; Nadon 2001, 26–27, 131–32; Gruen 2011, 53–54; Tuplin 2013, 
68–69. 
46 Tuplin 1987a, 140; Petit 1990, 107–8. Conversely, Briant (2002, 62–63) suggests that the Achaemenid 
institutions described by Xenophon may have been a timeless outline of the imperial apparatus and as such 
could be attributed to the actions of Cyrus the Elder. 
47 Arr. Ind. 1.3: καὶ φόρους ἀπέφερον Κύρῳ τῷ Καμβύσεω ἐκ τῆς γῆς σφῶν, οὓς ἔταξε Κῦρος. 
48 Tuplin 1987a, 140. The Indians (Sind) are absent from the catalogue of nations in the Bisitun inscription 
(DB §6/1.12-17), but they begin to appear regularly in later inscriptions (DPe §2/17-18, DSe §24, DMa §10, 
and DNa §25). Darius’ Indian campaign is mentioned by Herodotus (4.44), and Briant (2002, 140) suggests 
518 BC as the year in which the Indus Valley was subjugated by the Achaemenids, though he notes that it is 
unknown whether Darius himself led the expedition. 
49 Hdt. 3.13.3, 4.165. 
50 Hdt. 3.37.3. 
51 Ehtécham 1946, 92–93. 
52 Tuplin 1987a, 141. 
53 For instance, Petit (1990, 104) argues that this is exactly the case in regards to the reports of Polyaenus and 
the Chronicon Paschale. This argument is somewhat problematic since the later sources contain content 
which is absent from Herodotus’ account. It is possible that this additional information is the product of 
embellishment or rationalization, but it remains equally possible that there were other independent and now 
lost sources who credited Darius with the consolidation of the imperial mechanism. 
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process rather that a creation ex-nihilo. Cyrus, it should be noted, forged a new political 
entity in a relatively short time span. His new domain constituted an amalgam of Near-
Eastern kingdoms (e.g. Media, Babylon) in addition to numerous other regions, each with 
its own preexisting domestic traditions, inter alia the obligation of royal tribute. The 
subject nations probably acknowledged the supremacy of the Persian Great King by paying 
tribute, but they may have done so according to the various local customs.54 Consequently, 
some have argued that up until the reign of Darius, the Achaemenids received unregulated 
gifts rather than tribute in the form of precious metals,55 while others have claimed that the 
tribute exacted by the Persians consisted of both gifts and taxes.56 
If that was the case, it is reasonable that Darius was remembered as the creator of 
the tributary system because it underwent large scale reforms during his reign. Cook 
suggests that there must have been “some fiscal innovation” in the reign of Darius, though 
he provides no explanation regarding the nature of such innovation.57 Tuplin argues that 
Darius’ main contribution was in asserting uniformity between the various districts of the 
empire by setting a fixed assessment of tribute.58  This interpretation is shared by Briant, 
who adds that this action led Herodotus to claim that Darius was the first to establish a 
tributary system.59 Similarly, Sancisi-Weerdenburg claims that Darius brought into effect 
a shift from “an economic system as 'embedded' in personal relations under Cyrus and 
Cambyses” to “a more 'economic' form.”60 In sum, it seems likely that later sources 
inaccurately acknowledged Darius as the founder of the tributary system rather than the 
first Achaemenid King who regulated the tribute and imposed uniformity. 
The notion that Darius’ reign was marked for its revision of the tributary system is 
corroborated by a colorful comment made by Herodotus. On the basis of his anonymous 
Persian sources, Herodotus claims that while Cyrus received the epitaph ‘father’ (πατήρ) 
and Cambyses was branded as ‘despot’ (δεσπότης), Darius was known as the ‘shopkeeper’ 
(κάπηλος).61 How can we explain the origin of Darius’ reputation? Burn suggest that 
Darius’ awareness to economic matters was detrimental to his reputation among the 
Persians.62 Similarly, Tuplin claims that the term suggests an unfavorable view of Darius, 
since it equates the reciprocal relationship between a king and his subjects to a process in 
which the king sells something to his clients, possibly protection, in exchange for a fixed 
price.63 Conversely, Olmstead maintains that this moniker indicates that the Greeks 
perceived Darius as an excellent financier.64 A more neutral interpretation is offered by 
Wallinga, who maintains that the Greeks deemed the negotiations between Darius and the 
                                                 
54 Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1980, 173; Wiesehöfer 1987, 120; Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1989a, 130. 
55 Junge 1941, 5; Tuplin 1987a, 140. 
56 Murray 1966, 150; Dandamaev 1976, 135; Wallinga 1984, 411. 
57 Cook 1985, 271. 
58 Tuplin 1987a, 140. 
59 Briant 2002, 60. 
60 Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1989a, 130–3 with n. 5. 
61 Hdt. 3.89.3: λέγουσι Πέρσαι ὡς Δαρεῖος μὲν ἦν κάπηλος, Καμβύσης δὲ δεσπότης, Κῦρος δὲ πατήρ, ὃ μὲν 
ὅτι ἐκαπήλευε πάντα τὰ πρήγματα, ὁ δὲ ὅτι χαλεπός τε ἦν καὶ ὀλίγωρος, ὁ δὲ ὅτι ἤπιός τε καὶ ἀγαθά σφι 
πάντα ἐμηχανήσατο. 
62 Burn 1984, 108. 
63 Tuplin 1997, 374–82. 
64 Olmstead 1948, 185. 
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subject peoples regarding the final assessment of tribute equal to the commercial 
interaction between a trader and a client.65 In a similar fashion, Descat postulates that 
Darius was envisioned as a shopkeeper because he gave value to tribute, i.e. he monetized 
the tributary system.66 In any case, Tuplin connects Darius’ reputation to his reforms by 
stating that “the description of the king as a kapêlos is probably sufficiently striking and 
unexpected to guarantee that it is a response to a real perception of change.”67 Moreover, 
since this tradition groups Cyrus, Cambyses and Darius while differentiating their reigns 
by particular attributes, it seems plausible, as Briant concludes, that though the 
establishment of the Achaemenid administrative apparatus is ascribed to Darius, one 
should recognized that he was building on the efforts of Cyrus and Cambyses, who created 
a system which combined the various local traditions of the subject nations.68 
The Causes for Darius’ Reform of the tributary system 
One wonders why such a reform was needed. Dandamaev argues that prior to Darius’ 
reforms taxes were exacted, whether in kind or coin, without taking into consideration the 
economic potential and output of the fiscal districts. A disproportional burden of taxes 
inevitably resulted in discontent among the subject nations. Dandamaev even posits that 
the aforementioned exemption from tribute and military service granted by the usurper 
Bardiya was not a pure act of demagoguery. While there is no doubt that the rival of Darius 
sought ways to garner support by generous benefactions, the substantial tax relief could 
have been motivated by a desire to alleviate tax-related dissent among the subject 
peoples.69 Similarly, Wallinga suggests that the above mentioned flaw in the tributary 
system was identified by Cambyses, who sought, apparently without success, to monetize 
the tributary system by attaching cash value to gifts presented as tribute.70 
Therefore, the available evidence render it plausible that a tributary system existed 
before Darius, a system that was inefficient. The actions of Cambyses and Gaumāta to 
enact reforms probably encountered a certain degree of resistance and were probably 
incomplete when Darius rose to power. It seems that, as Tuplin states, it was up to Darius 
to find a more permanent solution to ensure economic and political stability.71 
                                                 
65 Wallinga 1984, 411. 
66 Descat 1989a, 80. In a later study Descat (1994) adds that Darius’ reputation as a retailer signifies that he 
was perceived as someone who extracted profit from an operation of exchange. 
67 Tuplin 2011a, 53. 
68 Briant 2002, 62. 
69 Dandamaev 1976, 134–35. This act was not a novelty since, as Wiesehöfer (1989, 184) points out, Gaumāta 
could have followed a preexisting royal custom in which the new king demonstrated his benevolence by 
waiving all debts owed to his predecessor. 
70 Wallinga 1984, 409–10. The monetization of the tributary system entailed a particular challenge. As 
outlined by Sancisi-Weerdenburg (1989a, 131–41), there are two aspects of gifts given as tribute. The first is 
the obligatory character, which is common with tribute paid in precious metals and possibly with gift-giving, 
while the other is the social value attached to the gift itself, which is absent when taxes are paid in cash. In 
other words, the monetization of the tribute system meant that the social value of the tribute was lost. The 
strongest attestation for gifts being given to the Great King as tribute are the reliefs in Persepolis, cf.: Walser 
1966, 20–26; Root 1979, 282–84; Cahill 1985. For further reading, see: Briant 2002, 191–94, 932; J. L. 
Wright and Hollman 2014. 
71 Wiesehöfer 1989, 184. 
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When did Darius’ Reform Took Place? 
Another important aspect of Darius’ reforms is the date in which the aforementioned 
regulations were brought into effect. Scholar have offered several suggestions in regard to 
the date in which the reforms began has been made, e.g. 520 BC,72 519 BC,73 and 518/17 
BC.74 But despite the disagreement regarding the exact date in which the reforms were 
initiated,75 it is widely acknowledged that their implementation took several years.76 This 
interpretation has been elaborated by Balcer who argues that Darius put into motion an 
extensive reorganization program which began in 519 BC and went through a process of 
development and change. He adds that the unique circumstances in each regions resulted 
in a different pace in which the new regulations were applied. For instance, Balcer argues 
that in Egypt the application of Darius’ reforms was completed in 503 BC and only three 
years later in Babylon, while the organization of the satrapy of Lydia was completed only 
in 493 BC, in the aftermath of the Ionian revolt.77 Though it is difficult to assess when 
Darius’ reforms began and the dates when they were finalized in the numerous satrapies, 
it seems reasonable to assume that it was indeed a long process. 
Darius as the First and Only Reformer 
Darius is not only the first but also the last Achaemenid King who is known for executing 
a large scale overhaul of the imperial apparatus.78 Accordingly, it is possible that the 
Achaemenid administrative apparatus, both the tributary and satrapal system, which was 
set up or at least reorganized by Darius endured until the end of fifth century BC and 
perhaps even until the end of the Achaemenid Empire.79 Even though we have ample 
evidence that the satrapal territorial division underwent continuous changes and that 
taxation systems in certain regions were reformed,80 these modifications occurred on a 
local scale, were probably the outcome of domestic circumstances, and were by no means 
a part of a grand reform on the imperial level.81 The notion that Darius’ imperial machinery 
long endured is accepted by Petit, who points out that though later sources might evoke 
                                                 
72 Petit 1984, 35–46; Petit 1987; Petit 1990, 108–9. 
73 Dandamaev 2005, 271. 
74 Poebel 1939, 121–31; Junge 1941, 5 n. 3.  
75 Shahbazi (1982, 233 with n. 218) argues Darius had an opportunity to reorganize the empire only after the 
Persian conquest of the Indus valley but prior to his Scythian expedition. The problem is that the exact date 
of both campaigns is uncertain. As noted above, Briant (2002, 140) suggests 518 BC as the date of Darius’ 
Indian campaign, while the date of the Scythian campaign is debated, cf. Balcer 1972; Cameron 1975; 
Georges 1995; Tuplin 2010. 
76 E.g. Bengston 1937, 124; Bengston 1965, 10; Dandamaev 1984b, 41; Petit 1984, 35–46; Descat 1985, 105; 
Petit 1987; Descat 1989a, 78–79; Petit 1990, 108–9. 
77 Balcer 1984, 143; Balcer 1987, 165–66. 
78 Although Artaxerxes I enacted several significant changes following his coronation, i.e. the appointment 
of new provincial governors (Diod. 11.71.1-2; Joseph. AJ. 11.6.1), and the introduction of new court 
protocols (Plut. Them. 29.4; Plut. Mor. 173d-3, 565a, these actions, as noted by Briant (2002, 572), reflect 
the desire of a new monarch who sought to confirm his position and nothing more.  
79 Dandamaev 1984b, 41. 
80 For instance, the taxation system in Babylonia was reformed in the 480s BC. See: Jursa and Waerzeggers 
2009. 
81 Kuhrt 2014, 5. For instance, Xerxes had the former Neo-Babylonian kingdom divided into two separate 
entities, the satrapy of Hellespontine Phrygia emerged as an independent administrative unit in the 470s BC, 
while Lycia and Caria were reorganized as satrapies in the fourth century BC. 
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contemporary conditions when describing the institutions of the Persian Empire, some 
traits reflect earlier times.82 Consequently, the Achaemenid tributary system and probably 
the imperial administrative apparatus as a whole, after they had been refashioned and 
reformed by Darius, saw only minor adjustments throughout the existence of the 
Achaemenid Empire. 
Conclusion 
Despite the scarcity of evidence several points can be made in regard to the origins of the 
administrative apparatus of the Persian Achaemenid Empire. First, a large scale reform was 
initiated by Darius after he cemented his position as the new Great King and reasserted 
order throughout the Empire. Second, Darius’ measures probably constituted a 
reorganization on a grand-scale, whose implementation took a decade and perhaps even 
more before it was finalized. Third, the application of the new regulations was gradual and 
probably dependent on the various local traditions and customs, which offered different 
degrees of resistance to the changes enacted by the Persian authorities. Fourth, a tributary 
system of some capacity operated under Cyrus and Cambyses, but Darius introduced, or at 
the very least, regulated the collection of tribute. Fifth, due to his effort to consolidate his 
kingdom Darius was remembered as the reformer and consolidator of the Persian Empire. 
This is definitely the case regarding the Greek traditions, and there is no reason to think 
that it did not correspond with the Persian perspective. 
1.3 Centralization of Power 
The Unknown aspects of Darius’ Reform 
As we have seen, the lack of uniformity and regulation rendered the Achaemenid tributary 
system before the reign of Darius defective. These deficiencies, however, were resolved 
by Darius who became known as the Great King to reorganize and consolidate the 
institutions of the Achaemenid Empire. But are we to believe that such a grand operation 
focused solely on the economic sustainability of the Achaemenid Empire? The 
contemporary ancient sources make no explicit remark regarding further regulations and 
measures employed by Darius. For instance, the Bisitun inscription and other royal 
inscriptions commissioned by Darius do not mention Darius’ reforms. Nevertheless, a hint 
can be found in Herodotus’ account, when the Greek historian admits that he glossed over 
other issues which were pertinent to the reorganization of the Achaemenid Empire.83 
Herodotus, so it seems, chose to focus on the satrapal division and the tributary system 
while omitting additional aspects of Darius’ grand enterprise. Presumably, Darius 
identified other defects and shortcomings in the imperial institutions and made the 
necessary adjustments to rectify them. Despite the limitations of the ancient sources, these 
supplementary measures can be reconstructed by taking into consideration the challenges 
Darius faced during and after his struggle for supremacy. There is little doubt that the 
numerous threats and challenges to Darius’ rule posed by powerful men, either local 
dynasts or Persian satraps, made it apparent that a centralization of power was crucial not 
only for the survival of Darius’ regime but also for the endurance of the Empire as a whole. 
                                                 
82 Petit 1990, 108. 
83 Hdt. 3.89.3: παραπλήσια ταύτῃ ἄλλα. 
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When Darius was confronted with the threat of political fragmentation, he must have 
realized that it was imperative to design a mechanism which would enforce obedience and 
loyalty to the Great King.   
1.4 The Dangers to the Stability of the Empire I: Separatist Factions 
The Rebel Kings 
In spite of eliminating his main rival Gaumāta fairly quickly, Darius’ position as the new 
Great King was far from secure. The succession war encouraged separatist sentiments 
among the conquered nations, which resulted in multiple and at times simultaneous 
rebellions led by those who proclaimed to be the descendants of the numerous dynasts and 
kings deposed by Cyrus and Cambyses.84 Darius, with the assistance of his generals and 
satraps, managed to suppress revolts in Persia (twice), Elam (thrice) Babylon (twice), 
Media, Armenia, Sagartia, Parthia, Hyrcania, Margiana, and Arachosia.85 All in all, Darius 
boasts that he defeated no less than nine kings who dared to stand against him.86 These 
leading men must have had considerable influence within their respective domestic 
political spheres, which allowed them to rally substantial support against Persian rule. It is 
not unreasonable to assume that these local dynasts might have held some sort of position 
within the imperial apparatus, perhaps as a reward for their willingness to cooperate with 
the previous regimes of Cyrus and Cambyses. If that was that case, Darius must have 
realized that conferring great power and influence upon non-Persians was too dangerous, 
especially at times when the Persian central authorities were weak and vulnerable.  
The Jewish Revolt against Darius  
The dangers of relying on local dignitaries is recounted an expanded upon in the biblical 
sources. By the power of a royal decree, issued by Darius no later than 520 BC, 87 a group 
of Jewish exiles travelled to Achaemenid Yehud.88 The leaders of this expedition were 
Zerubbabel son of Shealtiel and Joshua son of Yehozadak, the former was appointed as the 
                                                 
84 Stolper 1985, 6. 
85 For the rebellions crushed by Darius and recounted  in the Bisitun inscription: Persia (DB §8-14 [Gaumāta], 
§40-43); Elam (DB §16-17, §22-23; §71-72); Babylon (DB §18-20, §49-50); Media (DB §24-25, §31-32); 
Armenia (DB §26-30); Sagartia (DB §33); Parthia and Hyrcania (DB §35-6); Margiana (DB §38); Arachosia 
(DB §45-47). It should be noted that additional nations are mentioned in the inscription (DB §21) as 
rebellious, namely Assyria, Sattagydia, Scythia and Egypt. No information is provided regarding the leaders 
of these revolts or how they were suppressed. It is possible that these revolts were squashed only after the 
first regnal year of Darius, which is the chronological framework for the account given in the Bisitun 
inscription.  
86 DB §52: Gaumāta/Smerdis (Persia), Âçina (Elam), Nidintu-Bēl/Nebuchadnezzar III (Babylon), Martiya 
(Elam), Phraortes/Khshathrita (Media), Tritantaechmes (Sagartia), Frāda (Margiana), Vahyazdāta/Smerdis 
(Persia), Arakha/Nebuchadnezzar IV (Babylon).  
87 An alternative date, namely 538 BC, has been suggested, but it contradicts the evidence from I Esdras 4, 
which states that the permission was granted by Darius and not by Cyrus. For a discussion on the date of 
Zerubbabel’s expedition, see: W. H. Rose 2000, 33–4 with n. 67. 
88 Olmstead (1931, 560–61) argues that the impetus for the restoration of the Jewish exiles was probably 
Darius’ desire to win the support of the Jewish communities throughout the empire, some of which were 
under the rule of the rebel kings. 
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civic governor, i.e. paḥat (תַּח ַּפ), while Joshua was to preside as the High-Priest.89 Although 
the seniority of Zerubbabel’s office remains ambiguous, it is certain that he was a Persian 
appointee.90 Even more revealing is the fact that the identity of the High Priest was decided, 
or at least sanctioned, by the Persian authorities.  
The Jewish community in Jerusalem was reinvigorated by the new arrivals, and 
soon after the building of the temple in Jerusalem commenced. The construction works, 
however, were disrupted by Tatnai, the Persian governor of the satrapy Beyond-the-River 
(הָרֲהַּנ רַּבֲע תַּח ַּפ). Tatnai, we are told, arrived with a cavalry squadron and a multitude of 
infantry and tried to hinder the builders.91 The satrap demanded to know who sanctioned 
the construction of the temple and who the overseers of the project were.92 Since he was 
unable to bring the works to a complete stop, Tatnai sent a letter to Darius to inform him 
about the situation in Yehud. In response, the Jews dispatched an embassy of their own to 
the royal court. When the Jewish ambassadors were given audience with Darius, they 
claimed that they had the right to build the temple, stating that it was commanded by God, 
and that a Jewish temple stood in that location many years before, having been built by the 
great king of Israel, i.e. Solomon, though it was later destroyed by the Babylonians. The 
Jewish representatives added that Cyrus himself gave his permission to the construction of 
a new temple via a royal decree, and even promised to restore the golden vessels that were 
robbed by the Babylonians. Darius, so it seems, was more impressed by the mention of 
Cyrus’ name than the directive of the Jewish god or the history of the Jewish people. He 
ordered his secretaries to locate Cyrus’ decree, and a copy was found in Ecbatana (אָתְמְחאַ). 
It corroborated the Jewish claim and Darius instructed his subordinates to facilitate a 
speedy completion of the temple.93 
In spite of the fact that the episode ends with Darius sanctioning the construction 
of the temple, it had been suggested that the intervention of the Persian authorities was due 
to a revolt led by Zerubbabel. It is quite possible that the Jewish community in Yehud, like 
many other subject nations throughout the empire, recognized the apparent weakness of 
the Persian central authorities and saw an opportunity to liberate itself from Persian rule. 
Zerubbabel, a descendant of King David according to the biblical sources, seems like the 
ideal candidate to exploit the chaotic circumstance surrounding the rise of Darius by 
proclaiming himself as the legitimate king of Jerusalem.94  
This hypothesis is predicated on three lines of argumentation. First, it has been 
argued that the prophecies of Haggai (2.22-3) and Zechariah (4.9), which advocate the 
                                                 
89 Zerubbabel as the civil governor: Hag. 1:1, 14, 2:2, 21. Joshua as the High Priest: Hag. 1:1, 2, 12, 14. On 
the expedition led by Zerubbabel and Joshua to Jerusalem: Ezra 2:1, 3:8; Neh. 7:7; I Esdras 4. 
90 M. Smith 1971, 109. The term paḥat in the biblical sources is derived from the Assyrian paḫatu, which 
denotes ‘province’. In the biblical sources it usually designates a governor though the same term is employed 
to denote both satraps and their viceroys. On the terminology of Achaemenid administrative personnel in the 
biblical sources, see: Schmitt 1976, 374–75; Dandamaev and Lukonin 1989, 103; Petit 1990, 16–17. 
91 Ezra 5:5; I Esdras 2:30.  
92 Ezra 5:1-5.  
93 Ezra 5:6-6:13.  
94 Balcer 1984, 138 with notes 87-8; and Balcer 1987, 149 with references to earlier literature. See also: Fried 
2000; Fried 2004; Fitzpatrick-McKinley 2015. On the Davidic, hence royal, origin of Zerubbabel, see: Ezra 
3:2, 5:2; Neh. 12:1; Hag. 1:1, 12, 14, 2:2, 23; Matt. 1:12; Luke 3:27. See also: W. H. Rose 2000, 33 n. 65; 
Fulton 2011, 231–2 with n. 17. 
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overthrow of kingdoms, should be interpreted either as a call for a revolt against the 
Persians or as a universal call for political independence. As such, it does not reflect the 
contemporary political background in Yehud.95 Since Haggai and Zechariah were zealous 
supporters of the rebuilding of the temple in Jerusalem,96 the intervention of the Persian 
authorities can be perceived as a response to subversive activities which were somehow 
associated with the restoration of the religious and political center of the Jewish community 
in Yehud. 
Second, it is quite possible that the disorder that surrounded the construction works 
in Jerusalem was due to seditious activity. We should not forget that despite being 
accompanied by a considerable force, Tatnai was unable to bring the construction works 
into a halt. Moreover, in his letter to Darius, Tatnai states that the project was formidable 
and that the construction was proceeding quickly. This description seems to reflect a sense 
of urgency and perhaps even anxiety due to the state of affairs in Jerusalem.97 In addition, 
the Jewish ambassadors who were sent to Darius claimed that the temple was once built by 
a king, in an era when Yehud was politically independent. This statement could be another 
implicit indication of a Jewish attempt to overthrow Persian rule. Lastly, despite the 
amicable response of the Persian central authorities, the temple was completed only in the 
sixth regnal year of Darius, i.e. 515 BC. Such a delay may indicate that the project suffered 
a considerable set back before it was finalized.98 
Third, the involvement of Zerubbabel in anti-Persian activities can explain his 
sudden disappearance of from the ancient sources. It has been suggested that Zerubbabel 
vanished because he died of natural causes,99 or that he was assassinated by a priestly party 
led by the aforementioned Joshua.100 But it seems likelier that he was eliminated by the 
Persians or at least removed from office due after the Persian authorities heard rumors 
about his role in the political unrest in Yehud.101  
The amicable resolution of the tension in Yehud makes it difficult to assert with 
certainty if an actual rebellion transpired in Yehud, its extent, and the manner in which it 
was suppressed.102 If a revolt actually occurred, it seems that Darius preferred leniency, 
either because he wanted to avoid being perceived as opposing the policies of Cyrus, the 
founder of the Achaemenid Empire,103 or since he aimed at ensuring the future support and 
obedience of the Jews.104 When taking into consideration the available evidence and the 
contemporary political context, there are two plausible reconstructions. First, the 
succession struggle had an impact on the state of affairs in Yehud, and rumors of subversive 
                                                 
95 Ackroyd 1958, 13–17; Dandamaev 1989, 127–28; O’Kennedy 2014. For Haggai and  Zechariah as political 
agitators: Olmstead 1931, 560–69; Olmstead 1938, 409–12; Morgenstern 1949, 185–86; Waterman 1954, 
73. 
96 Ezra 5:2. 
97 Ezra 5:8. 
98 Ezra 6:15. 
99 Beyse 1972, 49. 
100 Garbini 1994, 182.  
101 Olmstead 1948, 142; Waterman 1954, 73, 78. 
102 Japhet 1982, 26–27; W. H. Rose 2000, 34–35; O’Kennedy 2014, 528. 
103 Olmstead 1931, 570. 
104 Morgenstern 1938, 184–86. 
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activities reached the satrapal court of Tatnai. Since the empire was engulfed with 
rebellions, Tatnai acted swiftly to suppress a revolt which was still in an early stages. 
Second, the disturbances in the construction of the temple might have been caused by an 
administrative miscommunication between Tatnai and his subordinates. In the chaos that 
followed Darius’ ascension, such misunderstanding seems understandable, as does the 
relatively harsh reaction of the satrap. In any case, the confusion was easily resolved by 
royal intervention.  
In sum, the circumstances in Yehud seems similar to those in the regions which 
revolted against Persian rule: the perceived weakness of the Persian authorities, the 
presence of a local dignitary with royal blood, and a mild response of the Persian central 
authorities to purported disobedience. All of these may have encouraged separatist 
sentiments. But while the rebellions in the core regions are poorly documented, the 
necessity of quelling multiple revolts must have taught Darius that if his reign was to 
endure, his hold on the provinces must be tighter. 
1.5 The Dangers to the Stability of the Empire II: Powerful Satraps 
Oroites, Satrap of Lydia 
A real and immediate threat to Darius’ position as the new Great King was posed by 
ambitious and powerful satraps who oversaw vast resources and exercised considerable 
influence under Cyrus and Cambyses. The exploits and grim end of Oroites, the satrap of 
Lydia who was reluctant to acknowledge Darius’ supremacy, demonstrate the dangers of 
unchecked satrapal power.105  
Insubordination I: Oroites’ Refusal to assist Darius  
According to Herodotus, Oroites’ was reluctant to side with Darius in his war against the 
Magi. When a royal envoy came to Sardis, carrying a message from Darius, Oroites 
responded positively in public, but later on the satrap had the ambassador assassinated and 
erased all traces of his treacherous deed.106 Herodotus’ account is not detailed and many 
questions remain unanswered. For instance, Herodotus is silent about the content of Darius’ 
message. Tuplin points out that just before we are informed about the arrival of Darius’ 
ambassador at Sardis, Herodotus mentions the war between Darius and the Magi. He 
maintains, therefore, that at this point the Magi were still in control and that Darius sought 
Oroites’ assistance against them.107 Similarly, Immerwahr postulates that Darius asked 
Oroites to come to Susa to participate in the conspiracy against the Magi.108 Others assume 
that the struggle against the Magi and their supporters was already public, and that Darius 
sought Oroites’ military support against rebel forces in Media and Armenia,109 or possibly 
                                                 
105 Hdt. 3.120.1. Herodotus employs the term Σαρδίων ὕπαρχος, a term which Herodotus uses to designate 
satraps. Petit (1990, 41, 83) suggests that Oroites was the first satrap of Lydia, appointed in c. 545 BC after 
the conquest of Asia Minor was carried out by Mazares (Hdt. 1.156-57, 160-61) and finalized by Harpagus 
(Hdt. 1.162, 164, 168-71, 174-76). Conversely, Briant (2002, 351) posits that Oroites began his term in office 
in 525 BC, i.e. under Cambyses. 
106 Hdt. 3.126.1. 
107 Tuplin 1997, 393. 
108 Immerwahr 1966, 33 n. 57. 
109 Burn 1985, 298. 
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in eastern Anatolia.110 Conversely, Burn and Petit speculate that Oroites, thinking that 
Darius was still too weak to enforce his will, withheld taxes, and that Darius’ envoy came 
to urge Oroites to renew the flow of tribute.111 Another suggestion was made by Briant, 
who claims that Oroites was summoned to the royal court, an invitation which was meant 
to test Oroites’ loyalty.112 All of the above mentioned explanations have one thing in 
common, namely that Darius wished to obtain Oroites’ acknowledgment of his position as 
the new Great King and support.113 When considering that Oroites exhibited deference in 
public while ordering the assassination of the royal ambassador in secret, it seems evident 
that Oroites was determined to oppose Darius, but, at least at this point, wished to refrain 
from publicly defying him.  
One wonders, then, why Oroites was unwilling to acknowledge Darius as his 
superior. As mentioned above, the succession struggle have shaken the control of the 
Persian central authorities in the Persian heartland and probably even more so in frontier 
satrapies such as Lydia. Therefore, it is possible that when Darius’ envoy arrived, Oroites 
had already made up his mind to secede and establish his own principality.114 Alternatively, 
under the assumption that the whole Gaumāta affair is a product of Darius’ propaganda, 
Vargyas argues that Oroites sided with Gaumāta, who was Cyrus’ son Bardiya and the 
legitimate Great King against the usurper Darius.115 Either way, Oroites became a threat 
from Darius’ viewpoint. 
Insubordination II: Oroites and Mitrobates 
Another possible act of defiance on Oroites’ part was the elimination of Mitrobates, the 
high-ranking Persian official who governed Daskyleion. It is not clear whether it happened 
before or after Oroites had Darius’ envoy murdered, since Herodotus simply notes that 
Oroites took advantage of the tumult caused by the succession struggle and had Mitrobates 
and his son Cranaspes assassinated.116 The problem with Herodotus’ account is that it 
contains an anachronistic detail, namely the mention of the satrapy of Hellespontine 
Phrygia, which did not exist as a separate administrative entity until the 470s BC.117 How 
could Mitrobates govern a satrapy that did not exist in the last quarter of the sixth century 
                                                 
110 Briant 2002, 122. 
111 Burn 1985, 298; Petit 1990, 41 n. 118. 
112 Briant 2002, 65. He relies on Ctesias (FGrH 688 F13 §11), who reports how a courtier advised Cambyses 
to summon his brother Bardiya (Tanyoxarces in Ctesias’ account) to the court as a test of his fidelity, stressing 
that a refusal would had been deemed as a clear indication that the Great King was being challenged by his 
brother.  
113 Balcer 1987, 148. 
114 Junge 1944, 72; Boffo 1979, 104; Burn 1984, 106–7; Balcer 1987, 146; Young 1988, 65; Petit 1990, 40, 
75–77; Abramenko 1995, 39–40; Briant 2002, 65. 
115 Vargyas 2000, 158. 
116 Hdt. 3.126.2. 
117 Petit (1990, 181–86) argues in favor of 476 BC. Descat (1989a, 79–80) suggests that Hellespontine 
Phrygia had been reorganized as a separate satrapy with its capital at Daskyleion by 465 BC. Bakir (1995, 
274–77), the director of the excavation in Daskyleion, argues that from the beginning of the fifth century to 
the middle of the fourth century BC, a period which she calls ‘middle Achaemenid phase’ 
(Mittelachämenidische), the site climaxed in terms prosperity and wealth. It is evident that her findings 
correspond with the opinion that Daskyleion became a satrapal seat at the beginning of the fifth century BC 
at the earliest. 
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BC? This anachronism led Petit to argue that Mitrobates was invented by Herodotus, but 
in a more recent study he accepts that historicity of Mitrobates while maintaining that he 
was not a satrap but a viceroy of Oroites.118 Vargyas adds that even if an anachronistic term 
was used to designate the position of Mitrobates, it does not necessarily mean that he was 
a figment of Herodotus’ imagination.119 Therefore, it seems prudent to follow Briant’s 
injunction, namely that we should accept the possibility that extensive satrapies were 
divided into smaller administrative units, even if there is no undisputed evidence for such 
subdivision.120 In sum, Mitrobates was probably the chief official of an administrative sub-
unit, whose center was in Daskyleion and a subordinate of Oroites.  
But what drove Oroites to eliminate his underling? It has been suggested that the 
assassination of Mitrobates facilitated the absorption of his domain into that of Oroites.121 
But such a suggestion fails to realize that Mitrobates’ domain was already a part of Oroites’ 
satrapy. An alternative explanation is offered by Vargyas, who claims that while Oroites 
sided with Gaumāta, Mitrobates joined forces with Darius, for which he was murdered.122 
Alternatively, if Oroites was aiming at secession, Mitrobates might have been a victim of 
his loyalty to the Great King since the rogue satrap must have sought ways strengthening 
his hold over his satrapy by eliminating Persian officials who refused to profess their 
loyalty. In any case, the seemingly unsanctioned murder of a fellow Persian nobleman and 
his son must have been perceived as an act of defiance by Darius. 
Insubordination III: Oroites and Polycrates  
The episode in which Oroites eliminates the Samian tyrant Polycrates reveals another 
possible aspect of Oroites’ pattern of insubordination. In essence, Herodotus reports that 
the satrap of Lydia lured Polycrates to Magnesia under false pretenses, where the latter was 
seized, tortured, and executed.123 Herodotus proposes two possible motives for Oroites’ 
actions against Polycrates. According to one of his sources, Oroites was taunted by the 
above mentioned Mitrobates, who pointed out that while Oroites had failed to subjugate 
Samos, Polycrates managed to do so with a force of fifteen hoplites.124 Alternatively, 
Herodotus recounts an incident in which Polycrates, either on purpose or by accident, 
offended Oroites by insulting the satrap’s envoy.125  
Personal grudges, which are key in Herodotus’ account, probably played a minor 
role in the downfall of Polycrates. Balcer argues that the elimination of Polycrates was a 
preliminary step in an Achaemenid attempt to subjugate Samos and perhaps additional 
islands in the Aegean.126 Indeed, the notion that under Cyrus and Cambyses the satraps 
were expected to expand their domain through conquest is implied in the sarcastic remark 
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122 Vargyas 2000. 
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of Mitrobates.127 Hence, it is possible that Oroites “slew Polycrates to prove himself a 
worthy expansionist of the empire in the Persian tradition.”128 Since Samos was eventually 
conquered by the Persians,129 it is reasonable that the actions of Oroites against Polycrates 
were in accord with the expansionist Persian policy in the west.130  
In contrast, the increasing power of the Samian tyrant may have led to his demise. 
Herodotus claims that Polycrates aspired to establish his own thalassocracy by asserting 
his dominance not only on the islands of the Aegean but also on the coastline of western 
Anatolia, i.e. Ionia.131 Polycrates’ ambition is implicitly corroborated by Diodorus, who 
says that several Lydians fled from Oroites’ grasp and found refuge in Samos, an insult 
that provoked Oroites to seek ways to eliminate Polycrates.132 Briant assumes that these 
Lydians were in fact aristocrats who were unhappy with the overbearing policies of 
Oroites.133 If that was the case, Oroites was acting as a dutiful satrap who was mindful of 
the growing power of the adjacent Samian tyranny and sought ways to keep Polycrates’ 
power in check. The execution of Polycrates, therefore, was meant to protect Persian 
interests in the west.134 If we accept that Oroites was aiming at blocking Samian expansion, 
one wonders why the assassination of Polycrates is presented by Herodotus as a hasty act 
of a proud, cruel and overly ambitious satrap. It is possible that even if Oroites got rid of a 
dangerous neighbor his action was not sanctioned by Darius. As a result, he incurred the 
hostility of the Great King, who deemed the Lydian satrap as too independent and perhaps 
a potential challenger.135 
There are several potential challenges to this interpretation. First, there is no record 
for a Persian attempt to capture Samos after Polycrates was eliminated. Second, even if 
Samos was ready to fall, it is difficult to believe that the subjugation of a single island at 
the fringes of the gigantic Persian Empire disheartened Darius. Surely, the resources of the 
former Lydian kingdom, which were at the disposal of Oroites, vastly overshadowed those 
of Samos. Third, there is no mention of trouble in Lydia in the royal inscriptions 
commissioned by Darius. This silence does not necessarily mean that all was quiet in the 
west, but that any event that took place in Lydia was of minor importance. Moreover, the 
silence of the official Persian records in regard to Oroites indicates that Herodotus had to 
rely on alternative sources when seeking to recount the downfall of Polycrates. 
Accordingly, since the reign of Polycrates was a formative period in Samian history, it is 
more likely that Herodotus derived his information from Samian informants and traditions, 
though he might have embellished his account during the process of composition.136 
                                                 
127 Petit 1990, 41. 
128 Evans 1991, 22. 
129 Hdt. 3.139-47. 
130 Diesner 1959, 215; Vargyas 2000, 158; Briant 2002, 139. 
131 Hdt. 3.122.1-2. 
132 Diod. 10.16.4.  
133 Briant 2002, 65. 
134 Abramenko 1995, 37; Briant 2002, 52. 
135 Myres 1953, 161; Wallinga 1991, 182 with n. 13. In Addition, Wallinga rejects the unfavorable image of 
Oroites as described by Herodotus and brands it as a product of Darius’ propaganda and Herodotus’ own 
imagination. 
136 It is generally agreed that Herodotus derived his information on the Samian tyranny from reliable Samian 
sources. Cf. Parke 1946, 105; Barron 1964b, 212; Mitchell 1975, 75; Hart 1982, 57; Abramenko 1995, 37–
24 
 
Moreover, the portrayal of Oroites, as Vargyas convincingly argues, was shaped by 
Herodotus’ focus on the murder of Polycrates and the desire to demonstrate that the Lydian 
satrap committed additional crimes which led to his just demise.137 In other words, 
Herodotus’ Samian sources and his literary intentions can explain the negative portrayal of 
Oroites’ actions rather than Darius’ propaganda. 
Polycrates as a loyal Persian vassal 
An alternative suggestion stipulates that Polycrates was a Persian vassal rather than a threat 
to Persian interests. This argument is predicated on the military contingents Polycrates 
supplied to Cambyses’ Egyptian campaign.138 But how did Polycrates become a servant of 
the Great King? Mitchell suggests that the ambitious Polycrates exploited the turmoil in 
Ionia during the Persian conquest, as he managed to seize control of several islands in 
addition to urban centers on the coastline, including Miletus. In the end, however, the 
Persians were able to recapture the Ionian cities, thus curtailing Samian influence in the 
region.139 Balcer adds that after his failed attempt to establish a thalassocracy, Polycrates 
had no choice but to acknowledge Persian supremacy by paying tribute and supplying 
military levies to the King’s campaigns. In exchange his tyranny was allowed to continue 
under Persian suzerainty.140 Polycrates’ vassal status is implicitly corroborated by the 
abrogation of the alliance between Samos and Egypt. According to Herodotus, an alliance 
was forged between the Egyptian king Amasis and Polycrates,141 but it was soon dissolved 
when Amasis, having noticed the good fortune of the Samian tyrant and dreading his 
inevitable downfall, decided to end the alliance.142 Balcer, however, rejects Herodotus’ 
fanciful explanation for the sudden break between Egypt and Samos and argues that 
Polycrates ended the alliance since Amasis became an enemy of the Persians. The new 
state of affairs dictated that there could be no collaboration between a Persian vassal state 
and a nation which was branded as an enemy of the Great King.143 Conversely, Rahe argues 
that when Polycrates realized the magnitude of the Persian preparations for the imminent 
expedition against Egypt, he defected to the Persian side.144 Either way, if Polycrates was 
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in fact a vassal of the Great Persian King, his elimination by Oroites constituted a rebellious 
act.145  
The Resources of Oroites 
The available evidence prevents us from reaching an irrefutable conclusion concerning the 
motives and intentions of Oroites. Nonetheless, it is certain that the conduct of the satrap 
of Lydia led Darius to contemplate and finally bring about his death. When taking into 
consideration that Oroites was the overlord of a vast satrapy which comprised Phrygia, 
Lydia and Ionia,146  it is only expected that any hint of insubordination on the satrap’s part 
caused much anxiety at the royal court. To begin with, we are told by Herodotus that 
Oroites had at his disposal 1,000 Persian soldiers,147 a fighting force which may have 
constituted the core of the military contingents under his command, as the satrap was 
probably able to levy troops from the numerous subject nations which dwelled within his 
extensive domain.148 Next, Oroites’ military might was augmented by his access to 
considerable funds. The revenue of the Lydian satrapy was relatively high. Lewis points 
out that according to Herodotus (3.90), the income of Oroites’ domain constituted the 500 
talents of the second nomos, and probably the greater part of the 400 talents of the first 
nomos.149 Further implicit indication for the wealth of Oroites can be found in his ability 
to deceive Polycrates by promising financial support for the tyrant’s ambitious endeavors. 
The whole ruse is predicated on the notion that the satrap was, or at least had the reputation 
of being, a man of considerable means.150 In the same vein, Diodorus mentions that the 
Lydians who were displeased with the policies of Oroites, fled from Samos to Polycrates 
and brought with them considerable wealth, so considerable that the tyrant had them 
executed and their possessions confiscated.151 It is possible that it was the burden of taxes 
which drove the wealthy individuals to seek asylum on Samos, which renders it possible 
that Oroites had garnered extensive funds through taxation in the period which preceded 
his elimination. Furthermore, if Oroites had stopped sending tribute to the royal treasury 
while Darius was distracted by the numerous rebellions in the core satrapies, the satrap 
may have been able to accumulate substantial wealth. Lastly, the succession struggle and 
the suppression of multiple rebellions must have brought the military capacity of Darius 
into a state of exhaustion.152 Hence, it should not come as a surprise that, as Herodotus 
recounts, Darius was well aware of the considerable resources at Oroites’ disposable and 
must have realized that the satrap of Lydia had the potential of becoming a formidable 
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enemy if openly challenged.153 A failure in suppressing Oroites could have exposed Darius 
as weak, which might have reignited multiple rebellions throughout the Empire.154  
The Elimination of Oroites 
But, as noted above, Oroites was himself reluctant to openly challenge Darius and preferred 
to show deference in public while undermining Darius’ authority in secret. Nevertheless, 
one can only assume that if Herodotus knew about the treachery of Oroites, so did Darius. 
The hesitation of Oroites, so it seems, created the opportunity for Darius to ensnare the 
rogue satrap. Herodotus reports that the Great King made an appeal to his loyal Persians, 
asking for a volunteer to kill or capture the rebellious satrap. Thirty men stepped up, and 
after lots were drawn, the task was given to Bagaius son of Artontes.155 Shortly after 
Bagaius arrived at the satrapal court in Sardis. Herodotus says that the King’s envoys 
brought with him letters bearing the Great King’s seal which he ordered to be read out 
loud, thus turning the Persians present at Oroites’ court against the satrap.156 The exact date 
in which Oroites was eliminated is disputed, but it is widely agreed that it occurred before 
Darius initiated his grand reform.157 
The Shortcomings of Herodotus’ Account 
Since Herodotus is our only source for Oroites’ exploits, it is difficult to assess his 
reliability on this matter. Balcer, for example, deems Herodotus’ account as “confused and 
historically unreliable and fitting more readily into his pattern of literary form and thought 
rather than historical cause and effect.”158 Similarly, Wallinga concludes that we cannot 
trust Herodotus in respect to Oroites’ motives in eliminating Polycrates or his policies 
during Darius’ rise to power.159 These caveats are valid but should be qualified. As stated 
above, the Polycrates episode is probably based on fairly reliable Samian sources and on 
Herodotus’ familiarity with the history of western Anatolia. It is safe to assume, therefore, 
that we have trustworthy information regarding the historicity of Oroites and the nature of 
his office.160 Furthermore, though we can only speculate about the motives and aims of 
Oroites and Darius, there is no reason to deem the account of the satrap’s actual deeds and 
actions, along with the historical framework within which he operated as unreliable. 
Explaining Oroites’ Absence from Bisitun 
One of the main arguments that is used to undermine the historicity of the exploits of 
Oroites as recounted by Herodotus is the absence of any trace of trouble in Lydia in the 
Bisitun inscription. This argument is even more compelling when taking into consideration 
that Darius included a report about the grim end of Âçina, a Persian rebel who had been 
seized by his own partisans and delivered to Darius.161 Vargyas points out the similarities 
between this Âçina and Oroites and wonders why Darius omitted another example which 
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could have demonstrated the Great King’s capacity to garner loyalty and to eliminate 
powerful challengers, thus enhancing his own prestige while deterring other ambitious 
satraps from imitating Oroites.162 Several cogent solutions have been offered. Balcer claims 
that Oroites is not mentioned in the Bisitun inscription due to Darius’ inability to suppress 
the dissent in Lydia within his first regnal year, the chronological framework of the 
inscription, and because the subjugation of Judah and western Anatolia was not as critical 
as the pacification of the core regions of the Empire and the adjacent regions.163 A 
supplementary explanation is predicated on the fact that the Bisitun inscription deals 
exclusively with vanquished rebels who proclaimed themselves as kings. Accordingly, the 
rebellion of Oroites, a Persian satrap, did not fit into this category and was thus omitted.164 
Conversely, it is possible that Darius omitted any mention of Oroites since he wished to 
conceal the fact that he eliminated a highborn Persian and an old companion of Cyrus, a 
problematic act for the new Great King who wanted to present himself as a legitimate ruler 
rather than a usurper.165 All in all, though we cannot know with certainty why the 
elimination of Oroites does not appear in the Bisitun inscription it should not be used as an 
argument against the historicity of Herodotus’ account. 
Conclusion 
Whether Oroites was contemplating political independence or merely refused to 
acknowledge Darius as the new Great King, his actions were clearly deemed by Darius as 
subversive, and thus had to be dealt with. As such, the case of Oroites constitutes a 
paradigmatic demonstration of the potential threat posed to the Great King’s authority by 
powerful satraps. It is also an excellent example of how the King’s authority was restored 
and upheld by royal representatives in the satrapal court.166 Although the dire consequences 
of Oroites’ insubordination are evident, it seems that the solution employed by Darius was 
based on Persian loyalty to the Great King rather than a preexisting mechanism of royal 
control. Therefore, it seems likely that after Darius consolidated his power, the reforms 
which he initiated included measures which were aimed at reducing satrapal power in order 
to deter overly ambitious satraps, now and in the future, from challenging the Great Persian 
King.167  
Aryandes, Satrap of Egypt 
Aryandes’ Initial Loyalty 
Another satrap who defied Darius was Aryandes, the governor of Egypt. Like Oroites, 
Aryandes was appointed by a predecessor of Darius I, this time Cambyses.168 But unlike 
his colleague, Aryandes chose to accept Darius as his new master. This is exemplified by 
the fact that Aryandes suppressed an Egyptian uprising on Darius’ behalf. According to 
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Polyaenus, it was the cruelty of Aryandes which drove the Egyptian to rebel,169 but the 
rebellion was brought to an end by Darius, who won back the loyalty of the Egyptians by 
showing homage to the Apis Bull.170 While Polyaenus’ claims concerning the causes of the 
Egyptian revolt and the manner in which it was suppressed cannot be corroborated, the 
historicity of the rebellion is beyond any doubt. Egypt is listed among the rebellious nations 
in Darius’ Bisitun inscription,171 and an Egyptian hieroglyphic text inscribed on the 
naophorous statue of Udjahorresne mentions unrest in Egypt dated to the reign of Darius. 
This inscription recounts the exploits and achievements of Udjahorresne, an Egyptian 
courtier, scholar, and priest, who served the last two Egyptian kings, Amasis (570-526) and 
Psammetichus III (526-525), and witnessed the Persian conquest. After Egypt lost its 
independence, Udjahorresne managed to maintain his lofty position under Cambyses and 
Darius I.172 Interestingly, Udjahorresne claims that during a great disaster, which affected 
not only his nome but the entire land, he did whatever he could to save and protect his 
compatriots.173 Though it has been suggested that Udjahorresne is referring to the Persian 
invasion,174 Cameron points out that Darius is mentioned by Udjahorresne immediately 
after he recounts the aforementioned hardships, and concludes that the calamitous event he 
notes was therefore the rebellion recorded in the Bisitun Inscription.175  
A number of suggestions have been made regarding the date of the Egyptian 
uprising. Several scholars argue that the Egyptian revolt erupted in the winter of 522/1 BC, 
when Darius was still scrambling to put down revolts in the Persian heartland.176 It seems 
logical that the Egyptians, like many other subject peoples throughout the Persian Empire, 
saw the apparent weakness of the Persian central authorities as an opportunity to liberate 
themselves from Persian rule. Supposedly, the revolt ended sometime in 520 BC, after 
Darius pacified the empire.177  
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There is, however, a chronological difficulty in such a reconstruction. Darius’ visit 
to Egypt is mentioned by Polyaenus (7.11.7), Herodotus (2.110) and Diodorus (1.58.4). 
Polyaenus notes that Darius’ arrival happened at the same time as the death of the Apis 
Bull. Coincidently, the Apis Stele commemorates the death and burial of the Apis Bull in 
the fourth year of Darius reign, i.e. 518 BC.178 Hence, Darius probably came to Egypt in 
518 BC, i.e. too late to subdue the uprising in person. Moreover, with the exception of 
Polyaenus, the accounts of Darius’ visit to Egypt fail to mention any sort of disturbances, 
while the actions of Darius in Egypt indicate that he aimed at cementing Persian rule due 
to the recent uprising by exhibiting his deference to Egyptian traditions and customs. 
Polyaenus emphasizes Darius’ piety by stating that the Great King promised to give a 
hundred talents to the man who would produce a new Apis.179 Herodotus recounts how a 
priest of Hephaestus refused to set up a statue of Darius in front of the statues of the 
Egyptian king Sesostris and his wife, presumably since the Persian King, unlike his 
Egyptian predecessor, had failed in his attempt to conquer Scythia.180 While Herodotus 
remains silent regarding Darius’ response, Diodorus claims that Darius was pleased with 
the honesty of the priest and asked to be judged again when he reached the age of Sesostris 
and later on he even joined the Egyptian priests in learning about the ancient kings of Egypt 
so he could imitate their righteous conduct.181 Even when Darius encountered resistance to 
his directives, there is no sign for coercive measures.182 Furthermore, Tuplin argues that it 
is difficult to believe that an Egyptian rebellion lasted until 518 BC and that such an event 
was unknown to Herodotus.183 This problem can be resolved by accepting the possibility 
that it was Aryandes rather than Darius who squashed the rebellion with the satrapal 
contingents under his command.184  
The Aryandic Coins 
The loyalty of Aryandes was not everlasting. Herodotus recounts that the satrap of Egypt 
lost Darius’ favor after he had minted coins of the purest silver, an imitation of the royal 
daric, hence positioning himself as equal to the Great King.185 Shortly after, Herodotus 
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claims that Darius had Aryandes executed on a different charge, namely that he rebelled 
against his master.186 Nevertheless, several scholars argue that the elimination of Aryandes 
is connected to the Aryandic coins. For instance, Milne maintains that Aryandes exploited 
the fact that that ratio of silver to gold was thirteen to one throughout the Empire, but 
significantly higher in Egypt. Therefore, Aryandes used his silver coins to purchase the 
King’s golden darics, which he had melted and sold as bullion. As a result, the satrap made 
a considerable profit. The problem was, Milne argues, that melting the King’s coins was 
perceived as an act of treason, since Aryandes was mindfully destroying the royal figure 
which was imprinted on the royal daric.187 Contrarily, it has been suggested that by minting 
his own satrapal coins, which supposedly bore the satrap’s image rather than the King, 
Aryandes incurred the animosity of Darius by usurping what was apparently a royal 
prerogative. In addition, these coins, presumably fashioned according to Egyptian values, 
weights, and designs, created unnecessary difficulties to the imperial financial system.188 
Briant sums it up by stating that “the king wished to punish the excesses of a satrap who 
had tried to become his rival in the very area Darius considered the defining characteristic 
of his reign and his power.”189 Yet, the emphasis on the role the Aryandic coins played in 
the execution of the satrap who minted them is problematic. Cameron observes that 
according to Herodotus Aryandes was condemned to death not for minting satrapal coins 
but for staging a revolt.190 Similarly, Tuplin maintains that the issuing of coins was not 
necessarily beyond satrapal authority and was probably far from a critical matter from 
Darius’ viewpoint, even if Aryandes imprinted his own image on the coins for self-
glorification.191 It seems, therefore, that the connection between Aryandes’ satrapal coins 
and his death as a traitor is fairly weak and probably coincidental.   
The Libyan Campaign 
An alternative explanation for the condemnation of Aryandes as a rebel was the supposedly 
unsanctioned campaign the satrap launched against the Libyan Greeks. Herodotus recounts 
how Arcesilaus III, who received Cyrene as a reward for his services to Cyrus and 
Cambyses, was murdered by his political rivals in Barce. His mother Pheretime fled to 
Egypt and asked Aryandes to avenge her son’s death, since, so she claimed, he was 
murdered because of his loyalty to the Persians. Aryandes was convinced and soon after 
he began gathering forces. Soon after, the Persians besieged Barce and eventually captured 
it through trickery.192 Petit argues that Aryandes, in a similar fashion to Oroites’ attempt to 
subjugate Samos, was expected to expand the territory of his satrapy with the resources at 
his disposal.193 In fact, Herodotus notes that if the campaign had succeeded the Libyans 
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cities would have been added to the empire or at least became tributary, which suggests 
that Persian imperialism was the real driving force behind Aryandes campaign and that the 
murder of Arcesilaus provided the pretext for Persian expansion.194 
In contrast, several scholars have argued that the Libyan campaign was not 
approved by Darius, and that its successful conclusion led Darius to deem Aryandes too 
independent.195 There are, however, two objections to this interpretation. First, the success 
of the rebellion was not as complete as it seems. Boedeker points out that while Pheretime 
got her opportunity to exact vengeance against those who murdered her son,196 Aryandes’ 
forces were harassed by the Libyans on their return journey to Egypt.197 It seems that 
Persian authority was reasserted in Cyrene and its immediate environs, but the adjacent 
regions remained independent.198 Second, Menecles of Barce notes that Pheretime not only 
persuaded Aryandes to assist her but that she also acquired an army from the King.199 While 
it is highly unlikely that Pheretime travelled to the royal court, the mention of the King 
may imply that he sanctioned the campaign. 
When Was Aryandes removed? 
The available evidence does not allow us to conclude whether it was the Aryandic silver 
coins, the allegedly unsanctioned Libyan expedition, or some unknown event which led to 
the unnatural death of Aryandes. We only know that Aryandes was charged and executed 
for unknown subversive activities. It is also uncertain when Aryandes was eliminated and 
how. The only concrete evidence is three Demotic texts dated to 493 and 492 BC which 
commemorate an exchange between Pherendates, the contemporary satrap of Egypt, and 
the local priests in the sanctuary of the god Khnum in Elephantine.200 Accordingly, it has 
been argued that Aryandes was eliminated by Darius when the latter came to Egypt in 518 
BC and replaced by Pherendates.201 This interpretation is predicated on two assumptions. 
First, that the Egyptian uprising mentioned by Polyaenus continued until 518 BC. Second, 
that it was a satrapal revolt led by Aryandes rather than a domestic rebellion against Persian 
rule. As we have seen above, both assumptions are highly unlikely, and, therefore, the 
removal of Aryandes probably took place later on. Tuplin and Briant speculate that 
                                                 
194 Hdt. 3.167.3, 4.167. 
195 Burn 1984, 112; Petit 1990, 76. Balcer (1984, 138; 1987, 146–47) argues that the invasion to Libya was 
an act of rebellion, as Aryandes was seeking to consolidate his independent rule in the region. Tuplin (1989, 
77) points out that Polyaenus uses the term ὠμότης to describe the cruelty of Aryandes, a term which Greek 
authors usually associate with tyrants. This might be another implicit indication that Aryandes conducted 
himself as if Egypt was his personal domain and failed to show sufficient deference to Darius. 
196 Hdt. 4.202. 
197 Hdt. 4.203. 
198 Boedeker 2011, 218. 
199 FGrH 270 F5: λαβοῦσα δὲ δύναμιν παρὰ τοῦ βασιλέως. Briant (2002, 141) assumes that the Libyan 
campaign was in fact approved by Darius, but supplies no evidence for this assumption. 
200 For the texts, see: PBerlin 13539 (December 493 BC); PBerlin 13540 (21 April 492 BC); PBerlin 13572 
(7 June 492 BC). These document were published by Spiegelberg (1928). For English translation, see: Kuhrt 
2007, no. 17.30.i–iii. 
201 Petit 1990, 74; Balcer 1995, 118. 
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Aryandes was removed from office sometime during the last decade of the sixth century202, 
while Descat proposes a later date, namely during the first decade of the fifth century BC.203  
Conclusion 
Though much remains confused in respect to the circumstances regarding the rebellion and 
elimination of Aryandes, it seems clear that even after the immediate resistance to Darius’ 
accession was squashed, his rule was not unchallenged. The similarities between the rise 
and fall of Oroites and Aryandes are revealing. Both were powerful governors of frontier 
satrapies and both were appointed by Darius’ predecessors. The common theme is 
excessive satrapal independence which was perceived as a threat by the Great King. 
Consequently, the necessity to maintain obedience, especially among the satraps stationed 
far away from the royal court, must have been apparent to Darius.  
Conclusion 
The scarcity and brevity of the contemporary evidence on the imperial system which 
emerged during Darius’ reign renders it almost impossible to reconstruct each and every 
aspect of the measures and regulations which constituted Darius’ grand reform. We have 
seen, however, that numerous sources recount a watershed moment in the history of the 
Achaemenid Empire. For instance, when analyzing the site of Pasargadae, Stronach 
concludes that the contributions of Darius to the complex were probably “more drastic than 
has hitherto been realized”,204 and it seems that the same can be said regarding the 
Achaemenid imperial mechanism as a whole. We can conclude with confidence that Darius 
“revitalized the earlier controls to produce a strong imperial centralization”, and that this 
new apparatus was “more vibrant and intricate than that of Cambyses or Cyrus.”205 
The circumstances under which the satrapal system emerged were unique. Darius 
was the new Great King, whose status was far from undisputed. There is little doubt that 
disobedience among the subject nations and the aforementioned satraps, whether only in 
appearance or in actuality, was a direct outcome of Darius’ precarious position. 
Consequently, it seems highly likely that a central aspect of Darius’ reforms was a response 
to the chaos that engulfed the Persian Empire in the first years of his reign and that Darius’ 
aim was to ensure deference to the central authorities. This should not be interpreted as if 
there was a vacuum before Darius. I completely agree with Briant, who notes that “neither 
Cyrus nor Cambyses had the simple aim of ruling in name only over some sort of loose 
federation.”206 Nevertheless, as noted by Cook, there are no indications for the existence 
of a uniform infrastructure of Achaemenid rule in the satrapies or a tributary system.207  
The revolts in Egypt and Lydia made it clear that satrapal power must be limited to 
prevent further instances of disobedience.208 This should be taken into consideration when 
                                                 
202 Tuplin 1989, 76–77; Briant 2002, 472. 
203 Descat 1989a, 87. 
204 Stronach 1997, 50. 
205 Balcer 1984, 123. 
206 Briant 2002, 77. 
207 Cook 1983, 173. This conclusion is accepted by Tuplin (1987a, 158), who still expresses hope that new 
evidence might allow us to acquire better understanding of the “of the manifold varieties” of the Achaemenid 
administrative apparatus. 
208 Petit 1983, 44–45; Dandamaev 1984b, 41; Petit 1990, 40, 76. 
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seeking to assess the nature and character of the office of satrap and the royal measures 
which were aimed at securing satrapal fidelity. Such an assessment is difficult to achieve 
due to the scarcity of evidence dated to the reign of Darius. Nevertheless, we have seen 
that the Achaemenid institutions which were established by Darius persevered, as only 
minor changes took place in the subsequent generations. Thus, later sources, such as 
Xenophon’s Oeconomicus and the Cyropaedia to name two, are of the highest importance 
to the study of the imperial mechanism established by Darius in general, and the satrapal 
duties, responsibilities, military and financial capacity along with additional aspect of the 
office in particular.209 Of course, while broadening the documentary base is essential, we 
must follow Briant’s injunction, as we “must be mindful of the diachronic perspective, and 
see that any piece of evidence should “fit into a logical and coherent whole.”210 A careful 
analysis of sources dated to the fifth centuries BC can produce a valid reconstruction of the 
powers and maneuverability granted to the satraps by the Achaemenid Kings. 
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2. ACHAEMENID ROYAL SUPERVISION 
 
The satrapal revolts of Oroites and Aryandes exposed a critical flaw in the Achaemenid 
imperial mechanism. The possibility that an overly ambitious satrap might exploit his 
access to the considerable resources which were at his disposal to challenge the Great King 
became a reality. Darius, therefore, must have realized that it was too risky to rely solely 
on the loyalty of the Persian elite and that additional measures were needed to ensure 
satrapal obedience. As we shall see, the Persian central authorities kept a close eye on the 
state of affairs in the satrapies through various means, e.g. the presence of military and 
civic officials in the satrapies who were appointed by the King, regular inspections of the 
satrapies by the King or one of his trustworthy representatives, and a network of royal 
informants. It is difficult to reconstruct the exact timeframe in which these regulations and 
institutions were inaugurated. Nevertheless, the challenges Darius faced during his rise to 
power and the subsequent reforms he implemented serve as a suitable framework for the 
emergence, or at the very least expansion, of the Achaemenid royal surveillance network 
in the satrapies. 
2.1 Royal Personnel in the Satrapies 
Garrison Commanders 
Xenophon’s Model  
One way to effectively monitor the satrapies was the placement of royal personnel in the 
satrapal administration. According to Xenophon, the Great King himself appointed the 
garrison commanders in the provinces. This practice, Xenophon claims, began with Cyrus 
the Elder, who, having installed garrisons in citadels, urban centers, and strategically 
important locations throughout the Empire,211 personally appointed the garrison 
commanders, namely phrouarchs and chiliarchs, along with the soldiers under their 
command.212 Xenophon also states that the purpose of this royal policy was to ensure 
satrapal compliance with royal directives since these officers were expected to inform the 
King whenever one of the satraps was growing too powerful or engaging in treasonous 
activities. In addition, if a satrapal revolt had erupted, the royal contingents in the satrapies 
were instructed to offer immediate opposition to the rebel forces.213 Cyrus, Xenophon 
continues, was well aware that the presence of independent military forces in the satrapies 
was likely to be interpreted by the soon to-be-satraps as a sign of distrust. Therefore, he 
sought to mitigate the anticipated disaffection by informing his newly-appointed governors 
about the conditions of their office before they were dispatched to their respective 
satrapies.214 In essence, Xenophon envisions this measure as a way to curtail satrapal 
military power.215 
                                                 
211 Xen. Cyr. 8.6.3. For a comprehensive survey of the literary and archaeological records on Achaemenid 
garrisons, see: Tuplin 1987c; Tuplin 1988. 
212 Xen. Cyr. 8.6.1, 9. 
213 Xen. Cyr. 8.6.1. 
214 Xen. Cyr. 8.6.2-3. 
215 Petit 1990, 111. In addition, Petit (1990, 112–13) postulates that the rebellions of Oroites and Aryandes 
were partially due to Darius’ effort to reduce satrapal military power. While this suggestion might be pertinent 
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In the Oeconomicus, Xenophon claims that the Great Persian King was first and 
foremost concerned with the economic well-being of the satrapies and the readiness of the 
military satrapal contingents. To this end, he appointed two classes of officials with discrete 
areas of responsibility:216 
[9] καὶ εἰσὶ δ᾽ αὐτῷ οἱ ἄρχοντες διατεταγμένοι ἐφ᾽ ἑκάτερον οὐχ οἱ αὐτοί, ἀλλ᾽ οἱ μὲν 
ἄρχουσι τῶν κατοικούντων τε καὶ τῶν ἐργατῶν, καὶ δασμοὺς ἐκ τούτων ἐκλέγουσιν, οἱ δ᾽ 
ἄρχουσι τῶν ὡπλισμένων <τε καὶ τῶν> φρουρῶν. [10] κἂν μὲν ὁ φρούραρχος μὴ ἱκανῶς 
τῇ χώρᾳ ἀρήγῃ, ὁ τῶν ἐνοικούντων ἄρχων καὶ τῶν ἔργων ἐπιμελούμενος κατηγορεῖ τοῦ 
φρουράρχου, ὅτι οὐ δύνανται ἐργάζεσθαι διὰ τὴν ἀφυλαξίαν, ἂν δὲ παρέχοντος τοῦ 
φρουράρχου εἰρήνην τοῖς ἔργοις ὁ ἄρχων ὀλιγάνθρωπόν τε παρέχηται καὶ ἀργὸν τὴν 
χώραν, τούτου αὖ κατηγορεῖ ὁ φρούραρχος. [11] καὶ γὰρ σχεδόν τι οἱ κακῶς τὴν χώραν 
ἐργαζόμενοι οὔτε τοὺς φρουροὺς τρέφουσιν οὔτε τοὺς δασμοὺς δύνανται ἀποδιδόναι. ὅπου 
δ᾽ ἂν σατράπης καθιστῆται, οὗτος ἀμφοτέρων τούτων ἐπιμελεῖται. 
And the officers who are appointed to each of these [areas of responsibility] are not the 
same men. On the one hand, there are those who govern the inhabitants and the workers, 
and they exact tribute from them. On the other hand, there are those who command the 
men-at-arms and the garrisons. If the garrison commander fails to adequately secure the 
land, the civic governor who is in charge of the workers files a complaint against the 
garrison commander, because, due to lack of defense, it is impossible to cultivate the land. 
If, however, the garrison commander provides peace for the workers, while the civic 
governor has a thinly populated land and scarcely toiled fields, the former can lodge a 
complaint against the latter. Generally, those who cultivate the land ineffectively can 
neither maintain the garrisons nor pay tribute. But whenever a satrap is appointed, he is 
responsible for both.  
The historical accuracy and even authenticity of the information Xenophon provides on 
various aspects of the Persian Empire has been rightly criticized.217 Nevertheless, it is 
generally accepted that while Xenophon’s statements on Persian matters are imperfect they 
still constitute a useful historical source for Persian traditions, institutions and practices.218 
                                                 
to Oroites’ revolt, I find hard to believe that it was connected in any way to the grim end of Aryandes. First, 
as we have seen, Aryandes was eliminated at least a decade after Darius’ rise to power. Second, while there 
are several possible explanations for Darius’ decision to execute Aryandes, the only possible provocation on 
the satrap’s part was the series of satrapal coins he minted without royal approval. Third, if Aryandes was 
determined to retain his military might, one might have expected Herodotus to include at least a hint regarding 
a military clash between the Great King and his disobedient satrap.  
216 Xen. Oec. 4.9-11. 
217 Cf. Cizek 1975; Starr 1975, 60; Higgins 1977, 44; Cawkwell 1981, 69; Cook 1983, 20–21; Sancisi-
Weerdenburg 1985; Tatum 1989, XV; Mueller-Goldingen 1995. 
218 Cf. Knauth 1975, 7–63; Briant 1982a, 34 n. 6; Briant 1982b, 185; Hornblower 1982, 147–48; Frye 1984, 
95, 112–14; Walser 1984, 114; Hirsch 1985, 61–85; Dandamaev and Lukonin 1989, 102–3, 111, 222–23, 
395; Petit 1990, 108; Pomeroy 1994, 237–38, 244; Masaracchia 1996; Briant 2002, 7; Tuplin 2004, 182–83; 
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Cyropaedia, I agree with Briant’s (2002, 7) suggestion, namely that “it is necessary, then, at each step, to 
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Moreover, Pomeroy (1994, 8 with n. 58) reminds us that since “inscriptions and the visual arts of the 
Achaemenids corroborate Xenophon’s reports about Persian culture in general, Iranologists have long 
accepted this testimony and pay as much attention to the Cyropaedia and Oeconomicus as they do to the 
Anabasis.” On Xenophon’s Persian sources, see: Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1985; Gera 1993, 13–22. Even those 
who expressed their doubts about Xenophon’s overall reliability admit that his accounts should not be utterly 
disregarded due to his first-hand knowledge of the Persian Empire:  See: Cook 1983, 20; Cook 1985, 207; 
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In regard to the information provided by Xenophon in the Cyropaedia and the 
Oeconomicus on the satrapal administrative apparatus, Tuplin observes that it is “far from 
identical but quite consistent.”219 Such consistency suggests that this passage was not a 
mere figment of Xenophon’s imagination but his own understanding of the satrapal 
administrative institutions gained during the time he spent in the court of Cyrus the 
Younger and on his march to and from the Persian heartland. As such, it should be taken 
into consideration.  
It is evident that Xenophon describes two specific offices in the satrapal hierarchy: 
the civic governor, who was responsible for effective exploitation of the agricultural 
potential of royal domain; and the garrison commander, who functioned as the commander-
in-chief of the satrapal military contingents and whose primary duty was to protect to 
King’s land. Xenophon’s final remark in the cited passage seems to contradict his 
statements in the Cyropaedia, namely that the garrison commanders were appointed by and 
directly responsible to the Great King.220 A cogent explanation is offered by Pomeroy, who 
argues that Xenophon says that not all of the regions in the Persian Empire were 
administered by satraps, (e.g. Cyprus) but whenever a satrap was appointed, he was 
responsible for the civic and military aspect of the satrapal administration.221 In fact, it is 
widely held that the aforementioned specialized officers reported directly to the satrap 
rather than the King.222 
Royal Garrisons 
Nevertheless, since Xenophon’s description of the satraps’ position of the vis-à-vis the 
garrison commanders is unclear, it becomes imperative to seek additional evidence. The 
only explicit instance of a garrison commander being appointed by the Persian Kings is 
recounted by Arrian, who reports that Hegesistratus, the garrison commander in Miletus in 
334 BC, was appointed by Darius III. 223 Yet, royal affiliation can be found in other 
instances. Xenophon, for example, states that the garrison on the Syrian side of the Cilician 
Gates in 401 BC was under royal authority.224 Xenophon also claims that Orontes, the 
commander of the garrison in Sardis, was following Artaxerxes II’s orders when he 
attempted to hinder the eastward advance of Cyrus the Younger, the satrap of Lydia who 
rose in revolt and presumably Orontes’ superior.225 The loyalty of Orontes to the Great 
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219 Tuplin 1988, 67. 
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personal enmity rather than administrative separation of powers. Such interpretation is flawed since, 
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King has led some to argue that his actions suggest that he answered directly to the King 
rather than to Cyrus.226 Indeed, his machinations correspond with the aforementioned 
protocol according to which royal forces in the satrapies were expected to oppose a 
revolting satrap.227  
The presence of non-local levies in the satrapies might be an implicit indication of 
the existence of garrisons which were under direct royal authority. For instance, Herodotus 
states that the Achaemenid garrison stationed in Memphis was composed of Persians and 
their allies.228 The Persian spearmen in the satrapal court of Oroites, who eventually turned 
against him, were probably a part of the garrison of Sardis.229 The grave goods from the 
cemetery in Deve Hüyük, which was in use in the first quarter of the fifth century BC, revel 
that it was used predominantly by Persian soldiers rather than native Syrians.230 But the 
foreign element in Achaemenid garrisons was not limited to soldiers of Persian origin. The 
numerous documents discovered at Elephantine in Egypt reveal that the soldiers serving in 
the local Achaemenid garrison consisted of troops of local descent, i.e. Jews and 
Egyptians,231 as well as foreigners, e.g. Arameans,232 Caspians,233 Medes,234 
Chorasmians,235 Babylonians236 and Persians.237 Doubtlessly, these soldiers were 
transported from their homelands by the Persian central authorities and installed in foreign 
territories to ensure obedience to the Persian authorities. Thus, it is not out of the question 
that these were the royal garrisons described by Xenophon and that their officers were 
appointed directly by the King.238 
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Garrisons Commanders as Satrapal Appointees 
Despite the above, there are several known instances in which garrison commanders were 
appointed by satraps. According to a trilingual inscription from Xanthus dated to c. 337 
BC, Pixodarus son of Hecatomnus, the satrap of Lycia, appointed a certain Apollodorus as 
the επιμελητής of Xanthus Artemelis, a term which, in this context, should be understood 
as a garrison commander.239 Moreover, in the second half of the fifth century BC 
Nehemiah, the governor (peḥā) of Yehud, appointed his brother Hannaniah as the overseer 
of the newly fortified city in Jerusalem (sar habira), a position which probably denotes the 
chief of the castle, i.e. the garrison commander.240 In Egypt, several documents recovered 
from the site of the Achaemenid garrison at Syene-Elephantine contain the term rab-ḥaylā 
(‘chief of the army’), which corresponds with the Greek phrouarch.241 The rab-ḥaylā is 
described as a subordinate of the frataraka (‘superintendent’),242 a deputy of the satrap 
whose post combined military and civil prerogatives.243 In a similar fashion to the biblical 
sources, the garrison commander is described as a subordinate of the satrap’s viceroy, 
which suggests that he was under satrapal authority. Furthermore, a letter dated to the late 
fifth century BC contains a response of Arsames, the satrap of Egypt, to a complaint issued 
by one of his subordinate clerics (אידקפ) Psamshek, an Egyptian, against a garrison 
commander named Armapiya.244 It seems that Armapiya and the soldiers under his 
command refused to follow the orders of Psamshek, and for that the officer was reproached 
by the satrap. This correspondence serves as another indication that the garrison 
commander in Elephantine was responsible to the satrap. All in all, these instances give the 
                                                 
satrapies was predicated on a well-established Persian practice. While this hypothesis might be true, is 
remains speculative due to lack of substantive evidence.  
239 R&O no. 87. Hornblower (1982, 147) demonstrates that the term epimeletes designates garrison 
commanders by pointing out several similar employments of the term in other instances. See: Xen. Hell. 
3.2.11; IG XII (8) 5 line 6 (Lemnos, 4th century); Syll.3 534 lines 5-6 (Delphi, 218/17 BC); Polyb. 4.80.15. 
240 Neh. 7:2. The appointment of Hannaniah occurred during Nehemiah’s first term as the governor of Yehud, 
which spanned from the 23rd until the 32nd regnal year of Artaxerxes I, i.e. from 445 to 433 BC. See: Neh. 
5:14. The case of Hannaniah is rather striking since Nehemiah was the underling of the satrap who governed 
the satrapy Beyond-the-River. It seems reasonable to assume that since Jerusalem was neither a satrapal seat 
nor a key strategic position, the satrap may have delegated the appointment of the garrison commander to his 
underling. 
241 For example, an Aramaic document (AP no. 1), dated to 495 BC, mentions a certain Ravaka who presided 
as the garrison commander (rab-ḥaylā) in Elephantine. For additional appearances of the term rab-ḥaylā in 
Aramaic documents from Egypt, see: AP no. 16, line 7 (an appeal to a higher court, c. 435 BC); AP no. 20, 
line 5 (a settlement of a claim, 420 BC); AP no. 20, line 5 (a settlement of a claim, 420 BC); AP no. 25, lines 
2 and 4 (a renunciation of a claim, 416 BC); AP no. 38, line 3 (a letter of recommendation, before 411 BC); 
AP no. 54, line 14 (fragments, unknown date). Moreover, Spiegelberg (1928, 621–22) suggests that the 
Persian Artabanes, who is mentioned in a document concerning grain transport sent to Pherendates the above 
mentioned the satrap of Egypt, was the garrison commander of Syene.  
242 See, for instance, the case of Waidrang/Vidarnga, the son of the above mentioned Ravaka. Cowely (1923, 
51) observes that Waidrang/Vidarnga presided as rab-ḥaylā (AP nos. 16, 20, 25, 38) under a frataraka named 
Nephayan, and that sometime before 411 BC he was promoted to the position of frataraka (AP no. 30).  
243 Porten 1968, 44–5 with n. 62; Wiesehöfer 1996, 62. For further reading on the organization and 
administrative hierarchy in the Elephantine-Syene garrisons, see: Porten 1968, 28–61. 
244 AD no. 4; TADAE I, A6.8.  
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impression that the garrison commanders, whether appointed directly by the Great King or 
not, were under the authority of the satrap.245 
Solving the Discrepancy 
The discrepancies regarding the status of the garrison commanders in the satrapies have 
led to various scholarly interpretations. Several scholars have simply accepted the notion 
that the Achaemenid Kings exercised direct control over the garrison commanders.246 
Others, mindful of the inconsistency in the ancient sources, offered alternative 
explanations. Petit, for instance, argues that satrapal military authority gradually increased 
during the fifth century BC and by the end of the century the satraps exercised full control 
over military affairs in their respective provinces. In addition, he postulates that Xenophon, 
who was mindful of the contemporary state of affairs, refers to an earlier period when 
satrapal military power was still limited.247 Such interpretation, however, seems 
problematic since Xenophon explicitly says that garrison commanders were appointed by 
the Persian King in his own time.248 Therefore, even if satrapal authority increased during 
the fifth century BC, the Achaemenid kings continued to personally appoint garrison 
commander well into the fourth century BC. An alternative explanation is offered by 
Dandamaev and Lukonin, who argue that it was Darius I who stripped the satraps of their 
military command by personally appointing the garrison commanders in the satrapies. But 
Darius’ new protocol was not strictly observed by the Great King’s successors, which 
caused the discrepancy in the ancient sources regarding satrapal military authority.249 A 
more cogent explanation, in my view, is offered by Lewis, who convincingly argues that 
the inconsistency in the ancient sources demonstrates that there was no uniform procedure 
and that there is no reason to expect that all Achaemenid garrisons were under direct royal 
authority.250 Similarly, Hornblower argues that Xenophon’s account is not false but rather 
too schematic, and as such provides a rigid description of Achaemenid practices.251 It is 
quite possible, as Briant suggests, that the Achaemenid Kings appointed garrison 
commanders, who presumably reported directly to the central authorities, only in critical 
locations as satrapal capitals and treasury deposits.252 Moreover, several scholars have 
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which suggests that these forces answered directly to the satrap. 
246 Ehtécham 1946, 113–14; Olmstead 1948, 59; Weiskopf 1982, 47; Cook 1985, 273; Wiesehöfer 1996, 62; 
Klinkott 2005, 289–94. 
247 Petit 1990, 106–7. For a discussion on the extent of satrapal power in regard to military matters, see p. 56 
below.  
248 Xen. Cyr. 8.6.9.  
249 Dandamaev and Lukonin 1989, 101. 
250 Lewis 1977, 53 n. 21. 
251 Hornblower 1982, 147–48. In addition, Kuhrt (1983a, 148, 150) and Briant (2002, 70, 507) has questioned 
the notion that the Achaemenids had ever imposed the same administrative structure in each satrapy and that 
such a monolithic structure ever existed. It is rather certain that the Achaemenids applied a slimier approach 
in regard to the garrisons in the satrapies.  
252 Briant 2002, 343.  
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pointed out that neither Xenophon nor any other source explicitly claims that the garrison 
commanders, even when they were appointed by the Great King himself, were exempted 
from satrapal directives.253 One must admit that it would have been very difficult for any 
satrap to carry on his duties with success if the garrison commanders were not obligated to 
follow his commands.254 Therefore, it is more than plausible that while in theory the 
garrisons were under royal authority, in practice they were still obligated to follow satrapal 
orders,255 though the garrison commanders probably had the discretion to disobey a satrap 
if it was apparent that his actions were against the King’s interests.256 In sum, the Persian 
protocol regarding the garrisons in the satrapies was fairly flexible. Notwithstanding the 
obligation of the garrison commanders and their soldiers to follow satrapal orders, they 
were ultimately expected to safeguard royal interests. Accordingly, royal appointments 
were clearly designated to enhance loyalty to the King, and as a result rendered it 
considerably more difficult for any satrap to rally sufficient military might to challenge the 
Great King. 
The Origin of the Measure  
While we can neither refute nor corroborate Xenophon’s claim that this practice was 
established by Cyrus the Elder, the satrapal revolts of Oroites and Aryandes probably led 
Darius to the conclusion that it was imperative to curtail satrapal military prerogatives.257 
Indeed, the cautious conduct of Bagaius when appearing before Oroites reveals that Darius 
and his emissary had their doubts regarding the fidelity of the Persian officials present at 
Sardis to their new Great King. Therefore, these circumstances may have prompted a 
change in the manner in which garrison commanders were appointed, but despite the 
official change in policy, in actuality it may have been implemented only in regions which 
demanded tighter royal control. 
Royal Chancellors 
Royal personnel in the satrapies were not limited to the military hierarchy. Ample evidence 
demonstrates the presence of royal chancellors and scribes in the provinces. Herodotus, for 
example, notes the presence of a royal secretary (τῷ γραμματιστῇ τῷ βασιληίῳ) in Oroites’ 
court and adds that each satrap had a royal scribe at his disposal.258 According to 
Xenophon, during his stay in the Cappadocian city of Dana, Cyrus the Younger put to death 
a Persian named Megaphernes, a wearer of the royal purple (φοινικιστὴν βασίλειον),259 
                                                 
253 Badian 1965, 173 with n. 5 and 174; Hornblower 1982, 147–48; Tuplin 1988, 69. 
254 Briant 2002, 340, 343.  
255 Porten 1968, 43; Klinkott 2005, 301–2. 
256 Tuplin 1987c, 171; Dusinberre 2013, 87. 
257 Petit 1990, 112–13. In contrast, Lewis (1977, 25 n. 21) argues that the independence of the garrison 
stationed in Sardis was the outcome of the more recent satrapal revolt led by Pissuthnes (see p. 147 below), 
which took place in c. 420 BC. Nevertheless, Lewis’ argument relies mainly on the chorological proximity 
of Pissuthnes’ revolt rather than substantive evidence.  
258 Hdt. 3.128.3. 
259 Xen. An. 1.2.20. Lendle (1995, 25) connects this event to the ravaging of the region of Lycaonia by Cyrus’ 
Greek mercenaries. He argues that Megaphernes and his accomplice staged a revolt in Lycaonia against 
Cyrus, an act which led Cyrus to deem Lycaonia as hostile territory. 
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and it has been argued that this title designates a royal scribe.260 Official documents from 
Achaemenid Egypt corroborate the existence of a satrapal chancellery, which was 
apparently supervised by an official who might have been the royal chancellor mentioned 
in the Greek sources. For example, three officials are named in the subscript of a Demotic 
letter dated to 492 BC, which was sent by the satrap of Egypt Pherendates to the Wab 
priests of Khanum at Elephantine. The first, a Persian named Satibar, was “cognizant of 
this order”, the second, an Egyptian named Peftuaneith, was “the one who wrote (the 
letter)”, and the third, another Egyptian by the name of Wahipre, “wrote (this letter)”.261 
Satibar probably presided as the satrapal chancellor, and as such had the authority over 
routine business and the satrap’s official correspondence, while Peftuaneith and Wahipre 
functioned as secretaries in the satrapal chancellery responsible for translating official 
documents into Aramaic and Demotic.262 A similar administrative protocol is attested in 
two Aramaic letters dispatched by Arsames, also a satrap of Egypt. The first letter, 
addressed to Armapiya, an Anatolian man who was an officer commanding a company of 
troops, is signed by Bagasravi, a Persian who presided as the chancellor, and Ahpepî, an 
Egyptian who functioned as the scribe.263 The second letter is signed by the chancellor 
Anani, a Hebrew name, and Nabuaqab, the scribe.264 Though we are not explicitly told that 
these official were of royal status, their senior position and foreign origin has led scholars 
to identify them as a royal element in the satrapal government.265  
Similarly, there is a Babylonian clay tablet signed by Liblut and Gadalama, who 
are recognized as sepiru, scribes who wrote Aramaic on parchment, and bēl ṭemi, i.e. 
chancellors.266 This dual title, which clearly designates a high ranking official in the 
satrapal hierarchy,267 seems to be equivalent to the chancellor mentioned in the Egyptian 
sources. Moreover, the biblical sources mention two Samaritans, Rehum and Shimshai, 
who wrote to King Artaxerxes I against the rebuilding of the temple in Jerusalem. Rehum 
was acting as לֵעְב םֵעְט , the Aramaic equivalent of the Akkadian bēl ṭemi, i.e. chancellor, 
                                                 
260 Lewis 1977, 25 n. 143; Tuplin 1987a, 118; Asheri, Lloyd, and Corcella 2007, 510–11. The Greek term 
ποινικαστάς is attested in a Cretan inscription, in which it denotes the term ‘scribe’ or ‘recorder’. Cf. Lilian 
H. Jeffery and Morpurgo-Davies 1970, 132–33; Raubitschek 1970, 155; Virgilio 1975, 83–84. In contrast, 
Weiskopf (1982, 26) argues that the title ascribed to Megaphernes indicates that he held some title in the 
court hierarchy of Susa. Such interpretation is problematic since one wonders why Megaphernes was in 
Cappadocia far away from the royal capital. It is more probable that he was sent to Sardis as a royal scribe, 
perhaps after he held a position of some importance at the royal court. 
261 PBerlin 13540. Published by Spiegelberg (1928, 605–6). For an English translation, see: Porten et al. 
1996, C1; Kuhrt 2007, no. 17.30.ii. 
262 Hughes 1984, 83; Porten et al. 1996, 291 ns. 15-17; Kuhrt 2007, 854 ns. 7-8. 
263 AD no. 4; TADAE I, A6.8. The letter is dated to the late fifth century BC. For an English translation, see: 
Kuhrt 2007, no. 16.60.iii. 
264 AP no. 26; TADAE I A6.2. The document is dated to 411 BC. For an English translation, see: Kuhrt 2007, 
no. 14.44. 
265 Stolper 1989b, 298–303; Kuhrt 2007, 729 n. 8. 
266 This legal document (BM 74554) was published and translated by Stolper (1989b, 284–86). Further on 
the office of bēl ṭemi, see discussion at Luukko 2007, 231 n. 18. 
267 Stolper 1989b, 299; Briant 2002, 447. For an English translation, see: Brosius 2000, no. 130; Kuhrt 2007, 
no. 16.60.i. 
42 
 
while Shimshai was the אָרְפָס, which is translated as scribe.268 The formulation and titles 
suggest that the chancellery of the satrapy Across-the-River resembled that of Egypt in 
structure and procedure.269 More importantly, the fact that the addressee of their petition 
was the Great Persian King himself indicates that they were prominent officers who had 
direct access to the royal court. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the satrapal 
chancelleries were supervised by senior officials who were either appointed by the King or 
were affiliated in some way with the royal court.270 
The chancellor, it seems, had considerable power and influence. In spite of the 
technical nature of the functions and duties of the satrapal chancellery, namely reading, 
writing, and dispatching official documents, the chancellor held a critical position in the 
administrative hierarchy.271 He was probably a permanent member of the satrapal 
entourage whose duties included management of the administrative and financial day-to-
day affairs in the satrapy a well as supervising official correspondence, including letters 
sent from the royal court.272 Accordingly, they could and probably were expected to inform 
the King when a certain satrap was not fulfilling his duty or even plotting against the great 
King.273 As a result, it must have been extremely difficult for any satrap to keep the central 
authorities in the dark regarding the true state of affairs in his province.  
Royal Judges 
Royal judges constituted another class of royal administrators who were present in the 
satrapies. According to Herodotus, these royal judges (βασιλήιοι δικασταί) were 
exclusively Persian, appointed for life, and members of the royal entourage.274 Their duties 
                                                 
268 Ezra 4:8-9. Rehum is also mentioned in 1 Esdras (2:17, 27) and in Josephus’ Antiquities (11.26), where 
he is described as he who records/writes down the affairs that happen (Ράθυμος ὁ τὰ προσπίπτοντα). 
269 We have seen before how the satrap Tatnai sent a letter to Darius to complain about the allegedly 
unauthorized construction of the temple in Jerusalem. Unfortunately, the sources provide only the gist of his 
accusations, but one can speculate that the letter was signed by two of his aides who held similar positions to 
Rehum and Shimshai’s. 
270 Lewis 1977, 25 n. 143; Weiskopf 1982, 47; Burn 1984, 107; Tuplin 1987a, 120; Stolper 1989b, 298–303; 
Asheri, Lloyd, and Corcella 2007, 510; Kuhrt 2007, 817 n. 3. Interestingly, numerous documents from 
Persepolis (e.g. PF 654-662, 665-669, 672) feature a subscript which is signed in a similar manner to the 
official documents found in Egypt and Babylon, i.e. ‘X wrote (the text)’; ‘Y communicated its message’. The 
predominance of this feature led scholars to conclude that the individuals who signed these documents were 
senior officials in the royal chancellery, which plausibly resembled in structure and function to the satrapal 
chancellery, e.g.: Lewis 1977, 10; Stolper 1984, 305 with n. 17; Tuplin 1987a, 118. For the various formulae 
employed in the Persepolis Fortification and Treasury Texts, see: Lewis 1977, 10 n. 38. 
271 The technical nature of these secretaries is attested in Herodotus (7.100.1), who recounts how during a 
review of his invasion force, all of the interactions of Xerxes with his subordinates were recorded by the 
scribes (οἱ γραμματισταί). Moreover, when Xerxes was watching the battle at Salamis, Herodotus (8.90.4) 
reports, whenever the Great King observed a gallant deed performed by one of his ships, he asked for the 
name of the trierarch, his patronymic and city of origin, information which, again, was recorded by the 
scribes. 
272 Porten 1968, 55–56. 
273 Tuplin 1987a, 120. 
274 Herodotus (3.14.5) reports that royal judges accompanied Cambyses during his Egyptian campaign and 
were responsible for deciding the punishment of the Egyptians who participated in a massacre of a crew of a 
Mytilenian trireme. Moreover, Herodotus (3.31.2-4) recounts an episode in which Cambyses, wanting to 
legitimize his marriage to his sister, turned to the royal judges. The latter, wishing to refrain from 
antagonizing their master, proclaimed that while there is no law that sanctioned a marriage between a man 
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included interpretation of ancestral ordinance and institutions and giving judgement when 
asked.275 But the responsibilities of these officials were not limited to the royal court. An 
Aramaic papyrus from Elephantine dated to 495 BC notes the presence of royal judges ( יניד
אכלמ) in the region, which demonstrates that the Royal judges travelled to the satrapies.276 
The impetus for sending the royal judges to the provinces is clarified by several documents 
from Babylon which mention the office of dayyānu ša rēš šarri, also abbreviated as ša rēši, 
a term which means ‘judge of the king’.277 These officials, who were clearly of royal 
status,278 had various areas of responsibilities, e.g. members of the royal, satrapal and 
military administration in addition to tax collection duties.279 Furthermore, in the book of 
Ezra we are told that Artaxerxes II sent a letter to Ezra which granted him the power to 
appoint judges for all the peoples of the satrapy Beyond-the-River.280 The fact that these 
judiciary officials were appointed not by the satrap but by a special delegate empowered 
by the King implies a royal status of some sort,281 and even if these officials were obligated 
to obey the satrap,282 the presence of an independent judiciary authority must have come 
                                                 
and his sister, there was a law which stated that the Great King of the Persians was allowed to do whatever 
he wanted. Kuhrt (2007, 604 n. 7) observes that a similar episode occurs in Plutarch’s biography of 
Artaxerxes II (Art. 23), in which Parysatis persuaded her son to marry his daughter Atossa by arguing that it 
was the divine prerogative of the Great King to judge what is good and bad.  
275 Hdt. 3.31.3. Diodorus (15.8.3-5, 10-11) adds that they presided as judges in high-profile trials and bring 
as an example the trail of Tiribazus, the former satrap of Lydia. It should be noted that royal judges were 
harshly punished by the Great Kings for accepting bribes, see: Hdt. 5.25, 7.194; Diod. 15.10.1. 
276 AP no. 1; TADAE II B5.1. For an English translation, see: Greenfield and Porten 1982, 106–7; Kuhrt 
2007, no. 17.29. The royal status of these judges becomes even more evident in light of evidence for other 
officials in Egypt who bore judiciary titles which lacked any royal affiliation. For instance, a fragmentary 
Aramaic papyrus from Elephantine, dated to the reign of Artaxerxes I, which mention ‘provincial judges’ 
( נידאתנדמ א ). See: AP no. 16; TADAE I A5.2. For an English translation, see: DAE no. 18; Kuhrt 2007, 14.36. 
In addition, two Aramaic fragments from Saqqara dated to the fifth century BC mention the title ‘judges’ or 
‘law-officials’ (Ar. d]tbry᾿ = OP dātabara) without mentioning any royal affiliation. See: Segal nos. 13-14. 
277 The component šarri means ‘of the king’ or ‘royal’.  
278 Dandamaev 1992a, 54; Bongenaar 1997, 99–100; Fried 2004, 31. For instance, in the archives of the 
temple of Eanna in Uruk the title ša rēši šarri bēl piqitti Eanna is well attested throughout the duration of the 
archive. Two of these royal officials presided as the treasurer (ša muḫḫi quppi ša-šarri ina Eanna) and as the 
supervisor (ša-rēš šarri bēl piqitti ša Eanna) of the temple. Fried (2004, 31) notes that the title of ša rēši šarri 
bēl piqitti appears in documents dated to the reigns of Cyrus the Great, Cambyses and Darius I, and therefore 
it is certain that this office was adopted by the Achaemenids when Babylon was converted from an 
independent kingdom into a Persian satrapy. For the ša-rēš šarri as a member of the Eanna temple 
administration in the reigns of Cyrus and Cambyses, see:  Jursa 2011a, 161–63. For the reign of Darius I, 
see: BM 25660, Borsippa, dated to 494 BC (see: Jursa and Waerzeggers 2009, 256 with n. 104); BM 31572, 
Babylon, dated to 497 or 496 BC (see: Abraham 2004, no. 31); BM 30980, Babylon, dated to 496 BC (see: 
Abraham 2004, no. 31); BM 3059, Babylon, dated to 487 BC (see: Abraham 2004, no. 16). 
279 Jursa 2011, 163. On the Neo-Babylonian origin of this office along with a survey of the available evidence 
and their duties, see: Holtz 2009, 27–47, 55–62; Holtz 2010. 
280 Ezra 7:25.  
281 Fried 2004, 217. Grabbe (1994, 293) postulates that Ezra may have been appointed as the governor of the 
satrapy Beyond-the-River. Such reading seems a bit too far reaching since Ezra’s area of activity was clearly 
confined to Yehud and, to our best knowledge, those who were appointed as satraps were exclusively of 
Persian origin. 
282 Grabbe 1994, 293; Fried 2004, 217. For further reading on the judiciary institutions and protocols of the 
Achaemenid Empire, see: Fried 2001. 
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at the expense of the authority of the satrap.283 Since these officers were royal agents, they 
were probably predisposed to observe the actions of the satrap and inform the central 
authorities about any satrapal misconduct.284 
2.2 Yearly Royal Review 
Periodic inspections constituted another measure designed to facilitate effective royal 
supervision. Xenophon claims that an annual royal review (ἀπόδειξις) was instituted by 
Cyrus the Elder.285 This inspection focused on two primary aspects. The first was the 
readiness of the satrapal military contingents. Xenophon says that the Persian central 
authorities assigned a fixed quota of horsemen, archers, slingers, and light-armed troops to 
each satrapy for the protection of the King’s land,286 and every year the King conducted an 
inspection of the preparedness of these forces.287 The review took place at the place of 
muster (σύλλογος), a specific location which functioned as a mobilization center for 
satrapal forces.288 During the review the troops marched in full battle gear before the great 
King, who inspected the condition of the various regiments. Garrison commanders, 
chiliarchs and satraps whose troops were well-equipped were rewarded, while those who 
neglected their duties were punished.289 The yearly royal review of the satrapal military 
contingents as described by Xenophon is not mentioned elsewhere, but there are two 
instances which illustrate the mechanism of this practice. Xenophon reports that while 
Cyrus the Younger camped in Cilicia, he held a review of his army. The armed forces 
marched in battle array, while Cyrus gazed upon them from his war-chariot.290 A similar 
description is provided by Herodotus, who recounts the manner in which Xerxes reviewed 
his army and navy at Doriscus. The infantry and cavalry were inspected as he rode through 
the camp on his chariot. Then, he boarded a Sidonian ship and surveyed the fleet.291  
The second aspect of the yearly review focused on the economic well-being of the 
satrapies. The aforementioned civic governors and their immediate superiors, the satraps, 
were punished if their domain was insufficiently cultivated and thinly populated due to 
poor judgment or excessive severity. But additional territory, gifts and various other honors 
were given to those whose domain flourished and prospered.292  
                                                 
283 Hornblower 1982, 150. 
284 Fried 2004, 214. 
285 Xen. Cyr. 8.6.15.  
286 Xen. Oec. 4.5. 
287 Xen. Cyr. 8.6.15. 
288 Xen. Oec. 4.6. According to Xenophon (An. 1.1.2, 1.9.7; Hell. 1.4.3) the Castolus Plain was the designated 
muster place of the Lydian satrapy and its immediate environ. Moreover, Xenophon mentions the plain of 
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Babylon (Xen. Cyr. 5.3.45) functioned as muster places for the royal armies. It should be noted that the 
Aramaic term that designates the rallying point of Achaemenid forces is hndz or hndyz. See: AP 13, line 4 
and AP 27, line 7. For a discussion on the Aramaic term, see: Petit 1990, 134 n. 116. 
289 Xen. Oec. 4.6-7.  
290 Xen. An. 1.2.14-18.  
291 Hdt. 7.100.  
292 Xen. Oec. 4.6-8. 
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However, the effectiveness and extent of these yearly royal reviews must have been 
limited. Xenophon claims that the garrison troops were not obligated to present themselves 
for inspection at the muster place.293 On the one hand, there is little doubt that leaving 
numerous key strategic positions unguarded at the same time meant that the satrapy was 
unnecessarily exposed. On the other hand, it is highly improbable that the garrison troops 
were not liable for inspection. Tuplin suggests that the King or his proxy could have 
reviewed the readiness of the garrison troops in situ.294 Yet, reviewing each and every 
garrison post in a given satrapy was an arduous and probably unfeasible task. Perhaps 
Xenophon’s description is again too schematic, and only important garrisons were visited 
on site. Conversely, since Xenophon does explicitly list the garrison commanders and their 
troops among those who appeared in full battle gear for inspection295, one can speculate 
that each garrison sent a delegation headed by an officer to the muster place to participate 
in the royal review, while a sufficient number of troops was left behind to guard the King’s 
land.  
The Circuit Commissioners  
A more serious challenge was offered by the vastness of the Achaemenid Empire. 
Xenophon states that the royal circuit was limited to the regions adjacent to King’s 
residence, doubtlessly the royal capitals in the core satrapies, and the regions which he 
passed through in his travels.296 The satrapies further away, Xenophon adds, were visited 
by trustworthy proxies,297 designated as the circuit commissioners (οὗτοι τῶν ἐφόδων), 
royal agents who inspected the condition of the satrapies on the King’s behalf. Their 
responsibilities were as follows:298  
 
ἐφοδεύει γὰρ ἀνὴρ κατ᾽ ἐνιαυτὸν ἀεὶ στράτευμα ἔχων, ὡς ἢν μέν τις τῶν σατραπῶν 
ἐπικουρίας δέηται, ἐπικουρῇ, ἢν δέ τις ὑβρίζῃ, σωφρονίζῃ, ἢν δέ τις ἢ δασμῶν φορᾶς 
ἀμελῇ ἢ τῶν ἐνοίκων φυλακῆς ἢ ὅπως ἡ χώρα ἐνεργὸς ᾖ ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τεταγμένων 
παραλίπῃ, ταῦτα πάντα κατευτρεπίζῃ: ἢν δὲ μὴ δύνηται, βασιλεῖ ἀπαγγέλλῃ: ὁ δὲ ἀκούων 
βουλεύεται περὶ τοῦ ἀτακτοῦντος. καὶ οἱ πολλάκις λεγόμενοι ὅτι βασιλέως υἱὸς 
καταβαίνει, βασιλέως ἀδελφός, βασιλέως ὀφθαλμός, καὶ ἐνίοτε οὐκ ἐκφαινόμενοι, οὗτοι 
τῶν ἐφόδων εἰσίν: ἀποτρέπεται γὰρ ἕκαστος αὐτῶν ὁπόθεν ἂν βασιλεὺς κελεύῃ. 
For on a yearly basis a man would visit (the satrapies) with an army. If a certain satrap is 
in need of assistance, he provides him with such, but if a satrap becomes arrogant, he 
corrects him. Moreover, if anyone might be careless regarding the collection of tribute, the 
protection of the inhabitants, the cultivation of the land or any other area of responsibility 
that was assigned to him, [the commissioner] restores everything back into order. But if he 
is unable to do so, he reports to the King, who, after learning about the situation, devises a 
solution regarding the one who is insubordinate. Often times there are those who say that 
the King’s son is coming or the King’s brother or the King’s eye. Sometime the circuit 
                                                 
293 Xen. Oec. 4.6. 
294 Tuplin 1987c, 173. Conversely, Petit (1990, 116 n. 51) believes that in spite of Xenophon’s articulation, 
all of the troops in any given satrapy were liable for inspection, a claim which I find highly unlikely. 
295 Xen. Oec. 4.7. 
296 Xen. Oec. 4.6, 8.  
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298 Xen. Cyr. 8.6.16. 
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commissioners would not make an appearance, for each of them would return [to the royal 
court] whenever he is summoned by the King.  
In essence, the circuit commissioners saw that the satrapies were administered effectively 
and with good judgement. In addition, these inspectors travelled with an army, which was 
presumably deployed whenever a satrap needed assistance to counter potential external 
threats or in times when a satrap failed to adhere to royal command. In addition, Xenophon 
notes a possible scenario in which a circuit commissioner found himself unable to restore 
order in a given satrapy, which would result in direct royal intervention. Xenophon might 
refer to a satrapal revolt or a local uprising which proved to be too much for the forces 
which accompanied the royal inspector and as such demanded direct royal intervention.299 
 Interestingly, Xenophon says that the advent of the ephodoi was preceded by 
rumors that the King’s immediate kin or the King’s Eye was en route.300 According to this 
passage, the office of royal inspector, doubtlessly a highly sensitive position, was manned 
by the closest confidants of the Great King.301 We know of several high-profile dignitaries 
who visited the western satrapies, and they may have done so in the capacity of a circuit 
commissioner. For instance, after being accused of conspiring against his brother, Cyrus 
the Younger did all he could to win the loyalty of the dignitaries who were sent to his 
satrapy from the royal court.302 One or more of these senior delegates might have been one 
of Xenophon’s commissioners. Another plausible member of the ephodoi is Tithraustes, 
who was sent to Sardis by Artaxerxes II to eliminate Tissaphernes and restore order in the 
western satrapies. Tithraustes initiated peace talks with Agesilaus303 and sent Timocrates 
of Rhodes to bribe several Greek cities to declare war on the Spartans.304  The actions of 
Tithraustes suggests that his mission was to resolve the military crisis in the west, which 
corresponds with the duties of the circuit commissioners.305 In addition, we know that 
Tithraustes did not stay long in the west since Xenophon notes that by 392 BC Tiribazus 
was the satrap of Lydia,306 and there is no indication that he ever assumed the office of 
satrap after the execution of Tissaphernes. Furthermore, while we are not explicitly told 
that Tithraustes was accompanied by an army, the fact that Agesilaus was willing to accept 
the terms offered by Tithraustes after the decisive Persian defeat at the battle of Sardis 
suggests that the Persian forces were quick to recover, perhaps due to the fresh forces 
Tithraustes brought with him from the Persian heartland. In short, the limited time 
Tithraustes spent in the west, the absence of any indication that he assumed the office of 
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formidable as a fully furnished royal army. For instance, Artaxerxes I had to deploy a royal army to suppress 
an Egyptian uprising in the 460s (see p. 122 below), while Artaxerxes II had to do the same to defeat the 
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300 For a discussion on the King’s Eye, see p. 47 below. 
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303 Xen. Hell. 3.4.25. 
304 Xen. Hell. 3.5.1. 
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satrap, and his actions to restore order in the Lydian satrapy suggest that he may have 
presided as one of the circuit commissioner on his mission in western Anatolia. 
 The Satrapal Inspection Service  
It should be noted that the existence of an Achaemenid inspection service on the satrapal 
level is well attested in non-Greek sources. Officials designated as gaušaka (‘Listeners’) 
are attested in an official document from Egypt,307 and Briant argues that they conducted 
inquiries when summoned by local communities.308 In the Book of Ezra were are told about 
the existence of the treasurers (gyzbria)309 and the inspectors (aphrskia)310 of the satrapy 
Beyond-the-River. The Persian King addressed these officials directly through a decree, 
which should be seen as an indication of their importance and that they may have been 
affiliated with to royal court in some way. Tuplin argues that their title suggests that they 
held responsibility over the entire satrapy, though it is impossible to know if they were a 
part of the central satrapal treasury or spread throughout the satrapy’s treasuries.311 In 
essence, these officials monitored the activities in the satrapies on the King’s behalf while 
being an integral part of the satrapal administrative machinery. Their area of responsibility 
was clearly limited to a particular administrative aspect rather than the wellbeing of an 
entire satrapy, and as such supplemented the more general periodic reviews which focused 
on the wellbeing of an entire satrapy. 
In sum, the evidence for the existence of royal inspectors, on the satrapal and inter-
satrapal levels, reflects another measure which allowed the Achaemenid Kings, through 
loyal agents who reported directly to the King, to acquire a real and accurate picture of the 
condition in the satrapies and ensuring that royal interests are safeguarded. 
2.3 The Achaemenid Surveillance Service 
The King’s Eye 
The King’s Eye in the Greek Sources 
One of the most intriguing institutions which facilitated royal surveillance is the elusive 
King’s Eye. The Greek sources provide various descriptions of this Achaemenid office. 
Aeschylus mentions the King’s Eye as the one who reviewed the Persian forces that took 
part in Xerxes’ expedition,312 a responsibility which depicts the King’s Eye as a senior 
official who functioned as a muster officer or the King’s chief-of-staff.313 Herodotus 
recounts how during a game of pretend Cyrus the Elder assumed the role of king and 
assigned various offices and tasks to his playmates. One of them was given the title of the 
King’s Eye.314 Apart from the fact that the office was held by a single official, Herodotus 
does not include any additional information regarding the function or importance of this 
office.  
                                                 
307 AP no. 27. 
308 Briant 2002, 343. On the gaušaka, see: AP no. 27 and discussion on p. 51 below. 
309 Ezra 7:21: ָאי ַּרבַּזִּג. 
310 Ezra 5:6, 6:6: ֵאיָכְסְר ַּפֲא. 
311 Tuplin 1987a, 116. 
312 Aesch. Pers. 978-980: ἦ καὶ τὸν Περσᾶν αὐτοῦ τὸν σὸν πιστὸν πάντ᾽ ὀφθαλμὸν μυρία μυρία πεμπαστὰν. 
313 Balcer 1977, 256; Hirsch 1985, 105; E. Hall 1989, 89 with n. 178; E. Hall 1996, 172.  
314 Hdt. 1.114.2: τὸν δέ κου τινὰ αὐτῶν ὀφθαλμὸν βασιλέος εἶναι. 
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Another reference to the King’s Eye is found in Aristophanes’ Acharnians. In a 
scene which takes place at the Athenian Pnyx, Pseudartabas, the Eye of the Great King, is 
given audience.315 Pseudartabas, who presumably came to Athens on a diplomatic 
mission,316 is described as wielding a gigantic eye while mumbling gibberish and being 
accompanied by two eunuchs, who turn out to be a pair of debouched Athenians in disguise. 
There is little doubt that Aristophanes chose to depict this Persian ambassador as the King’s 
Eye not due to his actual prerogatives but rather due to the playwright’s desire to gain the 
most effective impact on his audience through word puns and the absurd presentation of a 
Persian dignitary wielding a huge eye.317 Therefore, besides the possible existence of such 
an office, nothing can be deduced with regard to the character and nature of the King’s 
Eye. 
In the biography of Artaxerxes II Plutarch recounts how Artasyras, who is identified 
as the King’s Eye, discovered the body of Cyrus the Younger in the aftermath of the battle 
of Cunaxa.318 This passage stands out, as noted by Hirsch, since it is the only known 
reference the King’s Eye in a proper historical context.319 Artasyras son of Aroandus, of 
Bactrian origin, was the satrap of Armenia who became a member of the Achaemenid 
household after he married Rhodogoune, the daughter of Artaxerxes II.320 Thus, one can 
                                                 
315 Ar. Ach. 100-133.  
316 Olmstead (1948, 59 with n. 6) suggests that the King’s Eye was acting as a royal messenger by referring 
to two anecdotes in Herodotus (3.34, 77). Conversely, Balcer (1977, 258 with n. 17) rejects this claim by 
pointing out the distinction made by Herodotus (1.114.2) between the King’s Eye and the royal messenger. 
317 Lenfant 2015, 115. Several suggestions have been made in regard to the comedic effect of the name 
Pseudartabas. Bivar (1985, 631–32) argues that it should be translated as ‘false-measure’, which, on the one 
hand, resonated with the notorious reputation of the infamous usurper Pseudo-Smerdis, while on the other 
criticized the greed of the Athenians who expected to receive bribe from the Persian ambassador. Indeed, 
according to Herodotus (1.129.3) the ἀρτάβη is a Persian unit of measurement of dry capacity, greater than 
an Attic medimnus by three Attic choenixes, i.e. about 47 litters. Another appealing interpretation places an 
emphasis on the inclusion of the Persian element arta, which means ‘truth’ or ‘cosmic order’. For instance, 
Mayrhofer (1973, 163 no. 8.576) translates Ṛtabānuš as ‘with the splendor of Ṛta’, while Ṛta is translated as 
‘active truth’, ‘order’ or ‘righteousness’. The Greeks were quite familiar with this element in Persian names, 
e.g. Artaxerxes, Artaphrenes (Aesch. Pers. 21; Hdt. 5.25.1), Artabazus (Thuc. 1.129.1). If this was the case, 
as Balcer (1977, 257) and Olsen (2002, 101) believe, the Greek audience was entertained by a Persian 
ambassador called ‘false-truth’ or ‘false-justice’. 
318 Plut. Art. 12.1.  
319 Hirsch 1985, 106. It is generally agreed that Plutarch derived his information on this episode from Ctesias, 
who was Artaxerxes II’s physician at the time of battle of Cunaxa. See: Lommel 1953, 324; Balcer 1977, 
257; Binder 2008, 213 with reference to earlier literature; Lenfant 2004, 282 n. 688; Lenfant 2015, 113. For 
Ctesias’ account on the battle of Cunaxa, see: Ctes. FGrH 688 F16 §64, F18-23. On the possibility that Dinon 
and Heraclides were Plutarch’s sources for the battle of Cunaxa, see: Hirsch 1985, 106. 
320 For the sources which mention Artasyras by name, see: Xen. An. 4.3.4; OGIS 390.7, 391.7-10. On 
Artasyras’ marriage to Artaxerxes’ daughter: OGIS 391.7-10, 392.10-15. For Artasyras’ Bactrian 
background: OGIS. 2644-8. Moreover, Artasyras’ son Orontes succeeded him as the satrap of Armenia (Xen. 
An. 3.5.17), and like his father before him, he also married a daughter of Artaxerxes (Xen. An. 2.4.8, 3.4.13). 
A fragmented chronicle from Pergamum (OGIS 264.4-8) reveals that Orontes revolted against Artaxerxes II, 
briefly occupied Pergamum, and eventually capitulated and died.  For further reading on Orontes’ revolt, see: 
Osborne 1973; Weiskopf 1989, 69–93. 
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infer from this passage that the King’s Eye was a close associate of the King and possibly 
an Achaemenid by blood or marriage.321  
 The common feature in all of the aforementioned sources is the depiction of the 
King’s Eye as a single high ranking official in close proximity to the Great Persian King.322 
This representation is challenged by Xenophon, who provides a lengthy account 
concerning the King’s Eye: 
[10] κατεμάθομεν δὲ ὡς καὶ τοὺς βασιλέως καλουμένους ὀφθαλμοὺς καὶ τὰ βασιλέως ὦτα 
οὐκ ἄλλως ἐκτήσατο ἢ τῷ δωρεῖσθαί τε καὶ τιμᾶν: τοὺς γὰρ ἀπαγγείλαντας ὅσα καιρὸς 
αὐτῷ εἴη πεπύσθαι μεγάλως εὐεργετῶν πολλοὺς ἐποίησεν ἀνθρώπους καὶ ὠτακουστεῖν καὶ 
διοπτεύειν τί ἂν ἀγγείλαντες ὠφελήσειαν βασιλέα. [11] ἐκ τούτου δὴ καὶ πολλοὶ 
ἐνομίσθησαν βασιλέως ὀφθαλμοὶ καὶ πολλὰ ὦτα. εἰ δέ τις οἴεται ἕνα αἱρετὸν εἶναι 
ὀφθαλμὸν βασιλεῖ, οὐκ ὀρθῶς οἴεται: ὀλίγα γὰρ εἷς γ᾽ ἂν ἴδοι καὶ εἷς ἀκούσειε: καὶ τοῖς 
ἄλλοις ὥσπερ ἀμελεῖν ἂν παρηγγελμένον εἴη, εἰ ἑνὶ τοῦτο προστεταγμένον εἴη: πρὸς δὲ 
καὶ ὅντινα γιγνώσκοιεν ὀφθαλμὸν ὄντα, τοῦτον ἂν εἰδεῖεν ὅτι φυλάττεσθαι δεῖ. ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ 
οὕτως ἔχει, ἀλλὰ τοῦ φάσκοντος ἀκοῦσαί τι ἢ ἰδεῖν ἄξιον ἐπιμελείας παντὸς βασιλεὺς 
ἀκούει. [12] οὕτω δὴ πολλὰ μὲν βασιλέως ὦτα, πολλοὶ δ᾽ ὀφθαλμοὶ νομίζονται: καὶ 
φοβοῦνται πανταχοῦ λέγειν τὰ μὴ σύμφορα βασιλεῖ, ὥσπερ αὐτοῦ ἀκούοντος, καὶ ποιεῖν 
ἃ μὴ σύμφορα, ὥσπερ αὐτοῦ παρόντος. οὔκουν ὅπως μνησθῆναι ἄν τις ἐτόλμησε πρός τινα 
περὶ Κύρου φλαῦρόν τι, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς πᾶσι καὶ ὠσὶ βασιλέως τοῖς ἀεὶ παροῦσιν 
οὕτως ἕκαστος διέκειτο. 
[10] In addition, we have observed that [the Persian King] acquired those who are called 
the King’s eyes and the King’s ears exclusively by conferring gifts and honors. For, since 
he rewarded greatly those who reported the things which were advantageous to him to be 
aware of, he encouraged many men to eavesdrop and to spy so that they could provide the 
King with a useful report. [11] Consequently, many are acknowledged as the eyes and ears 
of the King. And if anyone thinks that the King chooses a single eye, his is wrong. For a 
single man would see and hear very little. And if this responsibility was assigned a single 
individual, it would be just like ordering the others to be negligent. Moreover, if people 
would come to know that there was a certain Eye and who he was, they would surely guard 
themselves. But this is not the case, but instead the King listens to all those who say that 
they heard or saw something of value. [12] Thus, the King’s eyes and ears should be 
regarded as numerous. And people are afraid of saying anything which is detrimental to 
the King, as if he could hear them, or doing anything subversive, as if he could see them. 
Therefore, being in a state of mind as if each and every one of those present were the King’s 
eyes and ears, no one dared speaking disparagingly of Cyrus.  
It is evident that Xenophon is describing an Achaemenid policy of rewarding informants, 
a practice which brought about an informal surveillance network by which the Great King 
                                                 
321 Balcer 1977, 258. 
322 The King’s Eye is attested, explicitly and implicitly, in several postclassical sources, though they offer 
little to no new information regarding this institution. Dio Chrysostom (Or. 3.118) claims that the King’s Eye 
was a low-ranking official rather than a close associate of the King. Lucian (Merc. Cond. 29; Ind. 23) claims 
that the ‘eyes of the king’ were royal informers. Hesychius of Alexandria, (s.v. βασιλέως ὀφθαλμός) reports 
that the King’s Eye functioned as an overseer (ἐπίσκοπος). Philostratus (VA 1.21) mentions a satrap who was 
a eunuch and functioned as the ‘eye of the king’, and later (1.28) makes notice of the ‘ears of the king’. 
Themistius (Orations 21.2.550) asserts that ‘the eyes of the king’ functioned as local judicial magistrates. 
For a comprehensive survey of sources, classical and post classical, which refer to the King’s Eye, see: Hirsch 
1985, 108–113 with appendix 1. 
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tightened his control over the satrapies.323 Apparently, this network of informants was so 
effective that the King’s subjects did not dare making seditious utterances in fear of being 
reported to the Persian authorities.324 More importantly, Xenophon seeks to refute a 
contemporary communis opinio that the King’s Eye was an office held by a single 
individual.325 Xenophon, however, makes another reference to the King’s eye. When he 
describes the duties of the circuit commissioners Xenophon says that whenever one of 
ephodoi was about to visit a province, rumors circulated regarding the identity of the 
dignitary who was about to arrive, whether the King’s son, brother or the King’s Eye.326 
On the face of it, Xenophon seems to contradict himself, because instead of a great many 
‘eyes’ and ‘ears’, the King’s Eye is described as a single office holder who functioned as 
one of the royal inspectors.327 Conversely, Hirsch argues that Xenophon’s ephodoi were 
simply high ranking royal dignitaries whose arrival was preceded by rumors. Hence, he 
asserts that there is no discrepancy since Xenophon’s intention was to refute popular 
misconceptions concerning the King’s Eye, and that the unsubstantiated rumors which 
preceded the advent of the circuit commissioners were probably predicated on such false 
beliefs.328 Such interpretation is compelling but the ambiguity of Xenophon’s remark 
renders is difficult to determine with certainly whether the appellation ‘the Eye of the King’ 
signifies an actual office or a misplaced honorary title.329 
The King’s Eye in the Old-Persian Record 
In addition, the King’s Eye is absent from the Old-Persian record. Nevertheless, several 
attempts have been made to suggest a plausible Old-Persian term which might have 
corresponded with the Greek ὀφθαλμός βασιλέως. Schaeder, for example, postulates that 
the hypothetical Old-Persian term spaθāka (‘observer’, ‘overseer’, ‘watcher’) existed in 
the fifth and fourth centuries BC as an equivalent to the Greek King’s Eye.330 Eilers 
suggests the term kasaka (‘good seer’), which is derived from the Ossetic (eastern Iranian 
language) term kāsag, as a possible parallel.331 Ehtécham advocates that the Old-Persian 
term spadak (‘supervisor’) designated a chief official who presided over numerous agents, 
whose duty was to monitor and regularly inspect the administrative departments in the 
satrapies.332 Under the assumption that the Sassanid kings sought to revive the glories of 
the Achaemenid Empire, Pagliaro suggests the term patyaxš (‘supervisor’, ‘procurator’, 
‘overseer’), a designation which is based on a title of a senior official in the Sassanid court 
                                                 
323 Olmstead 1948, 59; Frye 1972, 89. Tuplin (1987a, 120) adds that the mutual criticism of the civil and 
military officials in the satrapy, described by Xenophon (Oec. 4.9) is another example of informal 
surveillance. I tend to disagree, since complaints issued by these officials about the misconduct of their 
colleagues do not strike me as informal. 
324 Aristid. Or. 27.29. 
325 Hirsch 1985, 103; Briant 2002, 343. 
326 Xen. Cyr. 8.16.6.  
327 Oppenheim 1968, 173; Lenfant 2015, 114. 
328 Hirsch 1985, 107. 
329 This remark also suggests that the Great King was in the habit of sending his immediate relatives as circuit 
commissioners along with other trustworthy associates, who, whether correctly or not, were identified as the 
King’s Eye. 
330 Schaeder 1934, 16–19. 
331 Eilers 1940, 23 n. 2. 
332 Ehtécham 1946, 57 with n. 1. 
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who bore the title bitaxš/bidyaxš.333 Another alternative is offered by Hinz, who notes that 
the Elamite tablets in Persepolis refer to an official called ti-ti-kaš or ti-ti-ya-kaš-be, and 
suggests the hypothetical Old-Persian term ditaka or didiyaka (‘one who sees’ or 
‘overseer’).334 Such imaginative and at times ingenious reconstructions are more than 
impressive. They remain, however, in the realm of conjecture.335 
The gaušaka 
Interestingly, a royal ‘Ear’ is attested in a petition dated to 410 BC addressed to Arsames, 
the satrap of Egypt.336 This document, written in Aramaic, includes the plural masculine 
noun gaušaka (איכשוג), which resonates with the Old-Persian verb gūš (‘to hear’) and the 
noun gauša (‘ear’), hence translated as ‘listeners’. Cowley argues that this is the equivalent 
Aramaic term to the Greek King’s Eye.337 Similarly, Lommel maintains that the term 
gaušaka was the source of a Greek distorted translation of the already familiar concept of 
the King’s Eye.338 Other scholars were more concerned by the fact that these officials were 
marked by the action of hearing rather than seeing. Accordingly, it has been suggested that 
the gaušaka functioned as chiefs of the local police,339 intelligence officers,340 royal 
emissaries who represented the central authorities in legal cases,341 low ranking public 
functionaries,342 the aides of the royal inspectors of the satrapies (i.e. the ‘eyes’), and 
officials who functioned similarly to Xenophon’s circuit commissioners but on the satrapal 
level.343 All of the above suggestions are speculative, but it is certain that the gaušaka 
operated in the outermost borders of Egypt and probably throughout the Persian Empire.344 
Moreover, it is rather clear that the gaušaka were not the informants mentioned by 
Xenophon. Yet, if these officials were indeed royal agents, it is reasonable to assume that 
their presence contributed to the King’s ability to supervise the satrapies and ensured a 
flow of reliable information from the provinces to the royal court.  
There was no King’s Eye 
The silence of the Old-Persian testimonies, the numerous discrepancies in the Greek 
sources, and the seemingly unreliability of the post classical sources led Hirsch to conclude 
that there was no King’s Eye. He postulates that this ahistorical Achaemenid institution 
originated from Iranian mythology. In the tenth Yasht, an Avestan hymn, the Zoroastrian 
God Mithras is described as having one thousand ears, ten thousand eyes and ten thousand 
                                                 
333 Pagliaro 1954, 144–45. Followed by Schmitt 1967, 140. Frye (1972, 89) argues that the patiyaxš was more 
of a satrapal viceroy or perhaps a chief inspector who was under the satrap’s authority. This title also 
correlates with the Greek πιτιάξης (‘overseer’, ‘guardian’). 
334 Hinz 1973, 98–101. 
335 For a summary and the shortcomings of the above mentioned etymological reconstructions, see: Hirsch 
1985, 115–19.  
336 AP no. 27. 
337 Cowley 1923, 102. See also: Eilers 1940, 22–3 with n. 5. 
338 Lommel 1953, 324–27. 
339 Schaeder 1934, 5; Ehtécham 1946, 56–58. 
340 Porten 1968, 50 n. 83; Porten et al. 1996, 136 n. 20. 
341 Frye 1963, 67; Frye 1972, 89–90. 
342 Oppenheim 1968, 178. 
343 Balcer 1977, 257. 
344 Lommel 1953, 334.  
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spies, spread throughout the land ever watchful of any acts of insubordination.345 Hirsch 
suggests that the Great Persian Kings exploited this Iranian mythological motif to 
encourage their subjects to subscribe to the idea that, just like the god Mithras, they too 
had a legion of secret agents listening and watching for any indication of subversive 
activity. Presumably, these rumors circulated throughout the Achaemenid Empire and 
eventually made their way into the accounts of Xenophon and others.346  
In spite of the many merits of Hirsch’s argument, there are two objections to his 
conclusions. First, the absence of the King’s Eye from the Old-Persian record is all but 
expected. Achaemenid royal inscriptions bear little to no information regarding the 
administrative apparatus of the Achaemenid Empire. Moreover, the documents found in 
various archives throughout the Empire are concerned primarily with commercial 
transactions and redistribution of resources. More importantly, the available Old-Persian 
sources are official in nature and therefore the fact that there is no mention of a secret 
intelligence service should not come as a surprise.347 Second, it is possible that the 
Achaemenids drew inspiration from the representation of Mithras in Iranian mythology to 
spread the notion that the Great King was the god’s earthly equivalent. Yet, the 
effectiveness of the rumors addressed by Xenophon could not have endured for long unless 
they were confirmed by actual instances in which the central authorities demonstrated their 
capacity to gather intelligence and act upon it. It seems likelier that the Achaemenids 
implemented concrete measures to maintain and augment the fear of being associated with 
treasonous acts. The policy of rewarding informants, mentioned by Xenophon, was likely 
to be one of these measures.348 Furthermore, Sancisi-Weerdenburg points out the 
uncertainties concerning the extent of Achaemenid adherence to Zoroastrianism, and the 
primacy of Ahuramazda, the god of the kings and kingship, in Achaemenid royal ideology, 
which renders Hirsch’ emphasis on the centrality of Mithras as problematic.349  
Parallel Institutions  
Another way in which scholars sought to corroborate the historicity of the King’s Eye was 
by pointing out the existence of similar institutions in other ancient royal regimens. On the 
one hand, it has been suggested that the Achaemenids borrowed the office of the King’s 
Eye from their Near-Eastern predecessors. In Egyptian sources we find the earliest known 
reference to officials designated as the King’s ‘eyes’ and ‘ears’, dated to the first half of 
the first millennium BC.350 There is a possible Assyrian parallel attested in a document 
                                                 
345 YT 10.7: “We sacrifice unto Mithra, the lord of wide pastures, who is truth-speaking, a chief in assemblies, 
with a thousand ears, well-shapen, with ten thousand eyes, high, with full knowledge, strong, sleepless, and 
ever awake”; YT 10.24: “he, of the ten thousand spies, the powerful, all-seeing, undeceivable Mithra”; YT 
10.45: “as spies for Mithra, on all the heights, at all the watching-places, observing the man who lies unto 
Mithra, looking at those, remembering those who have lied unto Mithra, but guarding the ways of those 
whose life is sought by men who lie unto Mithra, and, verily, by the fiendish killers of faithful men”. It should 
be noted that the Avestan term for spy is the aforementioned spaθaka or spas(a). For the English translation 
of the Avesta hymn, see: Darmesteter 1882, 121, 125, 130. 
346 Hirsch 1985, 101–31. A similar line of argumentation is outlined by Shahbazi 1988, 182–83. 
347 Pomeroy 1994, 242. Hirsch (1985, 124) himself concedes that “an intelligence network would inevitably 
seek to avoid publicity”. 
348 Balcer 1977, 260 n. 26. 
349 Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1989b, 189–90. 
350 Oppenheim 1968, 173 with n. 1. 
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dated to the seventh century BC that features an idiomatic usage of two verbs amāru (‘to 
see’) and šamū (‘to hear’). Moreover, it has been suggested that the regular employment of 
a formulaic command – “write me whatever you see and hear” – in the letters of the 
Sargonid kings (721-627 BC) may attest the existence of Assyrian royal officials who 
functioned as royal overseers or inspectors.351 As noted above, Herodotus recounts how 
Cyrus the Elder, while the Median Empire was still the ruling empire, chose one of his 
playmates to be the King’s Eye in the midst of a game of pretend.352 Another intriguing 
Median episode narrated by Herodotus recounts the exploits of Deioces, the Median King 
who had spies and informants scattered throughout Media, which enabled him to apprehend 
and punish with due measure disloyal subjects.353 Balcer highlights the fact that both 
episodes are set in a reality in which the Persians have yet to take over the Median kingdom 
and deduces that the Persians adopted the office of the King’s Eye from the Medians.354 
Yet, since these anecdotes are almost certainly fictive, it seems highly likely that they 
depicts Persian court practices, e.g. the eyes and ears of the king along with personal guard 
and an audience ritual, which were projected into the Median past by later generations.355 
 On the other hand, it is possible that the Achaemenid King’s Eye inspired the 
emergence of similar institutions employed by empires which existed in parallel to the 
Achaemenids or rose centuries after their demise. A good example is the well attested 
Athenian imperial magistrate called the Episkopos (επίσκοπος), an essential component in 
the Athenian imperial mechanism. These officials were dispatched to the subject states in 
order to ensure proper administration and to enforce obedience to Athenian directives. 
Balcer maintains that this Athenian imperial institution was predicated on an Achaemenid 
model.356 Shahbazi places an emphasis on the account of Philostratus357, in which the 
‘eyes’ and ‘ears’ of the Parthian King are mentioned. He claims that these titles were 
appropriated during the Parthian era and later transmitted to the Sassanid Empire, whose 
ruling dynasty was known for its tendency to follow the footsteps of the Achaemenids.358 
Another possible parallel appears in Indian documents dated to the beginning of the second 
century AD which mention five imperial censors who are referred to as the five senses of 
the government.359 Another royal Indian official called adhyaksha (‘inspector’, ‘overseer’) 
                                                 
351 Oppenheim 1968, 174. Eilers (1962, 211 n. 14) considers the existence of an Assyrian officials designated 
as ‘royal ears’. In a comprehensive study of the duties of the Neo-Assyrian offices of ‘chief scribe’ and palace 
scribe’, Luukko (2007) demonstrates that in addition to their scribal work these officials supervised the use 
of precious metals, oversaw building projects, rituals and commercial activities, and administered the 
collection of tribute. These scribes were powerful officials in the Neo-Assyrian administrative hierarchy and 
most likely members of the royal inner circle. Thus, one can hypothesize that they also served as the king’s 
inspectors, i.e. eyes and ears, beyond the royal court.  
352 Hdt. 1.114. 
353 Hdt. 1.100.2. 
354 Balcer 1977, 256–57. Shahbazi (1988, 181–84) argues that the Medes borrowed the office of the King’s 
Eye from their Aryan ancestors. 
355 Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1994, 55; Briant 2002, 26; Lenfant 2015, 112 n. 96. 
356 Balcer 1977, 252–63. For the features, duties and responsibilities of the Athenian Episkopos, see: Balcer 
1976. For the Athenian adoption of Achaemenid imperial institutions, see: Root 1985; Raaflaub 2009a. 
357 Philostratus VA 1.21, 28. 
358 Shahbazi 1988, 176–82. 
359 Oppenheim 1968, 174 with n. 3. 
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may have been based on the Achaemenid King’s Eye.360 Lastly, a similar institution is 
attested in seventh century China, which constituted an official designated as the ‘ear-and-
eye’ and operated as a censor.361 
 The aforementioned examples demonstrate that trustworthy royal officials who 
supervised the state of affairs in the provinces were a critical component in any imperial 
framework. This principle is discussed by Aristotle, who highlights an inherent weakness 
of any monarchic regime. Since the king is just one person, Aristotle argues, he is 
dependent on others to maintain his position of prominence. Consequently, it becomes 
necessary for a king to assign to his most eminent companions the task of listening and 
watching, which enabled the king to see and hear everything.362 This passage seems to 
reflect Xenophon’s aforementioned passage on the Persian King’s eyes and ears, as both 
point out the necessity to form a web of spies and informants through which any sign of 
dissent can be treated before it endangers the stability of the domain or the position of the 
monarch. The Achaemenid Empire was no different. Briant has no doubt that the Persian 
central authorities took measures to facilitate firm control over the satrapies and to ensure 
that those who governed them followed royal directives without hesitation.363  
In light of the available evidence, several conclusions can be made. First, the 
account of Xenophon demonstrates that the Achaemenids established a semiofficial 
intelligence gathering network that was predicated on voluntary informants that informed 
the Persian authorities about disloyal utterances and activities. Second, the numerous 
parallel institutions in other imperial settings does not unquestionably prove the existence 
of the office of the King’s Eye in the Achaemenid Empire, but it renders it more probable 
that the Achaemenids invested efforts to monitor the provinces officially and unofficially. 
Third, it is plausible that the Greek sources may have misunderstood or distorted the 
functions of the office of the King’s Eye,364 but these discrepancies are not sufficient to 
reject its historicity. Accordingly, the scholarly consensus suggests that a sort of secret 
service existed, which relied on a large number of paid informants, i.e. ‘ears’ and ‘eyes’, 
and was directed by a senior overseer, possibly the King’s Eye, who reported about the 
affairs of the empire directly to the King.365 In my view, the existence of a high ranking 
court official who was responsible for processing the massive flow of information coming 
                                                 
360 Frye 1963, 98. 
361 Autran 1950, 290–91; Oppenheim 1968, 174 with n. 4. 
362 Arist. On the Heavens 398a-b; Arist. Pol. 1287b29-30. 
363 Briant 2002, 343.  
364 Lenfant (2015, 116) deems the appearance of the King’s Eye in the Greek sources as a newly coined 
expression which was a translation which designated a Persian institution and that the considerable 
discrepancy is the outcome of the Greeks reinterpreting this office into a Greek term in a way  that would 
make sense from their own perspective.   
365 Oppenheim 1968, 173; Frye 1984, 108–9 with n. 79; McNeal 1986, 156; Tuplin 1987a, 120; Pomeroy 
1994, 241–42; Cataldo 2009, 59–60. A slightly different interpretation is offered by Balcer (1977, 261), who 
suggests that there may have been at least one Eye for each satrapy, since the singularity of the office, as 
described by Aeschylus, Herodotus and Aristophanes, is far from certain. Shahbazi (1988, 183–84) argues 
that many security officials, whose identity was kept in secret, were called the ‘eyes of the King’. They 
functioned as the chiefs of the bureau of security, and as such were assigned to perform various tasks, 
inspection of the satrapies to name one.  
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from the ‘eyes’, ‘ears’ and ‘listeners’ in satrapies and deciding which reports demanded 
the King’s attention is more than likely.  
Conclusion 
It is evident that the central Persian authorities invested considerable resources and 
manpower in monitoring the satrapies. Satrapal administration consisted of chancellors, 
scribes, secretaries and military personnel of royal status, while periodic inspections were 
conducted by the King or his loyal agents. These measures facilitated a flow of information 
from the provinces to the royal court regarding the security and welfare of the satrapies, 
while establishing firm control over the satrapies and ensuring that royal directives were 
executed. The capacity to gather intelligence could be used not only to detect signs of 
insubordination among the subject nations but also among the satraps. The royal personnel 
in the satrapies in general and in the satrapal court in particular constituted a continuous 
reminder that nothing can escape the King. Consequently, since the local government was 
constantly scrutinized, the chances that a satrapal rebellion or a local uprising were checked 
at an early stage increased considerably.  
It is difficult to determine when this royal surveillance array was established. 
Xenophon’s claim, namely that the entire imperial apparatus was established en masse by 
Cyrus the Elder, seems highly unlikely and it is more probable that royal supervision, just 
like many other branches of the Achaemenid imperial government, developed gradually 
over time. The rise of Darius, however, and the challenges he overcame must have 
prompted an effort to expand and empower the institutions which were responsible for 
supervising the satrapies.366 In this way, the Persian royal authorities kept a close eye on 
the state of affairs in the satrapies and the conduct of the satraps. But while the satraps were 
closely monitored by the Great Persian King, they were given considerable resources and 
conferred with extensive executive power which corresponded with the numerous satrapal 
duties they were expected to fulfill. Satrapal responsibilities and prerogatives are the 
subject of the following chapter. 
  
                                                 
366 Balcer (1977, 261) postulates that if there was only one royal ‘eye’, it was during the reign of Cyrus, and 
that Darius must have expanded this office during the reorganization of the empire, resulting in numerous 
eyes instead of just one.  
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3. SATRAPAL DUTIES AND RESOURCES 
 
The office of satrap entailed numerous and diverse duties and functions. For successful 
fulfillment of these satrapal obligations, the satraps had access to ample financial and 
military resources. In the following, the emphasis is placed on the responsibilities of the 
satrap vis-à-vis the central Persian authorities and the resources allocated to the satraps for 
the successful completion of the tasks assigned by the Great Persian King. By surveying 
the various satrapal obligations and resources we can obtain a better understanding of the 
Great King’s expectations of his provincial governors and how satrapal performance was 
evaluated. Consequently, the extent and limitation of satrapal power, authority, and 
jurisdiction are also clarified and contextualized. In this way, one can explain (1) what 
motivated a certain satrap to prefer a specific course of action or policy over another and 
(2) whether the consequences of such action were perceived as failures or successes by the 
Persian royal authorities. 
3.1 Satrapal Duties 
Satraps as Protectors of Royal Domain 
The Old-Persian Record (xšaçapāvā) 
The term xšaçapāvā in the Old-Persian record is used to designate the Persian provincial 
governors, whom the Greek authors call satraps.367 This designation, which appears twice 
in the Bisitun inscription,368 constitutes a composite of two Old-Persian words: (1) xšaça 
which is generally translated as ‘dominion’ or ‘monarchy’,369 and (2) pāvā, which means 
‘guardian’.370 The exact nature of the term xšaça is contested. Briant argues that it is closely 
connected to the abstract notion of kingship, as it “connotes first and foremost the total 
loyalty to the king of the person described by it.”371 Conversely, several scholars claim that 
xšaça contains a geographical element. Herrenschmidt, for instance, maintains that it 
signifies not royal power but the Persian kingdom itself, i.e. the totality of the countries 
through which the rule of Persian King extends.372 In a variant of this interpretation, Tanck 
argues that the concept of kingship existed not only as a pure abstraction but signified a 
specific territory as well. Through an analysis of the context in which the term xšaça 
appears in Achaemenid royal inscriptions, she argues that the terms xšaça and dahyu are 
                                                 
367 On the Greek terminology concerning the office of satrap, see n. 6 above. 
368 DB §38/III.13-14: Dādarshi, a Persian, the satrap of Bactria (Dādṛšiš nāma Pārsa… Bāxtriy xšaçapāvā); 
DB §45/III.55-6: Vivāna the satrap of Arachosia (Vivāna nāma Pārsa… Harauvatiyā xšaçapāvā). For the 
appearance of the term in the Elamite and Babylonian versions of the Bisitun inscription, see: Schmitt 1976, 
374–75. 
369 Additional Old-Persian vocabulary stemming from the same word groups are: Xšay (‘dominion’ or 
‘reign’), xšayaθa (‘dominion’ or ‘monarchy’, though it literally means ‘belong to the dominion’) and 
xšāyaθiya (‘king’ or ‘overlord’). 
370 pāvā constitutes the substantive participle present active of the Old-Persian verb pā, which means ‘to 
protect’. 
371 Briant 2002, 65. Stolper (1985, 58) suggests ‘protector of the king’. 
372 Herrenschmidt 1976, 445; Klinkott 2005, 28–29. 
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synonyms, and that the former denotes Persis and the latter the subject lands.373 Tanck’s 
interpretation is widely favored as the term xšaçapāvā is generally translated as ‘protector 
of the realm’.374 According to a more expansive definition, the xšaçapāvā, i.e. the satraps, 
were keepers of Persian interests and order, both in Persis and the provinces.375 
The emphasis on protecting the royal domain is corroborated by the actions of the 
satraps mentioned in the Bisitun inscription. Darius recounts how Dādarshi, the satrap of 
Bactria, was ordered to march to the adjacent Margiana in order to crush a rebel army led 
by a Margian named Frāda. The satrap emerged victorious and Margiana was pacified.376 
Similarly, Vivāna, the satrap of Arachosia, marched against a rebel army who had invaded 
his satrapy on the orders of Vahyazdāta, allegedly another false Smerdis. Vivāna 
vanquished the rebel forces twice and eventually captured and promptly executed 
Vahyazdāta.377 These two satraps are portrayed as a loyal servants who protected the royal 
domain on behalf of their King. The loyalty of Dādarshi and Vivāna is emphasized by the 
thematic contrast in the Bisitun inscription between those who remained true to Darius and 
those who were branded as liars for claiming to be the legitimate kings. We should not 
forget, however, that the Bisitun inscription provides us with a mere glimpse of the Great 
King’s expectation of his satraps. It is imperative, therefore, to consult other sources when 
seeking to elucidate the nature and character of satrapal duties. 
The Hebrew, Aramaic and Babylonian Sources 
The Hebrew term ahashdarpān (ןָפְר ַּדְש ַּחֲא), probably the Hebrew parallel for the Old-
Persian xšaçapāvā, makes several appearances in the biblical sources.378 Overall, these 
officials are described as officers who received their orders directly from the Persian King. 
This procedure may serve as an indication of their senior position in the satrapal hierarchy, 
but we cannot conclude with certainty that this term is used to denote the provincial 
governors.379 Similarly, the Babylonian texts pose a problem since the designation 
aḫšadrapānu seems to signify either a provincial governor, i.e. satrap, or a lower-ranking 
local administrative officer.380 The ambiguity becomes more prominent since the term bēl 
pīḫāti is also frequently employed to designate satraps.381 In short, the overall scanty 
evidence, the ambiguous context of the available documents and the problematic 
                                                 
373 Tanck 1997, 231–32; Jacobs 2011. For instance, in DSf §3a/9-1373, DPd §2/6-9, and DPe §2/6-8 the term 
denotes the kingdom bestowed upon Darius by Ahuramazda. Even in places when it seems to be used in an 
abstract form, e.g. DB §13/I.48-50 where Darius recounts how Gaumāta the magus snatched the royal power 
or kingship, Tanck argues that the territorial meaning of the term is implicit, since in the previous section 
(DB §12/I.46-47) Darius blames Gaumāta for despoiling Cambyses of Persia and Media as well as the other 
countries. Weiskopf (1982, 6) merges both elements in  a single definition, namely ‘upholder/supporter of 
the crown/kingdom’. 
374 Olmstead 1948, 59; Kent 1950, 53, 64; Schmitt 1976, 373–74; Klinkott 2005, 29; Waters 2014, 100. 
375 Herrenschmidt 1976, 44–45; Petit 1990, 16.  
376 DB §38/III.10-19. It remains unclear whether Margiana was a part of the province governed by Dādarshi 
or perhaps by an unknown satrap who was overwhelmed by the rebel forces. 
377 DB §45-48/III.53-76. 
378 Esther 3:12, 8:9, 9:3; Daniel 3:2-3: Ezra 8:36. 
379 Esther 3:12, 8:9; Daniel 3:2-3, 27, 6:2-5, 7; Ezra 8:36. 
380 E.g. ROMCT 2 n. 48. Cf.  Stolper 1987, 399 with n. 47; Stolper 1988, 150–51; Stolper 1989b, 291 n. r. 
381 Stolper 1985, 58; Stolper 1987, 396 with n. 35; Stolper 1989b, 291 n. p.; Dandamaev 1992b; Kuhrt 2007, 
757 n. 1. 
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terminology renders it difficult to use Aramaic, Hebrew, and Babylonian sources to shed 
additional light on the attributes of the office of satrap.382 Fortunately, the Greek sources 
provide copious information on satrapal duties and responsibilities. 
The Greek Sources 
The duty of protecting the royal domain, the same duty which is embedded in the Old-
Persian designation of Achaemenid provincial governors, is well attested in the Greek 
sources. According to Xenophon, it was Cyrus the Elder who proclaimed that he would 
honor satraps who would became valuable protectors of his kingdom.383 But what was the 
nature of the threats a satrap was expected to contain? An answer is provided by Xenophon:  
τῶν μὲν γὰρ πολεμικῶν ἔργων ὁμολογοῦμεν αὐτὸν ἰσχυρῶς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, ὅτι ἐξ 
ὁπόσωνπερ ἐθνῶν λαμβάνει <τι>, τέταχε τῷ ἄρχοντι ἑκάστῳ εἰς ὁπόσους δεῖ διδόναι 
τροφὴν ἱππέας καὶ τοξότας καὶ σφενδονήτας καὶ γερροφόρους, οἵτινες τῶν τε ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ 
ἀρχομένων ἱκανοὶ ἔσονται κρατεῖν καὶ ἂν πολέμιοι ἐπίωσιν ἀρήξουσι τῇ χώρᾳ. 
For we agree that [the Persian King] is strongly attentive to warfare, because regarding all 
of the nations from which he exacts tribute, he orders each governor to provide 
maintenance to as many horsemen, archers, slingers and light-armed troops as necessary, 
so that [the governors] would be sufficiently capable to rule over their subjects and to 
protect the land in case an enemy attacks.  
 Xenophon’s compressed account seems to entail two types of threats: (1) a local uprising 
against Persian rule and (2) an incursion staged by a foreign entity. While the Achaemenids 
had to suppress domestic rebellions on numerous occasions, the second type of threat is 
somewhat ambiguous. Who were the enemies the satraps were expected to ward off? One 
possibility is a foreign invasion force, such as the incursions staged by the Delian League 
in the aftermath of Xerxes’ invasion, the Spartan military operations in Asia Minor in 401-
395 BC, and the invasion of the Greco-Macedonian army of Alexander the Great in 334 
BC. Another potential enemy that posed a challenge to the authority of the Great King was 
a rogue satrap. The insubordinations of Oroites and Aryandes have been discussed in detail 
chapter 1, but while their audacity did not lead to open war, the revolts of Pissuthnes and 
Cyrus the Younger were resolved only after an armed conflict. A satrapal rebellion 
probably required direct royal intervention that is assigning the task of eliminating a 
disobedient satrap to the governors of neighboring satrapies.384 An alternative threat that 
the satraps had to grapple with were occasional raids staged by seemingly autonomous 
peoples who dwelled within Persian territory and refused to acknowledge the sovereignty 
                                                 
382 In general, Schmitt (1976) offers a comprehensive survey of the title satrap in all of the pertinent sources. 
For the appearance of the term satrap in Demotic, see: H. S. Smith 1988. Further reading on the Aramaic, 
Hebrew and Babylonian terms for Achaemenid provincial governors, see: Petit 1988; Petit 1990, 15–20. 
383 Xen. Cyr. 8.6.11: τοῦτον ἐγὼ ὡς ἀγαθὸν σύμμαχον καὶ ὡς ἀγαθὸν συμφύλακα Πέρσαις τε καὶ ἐμοὶ τῆς 
ἀρχῆς τιμήσω.  
384 This seems to be the case in the matter of the rebellion in Margiana as recounted in the Bisitun inscription. 
The above mentioned Dādarshi, the satrap of Bactria, was commanded by Darius to lead the forces at his 
disposal to confront a revolt in adjacent Margiana. Another illuminating example is the prolonged revolt led 
by Amorges, the illegitimate son of the rebel satrap Pissuthnes. According to Thucydides (8.5.4.), Darius II 
sent a letter to Tissaphernes, the satrap of Lydia, in which he was instructed to apprehend Amorges, who was 
still undermining Persian rule in the Carian coast. Though at this point Pissuthnes was already dead and the 
rebellion was fairly contained, it is evident that Tissaphernes was responsible for bringing this satrapal 
rebellion to an end. 
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of the Great King. In Asia Minor, for example, the tribes dwelling in the mountainous 
hinterland of Mysia, Pisidia, and Lycaonia frequently attacked royal domain.385 The 
Persian response to the menace of the rural tribes of Asia Minor was military retaliation.386 
Maintenance of the Armed Satrapal Forces 
Since the satraps were expected to contain and suppress any military threat to Persian rule, 
Persian supremacy in the satrapies was safeguarded through the presence of substantial 
military forces. As noted above, Xenophon claims that when Cyrus the Elder dispatched 
his satraps to their respective provinces he ordered them to muster cavalry and chariot units 
from the Persians and allied nations.387 In addition, Cyrus instructed his governors to 
maintain a sufficient number of horsemen, archers, slingers and light infantry388 and the 
combat readiness of the satrapal forces was inspected on a yearly basis by the central 
authorities.389 In essence, the satraps functioned muster-officer, quartermaster, and 
paymaster since they were obligated to train, equip, and provision these contingents.390 
Satrapal Contribution to Royal Campaigns 
The Composition of Achaemenid Royal Armies 
The satraps were also expected to supply levies to royal campaigns. On numerous 
occasions the Great Persian Kings issued a decree which ordered the subject peoples 
throughout the Empire to contribute levies for the royal army. Cambyses, for instance, 
marshaled an army for his Egyptian campaign in c. 525 BC that included various subject 
nations, including the Ionian and Aeolian Greeks.391 Darius I issued a similar decree in 
preparation for his campaign against the Scythians in c. 513 BC,392 and the same goes for 
Artaxerxes I regarding the expedition he dispatched to retake Egypt in the 460s.393 The best 
example, however, is provided by the Herodotean catalogue of Xerxes’ invasion force, 
which exhibits the multi-ethnic composition of the royal armies deployed by the 
Achaemenids. Herodotus provides a detailed account on the composition of Xerxes’ army, 
which was comprised of no less than sixty-seven distinct ethnic units.394 These levies were 
                                                 
385 Xen. An. 3.2.23. The autonomy of the Anatolian hill-tribes is well attested. Tuplin (1987a, 114 n. 26) 
observes that while Herodotus (3.90.1) does not lists that Pisidians and Lycaonians as tributary in his 
catalogue of nations ruled by the Persians. The author of the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia (Hell. Oxy. 21.1.) claims 
that the majority of the Mysians were independent, while Xenophon (Mem 3.5.26) states the Mysians and 
Pisidians strove to preserve their freedom. 
386 Xen. An. 1.9.14; Xen. Hell. 3.1.13; Polyaen. Strat. 7.27.1; Nep. Dat. 4, 6.1. 
387 Xen. Cyr. 8.6.10. Xenophon (Cyr. 8.6.15) adds that Cyrus provided each satrap with an army, though it 
seems likelier that the satraps were given command over forces which were already in the provinces. 
388 Xen. Oec. 4.5: ἱππέας καὶ τοξότας καὶ σφενδονήτας καὶ γερροφόρους. 
389 Xen. Cyr. 8.6.15. 
390 Xen. Cyr. 8.6.3, 11; Oec. 4.5-6, 11. Cf. Briant 2002, 343; Klinkott 2005, 284. 
391 Hdt. 3.1.1, 25.2-7. 
392 Hdt. 4.81.1.  
393 Diod. 11.71.6. 
394 The nations which contributed infantry contingents (Hdt. 7.61-80) were as follows: Persians, Medes, 
Cissians, Hyrcanians, Assyrians, Chaldeans, Bactrians, Amyrgian Scythians (Σκύθας Ἀμυργίους/Σάκας), 
Indians, Arians, Parthians, Chorasmians, Sogdians, Gandarians, Dadicae, Caspians, Sarangae, Pactyes, 
Utians, Mycians, Paricanians, Arabians, Ethiopians who dwell above Egypt (τῶν μὲν δὴ ὑπὲρ Αἰγύπτου 
Αἰθιόπων), Ethiopians of the east (οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ ἡλίου ἀνατολέων Αἰθίοπες), Libyans, Paphlagonians, Matieni, 
Mariandyni, Ligyes, Syrians, Phrygians, Armenians, Lydians, Mysians,  Thracians of Asia (i.e. Bithynians), 
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mobilized from six different satrapies, stretching from Ionia to the Caucasus, and assigned 
to ten different divisions.395 When seeking to convey the enormous size of Xerxes’ invasion 
force Herodotus rhetorically asks “for which nation did Xerxes not lead from Asia to 
Greece?”396  
One may contest the level of accuracy of Herodotus’ list, but the abundant 
ethnographic detail, the probability that Herodotus had access to veterans who served in 
Xerxes’ army, and the compatibility with the catalogue of nations as recounted in the 
Bisitun inscription, 397 means that it is highly unlikely that Herodotus fabricated this list.398 
This does not mean, of course, that we should take it at face value. Nonetheless, we should 
acknowledge that Herodotus’ sources regarding this matter were generally accurate.399  
 Another compelling example is the royal armies mustered by Darius III to ward off 
the army of Alexander the Great. Curtius Rufus (3.2.1-10) reports that the royal army that 
fought at the battle of Issus was mustered in Babylon in 333 BC and consisted of numerous 
ethnicities. Curtius adds that the urgency to stop Alexander’s progress hindered the 
enlistment of Bactrians, Sogdians, Indians and the dwellers of the Red Sea. The second 
royal army that was routed in Gaugamela was even more ethnically diverse.400 In sum, the 
ethnic diversity of the contingents that served in the armies of the Great Kings clearly 
demonstrates that the subject nations were a crucial drafting pool for military manpower.401 
What Was the Role of the Satraps? 
The satraps were instrumental in the process of mobilization of royal armies. Herodotus 
reports that immediately after Xerxes decided to invade Greece, the Persians who had 
assembled at Susa departed to their respective provinces to facilitate the enlisting of 
                                                 
Pisidians, Cabelees, Milyae, Moschi, Tibareni, Macrones, Mossynoeci, Mares, Colchians, Alarodians,  
Saspires and the island tribes that came from the Red Sea (τὰ δὲ νησιωτικὰ ἔθνεα τὰ ἐκ τῆς Ἐρυθρῆς 
θαλάσσης). The nations which contributed cavalry contingents were as follows (Hdt. 7.84-86.2): Persians, 
Sagartians, Medes, Cissians, Indians, Bactrians, Caspians, Libyans, Paricanians and Arabians. The nations 
which contributed ships and crew to Xerxes’ fleet (Hdt. 7.89-96): Phoenicians, Syrians, Egyptians, Cyprians, 
Cilicians, Pamphylians, Lycians, Dorians, Carians, Ionians, Ionian islanders, Aeolians, Greek settlers from 
Pontus, Persians, Medes and Scythians. 
395 Burn 1984, 113. 
396 Hdt. 7.21.1: τί γὰρ οὐκ ἤγαγε ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίης ἔθνος ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα Ξέρξης. Similarly, Diodorus (11.2.3) 
claims that Xerxes collected both infantry and cavalry divisions from all of the satrapies. 
397 Barkworth 1993, 157. 
398 For a different view, see: Armayor 1978. 
399 It has been suggested that the catalogue of Xerxes army was partially predicated on a Persian document 
and on information derived from the works of Hecataeus of Miletus. For a discussion regarding the veracity 
of the Herodotean list of Xerxes’ army, see: Armayor 1978; Lewis 1984, 601–2; Barkworth 1993, 156–59; 
Armayor 2004, 329–305; S. R. West 2011, 261–65. 
400 Arrian (An. 3.8.3-6, 113-17) mentions Indians, Bactrians, Sogdianians, Sacians (Scythians of Asia Minor), 
Arachosians, mountaineer Indians (τοὺς ὀρείους Ἰνδοὺς καλουμένους), Areians, Parthians, Hyrcanians, 
Tapurians Medes, Cadusians, Albanians, Sacesinians, men who dwelt near the Red Sea, Uxians, Susianians, 
Babylonians, Carians, Sitacenians, Armenians, Cappadocians, Syrians from the vale between Lebanon and 
Anti-Lebanon (i.e. Coele-Syria), and the men of Syria which lies between the rivers. 
401 Tuplin 1987c, 193. For further examples of multinational royal armies mustered by the Achaemenids, see: 
Hdt. 4.1.1 (the army of Darius I’s in his campaign against the Scythians); Diod. 11.71.6 (the army mustered 
by Artaxerxes I to suppress the revolt of the Libyan Inarus in Egypt in the late-460s BC); Xen. An. 1.8.9-10 
(the royal army of Artaxerxes II at Cunaxa); Diod. 14.19.6 (the quasi-royal army of Cyrus the Younger, 
composed of levies from Asia Minor and Greek mercenaries). 
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troops.402 Though Herodotus does not spell out who these Persians were, it seems 
reasonable to assume that they were the King’s satraps.403 Moreover, if we are to believe 
Herodotus, the Achaemenid procedure regarding an official declaration of war required 
preliminary deliberation in a war council assembled by the King. This forum must have 
included the most prominent members of the royal court and plausibly several satraps 
though certainly not all of them.404 In any case, Herodotus notes that after Xerxes 
announced his final decision a sort of competition took place, as each satrap sought to win 
royal favor by mustering the best equipped contingents.405  
The satraps’ role in royal campaigns was not limited solely to the mustering phase. 
Though the role and position of the satraps in the above mentioned examples is not 
specified, it is reasonable that certain satraps may have assumed an active command post 
as officers of the divisions levied from their satrapies, especially if the campaign took place 
in a neighboring region, as exemplified in the role of the satraps in the Battle of the 
Granicus River.406 Moreover, on various occasions satraps were promoted to lead the 
King’s armies on large scale campaigns,407 an appointment which serves as an indication 
that the appointed satrap had considerable military experience which merited such a 
prestigious command.  
Collection of Tribute 
One of the primary civic duties of the satraps was the collection of tribute. Tribute held a 
central role in Achaemenid royal ideology, as attested by Achaemenid royal inscriptions,408 
and its importance is attested in the Greek sources as well.409 Fortunately, the Greek 
sources are more explicit in respect to the role of the satraps in regard to the collection of 
tribute. Xenophon explicitly notes that the collection of tribute constituted a satrapal 
duty.410 Furthermore, Thucydides recounts a letter sent by Darius II to Tissaphernes and 
Pharnabazus in 413 BC, in which the satraps were notified that the Great King wondered 
why they failed to send the tribute as expected.411 This notification clearly demonstrates 
                                                 
402 Hdt. 7.19.3: Περσέων τε τῶν συλλεχθέντων αὐτίκα πᾶς ἀνὴρ ἐς τὴν ἀρχὴν ἑωυτοῦ ἀπελάσας. 
403 Briant 2002, 343. 
404 Since Xerxes apparently mustered his army in the vicinity of Susa (Diod. 11.13), it is possible that only 
the governors of the core satrapies were present. 
405 Hdt. 7.26. 
406 Concerning the role of the satraps in the battle of the Granicus River, see p. 86 below. 
407 For instance, Pharnabazus II, the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia,  was appointed as one of the generals 
in the expedition against the Egyptian rebels shortly after the conclusion of the King’s Peace in 387 BC (Isoc. 
4.140-41), and again in 373 BC (Diod. 15.29.3-4, 41-44; Nep. Dat. 3.4-5). Concerning the date, preparations 
and execution of the first Persian attempt to recapture Egypt during the reign of Artaxerxes II, see: Ruzicka 
2012, 66–76. 
408 DB I.17-20/§7; DNa 15-30/§3; DPe §2/5-18; DPh §3/13-28. The centrality of tribute in Achaemenid royal 
Ideology is best exemplified by the monumental relief on the eastern stairs and southern wall of the Apadana 
at Persepolis, which depicts a procession of numerous delegations bringing tribute and bearing gifts to the 
Great Achaemenid king. Cf. Walser 1966; Root 1979, 227–84; Koch 1993, 117–35. 
409 For example, Herodotus (1.192.1) explicitly notes that the Great King received regular tribute (φόρος) 
from each of the lands that he ruled, a claim which is expanded upon in his detailed catalogue of satrapies 
(Hdt. 3.89-97). 
410 Xen. Cyr. 8.6.3, 6, 16; Xen. Oec. 4.5, 11. 
411 Thuc. 8.5-6.  
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that the regular collection of tribute was a satrap’s responsibility. A successful collection 
of tribute was facilitated through an effective exploitation of the agricultural potential of 
the conquered territories. This explains why Xenophon points out that the satraps were 
expected to see that their domain was prudently utilized,412 and that satraps who were able 
to show a flourishing and densely populated satrapy were given additional land and other 
honors, while those who failed to do so could have been removed from office.413 
Imitatio Regis  
According to Xenophon, the satraps were also expected to imitate Achaemenid royal 
customs and practices. This was, once more, a directive that was allegedly issued by Cyrus 
the Elder, who bid his satraps to follow his example and in turn to encourage their 
subordinates to follow their examples.414 Accordingly, the satraps were instructed to reign 
with moderation and self-restraint,415 to grant those who were worthy a seat at the satrap’s 
table, to share the wealth of their satrapy with loyal subordinates, and to honor those who 
exhibited noble character.416 The satraps maintained their own satrapal court, which was 
to a great extent a miniature version of the royal court, and just like the Persian King, they 
were expected to give audience to those who sought consultation.417 Furthermore, the 
satrapal court was the place in which the satrap’s sons and sons of other Persian nobles 
present in the region were educated.418 Xenophon also notes that the satraps were expected 
to maintain extravagant gardens (παράδεισοι),419 a setting which allowed them to exercise 
hunting and warfare, two skills that the Persian King and his nobles were expected to 
hone.420 The purpose of these requirements, as Briant convincingly argues, was “to 
conserve the political and cultural homogeneity of the Persians of the imperial diaspora.”421 
                                                 
412 Xen. Oec. 4.11. 
413 Xen. Oec. 4.8. 
414 Xen. Cyr. 8.6.10, 13. 
415 Xen. Cyr. 8.6.10. Interestingly, Nehemiah (Neh. 5:15) claims that while he presided as the governor (הָח ֶּפ ַּה) 
of Yehud, he remitted the obligation of his subjects to supply for his table, a custom which was enacted by 
his predecessors. It seems that his purpose was to demonstrate that he, in contrast to his predecessor, was a 
moderate ruler and that his conduct benefited the Persians and their subjects.  
416 Xen. Cyr. 6.11. 
417 Xenophon (Hell. 1.5.3) mentions the throne of Cyrus the Younger, presumably his seat while giving 
audience. Moreover, Athenaeus (13.570c) jokingly claims that one could get an interview with Pharnabazus 
quicker than with Lais, probably the famous Corinthian hetaera who flourished in the second half of the fifth 
century BC. 
418 Xen. Cyr. 8.6.10; Isoc. 4.152. Briant (1994, 298–302) suggests the possibility that the Macedonian 
institution of royal pages was an appropriated Achaemenid custom. 
419 Xen. Cyr. 8.6.10, 12.  
420 Xen. Cyr. 8.6.12. Lavish gardens attested in Sardis: Xen. Oec. 4.20-25; Plut. Alc. 24.5. In Dascylium: 
Xen. Hell. 4.1.15-16. Celaenae: Xen. An. 1.2.7. A garden in north Syria, near the palace of Belesys, possibly 
the residence of the local governor: Xen. An. 1.4.10. For evidence for the existence of royal gardens 
throughout the Persian Empire, see: Briant 2002, 942–43; Kuhrt 2007, nos. 16.43-52. For further reading on 
Persian gardens, see: Dandamaev 1984a; Tuplin 1996, 80–131; Briant 2002, 201–3, 442–45; Boucharlat 
2011. 
421 Briant 2002, 347. 
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Conclusion 
In essence, the satraps were expected to keep the peace and ensure that the tribute kept 
flowing. As long as the King got his share of the revenue and his authority was 
unchallenged, the satrap’s performance must have been regarded as adequate. More 
importantly, a satrap who successfully met the King’s expectations received honors and 
gifts.422 The Achaemenid Kings had a vast empire to rule and administer but the impressive 
apparatus of royal supervision, as surveyed in the previous chapter, enabled a close watch 
on the state-of-affairs in the satrapies. Even still, the King’s attention to matters of a 
specific satrapy must have been limited, while the nature of satrapal duties reveal that only 
in times of crisis, when the local satrap failed to contain, direct royal intervention was likely 
to occur. As we shall see, the response of the Persian central authorities varied from limited 
interventions such as issuing a royal decree or a change in personnel to the deployment of 
a fully equipped royal army. 
3.2 Satrapal Financial Resources 
The Great King’s expectations of his satraps were numerous and demanding. A satrap who 
wanted to maintain royal favor had to maintain the peace, to protect the land, to keep the 
tribute flowing, and to pay the soldiers and administrators. In order to accomplish these 
royal directives, the satrap was furnished with considerable financial resources in addition 
to civic and military manpower. In what follows, a survey of the various sources of satrapal 
revenue is offered. It is followed by a description of the mechanism through which the 
Persians ensured the availability of capable manpower for military and civic purposes. By 
outlining the scope and limitations of satrapal resources, we can contextualize the decisions 
and policies enacted by the satraps of western Anatolia and achieve a better understanding 
of the possibilities and necessities which led the satraps to prefer a specific course of action 
or policy over another. 
The Aristotelian Model 
One of the most detailed accounts that are concerned with satrapal sources of revenue is 
the Aristotelian Oeconomicus. This treatise provides a highly detailed description of the 
financial resources which were at the disposal of the satraps. In contrast to the Herodotean 
catalogue of satrapies, which merely quantifies the amount of tribute paid to the Great King 
in silver talents, the Aristotelian economic manual enumerates no less than six types of 
satrapal revenue:423  
οἰκονομίαι δέ εἰσι τέσσαρες, ὡς ἐν τύπῳ διελέσθαι (τὰς γὰρ ἄλλας εἰς τοῦτο ἐμπιπτούσας 
εὑρήσομεν), βασιλική σατραπική πολιτική ἰδιωτική… δεύτερον δὲ τὴν σατραπικήν. ἔστι 
δὲ ταύτης εἴδη ἓξ τῶν προσόδων ἀπὸ γῆς, ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ ἰδίων γινομένων, ἀπὸ 
ἐμπορίων, ἀπὸ τελῶν, ἀπὸ βοσκημάτων, ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων. αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων πρώτη μὲν καὶ 
κρατίστη ἡ ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς (αὕτη δέ ἐστιν ἣν οἱ μὲν ἐκφόριον, οἱ δὲ δεκάτην 
προσαγορεύουσιν), δευτέρα δὲ ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων γινομένη, οὗ μὲν χρυσίον, οὗ δὲ ἀργύριον, 
οὗ δὲ χαλκός, οὗ δὲ ὁπόσα δύναται γίνεσθαι, τρίτη δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐμπορίων. τετάρτη δὲ 
καὶ ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν κατὰ γῆν τε καὶ ἀγοραίων τελῶν γινομένη, πέμπτη δὲ ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν 
βοσκημάτων, ἐπικαρπία τε καὶ δεκάτη καλουμένη, ἕκτη δὲ ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων, ἐπικεφάλαιόν 
τε καὶ χειρωνάξιον προσαγορευομένη. 
                                                 
422 Starr 1975, 82. 
423 [Arist.], Oec. 2.1.1-4/2.1345b-1346a. 
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There are four types of administrations that can be classified (for we shall see that the rest 
will fall into this classification): royal, satrapal, civic and private… The second type is the 
satrapal administration. For this type there are six sources of revenue: from land, from those 
who inhabit the land, from trade, from taxes, from cattle and from other sources. The first 
and most important of these is revenue from land (which some call produce tax, while 
others tithe). The second [source of revenue] is generated from the particular (sources of a 
specific region), either gold, silver, copper or anything else that is available. The third is 
revenue from trade stations. The fourth is revenue from dues imposed on land and markets. 
The fifth comes from cattle, which is called revenue or tithe. The sixth is generated from 
other sources, called poll-tax and craftsman-tax.  
Since this work was probably composed in the last quarter of the fourth century BC or even 
later424, it is uncertain to what extent this model reflects Achaemenid practices and 
institutions. The apparent centrality of the provincial administration is an important 
indicator425, but certainly not a definitive one. Aperghis, for instance, argues against the 
view that the author incorporated Achaemenid elements into his model. He claims that the 
Achaemenid decentralized monetary policy allowed satraps, cities and local dynasts in 
Asia Minor and the Levant to mint their own coins. Aperghis points out that coinage is not 
mentioned in the in the Aristotelian model and concludes that is was not predicated on the 
Achaemenid Empire.426  
There are, however, several objections to Aperghis’ conclusion. First, the economy 
of the Achaemenid Empire was markedly flexible. While the financial system in the 
western satrapies was fairly monetized, the commercial transactions in the core satrapies, 
as attested in the Persepolis Fortifications tablets, were conducted in kind as well as in coin. 
Furthermore, the Babylonian record reveals that taxes, dues and other commercial activates 
had been discharged either in silver or in kind,427 while silver payments are also attested in 
Egypt428 and in the Persepolis Archives.429 Second, there is little doubt that the main focus 
of the discussed passage is the sources of satrapal revenue. Yet, the manner in which the 
satraps exacted their imposts and dues seems secondary, and as a result it is not discussed 
in detail. Hence, to deduce from the absence of coinage that the described model does not 
reflect Achaemenid practices is far from convincing. Third, Aperghis himself claims that 
“the financial administration of the Seleukid Empire inherited a great deal from that of the 
                                                 
424 According to Philodemus (On Property Management, col. 7 lines 38, 44 and col. 27 line 14), Theophrastus 
was the author of the Aristotelian Oeconomicus. Conversely, Pomeroy (1994, 68 n. 2) suggests that the work 
was composed by a student of Theophrastus or perhaps one of  Theophrastus’ colleagues in the Lyceum. In 
any case, most scholars (e.g. Wartelle 1968, XIII; Descat 2003, 154) agree that the second book was 
composed in the last quarter of the fourth century BC, but Aperghis (2004, 135) argues that of the second 
book could be dated to 275 BC. For a survey of past scholarship regarding the date of the second book, see: 
Aperghis 2004, 129–34. 
425 Descat 2003, 154, 157; Meadows 2005, 182.  
426 Aperghis 2004, 131.  
427 E.g. a Babylonian tablet from Nippur (BE X 97, translation: Dandamaev 1979, 103–5), dated to 420 BC, 
demonstrates that taxes were paid in silver and goods. Another document from Babylon (BM 33928, 
translation: Abraham 2004, no. 75), dated to 487 BC, mentions a payment that was made in silver shekels. 
428 A key Aramaic document from Elephantine, which is discussed in further detail in p. 69 below, recounts 
how the majority of dues and taxes imposed on trade ships that were carrying cargo to and from Egypt was 
levied in silver.  
429 E.g. PT 7, 27, and 52.  
65 
 
Achaemenids”.430 Later on he adds that the challenges the Seleucids grappled with were 
essentially similar to those the Achaemenids faced, and that the Seleucids could not but 
adopt the various Achaemenid administrative institutions, regulations, and practices that 
proved themselves to be effective for over two centuries.431 In other words, even if 
Aristotelian model is based on the Seleucid taxation system familiar to its author, it still 
probably reflects certain Achaemenid elements that were appropriated by the Seleucids.432 
As we shall see, there is a considerable body of evidence that shows that the majority of 
the sources of revenue that are described in this passage were well in use during the 
Achaemenid era. 
The Classes of Satrapal Revenue 
(1) Revenue from Land 
The first type of satrapal revenue mentioned in Aristotle’s Oeconomicus is the income 
generated from agricultural exploitation of the territories dominated by the Persians.433 
Two designations are ascribed to this type of revenue: ἐκφόριον and δεκάτη. Such 
articulation may imply that these terms are in fact synonyms that signify the same type of 
income.434 Yet, Descat argues that these classifications corresponded to two distinct 
systems of revenue extraction. The ἐκφόριον refers to a fixed rate set by the Persian 
government on the basis of estimated agricultural productivity, while the δεκάτη denotes a 
levy of 10% on the actual harvest.435 Furthermore, through an analysis of the Mnesimachus 
inscription, dated to the early Hellenistic period, Descat offers a reconstruction of the 
method by which the Persians assessed the agricultural potential of a given territory.436 He 
maintains that the Persian tribute assessment was calculated on the basis of one mina of 
gold (about 500 gr.) per, presumably squared, parasang (a tract of land of about 1.5 km2).437 
 There is little doubt that the taxes generated by agricultural production, whether in 
kind, bullion or coin, were of the utmost importance. Herodotus states that the Great King 
received regular tribute from each of the lands he ruled, along with provisions for his 
                                                 
430 Aperghis 2004, 132.  
431 Aperghis 2004, 263. 
432 Already in antiquity Appian (Syr. 55) and Plutarch (Demetr. 32.7) envisioned the Seleucids as heirs of 
Persian power. For further reading on the Seleucids as the successors of the Achaemenids, see: Bickerman 
1938, 197–207; Bickerman 1966; Sherwin-White 1987; Briant 1990; McKenzie 1994. For a different view, 
see: Tuplin 2008. 
433 It is unclear whether the author refers to royal land, private land or both. Aperghis (2004, 123) argues, 
correctly in my view, that the general sense of the term γῆ refers to all categories of land, namely land 
belonging to the King, cities, temples in addition to subject dynasts and peoples (both individuals and 
corporate groups). For a discussion and alternative interpretations, see: Aperghis 2004, 123 n. 5.   
434 For example, Rostovtzeff (1910, 241–42) suggests that in Egypt the designation for land tax was ἐκφόριον, 
while in other regions it was called δεκάτη.  
435 Descat 1989a, 82. Aperghis (2004, 123) arrives at a similar conclusion, apparently independently.  
436 For the text and translation of the Mnesimachus inscription, see: Aperghis 2004, 320–23. For a recent 
discussion regarding the information the Mnesimachus inscription can provide regarding the Achaemenid 
economic administration, see Roosevelt 2009, 112–14.  
437 Descat 1985. The employment of the parasang in the process of the Persian tribute assessment is 
corroborated by Herodotus (6.42), who recounts that in the aftermath of the Ionian revolt, Artaphrenes, the 
satrap of Lydia, ordered the Ionians to measure their land by parasangs, and according to this measurement 
he set the amount of tribute that was owed to the Persian authorities. 
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army.438 Moreover, according to Xenophon, the satraps were expected to maximize the 
production of foodstuff in their respective domains, which resulted in greater income.439 It 
should also be noted that numerous administrative documents found in Persepolis 
demonstrate that produce of various types (e.g. grain, wine, fruits, and sesame) were levied 
in the adjacent villages and stored in warehouses before being transported to an unknown 
destination, though probably some sort of royal centers.440 The enactment of a tithe is also 
well attested in the Persepolis archives. Several tablets from Persepolis, dated to the reign 
of Darius I, constitute receipts for distribution of wine. Each of these documents recounts 
a certain quantity of wine, of which one tenth is designated as a tithe (El. rit/riut).441 
Another source which sheds light on levies in kind which were imposed by the Persian 
authorities is the Book of Nehemiah. When seeking to illustrate his just and humble 
conduct as the governor of Yehud, Nehemiah boasts that he stopped the levies of bread, 
wine and cattle in addition to taxes (in silver shekels), which were exacted by his 
predecessors, and whose purpose was to provide for the various expenses of the governor 
of Yehud.442 Since Nehemiah was merely the underling of the governor of the satrapy 
Beyond-the-River, the satrap must have enacted similar levies only on a grander scale.443 
(2) Mines 
Mines are the second type of revenue that is mentioned, and there is plenty of evidence that 
indicates the availability of numerous mines, mineral deposits and other valuable materials 
during the Achaemenid era. Herodotus reports that the Elamite site at Ardericca, located 
about eighty km from Susa, was a source of bitumen, salt, and oil,444 while in Phrygia a 
lake near the city of Anaua yielded salt.445 He also notes the existence of naphtha fields in 
the vicinity of Susiana.446 Strabo reports that in the vicinity of Syspiritis, an Armenian city, 
a gold mine existed as well as a deposit of sandyx, an arsenic ore that was used to produce 
red and purple dyes.447 Strabo also notes that both deposits were well known in the time of 
Alexander the Great, and therefore were likely to be exploited by Alexander’s Achaemenid 
predecessors.448 In addition, Strabo reports that Onesicritus, the Cynic philosopher who 
                                                 
438 Hdt. 1.192: γῆ πᾶσα ὅσης ἄρχει. 
439 Xen. Oec. 4.8, 11. 
440 PF 546-653. For evidence for the transportation of produce levies, see: PF 48-49, 388-396, 428. 
441 PF 1953, lines 41-42; PF 1954, lines 7-8, PF 1997, lines 1-2, PF 1998, lines 4-5; PF 1999 lines 4-5; PF 
2000, lines 3-4; PF 2001, line 2. 
442 Neh. 5:14-18.  
443 On the duty of the subject nations to provide for the King’s table: Simpson 2005. A vivid example of this 
custom is provided by Herodotus (7.118-19), who recounts the considerable provisions supplied by the 
subject nations to Xerxes during his march against Greece.  
444 Herodotus 6.119.2-3. Also, Wright and Carter (2003, 65) Note another major bitumen source at Mamatain-
e Bala, about 13 km north-west of Ram Hormuz on the eastern edge of Khuzestan plain, which was imported 
to and used at Achaemenid Susa. 
445 Hdt. 7.30. In the book of Ezra (7:22), salt is mentioned among the resource allocated by Artaxerxes I to 
Ezra, which implies that another source of salt existed, probably located within the boundaries of Ezra’s 
assigned region of Yehud.  
446 Hdt. 6.119. 
447 Strabo 11.14.9.  
448 On the exploitation of these mines during the Achaemenid era, see:  Bernard 1999. For the Egyptian 
eastern desert in the Roman period, see: Gates-Foster 2012. 
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accompanied Alexander in his eastward march, claimed to have seen a river in Carmania 
that produced gold dust in addition to mines of silver, copper, ochre, arsenic, and salt.449 
In a passage that was predicated on the work of the fourth century historian Polycleitus of 
Larissa, Strabo maintains that the Achaemenid Kings levied silver, gold, dyes, and other 
goods that each province produced.450 Ctesias claims that there were silver mines in Bactria 
and that the rivers in India produced gold.451 The latter claim is corroborated by Herodotus 
who reports that the Indians send a tribute of 360 talents in the form of gold dust to the 
Great King.452   
In Egypt, ten Hieroglyphic rock inscriptions dated to the reign of Darius I are 
concerned with the operations and workers in the stone quarries in Wadi Hammamat, 
which was located in the mountains of the eastern desert. These quarries were exploited 
continuously as early as the Early Kingdom and well into the Roman period.453 
Furthermore, Cypriot copper was also fairly popular in the Achaemenid period. Stager and 
Walker address several items that were fashioned from copper that originated from Cyprus 
and were found in Achaemenid imperial centers such as Persepolis and Pasargadae.454 
The wealth of precious metals and other minerals is best exemplified by the Susa 
Foundation Charter, a trilingual inscription which commemorates the construction of a 
palace during the reign of Darius I. In this striking document, Darius provides us with an 
account of the various minerals, precious metals, and other raw materials which were 
gathered and used by the builders. He notes that cedar wood that was brought from 
Lebanon, yaka-wood (i.e. North Indian Rosewood) from Gandara and Carmania, gold from 
Lydia and Bactria, lapis lazuli and carnelian from Sogdiana, turquoise from Chorasmia, 
silver and ebony from Egypt, and ivory from Nubia, India, and Arachosia.455 The wealth 
of the satrapies and the capacity of the Great Kings to harness and effectively exploit it is 
impressive.456 In short, there is little doubt that the Great Persian Kings had notable access 
to a considerable variety minerals and precious metals. 
The lack of evidence, however, prevents us from obtaining a precise understanding 
of the actual income generated by mines, that is, the frequency and amount of the levies 
imposed by the Persian authorities in respect to these operations. Briant postulates that the 
owners of these sites were required to submit periodic accounts regarding their production 
to the local Persian officials, which were used to exact a certain amount from each 
operation according to an unknown rate.457 Such a hypothesis, despite the striking scarcity 
of documentation, is reasonable. Aperghis, who is also well aware of the difficulty posed 
by the absence of sources, points out the distinction in the Aristotelian Oeconomicus 
                                                 
449 Strabo 15.2.14. 
450 Strabo 15.3.21.   
451 Ctes. FGrH 688 F45 §26. 
452 Hdt. 3.94.2. 
453 Posener 1936, nos. 12, 14-16, 18-23. Egypt was also known for its gold deposits, see: Moorey 1999, 220.  
454 Stager and Walker 1989, 332–36. 
455 DSf §9-11. Translation: Brosius 2000, no. 45; Kuhrt 2007, no. 11.13. On the sources of precious stones 
recounted by Darius, see: Moorey 1999, 87–92 (Lapis lazuli), 96–7 (Cornelian) and 101–3 (turquoise). On 
the gold mines of Lydia, see: Briant 2002, 400–401.  
456 For evidence on Iran and Anatolia as regions rich in silver deposits, see: Moorey 1999, 234–35. 
457 Briant 2002, 401.  
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between the first type of revenue, namely revenue from land, and the second, which is the 
income from mines and other natural resources. He argues that there is little doubt that the 
Seleucid kings extracted significant revenue from natural resources, not only mines but 
also forests, irrigation canals, industrial products, and so forth.458 Moreover, while the 
evidence for Seleucid access to silver and gold ores is scarce, the availability and 
exploitation of other precious metals, minerals, and products is well attested.459 Therefore, 
the possibility that such lucrative resources were not exploited by the Achaemenids is 
simply incredible, and it is difficult to believe that profiteering from natural resources was 
a Seleucid innovation rather than a continuation of Achaemenid practices. The 
considerable treasuries captured by Alexander, which consisted of massive amounts of 
precious metals, should be seen as another, albeit indirect, attestation for Achaemenid 
access to precious metals deposits.460   
One question remains: to what extent did the satraps benefit from the availability 
of precious metals and other natural sources that were found in the provinces? Gold and 
silver mines were probably of crucial importance, and it is not unreasonable to assume that 
the Great King might have preferred to exercise direct control over these and other lucrative 
operations in the satrapies. Yet, there is a strong possibility that the satraps were in charge 
of such operations. First, revenue from mines is explicitly classified in the Oeconomicus 
as of the satrapal sort, hence under the supervision of the satrap himself. Since the satraps 
were responsible for the King receiving his fair share of the revenue, whether goods or 
cash, it seems plausible that the income from mines and other similar operations was also 
supervised by the satraps and their underlings.461 Second, Xenophon provides clear proof 
that the natural resources in the satrapies were well under satrapal authority. In 410 BC, 
after the Peloponnesians lost an entire fleet in the battle of Cyzicus morale was low, and it 
was Pharnabazus, the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, who exhorted Peloponnesian 
soldiers by proclaiming that there was plenty of wood in the King’s lands, and later on he 
provided them with timber and funds to rebuild their fleet.462 The implication is clear: not 
only that the satraps had control over the natural resources in their domain, in this case a 
resource of clear strategic importance, but they also had the discretion to use the resources 
in their domain as they saw fit as long as the King received his tribute. Therefore, it is 
reasonable for us to conclude that mines and other mineral deposits were managed by the 
satrapal administration. This also means that the availability of natural resource probably 
meant a substantial increase in revenue not only for the King but for the satraps as well. 
                                                 
458 Aperghis 2004, 124. 
459 Aperghis 2004, 64–69, 152–57. 
460 The Alexander historians report that numerous Achaemenid treasuries were captured by Alexander, but 
often omit the actual quantity that was captured. In the case of the royal treasury in Susa, however, we are 
told that Alexander discovered in the treasury either 40,000 coined talents (Plut. Alex. 36.1-2) or 50,000 silver 
talents (Arr. An. 3.1.7), either a phenomenal sum. 
461 Aperghis (2004, 264–66) notes that the Achaemenid administrative protocols, as reflected in the 
Persepolis fortification tablets, demonstrate that Parnaka (or Pharnaces), the senior Persian administrator, 
was the highest authority in regard to satrapal and royal administration. Aperghis envisions Parnaka as the 
de facto satrap of Persis due to his overarching authority as presented in the documents. Regardless of the 
status of Parnaka, the fusion of royal and provincial administrations in Persis probably reflects the state of 
affairs in the rest of the satrapies. 
462 Xen. Hell. 1.1.24-5.  
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(3 & 4) Trade Posts, Lands and Markets 
The third and fourth categories, i.e. taxes on trade posts, lands, and markets can be 
interpreted as taxation on commercial activities. Regarding the taxes on trade posts, an 
Aramaic palimpsest papyrus from Elephantine recounts the traffic of trade ships to and 
from Egypt over an entire year.463 This document includes the ships respective destinations, 
ports of origin, along with manifests of the crews, captains, and cargoes. It also enumerates 
the taxes levied on the shipments carried by these ships, including entry and exit dues in 
addition to taxes on itemized cargo. The payments were made to the ‘house of the king’, 
i.e. the local Persian treasury.464 Similarly, tax imposts on harbors are attested in a bilingual 
inscription from Xanthus, which commemorates a decree issued by Pixodarus, son of 
Hecatomnus, who presided as the satrap of Caria from 341 to 335 BC.465 Though highly 
fragmentary, it is evident that Pixodarus granted the people of Xanthus, Tlos, Pinanra, and 
Candaya a tithe of the harbor dues (δεκάτην τῆς ἐμπορίας).  
 There were additional commercial activities which were taxed by the Persian 
authorities. Babylonian administrative texts recount the legal obligation to register slave-
sales in the local royal tax office, and that a certain amount was levied on the transaction 
as tax.466 Main traffic routes were also liable for taxation. A Babylonian tablet, dated to 
496 BC, shows that those who sailed up and down the Euphrates River and used the riverine 
installations, such as bridges and quays, were regularly taxed by the officials of the Persian 
government.467 Another source of revenue was tax which was imposed on administrative 
appointments. According to a Demotic papyrus from Elephantine, a certain Paibes made a 
payment in two installments for the appointment of his son Djedhor as the second Wab-
priest of Khanum.468 It seems clear, therefore, that the Persian authorities exacted revenue 
from the appointments of a priest in the local temple, and quite possibly from additional 
institutions with similar administrative hierarchy in Egypt and elsewhere.  
(5) Tax on cattle  
The tax on cattle that is mentioned by the author of the Aristotelian Oeconomicus was 
probably calculated according to the increase of herds.469 Several documents from 
Persepolis contain receipts for sheep and goats which were handed over as payment for a 
tax called baziš. These documents note the name of the official to whom the payment was 
                                                 
463 TADAE III, C3.7. The two possible dates for the document are 475 and 454 BC. Porten and Yardeni 
(1993, 292), followed by Briant and Descat (1998, 61–62), are more inclined to date the document to 475 
BC. For further scholarship regarding this important document, see: Yardeni 1994; Lipinski 1994; Briant and 
Descat 1998. 
464 Briant and Descat 1998, 87. 
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made, the number of animals, their kind, age, and sex.470 Additional documents list the 
number of animals received by those who were sent to round up cattle, presumably state 
officials,471 designated as the bazikara, i.e. the collectors of baziš.472 Another possible 
subcategory of this tax type was levies of horses. Herodotus reports that the tribute the 
Cilicians paid to Darius I constituted 360 silver talents in addition to 360 white horses.473 
Moreover, Arrian states that upon the arrival of Alexander in the winter of 334/3 BC, the 
people of Aspendus agreed to pay tribute to the Macedonian King, which included horses, 
as they did for the Persian Kings.474 Strabo notes that the region of Cappadocia provided 
the Persians, in addition to silver tax (ἀργυρικὸν τέλος), i.e. the regular tribute, no less than 
1,500 horses, 2,000 mules, and 50,000 sheep. Strabo adds that the Medes payed twice as 
much.475 Moreover, Strabo claims that the people of Media and Armenia were famous 
horse breeders, 476 and he even mentions a disagreement in regard to the origin of the 
Nisaean horses, which were famously used by the Persian Kings themselves, as some say 
that it was Media while others Armenia. Herodotus, for example, states that the Nisaean 
plain was located in Median territory,477 a claim which is possibly corroborated by the 
Bisitun inscription where Nisaya is identified as a place in Media.478 
(6) Pol-Tax or Craftsman’s Tax 
Regarding the poll-tax that is mentioned in the Oeconomicus, there is no known source that 
can corroborate that such a tax existed. The abovementioned Aramaic palimpsest papyrus 
might elude to such a tax, since it includes the phrase ‘silver of the men’ (פסכ אירבג), which 
might denote some kind of toll,479 and possibly a sort of poll-tax.480 Yet, the ambiguity of 
this term renders it impossible to determine whether a poll-tax was actually employed by 
the Persians or not. 
Conclusion 
Xenophon claims that Cyrus the Elder instructed his satraps to dispatch from each of their 
provinces a fair share of the things which were fine and good back to the royal court.481 
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71 
 
We are left to wonder what portion of the collected taxes was deemed the King’s share.482 
It is evident, however, that the satraps presided over a diverse and multifaceted taxation 
system, which facilitated a continuous flow of funds. Indeed, some of which were sent to 
the Great King as tribute, while the rest was used for the military, administration and other 
satrapal expenditures. The conditions, of course, were singular in each satrapy, and it is 
rather certain that while certain satrapies were wealthy in natural resources, others were 
not as fortunate. The satrapal sources of revenue were considerable but not limitless, and 
we shall see in the following chapters that in times of crisis the satraps had to appeal to the 
King for financial aid. 
3.3 The Achaemenid Conscription System 
The Persian authorities were in constant need of manpower. Various civic projects required 
capable workers and skilled craftsmen while the armies of the Great King demanded fresh 
levies of soldiers to fight the King’s wars and to maintain Persian military supremacy. 
When seeking to understand the mechanism which enabled the Persians to acquire capable 
laborers and soldiers, the Babylonian records provide us with ample evidence. The archives 
of the Murašu family of Nippur483, the Egibi family of Babylon,484 and that of Bel-Rēmanni 
of Sippar,485 along with the archives of the Ebabbar Temple in Sippar486 and that of the 
Ezida Temple of Borsippa487, to name only a few, consist of numerous administrative 
documents which shed light on the various aspects of the Achaemenid conscription 
system.488  
The Mechanism 
According to the Babylonian records, the Persian authorities were able to meet the various 
requirements for manpower by distributing crown lands. These lands granted to numerous 
groups who dwelled in Babylonia, often of non-Babylonian descent, in exchange for 
services and dues. Those who received these land grants were subjected to various taxes in 
kind or silver along with the obligation to take upon themselves manual labor or military 
service on demand. The allocated crown estates were divided into three categories: chariot-
land (bīt markabti), horse-land (bīt sīsî) and bow-land (bīt qašti). These designations 
indicate the type of military service the grantees took upon themselves. Bow-lands were 
expected to supply archers and infantry soldiers, owners of horse-land furnished cavalry 
                                                 
third adjective (σοφὸν) is attached to the term, though it again described a noble act. It is possible that 
Xenophon sought to draw on the positive connotation of this phrase when he used it to describe characteristics 
of objects rather than persons.  
482 Klinkott (2005, 272–74) argues that the regular tribute (φόρος) constituted only a small portion of the 
various revenues (in kind and other) levied in the satrapies and that it was converted into silver before being 
transported to royal treasuries. The remainder was used by the satraps for various purposes, e.g. to pay of the 
wages of the satrapal administrators and to maintain the military contingents stationed in the satrapy. 
483 Cardascia 1951; Stolper 1985. 
484 Abraham 2004. 
485 Waerzeggers 2014. 
486 Bongenaar 1997. 
487 Waerzeggers 2010. For additional evidence from Borsippa, see: Joannès 1989a; Jursa and Waerzeggers 
2009. 
488 Additional pertinent documents were discovered in Šahrinu, Šatir, Ur, and Uruk. 
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soldiers, and chariot lands were to fit out chariots and charioteers.489 These taxes and 
services owed by the occupants of crown land are identified in the Babylonian texts as ilku, 
which is generally translated as ‘service’. In essence, the ilku tax constituted an annual 
silver payment ranging from ten shekels (about 50 gr) up to 17 minai (about 8.5 kg), 
depending on the size of the land held by the grantee. As noted above, this tax could also 
be traded for other obligations, including corvée labor and military service when such 
services were required.490 A certain function of the ilku tax, whose purpose was to ensure 
the availability of unpaid, unfree labor, is designated as an urašu service.491 Another aspect 
is denoted as upiyâta tax, which signifies the obligation to pay tax in-kind to the Great 
King.492  
Traditionally, a number of land holders were grouped into an administrative unit 
called ḫaṭru(s), which was headed by a šaknu/šagnu, i.e. the foreman of the group. The 
duties of the šaknu included the allocation of the land parcels among the members of the 
ḫaṭru, ensuring that the all of the available land was allocated and used, collection of owed 
dues and taxes, and making sure that any service obligations, military or otherwise, were 
adequately fulfilled. These duties were imposed on individual real-estate owners, the 
administrative personnel of temples that received land grants from the Persian authorities, 
and probably other similar corporate organizations.493 Through this mechanism, the Persian 
government was able to intensify agricultural exploitation of crown lands and consequently 
maximize revenues. More importantly, a large pool of potential conscripts was created, 
ensuring the availability of able-bodied men for manual labor and military service.494  
Civic Applications 
Babylonian Record 
There are several instances which demonstrate the effectiveness of the Achaemenid 
conscription system in regard to civic projects. In a document from Babylon, dated to 517 
BC, we are informed that a certain Bulṭaya, probably a seasoned if not professional sailor, 
received a monthly salary of eight shekels from Marduk Nāṣir Apli of the Egibi family to 
transport cress, oil, and flour by boat to Babylon.495 This service is denoted as a ‘service 
on behalf of the King’ (kanšu), an obligation to the Persian authorities that the Egibi firm 
                                                 
489 On this categorization of crown estates given as land grant, see: Tuplin 1987a, 153 n. 151 with references 
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incurred as the legal owner of crown land.496 A Babylonian tablet found in Borsippa, dated 
to 488 BC, recounts a demand issued by the Persian authorities to haul boats to a quay near 
Susa.497 These boats were appropriated for the collection of the abovementioned upiyâta 
tax, and the service, denoted as urašu, i.e. liability for manual labor, was provided by an 
owner of a bow-land. Similarly, another document of unknown date or origin revels that 
eighteen registered owners of bow-land, who were members of the ḫaṭru of the Kirkaeans, 
were conscripted by a certain garrison-commander named Edarni-Bel to haul two boats to 
an unknown location.498  
The obligation incurred by owners of crown lands enabled the Persian authorities 
to finance and supply laborers for routine governmental operations and infrastructure 
development. A document from the Egibi family archive, dated to 507 BC, recounts that 
the abovementioned Marduk Nāṣir Apli paid a debt of one and a half mina of silver, and 
that the money was used to finance the construction of a royal canal in Elam, possibly to 
pay the wages of the laborers hired to dig the canal.499 There are additional documents 
concerned with unspecified projects that reveal similar financial obligation along with 
salaries and rations, paid in kind or silver by Marduk nāṣir apli.500 It has been suggested 
that these financial payments were made due to ilku tax the Egibi family took upon itself 
as the legal owner of crown estates.501 In any case, an additional document dated to 535 
BC that was found in Sippar records the obligation of a certain Kinaya to the temple 
administer (šangu) of the Ebabbar temple to monitor a nearby canal and to prevent it from 
overflowing and damaging the royal road.502 Since a high ranking official in the temple 
hierarchy seems to have been responsible for the wellbeing of the royal road in the region, 
one can infer that the maintenance of roads and canals was imposed on local temples, 
almost certainly in exchange for land grants.503 A similar case is recounted in a document 
from the same year and place. This time we are informed that six spades and four sickles 
were brought to Bunene-shimanni and ten spades to Bel-silim at the sluice canal of the 
Cyrus River Canal. The equipment was clearly intended for a large group in charge of 
digging and maintaining the canal.504 Since this document belongs to the archive of the 
Ebabbar temple in Sippar, the maintenance of the canal was probably assigned to the priests 
serving in the temple.505 If that was the case, it seems reasonable to assume that such an 
obligation was the result of a land grant given to the priests from the Persian government. 
Road measurement was another task that the Persian authorities imposed on receivers of 
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land grants. In Sippar, for example, the šaknu of the ‘temple-enterers’ (sing. ērib bīti) of 
the Ebabbar temple, as recounted in a document dated to 530 BC, was obligated to measure 
a road.506 
Other Sources 
There are numerous examples in non-Babylonian sources for corvée labor that was 
furnished by the subject peoples on behalf of the Persian authorities. Regarding the 
province of Yehud, the author of the Book of Nehemiah mentions that some of the subjects 
of the King had to mortgage their lands and vineyards in order to be able to pay the 
tribute.507 Another possible attestation appears in Herodotus’ account. After the Persian 
fleet suffered heavy losses following the failed attempt to circumvent Mount Athos, Xerxes 
ordered to dig a canal through the isthmus of the promontory to facilitate a safe passage for 
his armada.508 Briant points out that in addition to Xerxes’ troops, the inhabitants around 
Mount Athos also participated in the project, probably the denizens of the five cities 
mentioned by Herodotus.509 The local workers were probably conscripted to participate in 
the project, which is reminiscent of the practices recorded in the Babylonian sources. 
Similarly, several sources report that the Suez Canal, whose construction was initiated by 
the Egyptian King Nacho, was completed by Darius I.510 It is reasonable to assume that the 
canal was constructed by conscripted workers from the neighboring settlements in a 
manner that resembles the mechanism described in the Babylonian records.511 Moreover, 
in the aforementioned Aristotelian Oeconomicus, we are informed that Antimenes, having 
been appointed by Alexander to preside as the supervisor of roads, ordered the satraps to 
see that the storehouses along the royal roads were adequately stocked. A possible 
implication that can be deduced, assuming that this was a continuation of Achaemenid 
practice, is that the satraps were responsible for road maintenance, including the supply of 
provision and routine upkeep of the roads, probably by means of corvée labor.512 This 
impression seems to be corroborated by a fairly colorful anecdote recorded by Aelian, who 
claims that a certain stretch of road from Susa to Media was filled with scorpions. 
Accordingly, every time the Great King’s entourage was about to use this route, the road 
was cleared.513 Since we are only told that the King issued the order to clear the road three 
days before his journey, it seems reasonable to assume that this task was assigned to the 
satraps, who saw that a local workforce was collected for the execution of this labor.  
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Lastly, the Susa Foundation Charter provides us with a clear demonstration that the 
Persians were able to employ specialists from numerous satrapies for their building 
Projects. Babylonian workers dug the foundations, Cedar wood was transported by 
Assyrians, Carians and Ionians, Ionian and Sardian masons fashioned the stone columns, 
Mede and Egyptian goldsmiths produced decorations, Egyptians carpenters also 
participated in the works, and Babylonian workers fashioned the bricks.514 It is evident, 
therefore, that the satraps, either on behalf of the King and probably for the sake of their 
own operations, had the capacity to enlist and employ capable and skilled manpower for 
various projects and other services,515 and that civic projects and operations were financed 
and maintained through the obligation incurred by holders of crown lands.   
Military Applications 
As noted above, the occupants of crown estates were liable for military service. In a similar 
fashion to corvée labor, the conscription of soldiers was based on the needs of the Persian 
central authorities. In other words, in times of peace the holders probably cultivated the 
land and paid taxes in kind or coin, though the military obligation did not lapse but simply 
was not implemented. Moreover, the sources show that crown land owners were able to 
hire replacements when seeking to discharge themselves from military service. This means 
that the Persian officials did not care about the identity of the person who reported for duty, 
as long as the quota was met.516 
Babylon 
Again, the Babylonian administrative archives shed light on how the military applications 
of the Achaemenid conscription system operated. A Babylonian document dated to 513 
BC lists the equipment provided for twelve squires who accompanied cavalry soldiers for 
a period of three years.517 The equipment was supplied by three individuals, who were 
probably liable for this military service but hired replacements to take their place and 
furnished them with the provisions appropriate for their task. Moreover, in a letter which 
recounts an argument over jurisdiction between a certain Guzanu, an owner of a chariot-
land, and an unnamed officer of the citadel in Sippar, we learn that the former was deprived 
of his chariot driver, shield-bearer, i.e. the third man on the chariot, along with several 
militia men.518 This example demonstrates a correlation between being the owner of 
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chariot-land and the obligation to serve as a charioteer. Another document, dated to 487 
BC, recounts how a certain Babylonian businessman made a payment of silver to discharge 
himself from the obligation to supply military equipment and travel provisions.519 
Similarly, holders of bow-land in Nippur in 422 BC were forced to take a loan in order to 
obtain clothing and additional unspecified military equipment.520 Another document, dated 
to 421 BC, also from Nippur, constitutes a contract between Rimut-Ninurta, who owed 
cavalry service in Uruk, and Gadalyama, who received payment and equipment to take 
upon himself this obligation.521 Lastly, the responsibility of holders of bow-land in Nippur 
to furnish soldiers is attested in a document dated to 421 BC.522 
Darius’ Bisitun Inscription 
The numerous examples provided by the Babylonian record should not be taken as an 
indication that these administrative practices and regulations were exclusive to Babylonia. 
Similar taxation and conscription systems are attested in other satrapies, albeit not as 
frequently.523 To begin with, the term bow-land (bīt qašti) appears in the Babylonian 
version of the Bisitun inscription,524 while in the parallel section in the Old-Persian version, 
Darius boasts that he restored the farmsteads, livestock, houses and slaves which Gaumāta 
stole from the people.525 This phrase may indicate that the actions of Gaumāta, which 
allegedly disrupted the order of things, were reversed by Darius, and also that, just like in 
Babylon, crown land was parceled and granted to the King’s subjects in return for taxes 
and services throughout the Empire. 
Asia Minor 
The conscription system which is depicted in the Babylonian record is also corroborated 
by the Greek sources. Apparently, this system was known to Herodotus, who reports that 
the King’s land was parceled out to provide for his army, though he does not specify what 
was to be provided.526 This is clarified by Herodotus’ report regarding the immediate 
Persian response to the burning of Sardis by the Ionian rebels in 498 BC. According to 
Herodotus, the Persians who dwelled in the districts west of the Halys River were able to 
muster an army and to defeat the Ionians near Ephesus.527 Such an immediate and effective 
response was impossible without a well-established system similar to the one described in 
the Babylonian sources. Another interesting and revealing episode is recorded by 
Xenophon. An estate that was owned by a Persian named Asidates, situated in the vicinity 
of Pergamum, was attacked by Xenophon and his men. After the Persian noble and his men 
were able to withstand the attack, they signaled to their neighbors that they were in distress. 
Shortly after several forces came to the rescue. Xenophon reports that these forces included 
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a band of men-at-arms led by a certain Itamenes, an unspecified number of Assyrian 
hoplites and eighty Hyrcanian cavalrymen from Comania, 800 peltasts and cavalry troops 
from Parthenium along with a contingents that came from Apollonia and other adjacent 
districts.528 The Assyrian and Hyrcanian soldiers are identified by Xenophon as troops who 
received their pay from the King, and their maintenance and wages were probably financed 
through revenues generated by crown estates.529 In any case, the quick response coupled 
with the diversity and impressive size of the Persian reinforcements demonstrate not only 
the dense settlement pattern under Persian rule, but more importantly the readiness of the 
local communities to provide levies to ward off raiders. It is highly likely that the troops 
that came to the rescue were holders of crown estates who answered when duty called.530 
In 396 BC, while campaigning in western Anatolia, the Spartan King Agesilaus 
realized that he was at a tactical disadvantage due to lack of sufficient cavalry forces in 
comparison to the Persian contingents under the command of Tissaphernes. Therefore, he 
compiled a list of the wealthiest men in the region and ordered them to provide horses, 
weapons and trained cavalry troops. The Spartan king’s demand was quickly met.531 Again, 
this indicates that the local population was already capable of furnishing cavalry soldiers 
in a relatively short time span, probably due to the well-established institutions and 
procedures similar to those described in the Babylonian records. Lastly, it has been 
suggested that the non-local detachments that were deployed at the battle of Granicus were 
also recipients of crown estates.532  
Egypt 
The presence of available military personnel, facilitated through the allocation of crown 
land, is also well attested in Egypt. An Aramaic Papyrus, dated to 495 BC, shows that land 
parcels were allocated by the Persian authorities and that at times there were disagreements 
between landholders, which were resolved by the imperial administration.533 That the 
occupants of these lands probably incurred an obligation to serve in the Persian army is 
demonstrated in a document dated to 461 BC, which shows that an Aramaean soldier 
stationed in the garrison of Elephantine was the legal owner of a plot of land.534 
Interestingly, an additional record from Elephantine, composed after 434/3 BC, recounts a 
dispute between a soldier serving in the garrison and a woman. According to the petitioner, 
named Nattun, in spite of the fact that the discussed tract of land that was owned by his 
detachment was ploughed, he did not receive his share of the revenue.535 Another 
illuminating Aramaic document, dated to the late fifth century BC, records the satrap 
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Arshama’s (i.e. Arsames) reaffirmation of a hereditary lease.536 Interestingly, in his reply, 
Arshama reminds the grantee that he will have to pay tax for the land he inherited from his 
father. Another letter dispatched by Arshama mentions thirteen Cilicians, whom the satrap 
ordered to release from custody after he had concluded that they were not deserters but 
rather captured by Egyptian rebels.537 It has been suggested that since these men were 
captured after they were unable to make it safely into the garrison, they probably served in 
a non-local detachment in Egypt, and were probably given crown land as a source of 
income.538 Similarly, a document discovered in Saqqara mentions ‘fields of the garrison’ 
and ‘things that ought to be brought to the house of the King’, i.e. the treasury.539 It is 
certain that the estates occupied by foreign garrison soldiers in Egypt were land grants 
distributed by the imperial administration in order to provide for the soldiers in return for 
their services. 
Conclusion 
The Great Persian King expected much of his satraps, and in order to successfully meet 
these expectations, the satraps were furnished with ample resources. Satrapal financial 
resources and manpower were considerable. Satrapal sources of revenue were numerous 
and lucrative while the Achaemenid conscription system guaranteed that there would be 
no shortage of laborers and soldiers. All of the above instances give a strong impression 
that the satraps must have had considerable military forces at their disposal. Therefore, the 
extent and limitation of satrapal military capacity is the focus of the following section. 
3.4 Satrapal Military Capacity 
The Types/Categories of Satrapal Forces 
As we have seen, the Great King expected his satraps to keep the peace, to suppress local 
uprisings, and to ward off external threats. Accordingly, the satraps had considerable 
military forces at their disposal.540 The ancient sources allow us to identify three types of 
military forces in any given satrapy: (1) elite units that consisted of soldiers hailing from 
the core satrapies, often of Persian origin, (2) non-local contingents which were drafted 
and transplanted by the Persian authorities, often times occupants of crown estates, and (3) 
local contingents which were levied as a part of the subject nations’ obligation to contribute 
a certain number of troops in addition to regular tribute.541 
Royal vs. Local 
Klinkott makes a distinction between ‘royal troops’ (“Reichstruppen”), a term which he 
employs to denote non-native soldiers who served in a given satrapy, and ‘satrapal’ or 
‘administrative’ troops (“Satrapen- oder Verwaltungstruppen”), a term which he ascribes 
to the local contingents conscripted by the satrap himself.542 Such categorization, however, 
                                                 
536 AD 8; TADAE I, A6.11. 
537 AD 5; TADAE I, A6.7. 
538 Petit 1990, 130. 
539 Segal no. 31.  
540 Previous surveys of satrapal military power has been offered by Tuplin (1987c), Petit (1990, 109–32) and 
more recently Klinkott (2005, 284–305). 
541 Tuplin 1987c, 192–98; Dandamaev and Lukonin 1989, 232–33; Klinkott 2005, 284–85. 
542 Klinkott 2005, 285, 295. 
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is somewhat problematic. On the one hand, all of the forces stationed in the satrapy were 
‘satrapal’. On the other, we have seen in the previous chapter that in spite of the fact that 
Xenophon identifies certain units and officers in the satrapies as ‘royal’, all of the satrapal 
forces, of local and foreign origin, were under satrapal authority. Even if the involvement 
of the central authorities in the appointment of officers and placement of garrisons 
constituted an effective measure to cultivate obedience among the provincial governors, 
each satrap was the senior officer in his domain in regard to civic and military affairs. For 
this reason, the terminology employed by Klinkott creates an unnecessary confusion in 
respect to the authority of the satrap vis-à-vis the military personnel in his satrapy. The 
distinction between ‘royal’ and ‘satrapal’ or ‘administrative’ troops insinuates that only a 
portion of the military forces in the satrapy were subordinate to satrapal authority. If the 
title ‘royal’ is irrelevant in respect to satrapal jurisdiction, it seems reasonable to conclude 
that this designation was used by Xenophon to distinguish non-local contingents, i.e. 
Persian and other, from local levies, and nothing more. 
The Various Satrapal Units 
Satrapal Land Army 
The ancient sources provide ample information regarding the units which comprised the 
forces stationed in the satrapies. Xenophon mentions horsemen, archers, slingers, light 
infantry,543 and even chariot units.544 The types of unites mentioned by Xenophon are well 
attested. Cyrus the Younger, for instance, deployed twenty scythed chariots in the battle of 
Cunaxa.545 Sling-bullets inscribed with Tissaphernes’ name found at Gördes, located in 
northern Lydia, suggest that the satrap of Lydia had slingers at his disposal.546 Moreover, 
there are numerous instances of satraps in command of cavalry squadrons, infantry 
detachments and sometimes both. For example, Thucydides reports that in 412 BC 
Tissaphernes came to Miletus with infantry and cavalry forces,547 and shortly after he 
moved on to Iasus with an infantry contingent.548 Xenophon reports that Thibron dreaded 
the superior cavalry forces of Tissaphernes.549 Another satrap with a formidable cavalry 
force at his disposal was Pharnabazus, the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia.550 Moreover, 
the joint armies of Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus, deployed in 397 BC in Ionia against the 
Spartan General Dercylidas, consisted of infantry and cavalry divisions,551 and a similar 
satrapal army was deployed in the battle of Sardis in 395 BC.552 According to Diodorus, 
this army amounted to ten thousand cavalry and fifty thousand infantry.553 In sum, the 
                                                 
543 Xen. Oec. 4.5: ἱππέας καὶ τοξότας καὶ σφενδονήτας καὶ γερροφόρους. 
544 Xen. Cyr. 8.6.10. 
545 Xen. An. 1.7.10. 
546 Foss 1975. 
547 Thuc. 8.25.2. 
548 Thuc. 8.28.2. 
549 Xen. Hell. 3.1.5. Diodorus (14.36.3) also notes the considerable cavalry forces of Tissaphernes. 
550 Xen. Hell. 3.2.14. 
551 Xen. Hell. 3.2.14; Diod. 14.39.4-5. 
552 Xen. Hell. 3.4.12; Hell. Oxy. 11(6).3. 
553 Diod. 14.80.1. 
80 
 
military forces deployed by the satraps of western Anatolia were formidable and fairly 
diverse.554  
Satrapal Fleet 
There are several attestations for the existence of satrapal fleets. The expedition of 
Aryandes against the Libyans included unspecified naval forces.555 In c. 500 BC the 
governor of Sardis was able to furnish 200 ships for a military campaign against the island 
of Naxos.556 Pharnabazus, together with Conon the Athenian, was the supreme commander 
of the Persian navy that defeated the Spartans near Cnidus.557 Later on, Pharnabazus and 
Conon sailed to Greece, occupied Cythera, and used it as a base of operations to raid the 
Laconian coastline.558 
Mercenaries 
Just like the Achaemenid Kings, the satraps were ready and able to augment their armies 
with mercenaries whenever necessary.559 It should be noted that despite the fact that the 
available sources recount numerous instances in which the Persians hired soldiers of 
fortune, almost all of known instances are concerned with Greek mercenaries.560 In 441/0 
BC the satrap of Lydia Pissuthnes supplied 700 mercenaries to Samian exiles who planned 
to retake the island after it was captured by Athens.561 In 427 BC Pissuthnes dispatched 
Arcadian and barbarian mercenaries to assist the pro-Persian party at Notium.562 Probably 
in the late 420 BC the same Pissuthnes, now in a state of open revolt, employed Greek 
mercenaries against the King’s forces. Eventually the Greek mercenaries defected to the 
King’s side and brought about the downfall of the rogue satrap.563 Pharnabazus too 
supplied the Peloponnesians with mercenary soldiers in 411 BC.564 
One of the most famous Persian employers of Greek mercenaries was Cyrus the 
Younger. According to Xenophon, when Cyrus travelled to the royal court after he had 
                                                 
554 Xenophon (Cyr. 5.3.24) makes a distinction between plain cavalry troops (ἱππεῖς) and mounted archers 
(ἱπποτοξόται). According to Xenophon, these mounted archers were Scythians. Herodotus too mentioned 
Scythian mounted archer (4.46.3) and reports that Mardonius deployed mounted archers at Plataea (9.49.2). 
Nevertheless, I am not aware of any evidence for these units being deployed by satraps, especially those of 
western Anatolia. 
555 Hdt. 4.167.1. 
556 Hdt. 5.30-32.  
557 Ctes. FGrH 688 F30 §74; Diod. 14.81.4-6; Nep. Con. 2.2, 4.1; Polyaen. Strat 1.48.3. 
558 Xen. Hell. 4.8.7-11; Diod. 14.84.4, 85.2.3-5; Philoch. FGrH 328 F146. 
559 There are many instances in which the Great Persian Kings employed mercenaries. For example, 
Xenophon (An. 7.8.15) identifies the Assyrian hoplites and Hyrcanian horsemen he and his men engaged in 
Mysia as mercenaries of the King (βασιλέως μισθοφόροι). According to Polyaenus (Strat. 7.14.3) Artaxerxes 
III employed 10,000 Greek hoplites against the rebel satrap Autophradates, and according to Nepos (Iph. 2, 
4) he appointed the Athenian Iphicrates as commander of a force of 12,000 mercenaries which was sent to 
fight in Egypt. In addition, Darius III used Greek mercenaries when he tried to ward off Alexander (Plut. 
Mor. 181a; Plut. Alex. 16.13; Arr. An. 3.21.1; Curt. 5.8.3, 11.1-11, 12.4). 
560 There are only a few known reports on non-Greek Mercenaries. Strabo (1.15.1) states that the Persians 
hired the Hydraces, mercenary troops from India. Thucydides (3.34.2) reports on barbarian mercenaries 
operating in Notium. Xenophon (An. 7.8.15) mentions Assyrians and Hyrcanian mercenaries in Mysia. 
561 Thuc. 1.115.4; Diod. 12.27.3. 
562 Thuc. 3.34.2.  
563 Ctes. FGrH 688 F15 §53. 
564 Diod. 13.51.2-4. 
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been summoned by his father Darius II, he was escorted by 300 Greek bodyguards.565 Later 
on, when Cyrus decided to overthrow his brother Artaxerxes II, he issued a command to 
the garrison commanders stationed in the Ionian cities to enlist as many Peloponnesian 
mercenaries as possible and of the best quality.566 According to Xenophon, the pretext for 
such action was the need to counter Tissaphernes’ purported design to recapture the Ionian 
city-states.567 Later on, Cyrus began enlisting barbarian and Greek mercenaries, while 
publicly declaring that he was making preparation for a campaign against the Pisidians.568 
The overall impression is that the enlistment of mercenaries was a well-established satrapal 
prerogative. This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that even when Cyrus’ ploy was finally 
detected by Tissaphernes, it was due to the overly extensive size of Cyrus’ army rather than 
the mustering itself.569 Moreover, after Cyrus was killed at the battle of Cunaxa, Clearchus, 
the leader of the Greek mercenary contingent, informed Tissaphernes that he and his men 
were willing to switch sides and to fight the King’s war against the Mysians, Pisidians, and 
Egyptian rebels.570 Such an offer, if we are to believe Xenophon, indicates once more that 
the deployment of mercenaries in times of necessity was nothing but ordinary. 
Another interesting example is that of Mania, the wife a Zenis of Dardanosu, a 
viceroy of Pharnabazus and the Persian governor of Aeolis. After Zenis passed away, 
Mania administered her late husband’s domain with much success. She even conquered 
several coastal Greek cities by using Greek mercenaries.571 Similarly, Tissaphernes and 
Pharnabazus employed Greek mercenaries when they were seeking to ward off the 
Peloponnesian army led by Dercylidas in 397 BC.572 Xenophon also reports that the 
preparations of Pharnabazus and Conon to raid the coastline of Laconia included fitting 
ships and hiring unspecified mercenaries.573  
In the late 350s BC Artaxerxes III was mustering an army to recapture Cyprus. On 
the Great King’s demand, Idreius, of the Hecatomnid household and the satrap of Caria at 
the time, supplied forty triremes and 8,000 mercenary troops to the Persian expedition.574 
Moreover, due to the growing power of Philip II, the same Artaxerxes ordered his satraps 
to assist the Perinthians, who were besieged by Philip in 340 BC.  In response, the satraps 
sent to Perinthus a force of mercenaries along with funds, food, weapons and other 
necessary provisions.575 In short, the satraps of western Anatolia, and doubtlessly satraps 
                                                 
565 Xen. An. 1.1.2. 
566 The emphasis on the descent and quality of the mercenary soldiers Cyrus wished to obtain might indicate, 
as suggested by Brunt (1984, 566), that the imperial land-tenure system did not produce good soldiers. In this 
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in other regions throughout the Empire, had access to an extensive pool of hired soldiers, 
in addition to funds and the permission to enlist mercenaries to resolve problems in their 
satrapy or when commanded by the King.576 
Military Personnel from the Core Satrapies 
Xenophon ascribes to Cyrus the Elder, once again, the Achaemenid practice of enlisting 
Persian soldiers to serve in the provinces.577 There are numerous instances in the ancient 
source of military personnel hailing from the core satrapies, namely Persia. Babylonia and 
Media, in the satrapies. Herodotus, for example, reports that Oroites had 1,000 Persians 
under his command,578 and that Persian troops were stationed in the citadel of Memphis 
along with allied contingents,579 which, according to Thucydides, were Medes.580 Persian 
and Babylonian troops and more frequently officers appear on multiple occasions in the 
Elephantine papyri.581 The aforementioned garrison in Deve Hüyük in Syria was manned 
by soldiers of Persian origin.582 
The presence of Persian soldiers and officers in the satrapies is far from surprising. 
On the one hand, these units were more inclined to remain loyal to the Persian authorities, 
which explains why many of the Persians who appear in the archives of Elephantine served 
as commanding officers.  On the other, the Persians were renowned warriors. The Persian 
warrior code is clearly articulated in an inscription found in Naqsh-I Rustam, in which 
Darius I proclaimed that he was a good horseman, and could use the bow and spear on a 
horseback and on foot.583 At Persepolis, Darius set another inscription in which he claims 
that Persis produced good horses and good men.584 The Persian warlike nature and military 
capacity were well known to the Greeks. Herodotus states that the Persians saw that their 
youth were capable of riding a horse, hurling a spear and shooting arrows.585 Xenophon 
claims that Cyrus the Younger surpassed all in horsemanship, archery and javelin throwing 
to such a degree that he was able to overcome a bear he encountered while hunting.586 
Similarly, Xenophon reports that Persian boys who reached the age of ten were expected 
to have mastered the usage of a bow, a javelin and a sabre.587 Moreover, the Greeks 
witnessed the battle hardened Persians in action on multiple occasions. Herodotus, for 
instance, takes special notice to the famous force of 10,000 Persian soldiers known as the 
Immortals.588 He also states that at the battle of Plataea Mardonius’ elite guard of 1,000 
Persians proved to be a formidable enemy and that only after Mardonius and his Persians 
                                                 
576 Further discussion on mercenary forces who served the Persian Kings and satraps, see: Seibt 1977; 
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perished the rest of the barbarian army broke into flight.589 Therefore, it is reasonable to 
assume that the Persian contingents stationed in the satrapies were well-trained and well-
equipped, especially in comparison to locally conscripted units, and as such formed an elite 
fighting force which was at the disposal of the satrap. 
Functions 
According to Xenophon, Persian occupation troops were stationed in two types of 
garrisons: (1) those serving in the citadels of urban centers and (2) those stationed in key 
locations in the countryside. The former were commanded by phrouarchs (φρούραρχοι), 
hereinafter designated as garrison commanders, while the latter were commanded by the 
chiliarchs (χιλίαρχοι).590 It is generally agreed that Xenophon makes a distinction between 
the small detachments stationed in the citadels of fortified urban centers and the widely 
scattered and thinly spread satrapal militia stationed in the countryside.591 As such, the 
units which were under the authority of the chiliarchs probably included the garrisons 
placed along the royal road, as reported by Polyaenus.592 Tuplin makes another observation 
regarding Xenophon’s account, namely that Xenophon employs the general term φρουροί 
to denote soldiers stationed in the citadels of the urban centers, while the soldiers stationed 
in the country are identified as φυλακοί.593 It is evident that the purpose of such distribution 
of the military satrapal forces was to secure Persian hold over the administrative, 
commercial, and strategic centers in the provinces while providing protection to the 
periphery from various immediate threats, such as incursions staged by the aforementioned 
hill tribes.594 
Function of the Elite Soldiers 
While the overarching objective of the satrapal military forces was to protect the provinces, 
the sensitive duty assigned to the forces installed in the citadels and key locations was 
clearly of greater importance. Accordingly, Klinkott postulates that the elite Persian and 
royal detachments were placed in such essential locations.595 This postulation seems 
reasonable since the Persian authorities must have implemented various measures to 
maintain control in case of a local uprising, one of which was to install soldiers of 
unquestioned loyalty in strategically important locations. As noted above, Herodotus 
recounts the presence of Persian military personnel in the provincial capitals of Memphis596 
and Sardis.597 Key strategic locations were also held by Persian troops. For example, the 
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aforementioned site of Deve Hüyük, which was manned by Persian troops, constituted a 
crucial checkpoint on the road which connected northern Mesopotamia to the Syrian 
heartland.598 According to Xenophon, the garrison which was installed on the Syrian side 
of the Cilician Gates, an important passageway that connected the low plains of Cilicia to 
the Anatolian Plateau, was under royal authority in 401 BC.599 Since Xenophon notes royal 
involvement regarding this particular strategic point, it is plausible that the soldiers serving 
in this post hailed from the core satrapies. Furthermore, the senior officer of garrison in 
Elephantine, which was situated on the southern border of Achaemenid Egypt, had military 
jurisdiction over Upper Egypt as far as Memphis.600 Therefore, it is significant to note that 
the persons who presided as the garrison commanders were exclusively Persians, and many 
of the soldiers were of non-local origin.601 
In sum, the placement of royal troops, whether Persian or other, in sensitive 
strategic points had two objectives: (1) to protect the satrapies from potential external 
threats and (2) to contain and suppress local uprisings, with or without the assistance of 
satrapal forces of local origin. If a rebellion proved to be too much for the Achaemenid 
garrisons, the loyal Persian forces in the satrapies were presumably expected to maintain 
control over key positions and to hold the line until the arrival of reinforcements from the 
King or from the adjacent satrapies. A similar scenario occurred in Sardis at the beginning 
of the Ionian revolt and once more in Egypt in the 460s BC. In the latter case, after a local 
uprising spun out of control, the Achaemenid garrison in Memphis was besieged by the 
Egyptian insurgents and their Athenian allies. The siege was lifted eventually and the 
garrison was relieved due to efforts of Megabyzus son of Zopyrus, who was dispatched by 
Artaxerxes I with an army to restore Persian rule in Egypt.602  
Function of the Local Levies 
In spite of some reservation in regard to their loyalty to the Persian authorities, the local 
levies still constituted an important element not only in the Persian royal armies but also in 
the satrapies. Conscripted soldiers, whether local or foreign, could be drafted and used in 
routine security details as well as in times of crisis. The local Jewish community at 
                                                 
consideration the Persian presence at the satrapal court of Oroites, it seems reasonable to assume that the 
loyal soldiers who managed to fortify themselves in the acropolis of Sardis were of Persian stock. 
598 Moorey 1975, 115. 
599 Xen. An. 1.4.4. Diodorus (14.20) provides a detailed description of this mountain pass and the tactical 
challenges it caused for any army that wished to pass through it. In addition, the importance of this route is 
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600 Bresciani 1985, 513. Contra: Petit 1990, 114 with n. 33. 
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602 Thuc. 1.104, 109-110; Ctes. FGrH 688 F14 §36-38; Diod. 11.71.3-6, 74-5, 77.1-3. 
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Elephantine, for example, supplied troops for the local Persian garrison.603 Similarly, we 
have seen that the Babylonian documents surveyed above recount numerous instances in 
which holders of crown land in Babylon and the adjacent settlements furnished manpower 
and equipment for military purposes.604 Since there is no indication that these services were 
rendered in times of crisis, one can conclude that the soldiers and provisions supplied by 
the inhabitants of Babylonia were intended to be used in routine security tasks.605 
 Furthermore, conscription was also employed to augment satrapal forces in special 
circumstances.  For instance, when seeking to convey the formidable military might of 
Oroites, Herodotus reports that while the satrap of Lydia had 1,000 Persian troops at his 
disposal, he was also able to muster forces from Phrygia, Lydia, and Ionia.606 The 
distinction between the Persian elite guard stationed at the satrapal court and the forces that 
could be potentially levied from the provinces which comprised Oroites’ domain indicates 
that Herodotus was referring to local levies which were ready for recruitment. According 
to Xenophon, when Cyrus the Younger decided to rebel he took special care that the 
barbarian contingents in his satrapy were adequately trained as soldiers,607 and when he 
began his march upwards he commanded a force of 100,000 barbarians.608 Even if the 
figure supplied by Xenophon is inaccurate, the army of Cyrus was formidable, since the 
Persian prince must have realized that a clash with a fully equipped royal army was 
inevitable. These soldiers must have been levied from the regions under Cyrus direct 
control, namely Lydia, Greater Phrygia, and Cappadocia.609 
The Versatility and Capacity of the Satrapal Forces 
The various types of land and sea forces along with an extensive pool of conscript soldiers 
and mercenaries indicate that the military capacity of the satraps was quite formidable. 
Numerous examples demonstrate that the satraps were able not only to effectively protect 
their domain but also to launch military campaigns independent of royal support. 
The account of Darius I in the Bisitun inscription demonstrates the impressive 
extent of satrapal military capacity. The events recounted in the inscription reveal four 
ways by which Darius suppressed the multiple rebellions against his rule: (1) to personally 
lead an army against a rebellious nation;610 (2) to intimidate the locals, thus inducing them 
to handover the ringleaders of the revolt;611 (3) to appoint a general by a special 
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commission and to send him with an army to crush a rebellion;612 (4) to order a satrap to 
suppress a revolt with his own contingents. The fourth type of response is crucial to the 
present discussion. Darius proclaims that his father Hystaspes, most likely the presiding 
satrap of Parthia, squashed a revolt that engulfed Parthia and Hyrcania.613 Only after 
Hystaspes made his first attempt to suppress the rebels, we are told that Darius sent 
reinforcements to his father.614 Similarly, Dādarshi, the satrap of Bactria, was sent to 
suppress a revolt in the adjacent Margiana,615 while Vivāna, the satrap of Arachosia, was 
ordered by Darius to crush a local uprising.616 Darius explicitly mentions the instances in 
which he himself furnished armies to a specially commissioned general, but there is not 
even a hint that he sent reinforcements to these satraps. Hence, it seems reasonable to 
conclude that the absence of any mention of royal military support indicates that the 
satrapal contingents were sufficient to deal with the threat posed by the local insurgents. 
Satrapal mobilization was capable of producing sizable armies. The army collected 
by Cyrus the Younger to repel Tissaphernes was capable of laying siege to Miletus, a 
formidable task which must have required a large force.617 As noted above, when the 
Persian crown prince began he march into the Persian heartland, he was able to muster 
100,000 barbarian troops in addition to 13,000 Greek mercenaries.618 While Xenophon’s 
figure cannot be taken at face value, it still serves as an indication that Cyrus non-Greek 
forces were considerable. Similarly, in their attempt to ward off the Peloponnesian land 
army commanded by Dercylidas, Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus were able to muster from 
their respective satrapies a joint force of 20,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry.619 Another 
revealing example is the aforementioned raid staged by Xenophon and his men on an estate 
of a local nobleman in Mysia. The Greek mercenaries were warded off by considerable 
forces that came to the rescue from the nearby settlements.620 This instance serves as a clear 
demonstration that the satrapal force were able to provide almost an immediate response 
to such threats. 
Granicus  
There are two events which, although occurred in the last quarter of the fourth century, 
shed light on satrapal military might. There are the battle of the Granicus River (334 BC) 
and the battle of Gaugamela (331 BC).  According to Diodorus, the Persian army that 
engaged Alexander at the battle of Granicus was commanded by generals and satraps.621 It 
seems reasonable to assume that this force did not constitute a fully equipped royal army 
                                                 
612 DB §25 (Hydarnes in Media); DB §26-28 (Dādarshi in Armenia); DB §29-30 (Omises in Armenia and 
Assyria), DB §33 (Takhmaspāda in Sagartia); BD §49-50 (Intaphernes in Babylon). 
613 DB §35. 
614 DB §36. 
615 DB §38. 
616 DB §45-48. 
617 Xen. An. 1.1.7. In the following passage (An. 1.1.8), Xenophon adds that Cyrus sent a letter to his brother 
Artaxerxes II, in which he demanded that the Ionian cities should be taken from Tissaphernes and given to 
him. At no point in this communication Cyrus requests reinforcements, which implies that his army was 
raised by using the resources he had at his disposal without any royal assistance. 
618 Xen. An. 1.7.10. 
619 Diod. 14.39.4-5. 
620 Xen. An. 7.8.15.  
621 Diod. 17.18.2: οἱ δὲ τῶν Περσῶν σατράπαι καὶ στρατηγοὶ. 
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similar to those Alexander was destined to meet at Issus and Gaugamela, but rather a joint 
force of various contingents hailing from the adjacent satrapies. The mustering of a royal 
army usually took considerable time, as it is best exemplified by Xerxes’ preparation for 
his Greek campaign, which, according to Herodotus, took no less than four years.622 
Therefore, the army that was ordered to ward off the Greco-Macedonian invasion force in 
the spring of 334 BC was probably scrambled quickly by the satraps of Anatolia along with 
additional forces that were able to make it in time to provide assistance. 
Diodorus provides a detailed description of the satraps who participated in this 
battle, their position in the Persian battle array, and the forces under their command.623 On 
the left flank we find first Arsamenes, the satrap of Cilicia, who led an unspecified cavalry 
contingent,624 then there was Arsites, the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, who commanded 
a Paphlagonian cavalry contingent, and finally Spithrobates625, the satrap of Ionia, who led 
a Hyrcanian cavalry contingent. On the right flank Diodorus names Rheomithres, the satrap 
of Persis, who commanded 1,000 infantry and 2,000 horses from Media and a similar 
number of Bactrian forces. Oddly enough, Diodorus omits the names of the generals who 
participated in the battle.626  
The ancient sources also provide different figures for the size of the satrapal army 
that was routed by Alexander. According to Diodorus, the satraps deployed 10,000 cavalry 
and about 100,000 infantry.627 Justin, on the other hand, states that the Persian army 
constitutes no less than 600,000 strong, a figure which one cannot accept.628 In contrast, 
Arrian records more reasonable figures, as he reports that the satraps mustered 20,000 
infantry and a similar number of cavalry.629 Either way, the battle of the Granicus River 
provides us with clear proof that the satraps had access to impressive military sources and 
that they were also eligible to take on active command duty on the battlefield. 
Gaugamela  
As noted above, the satraps were also expected to dispatch levies for the King’s army,630 
and the satrapal component within the royal army is again exemplified in the case of the 
forces deployed by Darius III at Gaugamela. Fortunately, Arrian recounts in detail the 
nationality and commanding officers of the different units of Persian army.631 Thus, we are 
                                                 
622 Hdt. 7.20. Diodorus (11.2.1) claims that the preparations took three years. 
623 Diod. 17.18.4.  
624 Diodorus (17.19.4) only states that Arsamenes was a satrap, but Curtius (3.4.4) notes that Arsames, 
probably the same Arsamenes mentioned by Diodorus, was the satrap of Cilicia. This is corroborated by 
Arrian (An. 2.4.5-6) who reports that Arsames, who seemingly managed to survive the defeat at the Granicus 
River, upon hearing that Alexander was advancing with all speed to Tarsus, abandoned the city and fled to 
the King Darius. 
625 Arrian, who calls Spithrobates Spithridates, claims that he was the one who was slain by Cleitus when he 
made an attempt to kill Alexander during the battle. See: Arr. An. 1.15.8. For additional mentioning of 
Spithrobates/Spithridates, see: Arr. An. 1.12.8-10, 1.16.3.  
626 It is possible that among them were the three Persian dignitaries who, according to Arrian (An. 1.15.6-8), 
were killed in the engagement: Mithridates, Darius’ son-in-law, Rhoisaces, and Dropides. 
627 Diod. 17.19.4-5. 
628 Just. 11.6.11. 
629 Arr. An. 1.14.4. 
630 See p. 59 above. 
631 Arr. An. 3.8.3-7. 
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informed that three of the senior commanders were satraps: Bessus, the satrap of Bactria, 
commanded the Indians, Bactrians, and Sogdians; Barsaentes, the satrap of Arachosia, 
commanded the Arachosians and the mountaineer Indians (τοὺς ὀρείους Ἰνδοὺς 
καλουμένους); lastly, Satibarzanes, the satrap of Aria, commanded the Arians.632 Just like 
in the battle of the Granicus River, the satraps presided as generals in a large scale 
engagement. 
Satrapal Naval Campaigns 
We have seen that Aryandes, the satrap of Egypt, was capable of mounting a seemingly 
independent expedition by land and sea with the intention of subjugating the Libyans.633 
The same goes for the naval campaign of Artaphrenes against Naxos,634 and Pharnabazus’ 
attack against the Peloponnesians coastline.635 Another example is recounted by Ctesias, 
who reports that before Darius I launched his campaign against the Scythians, he ordered 
Ariaramnes, the satrap of Cappadocia, to cross over to Scythia in order to capture male and 
female prisoners.636 The force dispatched by satrap was rather small, only fifty 
penteconters. Even still, if we believe Ctesias, this anecdote demonstrates once more that 
the satraps could, and at times were ordered to, conduct independent military campaigns 
and raids, well beyond Persian domain. The same goes for the forces deployed by 
Pharnabazus and Cyrus the Younger against the disobedient hill tribes of Asia Minor.637 
These campaigns, although limited in scale, exhibit the mobility and versatility of the 
satrapal forces of the governors of the western satrapies. 
The Limits of Satrapal Military Capacity  
Satrapal military might, however, was not without limitations. Often in times of crisis the 
satraps had to turn to royal military assistance. This notion is expressed in the Cyropaedia 
when Cyrus the Elder justifies his demand for tribute by underscoring that whenever a 
province is threatened, it is the Great who would provide protection.638 Similarly, 
Xenophon claims that the aforementioned circuit commissioners were furnished with an 
army which they could deploy when necessary.639 At times, local uprisings proved to be 
too much for the satrapal forces in the provinces. The best example is the Egyptian revolt 
against Persian rule in the late 460s BC. Achaemenid military presence in Egypt was 
considerable. Achaemenid garrisons were stationed in Memphis,640 Pelusium, Daphnai, 
Mareia, and Elephantine,641 and there is evidence for two additional garrisons in the eastern 
edges of the Nile Delta, namely Migdol and Tell al-Mašūta.642 In addition, after Xerxes 
                                                 
632 Arr. An. 3.8.3-4. 
633 Hdt. 4.167, 200-201.  
634 Hdt. 5.30-32. Even if the number of ships deployed by the satrap was smaller than the figure reported by 
Herodotus, it was certainly considerable. 
635 Ctes. FGrH 688 F30 §74; Diod. 14.81.4-6; Nep. Con. 2.2, 4.1; Polyaen. Strat. 1.48.3. 
636 Ctes. FGrH 688 F13 §20. 
637 See p. 58 above. 
638 Xen. Cyr. 8.6.6. 
639 See p. 45 above. 
640 Hdt. 3.91. 
641 Hdt. 2.30.2-3. 
642 For the garrison in Migdol, see: Oren 1984; Valbelle 1998; Tell al-Mašūta/el-Maskhuta: Bard 1999, 958–
62 (s.v. Tell el–Maskhuta). 
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suppressed an Egyptian revolt in c. 485 BC,643 a more oppressive policy was 
implemented.644 The only specific detail Herodotus provides is the appointment of 
Achaemenes, Xerxes’ brother, as the new satrap of Egypt. Even still, the placement of the 
King’s brother as satrap probably indicates that the Persian King was keen on keeping a 
close eye on the affairs of Egypt and it seems plausible that Persian military presence in 
the region was also augmented. Nevertheless, in spite of the considerable Persian military 
presence in Egypt, the rebel forces led by a Libyan named Inarus, were able to overwhelm 
the local satrapal forces.645  
There are several additional examples which demonstrate that satrapal forces could 
not withstand a fully equipped army in a pitched battle. During the campaign season of 395 
BC Agesilaus roamed and pillaged the countryside of western Anatolia almost 
unchallenged, and when he was finally opposed at the battle of Sardis, he utterly defeated 
the forces of Tissaphernes.646 Xenophon even claims that prior to the Persian defeat near 
Sardis, Tissaphernes deceitfully exploited the truce concluded with Agesilaus to ask the 
King for reinforcements,647 but the satrap was defeated at the battle of Sardis 
nonetheless.648 Lastly, despite the sizable satrapal forces deployed at the battle at the 
Granicus River, the Persian contingents were routed by Alexander.649 
Conclusion 
In essence, the military capacity of the satrap was considerable. Though Xenophon’s model 
seems to focus solely on the stationary garrison forces of the Achaemenid Empire, the 
ancient sources reveal that the satrapal forces could function as a standing army as well as 
a mobile fighting force. It seems highly unlikely, as noted by Tuplin, that the satrapal 
cavalry contingents were a part of the Persian provincial standing army.650 The same can 
be said for heavy infantry and chariots. The cavalry units must have been mobilized for 
planned raids while heavy infantry units were mustered for pitched battles. The ability to 
mobilize considerable forces on demand was enabled by a conscription system which 
allowed the Persian authorities to augment the garrisons when necessary. Consequently, in 
any given satrapy the subjects of the Great Persian King, both native and transplanted 
populations, were at the ready to furnished men, equipment and provisions whenever the 
Persian authorities demand it. The prerogative to muster an army was both royal and 
satrapal, though the conduct of Cyrus the Younger reveals that the satraps were expected 
to obtain royal approval. In short, in peacetime the satraps maintained a minimum number 
of soldiers in active service, while having access to a considerable number of reserve units 
of various types which were ready for deployment.651 
  
                                                 
643 Hdt. 7.1-7, 20. 
644 Hdt. 7.7. 
645 Thuc. 1.104.1; Ctes. FGrH 688 F14 §36; Diod. 11.71.3.  
646 See n. 552 above. 
647 Xen. Hell. 3.4.6. 
648 Xen. Hell. 3.4.11. 
649 See p. 86 above. 
650 Tuplin 1987c, 175. 
651 Klinkott 2005, 284–86. 
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4. IONIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST 
 
Western Anatolia constituted a frontier region of the vast Persian Empire. The coastal 
districts of the western satrapies, however, were inhabited by Greek communities and as 
such were also an integral part of the Greek world. In the following, I intend to demonstrate 
that the geopolitical reality of western Anatolia served was the backdrop for two opposing 
processes which produced a particular challenge to Persian rule in the western satrapies. 
On the one hand, the Persian conquest of Ionia in the latter half of the sixth century BC 
triggered a gradual increase in the willingness of European Greeks to intervene in the 
affairs of Asia Minor on behalf of their Asiatic brethren.652 On the other hand, Xerxes’ 
failure to subjugate mainland Greece resulted in a dramatic change in Persian imperial 
strategy in the west. The actions of the Great Persian King suggest that the policy of 
westward expansion, ushered by Cyrus the Great and continued by Cambyses and Darius 
I, was superseded by a policy of entrenchment. More importantly, having discarded his 
plan to conquer the Greek homeland, Xerxes became less concerned in respect to the state 
of affairs in the western frontier in the later part of his reign. These pivotal developments 
meant that the governors of the western satrapies had to fulfill their satrapal duties while 
striving to contain the growing Greek threat with minimal support from the Persian central 
authorities. 
4.1 Ionians and Greeks  
Defining Ionia 
The designations which are used in the ancient sources to denote the Greek communities 
of Asia Minor are somewhat ambiguous. At times the Ionians are identified as members of 
a particular Greek sub-group who shared customs, cults, tribal names, and a religious 
calendar.653 Such a broad definition includes all of the Greek communities, in Europe as 
well as in Asia, who identified themselves as Ionians. An alternative definition is based on 
geography. According to this comparatively narrow definition, the Ionians were 
exclusively the denizens of the twelve city-states that founded the Ionian League shortly 
before the Persian conquest of Asia Minor.654 In other words, the Ionians consisted of the 
Greek communities residing in the coastal district known as Ionia and the nearby islands. 
A third definition includes all of the Greek communities which inhabited Asia Minor, 
namely the Ionian, Dorian and Aeolian city-states in the Asiatic continent in addition to 
                                                 
652 The Asiatic Greeks were subjugated by the Lydians (Hdt. 1.6.2; Strabo. 12.3.1, 3.9), but due to lack of 
evidence it is difficult to determine the attitude of the Asiatic Greeks toward their Lydian masters. It should 
be noted that Herodotus (1.76.3) claims that the Ionians refused to desert the Lydian king to the Persians. 
653 Herodotus, for example, notes a common Ionian festival called Apaturia (1.147) and recounts the 
ceremonial importance of the Panionion, the sanctuary of Poseidon Heliconius on the promontory of Mt. 
Mycale (1.148). Similarly, Thucydides mentions the distinct luxurious Ionian lifestyle (1.6.3), a particular 
Ionian dating system (2.15.4), and pan-Ionian games held at Delos (3.104). 
654 Hdt. 1.148. The twelve Ionian city-states are: Miletus, Myus, Priene, Ephesus, Colophon, Lebedus, Teos, 
Clazomenae, Phocaea, Erythrae, Samos, and Chios. 
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the islands adjacent to the Anatolian coastline.655 While these various definitions are used 
interchangeably by the ancient Greek authors,656 in the present study I adopt the third and 
last of the abovementioned definitions. I do so because the Greek communities of the 
Asiatic continent and the adjacent islands who were either Persian subjects or under Persian 
military pressure are the main focus of the present chapter. 
Ionians and Greeks 
The ancient Greeks believed that the Ionian city-states were founded by settlers who 
migrated from the Greek mainland shortly after the Trojan War during the so-called ‘Ionian 
Migration’.657 The origin of these Greek colonizers is unclear. Traditions dated to the 
beginning of the Archaic period suggest that the Greek immigrants came from Messenian 
Pylos658 and Boeotia659, while in the sixth century BC the place of Athens became more 
and more predominant in Ionian ancestry.660 According to Herodotus, the Athenians were 
perceived not only as of Ionian stock661 but also as the most distinguished community 
among the Ionian Greeks.662 But a significant shift occurred in the middle of the fifth 
century BC. The Athenians refashioned their Ionian descent, as they began to claim that 
                                                 
655 Alty (Alty 1982, 2 n. 9) suggests that the predominance of the Ionian element among the Asiatic Greeks 
may have led to the ancient sources to assign the designation ‘Ionians’ to all of the Greek communities of 
Asia Minor. 
656 For instance, Herodotus notes that Croesus subjugated the Ionians, Aeolians and the Dorians of Asia (Hdt. 
1.6.2), and that the Greek contingents in Xerxes’ navy consisted of Dorians, Ionians, Aeolians, Ionian 
islanders, and Greek settlers from Pontus (7.92-5). Conversely, when Herodotus recounts the events of Darius 
I’s Scythian campaign, he denotes the Greek contingents in the Persian expedition as Ionians, in spite of the 
fact that some of Greek units came from the Hellespontine region and Aeolis (Hdt. 4.136-42, 138, 7.52). 
Diodorus tends to name the Aeolians alongside the Ionians whenever he mentions the Asiatic Greeks (e.g. 
11.37.1-3; compare Hdt. 9.106.2-4), probably, as Meiggs (1972, 414) suggests,  because he may have been 
following Ephorus, a native of Cumae who mentioned his hometown and the Aeolian cities whenever he 
could. 
657 For a succinct summary of the scholarship on the debate regarding the historicity of the Ionian Migration, 
see: Vanschoonwinkel 1991, 367–404; Greaves 2009, 10–11. 
658 Strabo preserves two traditions which claim that the Ionians, or at least some of them, came from Messenia 
in the Peloponnese. According to Mimnermus (Strabo 14.1.4), an elegiac poet who flourished in the second 
half of the seventh century BC, Neleus, the mythic king of Messenian Pylos and the son of Poseidon, traveled 
to Asia and founded the city of Colophon. Similarly, Pherecydes of Athens (Strabo 14.1.3), who flourished 
in the fifth century BC, says that Neleus led a colonizing expedition to Asia Minor which consisted of Pylians 
and Ionians from Athens. One of the cities they founded was Miletus. 
659 Wade-Gery (1952, 4–5) has suggested that there was a Boeotian element in the settlers who immigrated 
to Ionia, which is attested through the adoption of the Boeotian cult of Poseidon Heliconius. Roebuck (1955, 
34) argues that since the Boeotian settlers were a small minority they subscribed to the influences of the 
majority, and as a result  the evidence for the Boeotian origin of the Ionian cities is meagre. For a different 
view, see: J. M. Hall 2002, 69–70 with n. 60. 
660 See, for instance, a Solonian fragment ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 5 [= Solon F4a]) in which Athens is described as 
the oldest land of Ionia (πρεσβυτάτην ἐσορῶν γαῖαν Ἰονίης). In addition, Plutarch (Sol. 10.4) notes that in 
Solon’s time Salamis was identified by the Delphic oracle as Ionian. Noussia-Fantuzzi (2010, 270–71) 
connects the Solonian fragment to the claim, which appears in Herodotus (1.56.2), that Athens was the most 
distinguished Ionian city. 
661 Thuc. 1.6.3, 2.15.4, 3.104, 7.57.2; Strabo. 8.1.2.  
662 Hdt. 1.56.2, 143.2. 
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they were autochthonous.663 More importantly, the Ionians were recast as Greeks who 
originally dwelled in Achaea, from which they were driven out.664 After finding refuge in 
Athens, the homeless Ionians went on to colonize Asia, which transformed Athens into the 
mother-city of Ionia.665 It is generally agreed that the tradition which depicts the Ionian 
city-states as Athenian colonies was the product of Athenian propaganda, since it meant 
that the Ionians owed their metropolis certain obligations and as such facilitated tighter 
Athenian control over its fellow members of the Delian League.666  
Be that as it may, in spite of the discrepancies in the literary sources concerned with 
the origin of the Asiatic Greeks,667 there is no doubt that already at the beginning of the 
Archaic Period the Greekness of the Asiatic Greeks was well-established in Greece and 
Ionia.668 While this point might seem somewhat obvious, the fact that the Ionians were 
perceived as Greeks meant that they shared a bond of kinship with their European brethren. 
This bond is defined by Alty as ‘ethnic feeling’, that is “feelings (or opinions) arising from 
someone’s membership of an ethnic group.”669 Such a sentiment encouraged a sense of 
camaraderie between Greek communities on both sides of the Aegean, which was used by 
the Asiatic Greeks to garner the support of mainland Greeks on multiple occasions. As we 
shall see in the following section, while using kinship relations in order to gain support was 
not an uncommon phenomenon in the history of ancient Greece,670 the solidarity between 
the Asiatic and European Greeks gradually became a source of trouble for the Persian 
authorities in Asia Minor. 
                                                 
663 The earliest attestation for the Athenians being autochthonous appears in Aeschylus’ Agamemnon (536), 
produced in 458 BC. See also: Hdt. 1.56.2; Thuc. 1.2.5-6, 2.36.1. On the Athenian motive to claim to be 
autochthonous, see: J. M. Hall 1997, 54–55. Further on the Athenian claim of autochthony: Rosivach 1987; 
Shapiro 1996; Blok 2009. On the concept of autochthony in the works of Herodotus and Thucydides: Pelling 
2009. 
664 Hdt. 1.145, 7.94; Paus. 7.1.2-4. Strabo (8.1.2, 7.1-4) presents a slightly different version in which the 
Ionians first migrated from Athens to Achaea and only then they were driven out by the Dorians. 
665 Hdt. 1.146.2, 147.2, 7.51.2; Hellanicus FGrH F4 §125; Thuc. 1.2.6, 12.4, 95.1, 6.82.3-4; Diod. 11.37.1-
3; Strabo 8.1.2, 9.1.5, Poll. Onom. 8.109. On Miletus as an Athenian colony: Hdt. 1.146.3, 9.97.2; Val. Pat. 
1.2.1; Paus. 7.2.1-4. Colophon: Paus. 7.3.3. Myus and Priene: Paus. 7.2.10. Ephesus: Pherekydes FGrH 3 
F155. 
666 E.g. Barron 1964a; Nilsson 1986, 59–63; Smarczyk 1990, 318–84; Sakellariou 1990, 137; Hornblower 
1992, 186, 195–96; J. M. Hall 1997, 55; R. Parker 1996, 142–51. Though this change was dramatic, several 
scholars have argued, rightly in my view, that Athens’ role as the mother-city of Ionia was enhanced rather 
than invented, see: Alty 1982, 9 n. 46; Meiggs 1972, 294; Sakellariou 1990, 137; Raaflaub 1998, 39; Tuplin 
1999, 422. For a similar conclusion in regard to the Aeolian migration, see: B. C. Rose 2008.  
667 The lack of unity regarding the origin of the Asiatic Greeks was well known in the time of Herodotus 
(1.146.1-2), who explicitly states that the Ionian population of Asia Minor was actually an ethnic mixture of 
numerous Greek peoples. 
668 Hall (1997, 52) argues that these traditions reflect an active attempt of the Asiatic Greeks “to anchor their 
origins in the deeper mythical past of mainland Greece.” 
669 Alty 1982, 1. 
670 According to Herodotus (8.144.2), the Athenians proclaimed that they would not betray their fellow 
Greeks in their war against Xerxes since they shared a bond of kinship, common language, religious practices 
and gods, and followed a similar way of life. For additional instances in which one Greek nation used kinship 
to enlist the help of another, see: Thuc. 1.71.4, 124.1, 3.86.3, 6.6.2. For further reading of the role of kinship 
in Greek diplomacy, see: Jones 1999. 
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4.2 Ionian Appeals for Help 
Cyrus, the Ionians, and Sparta 
The earliest known occurrence in which mainland Greeks intervened in Persian affairs on 
behalf of the Ionians occurred shortly before the Persian conquest of Ionia. According to 
Herodotus, when the Lydian king Croesus began his eastward march to face the Persians, 
Cyrus tried to incite the Ionians, subjects of the Lydians at the time, to switch sides. The 
Ionians, however, rejected Cyrus’ proposition.671 But after Croesus’ army was driven back, 
it became clear to all that the arrival of Cyrus was imminent. Consequently, the Ionians 
and Aeolians dispatched an embassy to Cyrus, informing the Persian King that they were 
willing to acknowledge Persian supremacy in exchange for the same privileges granted to 
them by the Lydian kings. The Ionian diplomatic effort, however, was rebuffed by 
Cyrus.672 
Alarmed by Cyrus’ rejection, the Ionians made a unanimous decision to send 
emissaries to the Greek mainland to ask for Sparta’ support against the Persians.673 At 
Sparta, the senior Ionian delegate, Pythermus of Phocaea, donned a purple cloak and 
delivered a long speech in an attempt to move the Spartans into action. The Spartans, 
however, reluctant to make any concrete promises, decided to send scouts to examine the 
current situation in Asia. The Spartan embassy travelled to Sardis and had an audience with 
Cyrus. Herodotus reports that the brazen Spartan envoys informed the Great King that the 
Lacedaemonians would not allow any city which was on Greek soil to suffer any harm. In 
response, Cyrus warned the Spartans that they would have troubles of their own for trying 
to intervene in the affairs of Ionia. Ultimately, the Spartan threat proved to be hollow. The 
Persian armies swept across Ionia capturing one city after the other while the Spartans 
stood by.  
 The Greek city-states of Ionia are described in Herodotus’ report as situated on 
Greek soil,674 while in Diodorus’ account the Lacedaemonian envoys who approached 
Cyrus professed their blood ties to the Asiatic Greeks.675 From the Greek viewpoint, the 
claim that Ionia constituted Greek territory and the bond of kinship between the Spartans 
and Asiatic Greeks legitimized the Spartan intervention in the interactions between Cyrus 
and the Ionians. In other words, a sentiment of Greek solidarity was the main impetus for 
the Spartan diplomatic intervention in Asia Minor. The Spartan effort to assist to Ionians, 
even if limited to diplomacy, suggests that the Spartans, and possibly other Greek nations, 
were concerned with the wellbeing of the Ionians and were willing to take action in order 
to prevent the subjugation of fellow countrymen by non-Greeks.676 
                                                 
671 Hdt. 1.76.3. 
672 Hdt. 1.1141. For a slightly different version, see: Diod. 9.35. 
673 Hdt. 1.141.4, 152-3. 
674 Hdt. 1.152.2: γῆς τῆς Ἑλλάδος. 
675 Diod. 9.36.1: Λακεδαιμόνιοι συγγενεῖς ὄντες τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἀσίαν Ἑλλήνων. 
676 Although the historicity of the Spartan embassy to Cyrus is far from undisputed, it is difficult to believe 
that this tradition is a late invention set to conceal the fact that the Spartans did not help the Asiatic Greeks 
in their time of need since, to cite Asheri (2007, 180), “the image of Sparta that emerges from this chapter is 
of a city extremely narrow-minded, patriotic, arrogant, Panhellenic in words but totally ineffective is 
practice.” 
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The Ionian Revolt  
The Ionian Revolt was the pretext for greater involvement of mainland Greeks in Persian 
affairs. Herodotus is the only extant source for this rebellion against Persian rule, to which 
he devoted considerable attention.677 While the causes for and sequence of the events 
pertaining to the Ionian Revolt have been explored thoroughly,678 the manner in which 
Aristagoras, the acting tyrant of Miletus, won the military support of Athens is the main 
point of interest here. 
Shortly after the Ionians rose in rebellion, Aristagoras travelled to Sparta in order 
to convince the Spartans to join the rebellion. The Milesian tyrant tried to provoke king 
Cleomenes’ greed by describing the great wealth of the Persian Empire, but as soon as the 
Spartan king learned that the distance between Ionia and the Persian heartland was equal 
to a three months journey, he declined.679 In light of his failure to mobilize the Spartans, 
Aristagoras quickly departed to Athens. Fortunately for the Ionians, Athenian attitude 
toward Persia had already turned hostile. Prior to the arrival of Aristagoras, Artaphrenes, 
the satrap of Lydia, ordered the Athenians to take back Hippias, the deposed Peisistratid 
tyrant, or to suffer the consequences. The Athenian response was to brand the Persians as 
their enemies.680 Under these favorable circumstances, Aristagoras gave a speech in front 
of the Athenian popular assembly, in which he mentioned the endless wealth of Asia and 
reminded his audience that Athens, the mother-city of Miletus, had the obligation to protect 
its colony.681 The Athenians were persuaded and soon after twenty Attic ships set sail to 
Ionia.682 The Ionian rebels and their mainland allies captured Sardis, with the exception of 
the citadel, and put the satrapal capital to the torch. The Greek momentum, however, was 
short-lived. The Persians rallied and decisively defeated the Ionians at the battle of 
Ephesus. As a result, the Athenians decided to return home, refusing to give heed to the 
repeating appeals of Aristagoras.683 Eventually, the revolt was crushed, Ionia was pacified, 
and Persian rule was reinstated.  
                                                 
677 Hdt. 5.30-6.33.  
678 The reliability of Herodotus’ account of the Ionian Revolt has been criticized, especially due to his 
apparent bias against Histiaeus and Aristagoras, his portrayal of the rebellion as an endeavor that was doomed 
from the very first moment, and his misunderstanding of the mechanisms of the Persian Empire. For a 
summary of the shortcomings of the information provided by Herodotus, see: Cawkwell 2005, 61–72. 
Nonetheless, Herodotus’ report of the sequence of event is accepted as credible, e.g.: Lang 1968; Chapman 
1972; Manville 1977; Keaveney 1988; Georges 2000. For modern accounts on Ionian Revolt, see: Hegyi 
1966; Tozzi 1978; Lateiner 1982; Wallinga 1984; Murray 1988; Gorman 2001, 129–63; Briant 2002, 146–
56; Thomas 2004, 31–41; Cawkwell 2005, 61–86. 
679 Hdt. 5.49-51. It is evident that the Spartan refusal to provide assistance was based on the acknowledgment 
of the limited extent of Spartan military capacity. Since Xenophon and his ten thousand companions would 
make their march deep into the Persian heartland only a century later, not to mention Alexander’s successful 
campaign in the 330s BC, the notion of a Greek army marching into the core satrapies, let alone mounting a 
large-scale assault against the Persian Empire, must have seemed uncanny if not ridiculous in the fifth century 
BC.   
680 Hdt. 5.96.  
681 Hdt. 5.55. For Athens’ role in the foundation of Miletus, see: Hdt. 1.146.  
682 Hdt. 5.97. Herodotus (5.99) adds that the Eretrians, wishing to repay the Milesians for their past support 
during their war against Chalcis, contributed five triremes of their own to the expedition. 
683 Hdt. 5.102-3.   
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In the context of the Ionian Revolt a new precedent was set. Instead of limiting 
themselves to diplomacy, the Athenians sent troops to fight the Persians head on. Since the 
tradition concerned with the intervention of Artaphrenes in Athenian politics is 
suspicious,684 the only remaining impetus for the Athenian decision to send an 
expeditionary force was their sympathy for their fellow countrymen. Equally important are 
the profound consequences of Athens’ unsuccessful attempt to assists the Ionians to regain 
their liberty. Darius retaliated by sending Mardonius to the northern Aegean to assert 
Persian supremacy in the region.685 This campaign was followed by an expedition to the 
Greek mainland, whose objective was to punish Athens and Eretria for the burning of 
Sardis. This punitive campaign, however, was only partially successful. Eretria was sacked 
but Athens remained unscathed due to the unexpected Greek victory at Marathon.686 
Darius, so it seems, was not seeking to add new territories to his empire but to deter the 
European Greeks from meddling in the matters of Asia Minor.687 
We should be mindful of the literary function the role of the Ionian Revolt in 
Herodotus’ account, namely that the involvement of Athens and Eretria in the Ionian revolt 
was a crucial step toward the inevitable clash between Greece and Persia. Nevertheless, the 
historicity of Athens’ participation in the Ionian Revolt is rather certain, which means that 
the Persians must have realized that the bond between the European and Asiatic Greeks 
became a real and immediate threat to Persian rule in western Anatolia. One may 
hypothesize that Xerxes’ invasion to Greece was motivated not only by an imperial strategy 
of expansion but also by the need to put an end to the Greek problem in the west. In any 
case, Xerxes’ failed to subjugate mainland Greece, but this pivotal event highlighted 
Ionia’s problematic position, and the solution that was favored by the Greeks resulted in 
an even greater readiness of mainland Greeks to intervene in the affairs of western 
Anatolia. 
Deliberating the Evacuation of Ionia 
Like the rest of the subject nations, the Asiatic Greeks sent contingents to participate in 
Xerxes’ invasion to Greece.688 But the Persian defeat at Salamis reignited the Ionians’ 
                                                 
684 It has been argued (e.g. Kuhrt 1988b, 93; Waters 2014, 84; Waters 2016, 94) that after the Athenians 
became leaders of the resistance to the Persian invasion, their past collaboration with the Persians became a 
problem, one which they resolved by inventing a tradition in which the satrap of Lydia made an attempt to 
reinstate the Peisistratid tyranny. However, if we accept this episode as historical, the blatant intervention of 
the Persian satrap in Athenian politics could have been interpreted by the Athenians as an indication that the 
threat of a Persian backed tyranny was no longer an exclusively Ionian problem. One can postulate, therefore, 
that the Athenians wished to establish an independent Ionia that could function as bulwark against further 
Persian sponsored encroachments. 
685 Hdt. 6.43-45. 
686 Hdt. 6.94-120. For a recent study on the battle of Marathon, see: Krentz 2010; Carey and Edwards 2013. 
687 According to Herodotus (6.94), Datis and Artaphrenes were instructed by Darius I to enslave Athens and 
Eretria and to bring to the captives into his presence. Briant (2002, 158–59) convincingly argues that while 
Darius’ overarching aim was to assert Persian supremacy in the Aegean, the expedition of Datis and 
Artaphernes was intended to demonstrate Persian sea power and overall might rather than a proper conquest 
campaign.  
688 Hdt. 7.51-2, 93. 
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desire to throw off the yoke of Persian subjugation.689 Herodotus recounts that after the 
naval battle a group of Chian envoys travelled to Sparta and Aegina and beseeched the 
Greek allies to liberate Ionia. The Greeks, however, refused to sail beyond Delos since they 
still feared the might of the Persian fleet.690 Sometime after, a Samian embassy arrived at 
Delos, where the Greek fleet was mooring. The Samian envoys implored the Greeks to 
save Ionia from servitude and states that the Ionians were ready and willing to revolt, that 
the Persians were cowards, and reminded their audience of their common gods. This time 
the Greeks were persuaded and so they set sail to the east.691 This campaign ended with a 
Greek victory at the battle of Mycale, in which the Samians and Milesians betrayed the 
Persians and joined forces with the mainland Greeks.692  
The victories at Plataea and Mycale marked the end of the Persian Wars. 
Nonetheless, though the Persians were pushed back for the time being, the Greeks feared 
the Persian King who was still looming in the east. More importantly, the recent experience 
taught the Greeks that they were more than capable of making a stand in the Greek 
homeland, but Asia Minor was an entirely different story.  It was clear to all that as long 
as there were Greeks in the Asiatic continent, they would be vulnerable to Persian 
subjugation. Accordingly, shortly after the battle of Mycale the Greek allies assembled at 
Samos to deliberate the future of the Greek communities of Asia Minor. Herodotus 
recounts the debate between the Athenian and Peloponnesian delegates on this matter:693 
[2] ἀπικόμενοι δὲ ἐς Σάμον οἱ Ἕλληνες ἐβουλεύοντο περὶ ἀναστάσιος τῆς Ἰωνίης, καὶ ὅκῃ 
χρεὸν εἴη τῆς Ἑλλάδος κατοικίσαι τῆς αὐτοὶ ἐγκρατέες ἦσαν, τὴν δὲ Ἰωνίην ἀπεῖναι τοῖσι 
βαρβάροισι: ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἐφαίνετό σφι εἶναι ἑωυτούς τε Ἰώνων προκατῆσθαι 
φρουρέοντας τὸν πάντα χρόνον, καὶ ἑωυτῶν μὴ προκατημένων Ἴωνας οὐδεμίαν ἐλπίδα 
εἶχον χαίροντας πρὸς τῶν Περσέων ἀπαλλάξειν. [3] πρὸς ταῦτα Πελοποννησίων μὲν τοῖσι 
ἐν τέλεϊ ἐοῦσι ἐδόκεε τῶν μηδισάντων ἐθνέων τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν τὰ ἐμπολαῖα 
ἐξαναστήσαντας δοῦναι τὴν χώρην Ἴωσι ἐνοικῆσαι, Ἀθηναίοισι δὲ οὐκ ἐδόκεε ἀρχὴν 
Ἰωνίην γενέσθαι ἀνάστατον οὐδὲ Πελοποννησίοισι περὶ τῶν σφετερέων ἀποικιέων 
βουλεύειν: ἀντιτεινόντων δὲ τούτων προθύμως, εἶξαν οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι. [4] καὶ οὕτω δὴ 
Σαμίους τε καὶ Χίους καὶ Λεσβίους καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους νησιώτας, οἳ ἔτυχον συστρατευόμενοι 
τοῖσι Ἕλλησι, ἐς τὸ συμμαχικὸν ἐποιήσαντο, πίστι τε καταλαβόντες καὶ ὁρκίοισι ἐμμενέειν 
τε καὶ μὴ ἀποστήσεσθαι. τούτους δὲ καταλαβόντες ὁρκίοισι ἔπλεον τὰς γεφύρας λύσοντες: 
ἔτι γὰρ ἐδόκεον ἐντεταμένας εὑρήσειν. οὗτοι μὲν δὴ ἐπ᾽ Ἑλλησπόντου ἔπλεον.  
[2] After they arrived at Samos, the Greeks deliberated the evacuation of Ionia and in which 
part of Greece, of which they were in possession, it would be right to settle [the Ionians], 
and [the possibility of] handing over Ionia to the Barbarians. For it seemed impossible for 
[the mainland Greeks] to continually keep watch over the Ionians, but without the former 
being present, the Ionians had no hope of being delivered from Persia’s reach. [3] In regard 
to these matters, it seemed best to those of the Peloponnesians who were in office to give 
the land of the Greek nations which medized to the Ionians after their trade centers had 
                                                 
689 There is a hint of Ionian ambivalence in respect to fighting against mainland Greeks in Herodotus. See: 
Hdt. 7.51-2, 8.10.2-3, 85, 90. 
690 Hdt. 8.132. The conspiracy was led by a certain Herodotus son of Basileides. Hornblower (2003, 56) 
suggests that he was a member of a Basilidae, a priestly clan hailing from northern Ionia. 
691 Hdt. 9.90-92.   
692 Hdt. 9.103.2, 104; Diod. 11.36.2. The defection of Samos and Miletus led Herodotus (9.104) to proclaim 
that this event marked the beginning of a second Ionian revolt, but there is no evidence for a large scale 
Ionian uprising in the aftermath of the battle of Mycale.  
693 Hdt. 9.106.2-4. 
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been depopulated. But the Athenians thought that Ionia should not be abandoned and that 
the Peloponnesians have no right to give advice concerning the fate of Athens’ colonies. 
As [the Athenians] vehemently objected to the [Peloponnesian] proposition, the 
Peloponnesians yielded. [4] And thus [the Greeks] admitted the Samians, Chians, Lesbians 
and other islanders, who had joined the Greeks in the campaign, as allies after they 
compelled them by pledges and oaths to be faithful and to refrain from deserting [the 
alliance]. After they bounded them through oaths, they set sail with the intention of 
destroying the bridges; for they still taught that they would find them intact. And so they 
sailed to the Hellespont.  
Diodorus provides a similar yet not identical version:694 
[1] οἱ δὲ περὶ Λεωτυχίδην καὶ Ξάνθιππον ἀποπλεύσαντες εἰς Σάμον τοὺς μὲν Ἴωνας καὶ 
τοὺς Αἰολεῖς συμμάχους ἐποιήσαντο, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἔπειθον αὐτοὺς ἐκλιπόντας τὴν Ἀσίαν 
εἰς τὴν Εὐρώπην μετοικισθῆναι. ἐπηγγέλλοντο δὲ τὰ μηδίσαντα τῶν ἐθνῶν ἀναστήσαντες 
δώσειν ἐκείνοις τὴν χώραν: [2] καθόλου γὰρ μένοντας αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ τῆς Ἀσίας τοὺς μὲν 
πολεμίους ὁμόρους ἕξειν, πολὺ ταῖς δυνάμεσιν ὑπερέχοντας, τοὺς δὲ συμμάχους ὄντας 
διαποντίους μὴ δυνήσεσθαι τὰς βοηθείας εὐκαίρους αὐτοῖς ποιήσασθαι. οἱ δὲ Αἰολεῖς καὶ 
οἱ Ἴωνες ἀκούσαντες τῶν ἐπαγγελιῶν ἔγνωσαν πείθεσθαι τοῖς Ἕλλησι, καὶ 
παρεσκευάζοντο πλεῖν μετ᾽ αὐτῶν εἰς τὴν Εὐρώπην. [3] οἱ δ᾽ Ἀθηναῖοι μετανοήσαντες εἰς 
τοὐναντίον πάλιν μένειν συνεβούλευον, λέγοντες ὅτι κἂν μηδεὶς αὐτοῖς τῶν ἄλλων 
Ἑλλήνων βοηθῇ, μόνοι Ἀθηναῖοι συγγενεῖς ὄντες βοηθήσουσιν: ὑπελάμβανον δὲ ὅτι κοινῇ 
κατοικισθέντες ὑπὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων οἱ Ἴωνες οὐκέτι μητρόπολιν ἡγήσονται τὰς Ἀθήνας. 
διόπερ συνέβη μετανοῆσαι τοὺς Ἴωνας καὶ κρῖναι μένειν ἐπὶ τῆς Ἀσίας. 
[1] Leotychidas and Xanthippus sailed back to Samos and made the Ionians and Aeolians 
allies. After these things, they persuaded them to abandon Asia and to migrate into Europe. 
They announced that they would compel the Greek nations which sided with the Persians 
to leave and to give them their lands. [2] For, on the whole, as long as they stayed in Asia 
they would have enemies at their boarders which were more powerful than they are. Their 
allies, however, being across the sea, would not be able to come to the rescue when time 
demands it. The Aeolians and Ionians, after hearing these proclamations, decided to obey 
the Greeks and so they made preparations to sail with them to Europe. [3] But the 
Athenians, having changed their mind, advised them to stay, saying that even if none of 
the Greeks would come to help them, the Athenians, being their kinsmen, would provide 
assistance. They assumed that the Ionians, after they had been settled in a common location 
[in mainland Greece] by the Greeks, would no longer consider Athens as their metropolis. 
Therefore, it came to pass that the Ionians changed their mind and decided to stay in Asia. 
In spite of a few minor discrepancies,695 both Herodotus and Diodorus agree that the Greek 
allies sought a viable and permanent solution to the plight of the Ionians. Since the Ionians 
had appealed their mainland brethren for help on numerous occasions ever since the 
Persians conquered Asia Minor, the Spartan proclamation merely reiterated what was 
already known to all, namely that the geographical situation of Ionia vis-à-vis the Persian 
Empire meant that the Ionians were endemically unable to provide for their own defense.696  
                                                 
694 Diod. 11.37.1-3. 
695 For a summary of the differences between the accounts of Herodotus and Diodorus, see: Meiggs 1972, 
414. 
696 Munson 2007, 154. Migration as a solution for Persian military pressure was not a Spartan novelty (e.g. 
Hdt. 1.164-67, 168-169.1, 6.22, 33.2). Thus, the Spartan proposition was probably perceived as ambitious 
but not undoable. Further reading on relocating communities in ancient Greece: Demand 1988; Demand 
1990. 
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While the Spartan proposition was imperfect,697 the Athenians thwarted the 
evacuation of Ionia by conjuring up their shared ancestry with the Ionians. By doing so the 
Athenians were successful at branding the Peloponnesian proposition as an illegitimate 
interference in what was an internal Ionian affair. Since the Athenians persuaded the 
Ionians to stay in Asia by pledging themselves and their allies to the defense of Ionia, one 
wonders what Athens had to gain by perpetuating Greek presence in western Anatolia. 
Diodorus notes that the Athenians were afraid that they might lose the advantages of 
Athens’ status as the Metropolis of Ionia, and it can be added that the presence of the 
Ionians in Asia ensured that they would continue to be dependent on Athens and its 
formidable navy for protection. Furthermore, by placing the emphasis on the common 
Ionian origin and framing the security of the Ionian-city states as an exclusively Ionian 
affair, the Athenian delegitimized future Spartan interventions in the affairs of Ionia. And 
so, while Sparta remained the leader of the Hellenic alliance, the Athenians used this debate 
to cement their prominence among the Ionians, which became useful later on, when Athens 
assumed the leadership in the war against Persia.698  
Conclusion 
In summary, the interactions between the European and Asiatic Greeks in the context of 
Persian military pressure reveal that the former felt responsible for the safety, security, and 
liberty of the latter. This sentiment of solidarity was predicated primarily on ties of kinship 
and metropolis-colony connection. Prior to Xerxes’ invasion this bond drove the Spartans, 
Athenians, and Eretrians to interfere in the affairs of western Anatolia on behalf of the 
Ionians. But after the Persians were driven out of Greece, in the congress held at Samos, 
the Athenians claimed publicly that they would stand by Ionia’s side and guarantee its 
safety. This proclamation transformed what was, until that point, no more than a moral 
obligation based on the goodwill of the mainland Greeks into one of the ideological pillars 
of the soon to be formed Delian League. As we shall see, for the legitimacy of the Delian 
League to remain unchallenged, the Athenians, who assumed the role of guarantors of 
Ionian liberty, had to insert themselves further into the affairs of western Anatolia if they 
wanted to retain their position. Yet, Xerxes’ failed attempt to subjugate the European 
Greeks had an equally profound impact on Persian policies in the west, which is explored 
in the following section. 
                                                 
697 By transplanting the Ionians into Europe the Aegean would have become a natural barrier, which would 
be safeguarded by the fleets of the Greek allies. But the evacuation plan seems impractical due to the necessity 
to expel the Greek nations which medized. We are told that a substantial number of Greek nations 
collaborated with Xerxes during his invasion (see: Hdt. 7.132, 172-74, 205.3, 233.1, 8.30.2, 31, 9.15.2, 17.1, 
31.5, 40, 67, 86.1, 87.2, 88; Diod, 11.3.2). Even if the Greek allies were capable of forcing all of these 
communities into exile, how could they decide objectively who was compelled to medize and who did so 
willingly? What about the Ionians who fought on the Persian side? 
698 See p. 101 below.  
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4.3 The Greek Counter-Offensive in the 470s 
Xerxes’ Measures to Secure Persian Rule in Asia Minor 
After the decisive defeats at Plataea and Mycale, Xerxes aborted his plan to conquer Greece 
and returned home.699 The Great King, however, may have anticipated a Greek 
counterattack of some sort since prior to his departure Xerxes took measures to safeguard 
Persian rule in western Anatolia. To begin with, Xerxes made sure that there were sufficient 
land forces in the region and that key positions were under firm Persian control. For 
example, Xerxes reinforced the garrison at Sardis, probably to ensure that the satrapal 
capital would not be captured once again by the Greeks.700 Moreover, the Great King 
ordered the construction of a fortified palace and a citadel at Celaenae, a Phrygian city 
adjacent to Pisidia which was located on the route that linked Ephesus to northern Syria.701 
Due to the strategic importance of Celaenae, this measure probably echoes an attempt to 
bolster Persian military presence in this region.702 In addition, by fortifying Celaenae the 
Persians were able to monitor movement of enemy forces and prevent them from marching 
unchallenged into the Anatolian hinterland.703 
Another measure by which Xerxes cemented Persian rule in western Anatolia was 
the promotion of loyal Greek medizers to positions of power. Herodotus recalls that 
Theomestor son of Androdamas was appointed as the new tyrant of Samos, while Phylacus 
son of Histiaeus, also from Samos, was given the title ‘benefactor of the King’ (εὐεργέτης 
βασιλέος) and was granted vast estates, probably in Ionia.704 Moreover, sometime after 
Xerxes arrived at Sardis in 479 BC Xeinagoras of Halicarnassus was appointed as the ruler 
of Caria,705 and it has been argued that this action should be interpreted as a Persian effort 
to reassert royal presence in Cilicia due to fear of a Greek attempt to subjugate Cyprus.706 
In addition, several Greek cities were given by Xerxes to Greeks medizers for safe 
keeping,707 and Briant points out that almost all of these cities were located in the Troad, a 
                                                 
699 Hdt. 9.108.2; Diod.11.36.7. 
700 Diod. 9.36.7. It is also possible the Xerxes enhanced the fortifications of the satrapal capital, see: 
Dusinberre 2003, 47–56; Dusinberre 2013, 44. 
701 Xen. An. 1.2.7-9. Dusinberre (2013, 54) maintains that by ordering the construction of a palace and 
acropolis at Celaenae Xerxes was sending an assertive statement of “continued imperial power at this time.” 
702Briant 2002, 559; Tuplin 2011b, 86; Dusinberre 2013, 54. For the importance of Celaenae as a staging post 
for military expeditions, see: Summerer 2011, 35; Tuplin 2011b, 74–75. For the importance of Celaenae as 
a staging post for armies and the evidence for Persian military presence in the region which goes back to 
Xerxes’ campaign, see: Summerer 2011, 36–48. 
703 For example, Diodorus (14.80.5) reports that in 394 BC, while campaigning in western Anatolia, 
Agesilaus arrived at Phrygia and wished to move further inland in his war against the Persians. While 
Diodorus does not specify the exact objective of the Spartan King, the Oxyrhynchian historian (Hell. Oxy. 
12.4) reveals that it was Celaenae. The inland march, however, was eventually aborted by Agesilaus due to 
unfavorable omens obtained by sacrifices. Bruce (1967, 87–88) rejects this explanation and argues that 
Agesilaus knew that by moving against Celaenae he was placing himself in danger of being cut off from the 
sea. Similarly, Briant (2002, 639) argues that the bad omens merely confirmed a decision that was made 
beforehand, as Agesilaus and his officers were well aware of the dangers that an attack against Celaenae 
entailed. For a different view, see: Pritchett 1979, 67–71. 
704 Hdt. 8.85. 
705 Hdt. 9.107.3. 
706 Briant 2002, 560. 
707 Xen. Hell. 3.1.6.  
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region in which important Persian naval bases were located, e.g. Cyme.708 As a result, 
loyalty to Persian rule in this region must have enhanced considerably.  
All in all, it is not out of the question that the aforementioned defensive measures 
applied by Xerxes in western Anatolia provide us with a mere glimpse of the Persian effort 
to fortify western Anatolia in light of the defeat at Plataea and Mycale. Be that as it may, 
the counter-offensive of the Hellenic Alliance began shortly after the Great King returned 
to Persia. But while the Persian forces in the west were under attack, the response of the 
Persian central authorities suggests that Xerxes had not only abandoned his policy of 
westward expansion but expected the local satrapal authorities to contain the Greek assault 
and to protect Persian rule in the west with the resources at their disposal. 
The Greek Advance 
The Greeks did not wait long before they took the offensive. Soon after the victory at the 
battle of Mycale, the Athenians laid siege to the city of Sestos which was under Persian 
control at the time. The Persian defenders, however, held the line for several months until 
the city fell in the autumn of 478 BC.709 The attack on Sestos was only a prelude. In the 
spring of 478 BC the forces of the Hellenic Alliance, under the command of the Spartan 
regent Pausanias, landed on Cyprus.710 The extent of Pausanias’ success, however, remains 
unclear,711 and Persian rule on Cyprus was fully restored not long after the Greeks 
departed.712 Following the Cypriot campaign, probably in the autumn of 478 BC,713 the 
Greek fleet sailed northward and captured Byzantium.714  
Despite having the initiative, the Greek effort was still defensive in nature. The 
subjugation of Cyprus would have barred the Persians from using it as a base of operations, 
thus cutting short the range of the Persian fleet. The capture of Sestos and Byzantium, two 
cities which exercised control over the narrow straits between Asia and Europe, the 
Hellespont and the Bosporus respectively, was necessary to hinder a crossing of another 
                                                 
708 Briant 2002, 562. For a more detailed survey of the evidence for the installment of pro-Persian dynasts in 
Asia Minor, see: Whitby 1998, 219–21. 
709 Hdt. 9.116-120; Thuc. 1.89.2; Diod. 11.37.4-5. Vasilev (2015, 213) suggests that the Athenian impetus 
for attacking the Thracian Chersonese was their desire to reestablish control over this region which was 
dominated by Miltiades in the mid-490s BC. 
710 Thuc. 1.94.2; Diod. 11.44.1-2; Plut. Arist. 23.1; Plut. Cim. 6.1. A Greek attack on Cyprus was strategically 
sound. Parker (1976, 32–33 with ns. 10-11)  notes that Cyprus was the only island east of Rhodes that was 
capable of supporting and maintaining a large fleet due to its excellent harbors at Salamis, Citium, Amathus-
Neapolis, and Vouni. He adds that Cyprus was also rich in fresh water, grain, timber and metal, resources of 
tactical and strategic importance. Meiggs (1972, 39, 56–58) posits that the Greeks entertained the idea that a 
successful campaign could have resulted in the admission of the Cypriot cities into the Greek alliance. 
Moreover, Maier (1994, 308) observes that the recent military Persian defeats probably weakened Persian 
authority in Cyprus, a weakness which the Greek allies probably sought to exploit.  
711 Thucydides merely notes that the Greeks subjugated the majority of the island, while Diodorus and 
Plutarch add no information on this matter. Meiggs (1972, 39, 482) postulates that the Cypriot cities that are 
mentioned in Aeschylus’ Persians (892-3), namely Paphos, Soli, and Salamis, were likely to be among the 
cities taken by Pausanias. 
712 According to Diodorus (11.60.5) by the time of the Eurymedon battle (469 or 466 BC) the Persian navy 
consisted of Cypriot ships, which reveal that the island was recaptured. Cf. S. T. Parker 1976, 32; Wiesehöfer 
1990, 245; Petit 1991, 163–65; Kuhrt 2007, 289. 
713 The exact date of this operation is contested. For a summary of the scholarly debate, see: Loomis 1990. 
714 Thuc. 1.94.2, 128.5; Diod. 11.44.3. 
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Persian invasion force into Europe. All in all, it seems that the Greeks sought to keep the 
Persian fleet out of the Aegean and to prevent a second Persian land invasion into Europe.  
The Persian Opposition 
But what about the Persians? The relatively succinct accounts regarding the capture of 
Byzantium are interpreted by Meiggs as indication of lackluster Persian resistance.715 Yet, 
such an interpretation fails to consider the possibility that, just like the Greeks, the Persians 
were surprised by the defeat of Mardonius,716 and as a result were not fully prepared to 
withstand the Greek counterattack. The attack on Sestos, for instance, caught the Persians 
off guard, since Herodotus explicitly states that the city was not prepared to withstand a 
prolonged siege.717 This impression is bolstered by the fact that in spite of the long duration 
of the siege, no reinforcements came to relieve the besieged Persians.718 Moreover, the 
Persians launched a counterattack of their own, through which they managed to recaptured 
Sestos and Byzantium.719 But the Persians refrained from marching further into Thrace, as 
the Persian objectives were exclusively Sestos and Byzantium. The limited scope of the 
Persian counterattack suggests that the Persians were determined to prevent the Greeks 
from invading Asia Minor through the Bosporus straits, which could have destabilized the 
region and induced another Ionian revolt. The same can be said in regard to Cyprus. The 
reinstatement of Persian rule on the island was not followed by Persian naval operations in 
the Aegean, and one can infer that the Persians were satisfied with preventing the Greeks 
from using the island as a staging point for future raids against Persian coastal settlements 
in the eastern Mediterranean. In sum, the Persian central authorities sought to maintain 
stability in the west by containing the Greek offensive and refraining from further 
escalation. 
The Rise of the Delian League 
After the capture of Byzantium a dramatic development took place. Pausanias, the 
commander-in-chief of the Greek alliance, incurred the hatred of the Greek allies due to 
his abusive behavior and adoption of Persian attire and traditions.720 As a result, Pausanias 
was recalled to Sparta, reprimanded for his oppressive behavior but eventually acquitted.721 
The Greek allies, however, became averse to Spartan leadership,722 and rejected the 
appointment of the Spartan Dorcis as the new general. Instead, they offered the leadership 
                                                 
715 Meiggs 1972, 39. 
716 For the Persians’ confidence in Mardonius’ chances of success, see: Hdt. 8.114, 130.4. 
717 Hdt. 9.116.3.  
718 Vasilev 2015, 214. 
719 Plutarch (Cim. 9.2-3) recounts how Cimon told Ion of Chios during a dinner party that he presided as the 
arbitrator in the division of the spoils after Sestos and Byzantium were captured. Badian (1993, 86–87, 221 
n. 43) points out that Cimon had nothing to do with the capture of Sestos in 478 BC, and rightly concludes 
that the city probably switched hands during the 470s. See also: Miller 1997, 11. 
720 On Pausanias’ excessively harsh conduct: Thuc. 1.95.1, 130.2; Diod. 11.44.5; Plut. Arist. 23.1-2. On the 
medism of Pausanias, see: Thuc. 1.130.1; Diod. 11.44.5. Further on Pausanias’ interactions with the Persians, 
see discussion on p. 104 below.  
721 Thuc. 1.95.3-6; Diod. 11.44.6.  
722 Plutarch (Arist. 23.1) claims that Pausanias along with other Spartans officials treated the Greek allies 
with unwarranted severity, which may explain why the Spartan leadership as a whole was rejected by the 
Greek allies.  
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to the Athenians, who rose to the occasion while the Spartans acquiesced.723 The 
withdrawal of the Spartans facilitated the establishment of a new Hellenic coalition known 
as the Delian League.724 The official mission statement of the newly founded alliance 
varies in the ancient sources. Thucydides claims that the objective of the League was to 
seek restitution for the suffering the Greeks endured during the Persian wars by ravaging 
the Great King’s domain.725 Diodorus reports that the elected general of the allied forces, 
Cimon son of Miltiades, was instructed to assist the allied cities which were in Asia and to 
liberate other Greek city-states which were still garrisoned by the Persians.726 These two 
distinct goals can and should be seen as complementary. Be that as it may, the creation of 
the Delian League signaled the beginning of a new round of hostilities between Greeks and 
Persians. The capture of Sestos and Byzantium meant that the remaining Persians 
strongholds in Europe were cut off from Asia. Therefore, it was only natural that the first 
operations of the Delian League were aimed against the last pockets of Persian resistance 
in the northern Aegean.  
The Operations of the Delian League in the 470s 
The first target of the Delian League was Eion, a Persian stronghold situated on the mouth 
of the Strymon River.727 Eion was strategically important since those who controlled it 
were able to monitor the movements of armed force across Thrace.728 And so, the League’s 
forces laid siege to the city throughout the winter of 447/46 BC.729 Eion eventually fell 
after the Persian governor Bogas chose to set the city on fire instead of capitulating, causing 
                                                 
723 Thuc. 1.95.6-7, 130.2; Xen. Hell. 6.5.34; Plut. Arist. 23.4. Various complementary explanations have been 
suggested by the ancient authors regarding the rejection of the Spartan leadership and the rise of Athens. 
Thucydides (1.96.7) argues that the Spartans yielded the leadership because they feared the possibility that 
other Spartan officers might be corrupted like Pausanias. He also adds that the Spartans wanted to end their 
involvement in the war against the Persians. Aristotle (Ath. Pol. 23.2) and Aristides (Or. 23.47) maintain that 
Athens’ rise to prominence was due to its naval superiority which was admired by the Greek allies. 
Conversely, Diodorus (11.44.6) and Plutarch (Arist. 23, Cim. 6.1-3) claim that the machinations of Aristides 
and Cimon caused the rejection of the Spartan leadership. 
724 For modern accounts on the foundation of the Delian League, see: Meiggs 1972, 42–49; French 1988; 
McGregor 1987, 30–36; Loomis 1990; Rhodes 1992; Rhodes 2006, 14–21. It should be noted that the 
Athenian motive behind the foundation of the Delian League is contested. Some scholars (e.g. Larsen 1940, 
199–213; Brunt 1953, 150) argue that the objective of the Athenians at this early stage was to liberate Greeks 
from Persian subjugation, as indicated by Thucydides (3.10.1-3), while others (e.g. Rawlings 1977; French 
1988), maintain that the real motive of the Athenians was to subjugate their allies from the very beginning. 
See also the study of Robertson (1980a; 1980b) who maintains that one of Athens’ main objectives was to 
punish Greek medizers. 
725 Thuc. 1.96.1. 
726 Diod. 11.47.1. 
727 Hdt. 7.107; Thuc. 1.98.1; Aeschin. 3.183-5; Plut. Cim. 7.1-2; Diod. 11.60.2; Paus. 8.8.7-9; Nep. Cim. 2.2; 
Polyaenus Strat. 7.24. See also P.Oxy. 13.1610 f.6 [=Fornara 1983, no. 61/B2].  
728 Thuc. 4.108.1. In addition, by acquiring Eion the Athenians established a foothold in a region that was 
rich in ship-building timber, a source of clear strategic importance to a maritime power such as Athens. 
729 Although Diodorus dates the capture of Eion to 470/69 BC (which is accepted by Smart 1967), it is 
generally agreed the Persians lost Eion in 476 BC. See: Meritt, Wade-Gery, and McGregor 1950, 160, 214 
n. 88; Podlecki 1971; Meiggs 1972, 80; Delorme 1987; Hornblower 1991, 149–50 s.v. 98.1; Rhodes 1992, 
45; Green 2006, 124 n. 223. 
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the death of his wife, children, and himself, an action for which, according to Herodotus, 
Bogas was praised by Xerxes.730 
The next Persian stronghold in the northern Aegean that was overran by the forces 
of the Delian League was Doriscus, which dominated the crossing of the Hebros River via 
the coast.731 We do not know when Doriscus fell. A hint is provided by Herodotus, who 
claims that the Persian governor of Doriscus, a certain Mascames, received many gifts from 
Xerxes for his success at withstanding numerous Greek attempts to capture Doriscus, and 
that his descendants were honored by Artaxerxes I for his courage.732 The ambiguity of 
Herodotus’ remark has led to the suggestion that Doriscus fell only after the accession of 
Artaxerxes I, possibly in the mid-460s BC.733 But others claim, correctly in my view, that 
the information provided to us by Herodotus is not sufficient to conclude with certainty 
how long the Persians maintained control over Doriscus.734 It is, however, highly likely 
that the Greek attacks against Doriscus began shortly before or after Cimon besieged 
Eion.735  
The capture of Eion and Doriscus were only the highlights of the Delian League’s 
operations in the northern Aegean. We are told by Herodotus that the Greeks captured all 
of the Persian fortresses in the region with the exception of Doriscus.736 The Greeks, so it 
seems, were determined to expel the Persians from Europe. But what were the Persians 
trying to achieve? The fierce resistance offered by the Persian forces in Eion and Doriscus, 
Xerxes’ positive reaction to the manner in which Bogas perished, and the royal honors 
awarded to Mascames suggest that the Great Persian King ordered his forces in Thrace to 
hold the line. One can speculate that Xerxes’ intention was to occupy the Greeks in Europe 
so to have the necessary time to adequately fortify western Anatolia. Such a suggestion is 
corroborated by the fact that the struggle for Thrace continued for three years after Xerxes’ 
retreat and that the Persian central authorities neither sent reinforcements to the northern 
Aegean nor made any attempt to recapture the lost Thracians strongholds.  
                                                 
730 Hdt. 7.107; Polyaenus, Strat. 7.24; Plut. Cim. 7.1-2. 
731 Isaac 1986, 138. According to Herodotus (7.59.1), Darius I set up a royal fort (ἐν τῷ τεῖχός τε ἐδέδμητο 
βασιλήιον) at Doriscus during his Scythian campaign in c. 513 BC, which suggests that the strategic 
importance was known to the Persians. 
732 Hdt. 7.106.1. 
733 U. Köhler 1889, 87–92; How and Wells 1912, s.v. 7.106; Meiggs 1972, 69, 73, 82; Balcer 1984, 374. 
Dandamaev (1989, 231) argues that the Persians were able to control Doriscus well into the second half of 
the fifth century BC. 
734 Gomme 1945, 281; Miller 1997, 11. 
735 Meiggs 1972, 69. 
736 Hdt. 7.106.2. Several postulations has been made in regard to other possible Persian bastions that were 
lost during the Greek attack in the 470s BC. The authors of the ATL (Meritt, Wade-Gery, and McGregor 
1950, 216) suggest Abdera, while Miller (1997, 10 with n. 31.) posits that Achanthus, whose people made a 
pact of guest-friendship with Xerxes (Hdt. 7.116-17), was also a Persian hyparchy. In addition, Herodotus 
reports that the Persians laid up stores of provisions in Doriscus, Eion, a Thracian settlement called White 
Point (Leuce Acte) and Tyrodiza in the territory of the Perinthians, and it is possible that Persian strongholds 
existed in the latter two locations as well. 
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4.4 Pausanias, Xerxes and Artabazus 
Pausanias’ Machinations in Byzantium 
The Persian effort to hold off the Greek offensive was not limited to military measures. 
Several sources report that shortly after the Hellenic Alliance captured Byzantium, 
Pausanias began conspiring with Xerxes.737 Allegedly, after the fall of Byzantium 
Pausanias saw that several high-profile Persian captives were released and given safe 
passage back to the Persian heartland. This act was accomplished in secret by a confidant 
of Pausanias named Gongylus, who was instructed to accompany the Persians and to 
deliver a letter to Xerxes. Thucydides includes what seems to be a verbatim account of this 
letter, in which Pausanias proposed to marry Xerxes’ daughter and to subjugate Sparta and 
Greece in the name of the Great Persian King.738 
Pausanias’ proposal, we are told, was well received at the royal court. Thucydides 
states that Xerxes dispatched Artabazus son of Pharnaces to supersede Megabates as the 
new governor of Hellespontine Phrygia and gave him a letter bearing the King’s signet to 
deliver to Pausanias.739 In his reply Xerxes expressed his gratitude for the release of the 
Persian captives, encouraged Pausanias to carry on with his plans, ensured the Spartan that 
he would lack neither funds nor manpower, and added that Artabazus was instructed to 
assist him.740 The nature of the assistance provided by Artabazus is clarified by Diodorus, 
who says that the newly appointed satrap gave Pausanias large sums of money with which 
he was to buy the allegiance of other Greek notables.741  
As noted above, Pausanias was recalled to Sparta, probably at the end of 478 BC,742  
due to his abusive behavior, and, according to Thucydides, collaboration with the 
Persians.743 But shortly after his acquittal, most likely in the spring of 476 BC, Pausanias 
sailed back to the Hellespont without the approval of the ephors and expelled the Athenians 
from Byzantium. At some point the Athenians took back Byzantium, and Pausanias went 
to Colonae in the Troad.744 We are left to wonder what Pausanias accomplished during his 
                                                 
737 Thuc. 1.128.4-6; Diod. 11.44.3; Plut. Cim. 6.2, Them. 23.3-4. 
738 Thuc. 1.128.7; compare: Diod. 11.44.3. In contrast, Herodotus (5.32) states that the Spartan’s marriage 
proposal was addressed to the daughter of Megabates, the contemporary governor of Hellespontine Phrygia. 
To our best knowledge, the daughters of the Achaemenid King were traditionally given to notable members 
of the Persian nobility as a reward for distinguished services (e.g. Plut. Art. 27.4; Xen. Hell. 5.1.28). Hence, 
it is hard to believe that Xerxes was willing to give one of his daughters to a non-Persian and no less an 
enemy general. I agree with Meiggs, (1972, 466), who deems Herodotus’ account more reliable mainly 
because marriage between Pausanias and a satrap’ daughter was “a much more plausible ambition.” 
739 Thuc. 129.1. Diodorus (11.44.4) omits the appointment of Artabazus as the new satrap of Hellespontine 
Phrygia as he states that Artabazus, in his capacity as a general (στρατηγός), was sent to the west to negotiate 
the affair on behalf of Xerxes. 
740 Thuc. 1.129.2-3.  
741 Diod. 11.44.4. 
742 It is generally agreed that Pausanias was recalled at the end of 478 BC or at the beginning of 477 BC. See: 
Loomis 1990, 488 with notes 11-13 for references to previous scholarship. 
743 Such an accusation corresponds with the reports (Hdt. 9.82; Thuc. 1.130; Diod. 11.44.5) that Pausanias 
adopted Persian customs and traditions. 
744 Thuc. 1.128.3, 131.1. Thucydides does not specify the exact date in which the Athenians retook 
Byzantium. The authors of the ATL (1950, 175) argue in favor of the summer of 477 BC, White (1964, 144) 
suggests the end of 477 BC, while Gomme (1945, 394) and Evans (1988, 3) date Pausanias’ expulsion to 476 
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time in Colonae, but we do know that his exploits prompted his second recall and ultimate 
downfall.745  
The authenticity of the purported collaboration between Pausanias and Xerxes has 
been contested.746 Even scholars who accept the accusation of medism as historical argue 
that these charges were unfounded.747 As it stands, the nature of the available evidence 
renders it impossible to resolve the scholarly debate regarding Pausanias’ exploits in the 
Hellespont. Nevertheless, the one uncontested historical fact in this episode is the 
appointment of Artabazus as the new satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia.748 While Thucydides 
credits the arrival of Artabazus to Pausanias’ machinations, it is far more likely that the 
loss of Sestos and Byzantium prompted this change in personnel. Artabazus, I argue, was 
the ideal candidate for this position. As a seasoned general who accumulated considerable 
military experience during Xerxes’ invasion749 and forged connections with men of worth 
in the west,750 Artabazus was the right man to rule a western frontier region that was under 
attack. 
But what was Xerxes seeking to achieve through the appointment of Artabazus? I 
find it hard to believe that Xerxes entertained the notion of enslaving the Greek homeland, 
                                                 
BC. Lazenby (1975, 239) posits a slightly later date, 476/5 BC. Conversely, several scholars follow the 
testimony of Justin (3.1.9), according to which Pausanias ruled Byzantium for seven years until he was driven 
out of Byzantium in 472/1 BC (Fornara 1966, 267–71; Rhodes 1970, 397) or 471/0 BC (Meiggs 1972, 73). 
In my opinion, the strategic importance of Byzantium renders it difficult to believe that the Athenians waited 
seven years before they reasserted their control over the city. 
745 Thuc. 1.131-134. 
746 In favor of authenticity: Olmstead 1933; Dandamaev 1989, 229; Briant 2002, 560–61. In contrast, several 
scholars (e.g. Meiggs 1972, 466; Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover 1981, 381–82; Evans 1988, 3) have pointed 
out the implausibility of Thucydides’ chronology, others rejected Thucydides’ account due to apparent bias 
against Pausanias, whether Thucydides’ (Konishi 1970; Rhodes 1970; Evans 1988) or his sources (Podlecki 
1976; Westlake 1977b), while others claim that Thucydides’ overarching didactic program caused him to 
neglect his integrity as a historian in this particular episode (Ellis 1994). Meiggs (1972, 466) summarizes the 
problem by stating that “had Thucydides’ account been written by any other Greek historian, it would not 
have been taken seriously.” 
747 See discussion at Lippold 1965; Lang 1967; Lazenby 1975; Schmitt 1983, 71–72; Gauger 2000, 263–64, 
374; Cawkwell 2005, 129; Wiesehöfer 2006, 666.  
748 The appointment of Artabazus signaled the establishment of the Pharnacid satrapal dynasty. Further on 
the Pharnacids, see: Klein 2015. 
749 During Xerxes’ invasion, Artabazus presided as the commander of the Parthian and Chorasmian 
contingents (Hdt. 7.66.2). After Xerxes decided to return to Sardis, Artabazus received the honor of escorting 
the Great King to the Hellespont (Hdt. 8.126) and on his journey back to Thessaly he laid siege to Potidaea 
and Olynthus with partial success (Hdt. 8.127-9). Moreover, Herodotus (9.41.2-4) reports that Artabazus was 
the one who advised Mardonius to retreat to Thebes and to bribe noteworthy Greeks in order to weaken Greek 
unity against the Persians. Artabazus’ advice, however, was scornfully rejected by Mardonius, for which, as 
reported by Herodotus (9.66), Artabazus resented Mardonius. As a result, Artabazus abandoned the Persian 
lines at the beginning of the battle of Plataea along with 40,000 men and began his journey home. 
750 Herodotus (9.89) implies that Artabazus was on friendly terms with those among the Thessalians and 
Phocians who espoused the Persian cause. Moreover, though Herodotus notes that he lost many men during 
his march through Thrace, is it plausible that Artabazus forged connections in this region as well. For 
example, the Chalcidians, to whom Artabazus gave the city of Olynthus after he captured it (Hdt. 8.127), 
must have been grateful for his generosity. 
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with or without the assistance of Pausanias.751 Since Artabazus came to the west with gold 
rather than a massive army, his objectives must have been more attainable. In light of the 
Persian efforts to hold the line in Thrace, Artabazus was probably instructed to use bribes 
in order to ensure the collaboration of powerful men in the Aegean front. By garnering, or 
buying, support in the Hellespontine region, Artabazus was able to extend his influence 
beyond the borders of his satrapy with the purpose of hindering future attacks against 
Persian domain.752 Accordingly, the decision to appoint Artabazus as the new satrap of 
Hellespontine Phrygia and perhaps as the King’s representative in the negotiations with 
Pausanias are revealing. It suggests that Xerxes was aware of the problems in the western 
frontier and that he had full confidence that the local Persian forces were up to the task. 
Artabazus, so it seems, was mandated to ensure that the western borders of the Empire 
were secured while Xerxes turned his attention to other endeavors elsewhere. 
4.5 Xerxes’ Campaign from the Persian Viewpoint 
In the immediate aftermath of Xerxes’ abortive invasion to Greece, the Persians were 
expelled from Europe and even Cyprus was briefly occupied by the Greeks. On the face of 
it, the western satrapies were in a state of emergency whereas Persian responses to the 
Greek challenge constituted short-lived counterattacks in the Hellespontine region, the 
appointment of Artabazus, and the seemingly fruitless collaborations with influential 
Greeks such as Pausanias. One wonders why the Persian response to Greek aggression was 
limited in scope. The answer can be found in a tradition in which the Greco-Persian Wars 
ended with a Persian victory. This alternative version is visible not only in the ancient 
literary corpus but also in royal proclamations found in Achaemenid royal centers. Such a 
tradition, I argue, is highly likely to resonate Xerxes’ efforts to protect his own reputation 
and prestige in light of his failure to expand the borders of his realm.753 Yet, the promotion 
of such a version, a version that did not correspond with the actual reality in the western 
satrapies, had consequences which the satraps had to face. 
The Greek and Persian Versions 
The scarcity of Persian documentation renders it difficult to assess the impact of the 
unsuccessful attempt to subjugate Greece on Xerxes’ position.754 The Greek sources, of 
course, provide a heavily biased and therefore unreliable depiction of the Persian defeat 
and its catastrophic consequences.755 Accordingly, it is not unreasonable to assume that the 
                                                 
751 For the motives of Pausanias, see discussion at: M. E. White 1964, 152; Blamire 1970; Cawkwell 1970, 
53; de Ste Croix 1972, 172. 
752 This modus operandi resembles the Persian custom of appointing local notables as tyrant in the Greek 
city-states in Asia and a continuation of Xerxes’ policy of promoting loyal Greek medizers to positions of 
power. 
753 On the expansion of territory as a fundamental element in Achaemenid royal ideology see: Jacobs 2010; 
Haubold 2012; Waters 2016, 98–101. 
754 Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1995, 1048. 
755 The fact that Xerxes was assassinated 14 years after he retreated from Greece did not prevent the 
emergence of a tradition (e.g. Justin 3.1.1-2; Ael. VH 13.3) which attributes Xerxes’ assassination to the 
supposed contempt he incurred due to his misadventure in Greece. An additional attempt to inflate the scope 
of the Persian catastrophe is found in Aeschylus’ Persians, which includes several overly dramatic 
proclamation regarding the disastrous impact the Greek victory had on the Persian Empire. For instance, 
Aeschylus claims that the land of Asia was ravaged in its entirety (550), that Persian rule in Asia had utterly 
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Persian version of the war against the Greeks was radically different and equally biased as 
it was aimed at downplaying Xerxes’ military defeats while highlighting the more 
successful aspects of his Greek campaign.  
 In a succinct summary of the events of the Persian Wars, Dio Chrysostom claims 
that Xerxes defeated the Lacedaemonians at Thermopylae, sacked Athens and imposed 
tribute on the Greeks before returning home.756 One should admit that Chrysostom is not 
utterly wrong. The Greeks were in fact defeated at Thermopylae, Athens was sacked by 
the Persians, and the Greek communities in Asia remained subjects of the Persian Empire 
long after Xerxes’ departure. Accordingly, it is not unlikely that the Xerxes placed an 
emphasis on his accomplishments during his Greek campaign, regardless of its final 
outcome, and presented the expedition against the Greeks as a success.757 It is possible, as 
postulated by Briant, that Chrysostom’s account conveys a tradition which originated from 
the official Persian version of the events which transpired during Xerxes’ invasion, a 
version which was cultivated and disseminated by Xerxes after he returned to the Persian 
heartland.758  
The notion that the Persians accomplished their objectives can be found in 
Herodotus’ Histories as well. Herodotus claims that after the battle of Salamis Artemisia 
of Caria tried to persuade Xerxes to return home by pointing out that the primary objective 
of the campaign, namely the punishment of the Athenians for the burning of Sardis, was 
achieved.759 Now, the historicity of the content of Artemisia’s speech, if she ever gave a 
speech, is highly dubious. Yet, Herodotus, so it seems, acknowledges the possibility that 
Xerxes’ campaign could have been deemed as partially successful from a Persian 
viewpoint. But the Histories provide further evidence for the manner in which Xerxes’ 
campaign may have been presented by the Persian royal authorities. In his attempt to 
convince the Athenians to switch sides, Xerxes made a promise to rebuild the Athenian 
temples that had been burned down during the sacking of Athens.760 Briant argues that this 
promise implies that Xerxes despoiled the Athenian acropolis and took the loot back to 
Persia to be paraded as markers of a successful expedition.761 Briant’s postulation is 
corroborated by reports concerned with the restoration of the statues of the Athenian 
tyrannicides Hermodius and Aristogeiton, which were stolen by Xerxes.762 Additional 
monuments which Xerxes took with him back to Persia were a bronze statue known as the 
Water-carrier from the temple of the Mother in Athens,763 the foundation of the statue of 
                                                 
collapsed (585-95), that only a handful of Persian survivors made it back home alive (510), and that both the 
Persian navy and army were utterly ruined leaving Susa desolate (728-31). 
756 Dio Chrys. Or. 11.149. 
757 On the Achaemenids as masters of propaganda, see: Kelly 2003.  
758 Briant 2002, 542. 
759 Hdt. 8.102.3. Moreover, in an earlier passage Herodotus (8.99) claims that the Persians at Susa celebrated 
when they heard that Athens was captured by Xerxes. 
760 Hdt. 8.140. 
761 Briant 2002, 541. 
762 Arrian (An. 3.16.7, 7.19.2) claims that they were restored by Alexander the Great. Conversely, Valerius 
Maximus (2.10.ext.1) claims that the statues were returned by Antiochus, while Pausanias (1.8.5) ascribes 
this benevolent act to Antiochus, presumably Antiochus I Soter. 
763 Plut. Them. 31.1. 
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Artemis of Celces,764 the bronze statue of Apollo from the Branchidae at Miletus, and the 
image of Brauronian Artemis from Brauron.765 That these spoils of war were used for 
propagandistic purposes is corroborated by Arrian, who states that Xerxes had all the 
statues, ornaments and votive offerings which he stole from the Greeks taken to Babylon, 
Pasargadae, Susa, and other cities in Asia,766 and it is highly likely that these artifacts were 
used to validate Xerxes’ claim that the war against the Greeks ended with a Persian 
victory.767 
The Daiva Inscription 
Another possible manifestation of an alternative Persian version of the Persian Wars can 
be found in a trilingual inscription (Old Persian, Akkadian and Elamite) commissioned by 
Xerxes and known as the Daiva inscription.768 The Daiva inscription was preserved on five 
stone slabs which were discovered in Persepolis and Pasargadae though not in-situ.769 The 
date in which the Daiva inscription was produced is contested. Herzfeld has argued that 
the formulaic similarities between the Daiva inscription and inscriptions commissioned by 
Darius I indicate that it was produced early in the reign of Xerxes, i.e. before his invasion 
to Greece.770 Herzfeld’s initial dating of the inscription was widely accepted,771 but later 
on Herzfeld himself changed his mind and argued that the Daiva inscription was produced 
after Xerxes’ failed attempt to subjugate Greece but before Pausanias was expelled from 
Byzantium.772 Eventually Herzfeld settled on 478 BC.773 Presently, it is widely agreed that 
the Daiva inscription was produced after Xerxes’ invasion,774 and even if it was 
commissioned in the 480s, it is almost certain that it was on public display throughout 
Xerxes’ reign.  
In light of the above, the Daiva inscription provides indirect proof of the manner in 
which Xerxes’ Greek campaign was presented in Achaemenid royal centers. In a similar 
fashion to other Achaemenid royal proclamations, the Daiva inscription includes a 
catalogue of tributary peoples in which thirty one peoples are listed.775 In comparison to 
                                                 
764 Arr. An. 7.19.2. 
765 Paus. 1.16.3, 8.46.3. 
766 Arr. An. 7.19.2. 
767 Briant 2002, 542. 
768 For recent translations of the various versions of Daiva inscription, cataloged as XPh, see: Herzfeld 1937; 
Herzfeld 1938 (Akkadian); Cameron 1959 (Elamite); Kent 1950, 150–52; Lecoq 1997, 105; Schmitt 2000, 
88–95 (Old Persian). 
769 Sancisi-Weerdenburg (1980, 9) has argued convincingly that although the stone slabs were reused, it is 
highly likely that during the reign of Xerxes these inscriptions were placed at central locations in Achaemenid 
royal capitals. For the archaeological context in which the copies of the Daiva inscription were found, see: 
Schmidt 1939, 12; Schmidt 1953, 209 (Persepolis); Stronach 1978, 152 (Pasargadae). 
770 Herzfeld 1937, 64–5. 
771 E.g. Kent 1937, 305; Schmidt 1953, 14; Abdi 2007, 54. 
772 Herzfeld 1947, 396. For the date in which Pausanias was expelled from Byzantium see n. 744 above. 
773 Herzfeld 1968, 351. 
774 E.g. Briant 2002, 541; Kuhrt 2007, 305 n. 5. 
775 Media, Elam, Arachosia, Armenia, Drangiana, Parthia, Aria, Bactria, Sogdiana, Chorasmia, Babylonia, 
Assyria, Sattagydia, Sardis, Egypt, Ionians, those who are by the sea and those who are beyond the sea, 
Makans, Arabia, Gandara, Indus, Cappadocia, Dahae, the Amyrgian Scythians, the Scythians with the 
pointed caps, Thrace, the Akaufaka people, Libyans, Carians, and Nubians. 
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similar lists which appeared in inscriptions commissioned by Darius I, Xerxes’ catalogue 
includes a greater number of subject peoples.776 The message the catalogue conveys is 
clear: Xerxes expanded the borders of the Empire, a claim which depicted the Great King 
as an accomplished conqueror, a capable general, and a worthy successor of his 
predecessors.777 Interestingly, there are two or possibly three groups of Greeks which are 
mentioned in the Daiva inscription: (1) the Ionians (Yaunā), (2) ‘[the Ionians] who dwell 
by the sea’ (tyaiy darayahiyā dārayatiy) and (3) [the Ionians] who dwell beyond the sea’ 
(utā tyaiy paradraya dārayatiy).778 It is generally agreed that the Yaunā were the Asiatic 
Greeks, but the other two designations are contested. In regard to the identity of ‘those who 
dwell by the sea’, it has been suggested that this term signifies the inhabitants of the satrapy 
of Hellespontine Phrygia,779 the Asiatic Greeks in general,780 or the dwellers of the Aegean 
islands.781 Regarding ‘those who dwell beyond the sea’, it has been argued that this term 
denotes the territories of Thrace and Macedon, or at least part of them,782 while other 
scholars have argued that the term signifies the European Greeks.783 Sancisi-Weerdenburg 
has suggested a more inclusive definition by arguing that from the Persian viewpoint the 
nations beyond the sea included Greeks, Thracians, and Scythians.784 
If the term ‘those who dwell beyond the sea’ was used to denote the European 
Greeks or even the dwellers of the northern Aegean, it becomes evident that the official 
Persian version was that Xerxes successfully subjugated these peoples and exacted tribute 
from them, just as Dio Chrysostom claims. This interpretation is bolstered by the fact that 
the term Skudra, i.e. Thrace, is also included in Xerxes’ catalogue of nations.785 
Accordingly, there is little doubt that Xerxes proclaimed that his control in the northern 
Aegean, and possibly mainland Greece, was unchallenged, a claim which utterly ignored 
the reality in the western frontier.786 
                                                 
776 DB §6/12-17 (23 nations); DNa §6/15-30 (30 nations); DPe §2/10-18 (26 nations); DSaa (22 nations); 
DSab (24 nations); DSe 21-30 (30 nations); DSf (15 nations); DSm 6-11 (23 nations); DZ (21 nations). 
777 Xerxes’ expanded catalogue of tributary nations can be taken as another indication that the Daiva 
inscription was commissioned after Xerxes’ Greek campaign. Xerxes managed to crush an Egyptian revolt 
that began at the end of his father’s reign, but the victory over the Egyptian rebels did not brought about any 
new territorial acquisition. Moreover, according to Herodotus (7.5, 7, 20) the Egyptian rebellion caused a 
delay in the preparation for the Greek campaign, and it is highly unlikely that another war of expansion took 
place between the revolt in Egypt and the Persian invasion to mainland Greece. Therefore, the war against 
the Greeks provided Xerxes the pretext for making a claim that he expand his father’s empire.  
778 XPh §3/23-5. Briant (2002, 173) identifies three different groups of Greeks, as noted above, and thus he 
enumerated thirty two nations in the Daiva inscription. In contrast, Schmitt (2000, 92–93) and Sancisi-
Weerdenburg (2001, 332) argue that there are only two groups of Greeks: (1) ‘Ionians beyond the sea’ and 
(2) ‘Ionians by the sea’. 
779 Schmitt 1972; Hornblower 1982, 19 n. 108; Sekunda 1988; Schmitt 1991, 49. n. 15. 
780 Kent 1937, 304. 
781 Lecoq 1997, 143. 
782 Kent 1937, 304–5. 
783 Lecoq 1997, 143; Briant 2002, 173. Contra: Herzfeld 1947, 396. 
784 Sancisi-Weerdenburg 2001, 331. 
785 XPh §3/27. 
786 Several scholars (e.g. Root 1979, 309–11; Bridges 2014, 73–96) have argued that the artistic program 
employed by the Achaemenid Kings in Persepolis and other imperial centers was intended to convey a strong 
message of imperial order, unity and security. This was achieved through various means, e.g. motif of liars 
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The possibility that Xerxes proclaimed that his Greek campaign was a success is 
nothing but expected. No Persian King in his right might would have dared to publicize his 
failures, an act which would undermine his authority and embolden potential pretenders. 
The fact that Xerxes continued to reign for additional fourteen years,787 during which he 
saw that the building program in the Achaemenid royal capitals, which was initiated by 
Darius I, continued as planned,788 suggests that the Persian defeats in the western frontier 
constituted “but a brief inconvenience in the history of the Persian Empire.”789 The Greek 
incursions, as seen from Susa or Persepolis, were not viewed as a threat to Persian rule in 
Asia Minor. But from the viewpoint of the satraps of western Anatolia the Greek attacks 
constituted a real and immediate problem which exacerbated when the anti-Persian Delian 
League was founded. Xerxes was not alarmed by the Greek incursions and was confident 
that his satraps were up for the task. Accordingly, the satraps of western Anatolia were 
expected, in accordance with their satrapal duties, to protect the King’s possessions in the 
west without royal assistance.  
4.6 The Battle of the Eurymedon River 
The battle at the Eurymedon River was a pivotal event in the history of the Delian 
League.790 In the early 460s BC a confederate fleet of about 200791 ships under the 
command of Cimon was campaigning in Caria and Lycia, subjugating several cities, some 
by persuasion and others by force.792 At some point, Cimon learned that Persian land and 
sea forces were being mustered nearby at the mouth of the Eurymedon River. The Athenian 
general decided to strike and a double engagement ensued. After defeating the enemy fleet 
                                                 
being punished by the Great Persian King in royal proclamations, reliefs of Persian heroes (or kings) subduing 
mythical monsters, and the rigid continuation of style and manner in which the Great Kings were depicted. 
Accordingly, Briant (2002, 542) has argues that this artistic backdrop must have enhanced the impression 
created by the catalogue of nations in the Daiva inscription, namely that the empire, including the western 
frontier, was pacified and that the authority of the Great King was absolute. 
787 Until the assassination of Xerxes, which occurred in 465 BC. See: Wiesehöfer 2007, 4; Depuydt 2008, 9–
12; Abdi 2010. 
788 On Xerxes’ contribution to the palace complex at Persepolis, see: Olmstead 1948, 272–88; Schmidt 1953, 
34. 37. 41-2; Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1989c, 549–50; Yamauchi 1990, 338–39; Root 2015, 16-19. 27-8.  
789 Villing 2005, 238. This notion is brilliantly captured in a poem entitled ‘The Persian Version’, composed 
by the renowned Robert Graves, who wrote: “Truth loving Persians do not dwell upon the trivial skirmish 
fought near Marathon.” See: Graves 1966, 185. 
790 The primary sources for Cimon’s Eurymedon campaign are: Thuc. 1.100.1; Diod. 11.60.4-62.3; Plut. Cim. 
12.4-13.4. See also: Plato, Menex. 242a; Nepos. Cim. 2.2; Lycurg. In Leocr. 73; Paus. 1.29.14; OP. Oxy. 
13.1610, fr. 9-10 col. 1 [=Ephor. FGrH 70 F191]. 
791 Thucydides does not specify the size of Cimon’s fleet, but Plutarch (Cim. 12.2) reports that Cimon had 
200 ships at his disposal. Diodorus (11.60.3, 5) claims that additional vessels joined the confederate fleet 
during Cimon’s advance and by the time of the clash with the Persians the confederate navy consisted of 300 
ships. Meiggs (1972, 76–6) observes that the confederate fleets which were sent to Egypt in the late 460s 
(Thuc. 1.104.2) and to Cyprus in 450 BC (Thuc. 1.112.2) consisted of 200 ships and concludes that a fleet of 
200 ships constituted the full force of the Delian League. Thus, he posits that this was the size of the fleet 
which was deployed at the Eurymedon battle. 
792 Diod. 11.60.4; Plut. Cim. 12.1-4; Frontin. Strat. 3.2.5. The reliability of the evidence for Cimon’s 
campaign in Caria and Lycia has been challenged, but now the historicity of the events which preceded the 
battle Eurymedon are widely accepted. See: Keen 1997, 60 with notes 16-18 with reference to earlier 
scholarship.  
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Cimon and his men disembarked and routed the Persian land forces that were encamped 
on the river bank. There are several discrepancies in the ancient sources in regard to the 
size of the Persian fleet,793 the identity of the Persian generals,794 and the location of the 
first naval engagement.795 The exact date of the battle is also contested, as arguments have 
been made in favor of 469796 and 466797 BC. In spite of these disagreements, it is widely 
accepted that the mobilization of Persian land and sea forces at the Eurymedon constituted 
preparations for a large scale offensive that was intended to reassert Persian supremacy in 
the Aegean.798 In what follows I highlight the shortcomings of the Persian offensive 
hypothesis and demonstrate that the Eurymedon battle was nothing more than an 
engagement between a confederate fleet sent to ravage the King’s land and augmented 
satrapal forces which were mobilized to contain and repel the Greek invaders. Such 
interpretation corresponds with the detached attitude of the Persian central authorities 
toward the state of affairs in western Anatolia and strengthens the impression that Xerxes 
was unmoved by the Greek incursions in the west and had confident that his satraps were 
capable of protecting the western borders of his empire.  
The Persian Offensive Hypothesis 
The proponents of the hypothesis that Cimon’s Eurymedon campaign thwarted 
preparations for a Persian offensive make several seemingly compelling arguments. It has 
been argued that Xerxes, determined to avenge his past defeats, mobilized land and sea 
forces with the intention of reviving Persian preeminence in the west,799 and that Xerxes, 
aware of the Naxian revolt and the increasing dissent among Athens’ allies, decided to 
seize the moment and strike.800 In addition, the substantial size of the Persian fleet coupled 
with the mobilization of land forces were seen as indications of an ambitious offensive in 
                                                 
793 Thucydides (1.100.1) and Nepos (Cim. 2.2) mention 200 Persian ships but Diodorus (11.60.6) claims that 
the Persians had 340 ships deployed. Plutarch (Cim. 12.6) includes two figure: 600 ships, as reported by 
Phanodemus, an atthidographer who flourished in c. 330 BC, and 350 ships, as reported by Ephorus.  
794 Plutarch (Cim 12.4), citing Ephorus, reports that Tithraustes was the commander of the fleet and that 
Pherendates commanded the land forces. According to Callisthenes, who is also cited by Plutarch, 
Ariomandes son of Gobryas was the commander in chief of the entire force. Diodorus (11.60.5, 61.3) 
mentions only Ephorus’ account. Meiggs (1972, 72) argues, correctly in my opinion, that these accounts are 
not necessarily mutually exclusive since it is possible that Tithraustes and Pherendates were in charge of the 
sea and land forces respectively, but that both were subordinate to Ariomandes. 
795 Thucydides and Plutarch set the sea battle at the Eurymedon River. In contrast, Diodorus claims that the 
naval clash took place near Cyprus. Since the distance between Cyprus and the Eurymedon River is about 
200 km, it is impossible for Cimon to have been able to cover such a distance in order to fight two 
engagements on the same day. Accordingly, it is widely held that Diodorus confuses the Eurymedon battle 
with Cimon’s Cypriot campaign in 450 BC. See: Gomme 1945, 286; French 1971, 38 n. 40; Meiggs 1972, 
75; Schreiner 1976, 20–25; Haillet 2001, 162–63 n. 5; Green 2006, 120 n. 230. 
796 French 1971, 37 n. 40; Meiggs 1972, 80–82; Bayer and Heideking 1975, 118–19; Fine 1983, 345; Unz 
1986, 69–73; Blamire 1989, 138; Hornblower 1991, 153; Badian 1993, 100; Keen 1997, 57 n. 3; Briant 2002, 
555; Green 2006, 20. 
797 Meritt, Wade-Gery, and McGregor 1950, 160; Sealey 1976, 250; Cawkwell 2005, 225; Rhodes 2006, 20. 
798 Curtius 1879, 140; Beloch 1921, 159–62; Bury and Meiggs 1975, 208; Sealey 1976, 251; Meiggs 1972, 
78; Fine 1983, 344; Blamire 1989, 138; Davies 1993, 44–45; Briant 2002, 557; Buckley 2002, 183; Cawkwell 
2005, 132–33; Rhodes 2014, 248. 
799 Meiggs 1972, 78.  
800 Briant 2002, 557. 
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the making.801 Furthermore, the size of Greek fleet, namely 200 vessels, had been deemed 
too large for a raiding party, which led to the conclusion that Cimon was in fact leading a 
preemptive strike.802 All of these arguments may seem convincing, but none of them is 
without flaws.  
The Greeks as the Aggressors 
A close reading of the sources reveals that the battle at the Eurymedon was preceded by 
Greek aggression. From the capture of Eion in 476 BC the war against Persia came to a 
standstill. The Athenians, so it seems, preferred to cement their position as the leaders of 
the Delian League,803 and one can infer that the Persians, still unchallenged in the Asiatic 
continent, were satisfied with the emergence of an unofficial truce. But the diminishing 
Persian threat and the failure of the Athenian leadership to follow the Delian League’s 
official objectives, namely to liberate Persian controlled Greek cities and to ravage the 
King’s land, were not without consequences. The Athenians witnessed a sharp decline in 
support for continuing the war against the Persians among the members of the Delian 
League, 804 which corroded the justification for Athens’ demand for tribute, ships, and 
men.805 These developments probably led to the abortive attempt of the Naxians to secede 
from the Delian League, and for the first instance in the history of the Delian League in 
which the Athenians used force to compel a former member to rejoin the alliance.806  Thus, 
from an Athenian point of view, the Naxian secession attempt was a warning sign, a clear 
indication that the legitimacy of the Delian League was in decline. Since this was the 
background to Cimon’s campaign in Caria and Lycia, it seems reasonable to assume that 
the Athenians dispatched a fleet to south-western Anatolia in order to demonstrate to their 
allies and perhaps to the rest of the Greek world that the war against Persia was far from 
over.807 
That the Athenians were eager to reassert their position as the leaders of the war 
against Persia is reflected in the propagandistic frenzy that followed Cimon’s victory at the 
Eurymedon. Stelai in honor of the Athenians who fell at the Eurymedon were set up in 
Athens,808 celebratory epigrams commemorating the Greek triumph were inscribed on 
monuments set up by Cimon,809 and the spoils from the battle were used to beautify 
                                                 
801 Sealey 1976, 251; Briant 2002, 557. 
802 Cawkwell 2005, 132–33. 
803 After the capture of Eion, Athens subjugated Scyros and Carystus. See: Thuc. 1.98.1-3; Diod. 11.60.2; 
Plut. Cim. 8.3-6. 
804 Plut. Cim. 11.1.  
805 Thucydides (1.99) claims that the rising dissent among the members of the Delian League was caused not 
by Persian inactivity but by the inability of Athens’ allies to withstand continuous labor and Athens’ severity 
in exacting tribute, vessels, and soldiers. Such explanation, however, is far from convincing since the allies 
had contributed their fair share diligently in the past and it is more likely that their change in attitude occurred 
once Athens began targeting Greek cities while the Persian threat became less and less tangible. 
806 Thuc. 1.98.4. 
807 Cf. Hornblower 2011a, 21. In addition, Grote (1846, 395) maintains that Cimon was sent to Asia due to 
an Athenian desire to obliterate the memory of Athens’ recent brutal treatment of Naxos.  
808 Paus. 1.29.14. 
809 There are three epigrams, each a four-line stanza, which were inscribed on monuments set up by Cimon 
in celebration of his victories. See: Aeschin. 3.183-5; Diod. 11.62.3; Plut. Cim. 7.3-8.1. Wade-Gery (1933) 
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Athens.810 In addition, the victory was commemorated at Delphi,811 depicted on vase 
paintings,812 and Athenians boys were named Eurymedon.813 By the time of Plutarch, the 
battle at the Eurymedon River was remembered as a pivotal moment in the war against 
Persia, a glorious achievement that overshadowed the triumphs at Salamis and Plataea.814 
But when the actual consequences of the battle are taken into account, the claim that the 
battle was a watershed moment seems like a wild exaggeration.815 To being with, to our 
best knowledge cities from Caria and Lycia did not joined the Delian League. It is quite 
possible that several cities within the confederate fleet’s range might have joined the Delian 
League due to awe or fear, but the scarcity of evidence, mainly the information that can be 
derived from the Athenian tribute lists, suggests that the Delian League did not expand 
eastward.816 Moreover, it is difficult to believe that Cimon, having utterly defeated the 
Persian forces, decided to return home instead of capitalizing on his victory.817 Therefore, 
one can hypothesize that the Athenians were more interested in reminding their allies that 
the war against Persia was still ongoing and that the existence of Delian League was 
                                                 
provides a comprehensive survey of all the extant traditions and versions of Cimon’s celebratory epigrams. 
Further on Cimon’s epigrams, see: Peek 1940. 
810 Plut. Cim. 13.6-8. 
811 Paus. 10.15.4-5. Moreover, Kebric (1983) has argued that the Lesche of the Cnidians at Delphi, a club-
room for communal gathering, was constructed and adorned in response to the Athenian victory at the 
Eurymedon. 
812 It is generally agreed that the famous Eurymedon Vase, a red-figure oinochoe dated to c. 460 BC, 
celebrates Cimon’s victory at the Eurymedon. On Side A there is a depiction of a mature bearded Persian, 
wearing a decorated jumpsuit, a soft cap, and a dangling empty quiver. The Persian is bending over with his 
hands held to the side of his head in a gesture of panic. On side B we find a naked Greek youth who seems 
to be chasing the Persian while brandishing not a spear but his penis. Between the two there is an inscription 
which says: “I’m Eurymedon, I stand bent-over”. The restoration suggested by Schauenburg (1975, 104 n. 
38a) is the following: εὐρυμέδον εἰμ[ὶ] κυβά[δε ]ἕστεκα. On the connection between the Eurymedon Vase 
and the Eurymedon battle, see: Dover 1989, 105; Pinney 1984; Miller 1997, 13; Castriota 2005, 99; Cohen 
2011, 474–77. 
813 The best example for this phenomenon is the Athenian general Eurymedon (e.g. Thuc. 3.80.2), who, as 
pointed out by Hornblower (1991, 154, 475), was almost certainly named after this battle. 
814 Plut. Cim. 13.4. Compare: Paus. 1.29.14. Plutarch (Cim. 12.1, 13.4) even claims that nobody humbled the 
Great Persian King like Cimon at the Eurymedon. 
815 Plutarch (Them. 31.3) maintains that prior to the Egyptian uprising in the early 450 BC, Cimon 
successfully established Athens’ mastery over the sea, which forced the King to mount a counterattack. While 
Keen (1997, 63-4) deems this achievement as an outcome of Cimon’s victory at the Eurymedon, I argue that 
such a statement reflects Athenian propaganda rather than historical reality. 
816 Gomme 1945, 290–95. Thucydides (2.9.4) reports that the allies of Athens in 431 BC included the coastal 
cities of Caria with its Dorians neighbors, but a thorough examination of the Athenian tribute lists (see: Keen 
1993a) demonstrates that while Lycian and Carian settlements appeared inconsistently in the mid-450s BC, 
they are conspicuously absent after 440 BC. Therefore, it is clear that the Carian and Lycian cities were in a 
position to depart from the Delian League with impunity and it is not out of the question that they 
acknowledged Persian authority. 
817 Rhodes (1992, 43) posits that at the very least Cimon could have made an attempt to recover Cyprus, as 
he did in 450 BC under less favorable circumstances. Moreover, it is puzzling why the Athenians did not 
cement their control over southwestern Anatolia, which entailed numerous strategic advantages. Cf. Keen 
1993b; Keen 1997, 65–66.  
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imperative.818 Accordingly, it is not out of the question that the somewhat exaggerated 
reputation of the battle at the Eurymedon River was probably the outcome of Athenian 
propaganda. 
The Persians were on the Defensive 
The notion that the Greeks were the aggressors is bolstered by several indications which 
suggest that the Persians were on the defensive. First, there is no substantive evidence for 
Persian design to mount an assault on the Aegean. The three traditions which make such a 
claim are, as noted by Keen, highly dubious.819 Most importantly, it is hard to believe that 
the Persians were in a state of paralysis for at least a decade before they resolved to reassert 
Persian authority in the Aegean, or that Xerxes was motivated by a thirst for vengeance so 
long resolved after his failure to conquer Greece. In general, the assumption that the Great 
Persian Kings were aware of or cared for the political squabbles in mainland Greece is 
unrealistic. Accordingly, it highly unlikely that Xerxes was paying close attention to the 
changing dynamics between Athens and its allies from the moment he returned home and, 
when he learned about the Naxian revolt, he sprang into action seeking revenge. As we 
have seen, Xerxes was unaffected by the Greek incursions which preceded the Eurymedon 
campaign, so there is no reason to believe that he suddenly changed his mind and made 
plans to storm the Aegean once more. Xerxes, I argue, was not paralyzed but detached, and 
almost certainly preoccupied with other regions within his domain which demanded his 
attention.820 This was true before the Persians were defeated at the Eurymedon River, and, 
when considering the fact that the Greek victory had no substantial consequences, probably 
after. 
Second, any argument that is predicated on the size of Persian land and sea forces 
cannot be accepted. The ancient sources are notorious for providing questionable if not 
                                                 
818 Several explanations have been suggested for the seemingly abrupt ending of the Greek offensive. Plutarch 
(Cim. 13.4) implies that the Persians sued for peace after the defeat at the Eurymedon, but it is rather clear 
that the biographer is referring to the so-called Peace of Callias, which Diodorus (12.2.4-5) dates to 450/449 
BC. Some scholars (e.g. Walsh 1981; Badian 1987) have argued that a peace treaty was concluded after the 
Eurymedon. Nevertheless, there are several problems with such a claim. First, Blamire (1989, 144) notes that 
the conclusion of a truce after the battle at the Eurymedon River is utterly absent from fourth century BC 
traditions. Second, if the Athenians and Persians came to terms, how could we explain the Athenian 
involvement in the Egyptian uprising in first half of the 450s BC and the Athenian attack on Cyprus in 450 
BC? A more plausible explanation have been suggested by Meiggs (1972, 79), who maintains that Cimon 
decided to refrain from pushing forward because he had no reconnaissance on the potential threats that were 
waiting ahead and because the sailing season was close to its end. 
819 Keen 1997, 58. Plato (Menex. 241d) merely mentions in passing that Xerxes planned a third invasion. 
Diodorus (11.58.2-3) asserts that Xerxes’ expected Themistocles to facilitate the reassertion of Persian power 
in the Aegean, but the death of Athenian general led Great King to abort his plan. This tradition, it should be 
noted, is utterly rejected by Thucydides (1.138.4). Justin (12.15.17-20) asserts that Xerxes began preparations 
for a second Greek campaign after he learned about the elimination of Pausanias, his alleged co-conspirator. 
All in all, the traditions concerned with a third Persian invasion should be envisioned as manifestations of 
Greek paranoia rather than actual Persian design. Cf. Fornara 1966, 271; Meiggs 1972, 467; Badian 1993, 
87–88; Keen 1997, 58–59. 
820 The portrayal of Xerxes in the ancient sources as preoccupied almost exclusively with court intrigue in 
the later part of his reign (e.g. Hdt. 9.108-13, Ctes. FGrH 688 F13 §32-33; Diod. 11.69.1-2; Just. 3.1.1-2) 
cannot be accepted as historical. It is far more likely that Xerxes had to attend to the needs of his vast empire, 
of which western Anatolia was only a small part. 
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dubious figures whenever Persian armies and navies are involved.821 In respect to the 
number of Persian ships deployed at the Eurymedon, the figures mentioned in the sources 
range from 200 to 600,822 while we have no concrete information regarding the size of the 
Persian land forces. On the contrary, there are several indications which suggest that the 
size of the Persian fleet that gathered at the Eurymedon was grossly inflated. Keen notes 
that Phanodemus' claim that the Persians deployed 600 ships is dubious since it constitutes 
the sum of both Greek and Persian fleets as reported by Ephorus.823 Moreover, we are told 
that Cimon, with a fleet of at least 200 ships,824 had to force the Persians to engage as the 
latter tried to refrain from battle by sailing up river until the arrival of eighty Phoenician 
ships which were en route from Cyprus.825 In previous naval engagements in which the 
Persians had a numerical advantage there was no hesitation on the Persian side.826 The 
caution of the Persian admirals suggests that the Persian fleet may have been much smaller 
than reported and perhaps even smaller than Cimon’s armada.827  
In regard to the Persian land forces, a close reading of the sources reveals that the 
Greeks were probably far from outnumbered on land as well. Plutarch notes that Cimon’s 
fleet consisted of newly designed triremes, which were broader and were furnished with 
bridges between the decks. The new design meant that each trireme was capable of carrying 
a greater number of hoplites.828 In other words, Cimon’s fleet was carrying a large infantry 
force ready for deployment.829 In addition, though the reports on the land battle are 
succinct, all agree that the Persian land army was easily routed, which renders the 
possibility that the Persians outnumbered the Greeks even less plausible. 
                                                 
821 Herodotus, for example, claims that Datis had no less than 600 triremes under his command (Hdt. 6.95.2), 
that the Persian fleet that crushed the Ionian rebels near Lade consisted of 600 ships (Hdt. 6.9.1, 95.2), that 
Xerxes’ fleet consisted of 3,000 various types of vessels (Hdt. 7.97), and that the Persian invasion force 
consisted a total of 5,283,220 men (Hdt. 7.184-6). The accounts regarding the Persian efforts to suppress an 
Egyptian uprising in the early 450s BC serve as another compelling example. Ctesias (FGrH 608 F13 §36-
7) recounts two Persian attempts to recapture Egypt: the first expedition consisted of 400,000 infantry and 
eighty ships, while the second 200,000 and 300 ships. The figure reported by Diodorus (11.74.1, 75.1-2, 
77.1) are equally unbelievable: 300,000 infantry and cavalry for the first expedition and 300,000 coupled 
with 300 ships for the second. 
822 See n. 793 above. 
823 Keen 1997, 59–60. 
824 See n. 791 above. 
825 Plut. Cim. 12.4.  
826 For example, in the battle of Artemision (Hdt. 8.4-11) the Persians, who had a numerical advantage, 
charged headlong. Similarly, in the battle of Salamis the Persians attacked without hesitation (Hdt. 8.84) 
while the Greek counter-maneuvers were aimed at cancelling the Persian superiority in numbers by luring 
the Persians ships into a narrow strait (Hdt. 8.60a-b; Diod. 11.15.4; Plut. Them. 12.3). The Persians at the 
Eurymedon, so it seems, tried to do the same by sailing up river, which suggests that they had a smaller fleet. 
Moreover, Herodotus (9.96-7) recounts how shortly before the battle of Mycale the Persian admirals 
preferred to beach their ships and fight the Greeks on land because they had fewer ships. 
827 In addition, Keen (1997, 60) argues that even if we accept the possibility that the Persians assembled a 
fleet of 600 ships, it was still insufficient for a large-scale attack.  
828 Plut. Cim. 12.2. 
829 The magnitude of Cimon’s land forces is demonstrated by the subjugation of the city of Phaselis shortly 
before the Eurymedon battle. Phaselis fell not due to a prolonged siege but after Cimon mounted a frontal 
assault against the city walls, which probably required the participation of considerable land forces. See: Plut. 
Cim. 12.3. 
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Third, the considerable size of the Greek fleet does not necessarily mean that the 
Greeks launched a preemptive strike against a forming Persian invasion force. We should 
not forget that Cimon was the first Greek to sail deep into enemy waters since Pausanias’ 
attack on Cyprus in 478 BC. The proximity to the Persian naval bases in Cyprus, Phoenicia, 
and Cilicia meant that the chances of encountering a Persian fleet were considerable. 
Moreover, Athens influence in this region was non-existent before Cimon’s arrival, which 
explains why Cimon was not received as a liberator by the people of Phaselis.830 
Accordingly, the Athenians and their allies must have been aware of the potential threats 
that Cimon would be facing during his campaign and therefore mobilized a force that was 
suitable for siege works, land skirmishes, and naval engagements. In addition, a large fleet 
constituted an effective demonstration of the Delian League’s might, which must have 
improved Cimon’s chances of success in persuading Carian and Lycian cities to revolt from 
the Persians and join the Delian League. In sum, the size of Cimon’s fleet had nothing to 
do with an imminent clash with a considerable Persian force but a necessary precaution in 
light of the dangers it could have encountered. 
Fourth, if Cimon was instructed to attack the Persian forces at the Eurymedon, one 
wonders what drove him to disregard his orders and waste valuable time in assaulting 
several cities in Caria and Lycia. A prudent and seasoned general like Cimon must have 
known that it was best to attack before the enemy was in full strength. In addition, the 
accounts of Diodorus and Plutarch imply that Cimon learned about the Persian military 
presence at the Eurymedon in the midst of his campaign in Caria and Lycia.831 If the Persian 
forces at the Eurymedon were news to Cimon, the claim that he was leading a preemptive 
strike becomes impossible. So why was Cimon sent to Caria and Lycia? Diodorus frames 
Cimon’s exploits in southeastern Anatolia as a continuation of the overarching effort of the 
Delian League to liberate Greek cities garrisoned by the Persians.832 Thus, I completely 
agree with French, who maintains that “there seems no reason why we should not interpret 
the campaign as one of the more successful examples of the League’s original policy, i.e. 
as a punitive plundering raid upon the Persian domains.”833  
 Fifth, the sequence of events demonstrates that the Persian mobilization at the 
Eurymedon was a response to Cimon’s advance. While it is unclear whether Cimon’s 
campaign in Lycia and Caria spanned over a single or several seasons834 our sources agree 
that the Persian mobilization at the Eurymedon took place while Cimon was already 
operating in Caria and Lycia. Therefore, is seems unfathomable that the Persians were 
leisurely mustering a vast host to embark on another ambitious conquest expedition instead 
                                                 
830 Diodorus (11.60.4) reports that Cimon had to reduce unspecified of Carian cities by siege, while Frontinus 
(Strat. 3.2.5) mentions an unnamed city that Cimon captured through a clever stratagem. 
831 Diod. 11.60. 4-6; Plut. Cim. 12.2. 
832 Diod. 11.60. 
833 French 1971, 38 n. 40. For a similar interpretation of the origin of Cimon’s campaign, see: Grote 1846, 
395; Walker 1923, 55; Steinbrecher 1985, 104–6; McGregor 1987, 40. 
834 Diodorus dates all of Cimon’s achievements in Caria and Lycia to 470/69 BC, and Plutarch’s narration 
gives the impression that Cimon’s assault in the region occurred in a single and continuous campaign. While 
this timeline is accepted by Keen (1997, 61–62), Meiggs (1972, 74) and Blamire (1989, 138) have argued 
that the many achievements of Cimon were more likely to have been accomplished over several seasons. 
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of moving against the Greek invaders who were roaming in Caria and Lycia,.835 A more 
reasonable explanation for the presence of the Persian forces at the Eurymedon is that the 
Persian mobilization began as a response to Cimon’s exploits.836 In other words, only when 
the Persian authorities received reports about the presence of a sizable Greek fleet that was 
operating in Caria and Lycia they began mustering land and sea forces with the intention 
of preventing the Greeks from advancing further to the east.837 Time was pressing and 
when Cimon attacked the Persians were still building up their strength, which explains the 
hesitation of the Persian navy. 
Sixth, the usage of the Eurymedon as the mustering site for the Persian forces 
validates the notion that the Persian mobilization was defensive and reactionary in nature. 
The traditional staging point for Persian land forces in Asia Minor was not the banks of the 
Eurymedon River but Sardis838, while the naval bases in Cilicia and Phoenicia were the 
conventional mustering places for Persian navies.839  Furthermore, the Eurymedon was not 
a suitable starting point for a westward campaign since there was no good coastal road for 
quick transportation of troops in the area and it had no easy access to the Anatolian 
hinterland.840 The only seemingly tactical importance of the Eurymedon was that it was in 
the path of Cimon’s fleet, which again indicates that the Persians were aiming at blocking 
the advancing Greek fleet.841 
                                                 
835 Keen 1997, 62–63. 
836 Steinbrecher 1985, 105–6. A similar response of the satrapal authorities in western Anatolia occurred 
when Alexander invaded to Asia, as the local satraps gathered their forces and engaged the Macedonians at 
the Granicus River. See n. 844 below.  
837 Cawkwell (1970, 47–48) points out that the assembling of a fleet was a prolonged endeavor and argues 
that the forces at the Eurymedon began mustering two years prior to the battle. Conversely, Keen (1997, 63) 
notes that while there are several instances of long preparations which preceded a campaign (e.g. Hdt. 726.1; 
Xen. Hell. 3.4.1; Diod. 15.14.2, 38.1), if the Persian preparations began two years before Cimon’s arrival, 
they should have been much larger in scale than reported. 
838 For instance, Sardis served as winter quarters for Xerxes’ army prior to the crossing of the Hellespont 
(Hdt. 7.37.1). Similarly, when Cyrus that Younger was gathering an army before he tried to usurp the throne, 
the Greek officers were instructed to assemble at Sardis with the men under their command (Xen. An. 2.2-
5). Sardis was also the site in which reinforcements from the east joined Tissaphernes’ satrapal contingents 
in 396 BC (Xen. Hell. 3.4.5-11). 
839 For examples, in 492 BC Mardonius marched with his army to Cilicia, where a fleet was waiting for him. 
From there he sailed along the Anatolian coastline to Ionia (Hdt. 6.43.2-3). Two years later Datis assembled 
his navy in the Aleian plain in Cilicia in preparation for the expedition against Athens and Eretria (Hdt. 6.95). 
Similarly, when Egypt rebelled in the late 460s, Artabazus and Megabyzus, the generals who were ordered 
to retake Egypt, marched with their land army to Cilicia and Phoenicia, where they rested their forces and 
commanded the Cyprians and Cilicians to supply provisions and ships (Diod. 11.75.2-3). 
840 Meiggs (1972, 78) suggests that the land route was not critical since the Persians intended the ships to 
carry the land forces. In contrast, Keen (1997, 61) points out that since the Athenians dominated all that was 
west of the Eurymedon River, the Persian fleet needed to advance in parallel with the land forces in order to 
ensure control of the coastline, a basic and necessary tactic in ancient maritime warfare. Similarly, Cawkwell 
(2005, 133–34) argues that the Persians planned to march along the coast with the army and navy moving 
along each other, thus capturing city after city just like Alexander did in 333 BC,  albeit in the opposite 
direction. Such a plan, however, does not necessarily mean that the Persian design was to launch a large scale 
offensive, and it could also be argued that they simply intended to reclaim all the cities that were lost to the 
Greeks in Caria and Lycia. 
841 It should be noted that Thucydides (8.87) reports that in 411 BC a Persian fleet sailed as far as the city of 
Aspendus, which was situated on the Eurymedon River, in readiness to sail westward. At no point, however, 
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In summary, the battle of the Eurymedon River was by no means the outcome of a 
Greek preemptive strike that was intended to prevent a Persian offensive. It was a clash 
between a confederate fleet that was instructed to liberate the Greek cities in Caria and 
Lycia and Persian forces that were hurriedly gathered to protect the King’s land from the 
pesky Greeks. Such reconstruction becomes evident when taking into consideration the 
rising dissent among the members of the Delian League in the late 470s, Cimon’s exploits 
prior to the battle, the unusual usage of the Eurymedon as a site for mobilization of Persian 
land and sea forces, and the maneuvers of the Persian fleet during the naval engagement.  
On the one hand, Cimon’s main objective was to reignite the war against Persia in 
order to legitimize Athens’ demand for tribute, ships, and men, and by extension to 
discredit potential secession attempts from the Delian League. It is not out of the question, 
therefore, that the battle at the Eurymedon River was an unexpected development, an 
opportunity which Cimon was prudent enough to exploit. The Athenians, I argue, neither 
planned nor were able to extend their authority further to the east and in any case they were 
probably more interested in reminding their fellow countrymen that the Delian League was 
a Panhellenic coalition that spearheaded the war against Persia rather than an instrument 
of power abused by Athens. 
On the other hand, it is clear that the Persian actions were reactionary in nature. The 
absence of any hint that the Persians were planning to reassert their dominance in the 
Aegean since Xerxes’ retreat suggests that the Great King was content with the status quo 
which emerged in the mid-470s BC. The assumption that a sudden and dramatic shift in 
Persian policy in the west occurred due to personal grudge is highly improbable. To our 
best knowledge, there was no Persian retaliation following the battle of the Eurymedon, 
which seems expected when considering the limited effect of Cimon’s achievements in 
Caria and Lycia. Consequently, the forces which Cimon encountered at the Eurymedon 
were probably satrapal forces scrambled from Caria, Lycia, and the neighboring satrapies 
along with available ships that were harboring nearby. The notion that the Persian forces 
at the Eurymedon were satrapal is expressed by Grote,842 though he left this important 
observation underdeveloped. I should point out that Diodorus provides a hint that these 
forces were of local origin when he notes that when the Greek surprise attack began, the 
Persian infantry thought that they were attacked by the Pisidians who dwelt in neighboring 
territory and were hostile to the Persians, an assumption that soldiers who were familiar 
with the region and probably served nearby could have made.843 As we have seen, one of 
the most important duties of the satrap was to protect his domain from local and foreign 
threats, and Cimon and his men were clearly of the latter sort.844 The Persians were defeated 
                                                 
Thucydides explicitly claims that the Persian fleet that was present at Aspendus was mustered at that specific 
location. The only fact that Thucydides is ready to sanction is that 147 Phoenician ships came as far as 
Aspendus, which implies that the armada was mobilized elsewhere and sailed to Aspendus.  
842 Grote 1846, 395. 
843 Diod. 11.61.4. 
844 All of the Persian generals at the Eurymedon were of noble if not royal descent. Pherendates was most 
likely the son of Megabazus who was an honorable member in the royal court of Darius’ I, and was tasked 
to lead the Persian attack in Thrace after the Scythian campaign (see: Balcer 1993, no. 49). Pherendates 
himself was one of Xerxes’ generals (Hdt. 7.67.1) and we know that he presided as the satrap of Egypt in the 
late 490 BC (see p. 41 above). Not much is known about the career of Tithraustes, but Diodorus (11.60.5) 
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once more, but the consequences of this defeat were insignificant, and as such made royal 
intervention redundant. 
Conclusion 
The Greek communities which inhabited the coastal districts of western Anatolia played a 
key role in the interactions between Greeks and Persians. The bond of kinship between the 
Asiatic and European Greeks was the main cause, or justification, for the interventions of 
the latter in the affairs of western Anatolia. Before Xerxes’ invasion, however, the 
responses to Ionian appeals for help were limited to diplomacy or small scale military 
expeditions. But the willingness of the mainland Greeks to intervene on behalf of the 
Ionians increased dramatically in the aftermath of the Persian Wars. The foundation of the 
Delian League constituted a well-organized Panhellenic effort to guarantee the safety, 
security, and liberty of the Asiatic Greeks. Athens and its allies carried on the war against 
Persia under the slogans of Greek liberty and vengeance, which led to several military 
operations against Persian targets throughout the eastern Mediterranean. The war against 
Persia validated the Delian League, and the Athenians knew that as long as they can 
demonstrate that Persia remained a real and immediate threat to the Asiatic Greeks, they 
would be able to justify the existence of the Delian League and by extension Athens’ 
dominance within this political framework.  
 Xerxes’ failure to enslave the European Greeks had an equally profound and to 
some extent opposite impact on the attitude of the Persian royal authorities toward the 
western satrapies. The apparent disengagement of the Great King in respect to the Greek 
offensive in the 470s BC suggests that following the conclusion of Xerxes’ Greek 
campaign the official Achaemenid policy in the west shifted from a policy of expansion to 
a policy of entrenchment. Such policy, which presumably remained unchanged throughout 
Xerxes’ reign, became viable due to the fact the Delian League was primarily a maritime 
power. While the Greeks managed to expel the Persians from Europe and raided the 
Anatolian coastline and Cyprus, at no point Persian rule in the Asiatic continent was truly 
jeopardized. But while the Greeks remained an ongoing threat to Persian authority, the 
dissonance between the reality in the west and its misrepresentation in Achaemenid royal 
inscriptions meant that the Persian governors of the western satrapies were expected to 
fulfill their satrapal duties while dealing with the Greek challenge on their own. Such an 
interpretation, I argue, is much more compelling than the assertion that Xerxes simply 
decided to concede the coasts of western Anatolia to the Greeks.845 The Achaemenids, as 
we shall see in the following chapter, never officially relinquished their claim over Ionia, 
although Artaxerxes I adopted his father’s approach toward the western frontier. The fact 
that the Great King remained unconcerned regarding the western satrapies encouraged 
                                                 
says that he was Xerxes’ bastard son. Ariomandes was the son of Gobryas, a high ranking Achaemenid, a 
spear-bearer of Darius I (See: Balcer 1993, no. 41), and his brother was the renowned Mardonius. In sum, 
the generals at the Eurymedon were seasoned commanders and connected in some way or the other to the 
Achaemenid royal household. Since there is no mention that they were appointed by the Great King through 
a special commission, it is not out of the question that they were the satraps of the adjacent provinces who 
formed a joint force to repel the Greek invaders, in a similar fashion to the satrapal coalition that Alexander 
the Great faced at the battle of the Granicus River.  
845 E.g. Cawkwell 1968; Balcer 1991, 62. 
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satrapal initiative. Consequently, while the exploits of the satraps during the reign of 
Xerxes are underreported, their presence in the ancient sources becomes more and more 
dominant, which reflects their growing agency in the interactions between Greeks and 
Persians. 
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5. DISINTEREST AND EQUILIBRIUM 
 
In contrast to Xerxes, his son and successor Artaxerxes I played a rather secondary role in 
Greek historical sources. In the early part of his reign, Artaxerxes’ interactions with the 
Greeks were infrequent and reactionary in nature, and after the conclusion of the so-called 
Peace of Callias in 449 BC, Greco-Persian relations were limited to diplomatic exchange 
coupled with limited military conflicts in western Anatolia. Nevertheless, modern 
interpretations envision almost every Persian intervention in Greek affairs as an outcome 
of a royal directive dictated by Artaxerxes. Consequently, the aim of the present chapter is 
to challenge and correct the apparent misconception regarding the agency of the Persian 
royal authorities during the reign of Artaxerxes I. 
I begin by demonstrating that Artaxerxes adopted his father’s policy of 
entrenchment in the western frontier. On the one hand, Artaxerxes neither showed 
expansionist aspirations toward the west nor sought to actively challenge Athens in the 
Aegean. On the other hand, Athenian aggression in the eastern Mediterranean basin was 
met with lukewarm Persian response. Accordingly, I argue that Artaxerxes’ lack of concern 
regarding the Athenian threat can be explained by a consideration that often goes 
unnoticed, namely that while there is no doubt that Athens constituted a formidable 
maritime power, its reach was limited to the coastal regions of the eastern Mediterranean. 
Therefore, Athens was never constituted a real and immediate threat to Persian authority, 
and as such the Great King expected the satrapal authorities in the west to resolve, or at the 
very least contain, the Athenian problem. By taking into consideration the true balance of 
power between Athens and Persia as well as the Great King’s position and interest, I offer 
a reappraisal of the extent and impact of the achievements of the Delian League vis-à-vis 
Persia, and conclude that the depiction of Cimon’s Cypriot campaign as a glorious triumph 
which coerced Artaxerxes to sue for peace must be rejected in favor of a more balanced 
account. 
The second point of interest is the conclusion of the Peace of Callias and the 
subsequent status quo between Athens and Persia. I demonstrate that the scholarly debate 
concerning the historicity of the alleged treaty negotiated by Callias can be resolved by 
accepting the notion that the Peace of Callias constituted an informal agreement rather than 
an official treaty. I then offer an analysis of the factors which allowed the modus vivendi 
in western Anatolia to endure throughout Artaxerxes’ reign. Most importantly, I argue that 
the unofficial nature of the equilibrium in the west and the measures which allowed it to 
continued created favorable conditions for independent satrapal initiatives.   
Lastly, I focus on the interactions between Greeks and Persians in the context of 
the Archidamian War. These interactions manifested in two forms. On the one hand, there 
was an ongoing exchange of embassies between Susa, Sparta, and Athens, as both Spartans 
and Athenians sought to obtain Persian support in order to win the war. Though the Great 
King opted to remain neutral, the vibrant diplomatic interchange shows that the relations 
between Artaxerxes and the two Greek superpowers were amicable. On the other hand, a 
series of skirmishes took place in western Anatolia as Athenian forces clashed with various 
local contingents, some of which were affiliated with the satrapal authorities. I argue that 
the discrepancy between the ongoing diplomatic exchange and the skirmishes occurring in 
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the west was the outcome of the contrast between the position of the Great King and that 
of the satraps of western Anatolia. From the Great King’s viewpoint blatant Persian 
intervention in the war could have jeopardized the status quo in the west, but for the satraps 
of western Anatolia the ongoing war in the Greek mainland created an opportunity. When 
the members of anti-Athenian factions in Ionia, who wished to throw off the yoke of 
Athenian rule, appealed the satraps for assistance, the latter, in spite of or perhaps due to 
Artaxerxes’ do-nothing policy, were willing to intervene in hope of increasing their 
influence and power. 
5.1 The Disinterest of Artaxerxes I 
The Embassy of Megabazus 
The earliest known instance in which Artaxerxes I interacted with the Greeks was prompted 
by an Egyptian uprising that erupted shortly after Xerxes’ death.846 In essence, shortly after 
the Egyptians rose in revolt against Persian rule, they appealed to the Athenians for 
assistance. The Athenian authorities ordered a confederate fleet that happened to be 
operating in Cyprus to join the fighting. At first, the Greco-Egyptian coalition managed to 
overwhelm the Persian garrisons, but eventually Artaxerxes dispatched a vast army that 
suppressed the rebellion, and only a handful of Greeks who participated in the Athenian 
expedition to Egypt made it home alive. But before the Great King mobilized his forces, a 
Persian embassy led by a certain Megabazus arrived at Sparta and offered to finance a 
Peloponnesian invasion to Attica. The Persian design, we are told, was to force the 
Athenians to recall their fleet from Egypt. Despite the Persian appeal, the Spartans 
remained inactive.847  
In a sharp contrast to Darius I’s response to Athens’ involvement in the Ionian 
revolt, Artaxerxes made no attempt to punish the Athenians for meddling in Persian affairs 
in Egypt. The Great King, so it seems, was unconcerned with Athens’ encroachment. But 
the diplomatic effort to induce a war between Sparta and Athens suggests that Artaxerxes 
was aware of the animosity between the two Greek city-states. Yet, it is hard to believe that 
the Great Persian King was familiar with the contemporary state of affairs in mainland 
Greece and the rising hostility between two minor polities which resided well beyond the 
borders of his empire. A possible explanation can be found in a tradition concerned with a 
certain Arthmius of Zeleia who, according to an inscription mentioned by several fourth 
century sources, was branded as an enemy of the Athenian people for conveying Persian 
gold to Greece.848 While the historicity of the decree has been challenged, arguments in 
                                                 
846 Thuc. 1.104, 109-110; Ctes. FGrH 688 F14 §36-38; Diod. 11.71.3-6, 74-5, 77.1-3. See also: Hdt. 3.12.4, 
7.7; Justin, prolog. 3. 
847 Thucydides (1.109.3) reports that the money was spent without results, but Diodorus (11.74.6) claims that 
the Spartans refused the money. Walker (1923, 78) argues that the Spartans took the Persian money but the 
failed to keep their side of the bargain. In contrast, Lewis (1977, 62 n. 84) and Hornblower (1991, 175) argue 
that Diodorus’ assertion is mere guesswork. On the strategic considerations behind the Spartan inactivity, 
see: de Ste Croix 1972, 190–91; Holladay 1977, 54–63; Lewis 1981, 70–78. Conversely, Rung (2008, 31) 
suggests that the Spartans had no desire “to discredit themselves by cooperation with the Persians”. 
848 Dem. 9.41-2, 19.271; Aeschin. 3.258; Din. 2.24; Krateros FGrH 342 F14; Plut. Them. 6.3; Aristid. Or. 
1.369, 3.334-6, 650-1. Hofstetter (1978, 32–33) provides a bibliography of previous studies concerned with 
Arthmius of Zeleia. 
123 
 
favor of authenticity seem more compelling,849 and it has been suggested that Arthmius 
was a member of the entourage that accompanied Megabazus in his journey to Sparta.850 
The notion that a Greek facilitated a Persian attempt to manipulate Greek politics by 
distributing funds reveals a possible channel of communication through which the satraps 
of Hellespontine Phrygia monitored Greek politics and conveyed valuable information to 
the Persian central authorities.851 
We should not forget that throughout the fifth century BC the satraps of 
Hellespontine Phrygia found themselves in the forefront of the ongoing conflict with the 
Greeks. One way to face the Greek threat was to forge connections with powerful and 
influential men in the Hellespontine region in order to create a defensive bulwark that 
would safeguard their satrapy from Greek incursions. The earliest instance in which this 
tactic was used occurred in 478 BC, in the context of the collaboration between Artabazus 
and Pausanias.852 It is rather likely that this tactic was adopted by Artabazus’ successors, 
who went on to create a network of guest-friendships and other types of connections with 
Greeks and Thracian elements in the neighboring regions. 
Accordingly, the satraps of Hellespontine Phrygia must have established a working 
relationship first and foremost with the Greek communities within their satrapy. In 
exchange for the satrap’s favor, which probably constituted material rewards, prominent 
Greeks acted as facilitators of potential collaborations between the satrap and various 
Greeks cities, communities, and individuals in Asia as well as in Europe. The Persian 
ambassadors, whether sent by the satrap or the Great King himself, were in need of Greek 
collaborators to arrange meetings with high ranking Greek functionaries and politicians as 
well as acting as translators to enable effective communication.853 Arthmius, an Athenian 
proxenus and a native of Zeleia, which was in close proximity to the satrapal capital at 
Dascylium,854 was the ideal candidate to represent the interest of the satrap of 
Hellespontine Phrygia in the Greek mainland.  
 The Hellespontine connection hypothesis becomes even more compelling when 
considering the familial background of the Persian ambassador Megabazus. While is it 
                                                 
849 In favor of authenticity of the Arthmius decree: Stroud 1963, 138 n. 1; Meiggs 1972, 508–10; Frost 1980, 
95–98; Lewis 1989, 230 n. 9. Against authenticity: Habicht 1961, 23–27. 
850 Colin 1933, 254–55; Kolbe 1938, 259–60; Gomme 1945, 327 n. 1; Connor 1967, 71 n. 15; Famerie 1992, 
198–99. It should be noted that several scholars (Wallace 1970, 200–202 with n. 15; Rung 2008, 30–31) 
argue that the arrival of Arthmius occurred in the context Xerxes’ invasion, while others (Cary 1935, 177–
80; Meiggs 1963, 10; Meiggs 1972, 511–12; Frost 1980, 95–98; Briant 2002, 563) connect it to Pausanias’ 
machinations in Byzantium in the 470s BC. Wade-Gery (1945, 222 n. 22) suggests that Arthmius could have 
brought Persian gold to the Greek mainland only after 451/0 BC. 
851 A similar instance occurred sometime before the summer of 395 BC when Timocrates, a Rhodian, was 
sent to Greece with encourage Athens, Corinth, Thebes, and Argos to declare war on Sparta. See: Xen. Hell. 
3.5.1-2; Hell. Oxy. London Fragments 7.2-3 [=McKechnie and Kern 1988, 48–51]; Diod. 14.81.4-82.4; Paus. 
3.9.8; Polyaen. Strat. 1.48.3; Plut. Ages. 15.6. Cf. Cook 1990; Rung 2004; Schepens 2002; Schepens 2012. 
852 See p. 104 above.  
853 Right before recounting the condemnation of Arthmius, Plutarch (Them.  6.2) mentions how Themistocles 
ordered the execution of an unnamed Greek translator (δίγλωσσος) who accompanied Persian envoys 
presumably to Athens to demand earth and water, i.e. recognizing the authority of the Great King. 
854 Meiggs 1972, 511. 
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almost certain that Megabazus was a high-ranking Persian noble,855 his name suggests that 
he was related to an accomplished Persian general of the same name who subjugated the 
Thracian coast in the name of Darius I and later on presided as one of the commanders of 
the Persian fleet under Xerxes.856 The father of the general Megabazus was Megabates, the 
aforementioned satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, who was also a cousin of Darius I.857 The 
likelihood that the ambassador Megabazus came from a family whose leading members 
served in the west in key positions suggests that Artaxerxes chose a delegate who had 
preexisting family-ties in the west, ties which could have increased the embassy’s chances 
of success.  
Therefore, it is more likely that the driving force behind the diplomatic effort to 
incite a war between Athens and Sparta was the contemporary satrap of Hellespontine 
Phrygia.858 It is not out of the question that after the rebellion in Egypt span out of control, 
the satrap of Hellespontine informed the Persian central authorities about the deteriorating 
relationship between Athens and Sparta and proposed a plan to persuade the Spartans to 
attack the Athenians as a way to compel the Athenians to pull out their forces from Egypt. 
Although the evidence for such a reconstruction is circumstantial, it seems more 
convincing than assuming that the Great King was particularly attentive to the 
contemporary political atmosphere in European Greece. Accordingly, by envisioning the 
satraps of western Anatolia and their Greek proxies as middlemen who allowed the flow 
of information from west to east, we can explain the mechanism by which the Achaemenid 
Kings gathered intelligence on events which occurred far away from their royal capitals.  
Cimon’s Cypriot Campaign 
The catastrophic conclusion of the Athenian expedition to Egypt did not deter the 
Athenians from further interventions in Persian affairs. In 450 BC, after peace was 
established on the home front,859 the Athenians dispatched a fleet to Cyprus under the 
                                                 
855 Lewis 1989, 230. 
856 For Megabazus’ Thracian campaign, see: Hdt. 5.2, 10, 14-15, 7.108.1; Plut, Mor. 869b. For his 
commanding post in Xerxes’ navy: Hdt. 9.97.  
857 Megabates led the abortive Persian attempt to conquer Naxos (Hdt. 5.32-33, 35.1), and later on acted as 
the supreme commander of the Persian fleet at Artemision (Diod. 11.12.2-3). Burn (1984, 335) argues that 
Megabazus the ambassador and Megabazus the general were the same person. Conversely, while accepting 
the notion that Megabazus the ambassador was a relative of Megabates, Balcer (1993, 138, 158) advocates 
that Megabazus the general was the unnamed son of Megabates who, according to Aeschylus (Pers. 983), 
was killed in Salamis. 
858 The likeliest candidate is Pharnabazus I, who is mentioned by Thucydides (2.67.1) as the acting satrap in 
430 BC. This Pharnabazus was either Artabazus’ son (Balcer 1993, 85) or his younger brother (Beloch 1921, 
145–46). Artabazus could not have been the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia at this time since, according to 
Diodorus (11.75.1-3), he commanded the Persian army that was sent to suppress the Egyptian uprising. It 
should be added that Plutarch (Them .30.1) reports that a Persian named Epixyes was the satrap of 
Hellespontine Phrygia shortly before the battle of the Eurymedon River, but Balcer (Balcer 1993, 163) argues 
that he was not the satrap but a low-ranking official in the satrapal administration. 
859 Just before recounting Cimon’s exploit in Cyprus Thucydides (1.112.2) notes that the Athenians kept 
away from a Hellenic war (καὶ Ἑλληνικοῦ μὲν πολέμου ἔσχον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι), which implies that the Athenians 
were no longer encumbered by a local war and were therefore free to further their interests in the eastern 
Mediterranean. 
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command of Cimon.860 The Athenians, however, were not received as liberators by the 
locals. Several cities, as Marium, Citium and Salamis are mentioned by name,861 were 
subjected to Athenian siege. But the manner in which the campaign ended is unclear. 
Thucydides reports that Cimon died during the siege of Citium, and that soon after the 
Athenians defeated the Persians in a naval engagement.862 Such sequence of events 
suggests that the death of Cimon prompted an Athenian retreat, and that the Athenians 
encountered a Persian navy off Salamis on their way home.863 In this way, Cyprus was not 
subjugated, but the Athenians were able to claim another victory over the Persians. In 
contrast, Plutarch places the naval battle before the siege of Citium, though he agrees with 
Thucydides that Citium was the place of Cimon’s demise.864 If Plutarch’s account is 
followed, it becomes much clearer that the death of Cimon led the Athenians to abort the 
campaign. Diodorus’ account is rather puzzling since he states that the Athenians left 
Cyprus only after the Persians sued for peace and only then he mentions in passing that 
Cimon died on Cyprus.865 While it is possible that the tradition in which Cimon presided 
as the commander in chief throughout the entire or at least the majority of the campaign 
was fueled by his posthumous glorification,866 the overall impression is that the campaign 
ended with mixed results. The Athenians vanquished the Persians once again, but Persian 
rule on Cyprus endured. As such, it is difficult to accept Diodorus’ statement, namely that 
it was the Athenian operations on Cyprus that drove the Persians to sue for peace.867 
On the contrary, the Cypriot campaign highlighted the limits of Athenian military 
capacity. The Athenians forged their Aegean empire by the might of their fleets, but their 
capacity to undermine Persian rule in the eastern Mediterranean was inherently limited. 
Athens’ navies posed a threat to the Anatolian and Levantine coastal regions as well as 
                                                 
860 The sources for Cimon’s Cypriot campaign: Thuc. 1.112.2-4; Diod. 12.3-4; Plut. Cim. 18.4-19.1. See also: 
Isoc. 8.86; Aristodemus FGrH 104 F13; Nep. Cim. 3.4; Ael. VH 5.10. I follow Diodorus’ chronology, who 
sets the beginning of the campaign at the spring of 450 BC and its conclusion at the spring of 449 BC. This 
timetable is widely accepted, see: Gomme 1945, 325; Meritt, Wade-Gery, and McGregor 1950, 178; Badian 
1993, 58–60; Green 2006, 179–80 n. 10. Conversely, Meiggs (1963, 11–31; 1972, 124–26) has argued in 
favor of 451 BC as the year in which Cimon arrived at Cyprus. 
861 Interestingly, Cimon had to reduce by force not only Citium, which was an important Phoenician center 
(Cf. Gomme 1945, 329; Demetriou 2001; Cawkwell 2005, 131), but also Greek cities such as Marium 
(Gomme 1945, 330; Meiggs 1972, 480) and Salamis. It has been argued (Seibert 1976, 24–25; Maier 1985, 
36) that the opposition Cimon met at Marium was due to the possibility that the city was ruled by a pro-
Persian Phoenician dynasty. Miller (1997, 21) points out that the hostility of the Cypriot Greeks  toward 
Athens can be explained by the fact that the they were already ‘liberated’ and promptly deserted in 478 BC, 
and that this sentiment must have been augmented by the aborted Cypriot campaign in c. 462 BC. 
862 Thuc. 1.112.4.  
863 It should be noted that while Thucydides and Plutarch report that the sea battle took place off Salamis, 
Diodorus claims that the naval engagement happened in Cilicia. It is generally agreed that the fault is with 
Diodorus, who mashed together the events of Cimon’s exploits on Cyprus together with the Eurymedon 
campaign (e.g. Gomme 1945, 330; Barns 1953; Briant 2002, 579). It is also possible, as suggested by 
Schreiner (1997, 50–59), that Hellenicus, the source of Ephorus and by extension Diodorus, was responsible 
for the inaccurate information. 
864 Plut. Cim. 19.1. 
865 Diod. 12.4.6. 
866 Gomme 1945, 330; Meiggs 1972, 128; Badian 1993, 59. 
867 Diod. 12.4.4-5. 
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Cyprus,868 but the lack of an equally capable land army meant that the hinterland was 
beyond Athenian reach. Cimon’s misadventure on Cyprus proved that defeating the 
Persians armies and navies was a necessary first step, but without garnering local support, 
such victories had a fleeting effect. Consequently, it is not out of the question that from a 
Persian viewpoint the operations of the Delian League constituted a problem with which 
the satrapal authorities were expected to deal.  Be that as it may, the attempt to takeover 
Cyprus made it evident that the Athenians were determined to continue operating in the 
eastern Mediterranean. But the inconclusive outcome of the Cypriot campaign created an 
alignment of interests which rendered a peaceful resolution of the conflict between Athens 
and Persia beneficial to both parties.  
5.2 Equilibrium 
The Peace of Callias 
In the wake of Cimon’s Cypriot campaign, the war between Athens and Persia came to a 
halt. In the following decades the Athenians stopped operating in Egypt, Cyprus, and the 
Levant while the Persians stayed out of the Aegean. According to the ancient sources, this 
period of peace was the outcome of the so-called Peace of Callias which was purportedly 
concluded in 449 BC. But while the silence of the ancient sources suggests that a status 
quo was established in western Anatolia, the authenticity of the Peace of Callias has been 
debated.869 The crux of this scholarly debate is the fact that while the Peace of Callias is 
mentioned by several fourth century Attic orators, it is utterly ignored by fifth century 
traditions.870 As it stands, both lines of argumentation, i.e. in favor or against authenticity, 
remain imperfect. On the one hand, if a peace treaty had been concluded, the Athenians 
would have followed their practice by commemorating the decree which announced the 
end the war with Persia on a slab of stone or marble and set it up on the acropolis for all to 
see. However, there is no evidence for the existence of such a formal document and none 
of the available fourth century sources seems to have had access to such a document. On 
the other hand, it is unlikely that the abrupt cessation of hostilities following Cimon’s death 
on Cyprus was the outcome of an independent yet simultaneous decisions made by the 
Athenians and the Great King.  
The Informal Agreement Hypothesis 
Most scholars have been inclined to accept or reject the peace. Yet, an alternative 
reconstruction, one which constitutes a middle ground between these two mutually 
                                                 
868 According to the Erechtheid casualty list (IG I3 1147 [=ML 33]), the Athenians operated in Cyprus, Egypt, 
and Phoenicia in the early 460s BC. 
869 Meister (1982, 6–22) offers a comprehensive list of no less than 162 studies concerned with the 
authenticity of Peace of Callias, beginning in the early 19th century down to 1982. Interestingly, Badian 
(1993, 187 n. 5) observes that out of the 151 scholars who explicitly state their stance on the subject, 141 
argue in favor of authenticity while only 29 reject it. The tendency to accept the Peace of Callias as historical 
has remained dominant in later studies, e.g. Stylianou 1989; Lewis 1992b, 121–29; Badian 1993, 1–72, 188–
201; Cawkwell 1997a; Samons 1998; Cawkwell 2005, 139–46; Wiesehöfer 2006, 659; Rung 2008, 31–34. 
See also the observations of Hornblower (1991, 180–81), who provides evidence from the work of 
Thucydides that seem to outweigh the author’s silence concerning the Peace of Callias. 
870 For a comprehensive catalogue of the direct and indirect evidence for the Peace of Callias, see: Meister 
1982, 6–22; Fornara 1983, 97–103. 
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exclusive hypotheses, has received relatively little attention. It has been suggested that the 
Athenians and Persians made an informal agreement according to which the former 
acknowledged Persian superiority in Cyprus and Egypt while the latter agreed to refrain 
from intervening in the affairs of the Greek city-states of Asia.871 The informal agreement 
hypothesis, which is implied by Callisthenes, who rejects the claim that the Athenians 
concluded a peace treaty with the Persian King, but he admits that the latter acted as if a 
treaty was concluded because he was afraid of the Athenians.872 Regardless, the informal 
agreement hypothesis is far more attractive since it resolves the problematic issues which 
challenged interpretations offered by both supporters and detractors of the Peace of Callias. 
To begin with, the informal agreement hypothesis explains the nature of the 
evidence regarding the Peace of Callias. If there was no formal treaty, we should not expect 
the sources to recount the occurrence of formalities such as mutual oath-taking,873 the 
ratification of the treaty in the Athenian assembly,874 or the public display of an inscribed 
copy of the treaty on the Athenian acropolis. Moreover, the informal nature of the 
agreement explains, on the one hand, the suspicious silence of Thucydides.875 On the other, 
it clarifies why Herodotus, when referring to the embassy of Callias, states that Callias and 
his colleagues were sent to Susa ‘on account of some business’ (ἑτέρου πρήγματος 
εἵνεκα),876 an ambiguous articulation which, as argued by Holladay appropriately describes 
not a conclusion of a formal peace treaty but an informal understanding.877 An unofficial 
agreement can also account for the contradictory fourth century versions of the specific 
terms of the treaty,878 and the puzzling absence of any references to an official document 
in fourth century sources.879 
                                                 
871 The first to express the possibility of an unofficial understanding is Habicht (1961, 25–26), who rejects 
the fourth century traditions but acknowledges a reality of peace (Realität des Friedens), which implies that 
some sort of understanding was reached. He was followed by Knight (1970, 2 with n. 9), who maintains that 
the emergence of the peace in 449 BC was the outcome of “no more than an unwritten understanding.” The 
same opinion has also been expressed by Lewis (1977, 50–51), but the first to develop this line of 
argumentation was Holladay (1986), whose conclusions, in my view, provide the most likely and cogent 
solution to the controversy regarding the Peace of Callias. The informal agreement hypothesis has continued 
to gain traction, see: Podlecki 1998, 69; Briant 2002, 558, 580; Samons 2004, 343–44 n. 67; Brock 2006, 88; 
Azoulay 2014, 52–53; Waters 2014, 164–66; Samons 2016, 111–15. 
872 Callisthenes FGrH 124 F16 [=Plut. Cim. 13.5]. Bosworth (1990) argues that what Plutarch meant to say 
is that Callisthenes was not denying the actuality of Peace of Callias but merely failed to mention it in his 
account. Be that as it may, Bosworth agrees that Callisthenes “drew attention to the actual behavior of the 
King,” which sits well with the informal agreement hypothesis. 
873 Lewis 1977, 51; Samons 2004, 343–44 n. 67. 
874 Samons 2004, 343–44 n. 67.  
875 Holladay 1986, 506. 
876 Hdt. 7.151. 
877 Holladay 1986, 504. 
878 Samons 2004, 343–44 n. 67. Holladay (1986, 506–7) suggests that the actual source for the unofficial 
agreement was Callias himself, whose descendants kept passing down the story about his diplomatic 
achievement in service of the Athenian people, a tradition which became important following the conclusion 
of the King’s Peace in 387/6 BC since it could have been used as an effective propagandistic weapon against 
Sparta.  
879 Holladay 1986, 506. 
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Next, an informal understanding meant peace without its negative implications for 
both parties.  On the one hand, the conclusion of the war against Persia would have freed 
to the Athenians to tighten their hold on their empire and to prepare for a possible clash 
with Sparta.880 But an unofficial agreement would have allowed the Athenians to carry on 
with the collection of tribute under the pretext that the funds were necessary for war against 
the Persians.881 On the other hand, from the Great King’s viewpoint, a peaceful resolution 
of the Greek problem must have been more than welcomed,882 especially since Egypt was 
not completely pacified,883 and the Athenians, shortly before Cimon’s arrival at Cyprus, 
were gradually gaining ground in Ionia, as Erythrae,884 Miletus885 and Sigeum886 
acknowledged Athens’ authority. But a formal peace treaty meant that Artaxerxes was 
required to officially agree to restrictions on the movements of Persian armies and fleets 
and to publicly renounce any claims to the Greek city-states in Asia Minor. The mere 
appearance of bowing to Athenian demands would have been humiliating and harmful to 
King’s authority and prestige.887 All of these difficulties, however, are averted if we accept 
the notion that Artaxerxes merely publicly proclaimed that he had no intention to launch 
another offensive against Athenian domain in the foreseeable future while promising to 
refrain from intervening in the internal affairs of the Greek cities of Asia, at least those who 
were Athens’ allies.888 
                                                 
880 Briant 2002, 579. 
881 Holladay 1986, 504; Samons 2004, 343–44 n. 67. Meister points out (1982, 99) that ending the war with 
Persia would have rendered the existence of the Delian League, the primary source of Athenian political 
power, obsolete. 
882 Holladay 1986, 504. 
883 On the rebellion of the Egyptian Amyrtaeus, see: Thuc. 1.110.2, 112.3; Plut. Cim. 18.4. 
884 The Erythrae decree (ML 40), firmly dated to 453/2 BC, records the regulations Athens imposed on the 
Erythrians, which included the appointment of inspectors and the installment of a garrison. Moreover, in lines 
26-27 there is a clause which states: “nor shall I be persuaded to take back any of those who have fled to the 
Medes” ([----] τȏν φ[υγά]δ̣ον [κατ]αδεχομαι οὐδὲ ηένα οὔτ[--------] | [ἄλλο]ι πείσο[μ]α[ι τὸν ἐς] Μέδος 
φε[υ]γό[ντο]ν) which suggests that before Athens captured the city it was dominated by a pro-Persian faction. 
885 The city of Miletus is absent from the tribute list of 454/3 BC and instead ‘the Milesians in Leros’ 
(Μιλέσιοι [ἐ]χς Λέρο) and ‘the Milesians of Teichioussa’ ([Μι]λέσιοι [ἐκ Τ]ειχιόσσε[ς) are recorded among 
those who sent tribute to Athens. But in 451 BC only the city Miletus appears as tributary, which led several 
scholars (e.g. Meiggs 1943, 26; Barron 1962, 1; Meiggs 1972, 112) to suggest that Miletus was still under 
Persian control in 454 BC, and that the pro-Athenian Milesians who had taken refuge in Leros and 
Teichioussa continued to pay tribute to Athens. By 451 BC, however, Athens recaptured Miletus, which 
explains the (re)appearance of Miletus in the Athenian tribute lists. 
886 An Athenian decree (IG I3 17) commemorates Athens’ commitment to protect Sigeum from enemies 
hailing “from the mainland”, a designation which almost certainly refers to the Persians (e.g. Briant 2002, 
580). Sigeum paid tribute to Athens in 450/49 BC but not in the previous recorded years. Accordingly, Meritt 
(1936, 362) and Balcer (1984, 374) maintain that the people of Sigeum were eager to secure Athenian 
protection to block a Persian attempt to take over the city by joining the Delian League. It should also be 
noted that while the orthodox date of the Sigeum decree is 451/0 BC, Mattingly (1996, 347–51) argues in 
favor of 418/17 BC. 
887 Holladay 1986, 504. Samons (2004, 343–44 n. 67) adds that in light of Xerxes’ attempt to enslave the 
Greeks Artaxerxes would have regarded this treaty as “tantamount to an admission of failure to expand the 
empire in the face of Greek opposition”. See also: Samons 2016, 112. 
888 Holladay 1986, 505. Briant (2002, 580) posits that Artaxerxes viewed the concessions to the Athenians as 
limited and temporary. 
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Keeping the Peace 
Mutual Interest 
The peace between Athens and Persia endured until the outbreak of the Ionian war in 412 
BC.889 But how the status quo in western Anatolia was able to persevere for so long? In 
Athens, the unexpected death of the pro-Spartan Cimon allowed Pericles to garner support 
for a policy which branded Sparta instead of Persia as the true enemy of the Athenian 
people, and as long as Pericles dominated Athenian politics his anti-Spartan policy 
endured.890 Thus, since the Athenians had no desire to fight on two fronts, it became 
imperative to refrain from provoking the Persians.891  
Furthermore, a strong indication that both Athenians and Persians were content 
with the détente can be found in the apparent demilitarization of Ionia after 449 BC. The 
Athenian orators of the fourth century boast that the Great King was not allowed to 
mobilize an army past the Halys River.892 Although such a claim cannot be taken seriously, 
the lack of Persian military activity in the coastal regions is more likely to be the outcome 
of the unofficial truce, according to which Artaxerxes instructed his satraps to set their 
defenses in the Asiatic hinterland, probably in the satrapal seats at Sardis and Dascylium 
as well as in key locations such as Celaenae.893 This was by no means a unilateral action. 
To our best knowledge, the Athenians refrained from installing garrisons in Ionia after 449 
BC and before the outbreak of Peloponnesian War.894 The silence of the sources is 
validated by Thucydides, who describes Ionia as ‘unwalled’,895 and goes on to attach this 
designation to a number of Ionian cities.896 It is hard to believe that the dismantling of the 
fortifications of several Greek city-states in Asia and the Persian decision to keep their 
forces out of Ionia were coincidental. Instead, they should be envisioned as reciprocal 
measures taken by the Athenians and the Great King, as both sides apparently agreed that 
demilitarizing Ionia was a necessary step which would allow the cessation of hostilities to 
continue.897 
                                                 
889 As we shall see below, although several local skirmishes between the Athenians and forces affiliated with 
the Persians occurred in the 420s BC, they did not escalate into open war between Athens and the Great King. 
890 Holladay 1986, 503–4. 
891 Holladay (1986, 505) adds that even after Pericles’ death the Athenians were eager to remain on friendly 
terms with Persia due to the Spartan efforts to forge an alliance with Persia due to the outbreak of the 
Archidamian War. See discussion on p. 137 below. 
892 Isoc. 4.118, 7.80; Dem. 19.273; Lycurg. Leoc. 73; Diod. 12.4.5; Livy 33.22.2; Plut. Cim. 13.4; 
Aristodemus, FGrH 104 F13. 
893 Dusinberre (2013, 108–13) provides a comprehensive catalogue of ancient sources which refer to 
Achaemenid military presence in Asia Minor. For scholarship on Persian forts and outposts in Anatolia, see: 
Gezgin 2001; Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 1043–46; Roosevelt 2009, 117–21; Dusinberre 2013, 95–104; Lee 
2016, 264–65. 
894 Gomme 1945, 381. 
895 Thuc. 3.33.2: ἀτειχίστου γὰρ οὔσης τῆς Ἰωνίας. 
896 For ‘unwalled’ Ionian cities in Thucydides: Clazomenae (8.31.3), Cnidus (8.35.3), Lampascus (8.62.2), 
Cyzicus (8.107.1). 
897 Wade-Gery 1958, 219–20 with n. 2 for previous scholarship; Cawkwell 1973, 54 n. 3; Lewis 1977, 153 
n. 118; Amit 1975, 39–40; Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover 1981, 36; Hornblower 1991, 180–81; Badian 1993, 
53; Hornblower 1996, 414–15; Lee 2016, 263. In contrast, several scholars (e.g. Brunt 1966, 84, 92 n. 54; 
Meiggs 1972, 149–50; Raaflaub 2009b, 110) have argued that the Ionian city-states were deprived of their 
walls due to an Athenian decision, since a similar policy was implemented in the Aegean islands, for instance 
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What about the tribute?  
The issue of tribute must have posed a serious difficulty. On the one hand, the Athenian 
tribute lists demonstrate that the Athenians exacted tribute from numerous Greek cities of 
Asia, some of which irregularly. On the other hand, the Great King never relinquished his 
demand for tribute from Ionia even after the conclusion of the truce in 449 BC.898 
Accordingly, when Isocrates celebrates Athens’ achievements in the war against Persia, he 
notes that the Athenians successfully set limits to the Great King’s domain and imposed 
tribute on some of his subjects.899 From the viewpoint of Isocrates, the struggle between 
Athens and Persia in Asia Minor was a zero sum game. If Athens captured a city, its 
denizens were to pay tribute to Athens instead of Persia and vice versa. Yet, the earliest 
dispute regarding the tribute occurred, to our best knowledge, in 413/12 BC when 
Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus II were called upon by the King for the tribute from their 
provinces, for which they were in arrears since the Athenians prevented the satraps from 
collecting tribute from the Greek cities.900 One can infer that (1) the conclusion of an 
unofficial peace in 449 BC must have entailed some sort of arrangement concerning the 
division of the tribute generated by the Greek city-states of Asia,901 and (2) that whatever 
the precepts of the agreement between the King and the Athenians were, it was up to the 
                                                 
in Cos (Thuc. 8.41.2), Cameiros (Thuc. 8.44.2), Samos (Thuc. 8.50.5), and Thasos (Thuc. 8.64). Yet, the fact 
that the Athenians applied a similar measure in the Aegean does not exclude the possibility that this policy 
constituted an Athenian concession to Persian demand. 
898 Thuc. 8.5.5, 6.1, 18, 36, 43.2-3, 58; Xen. Hell. 5.1.31. In addition, according to Herodotus (6.42), after 
the suppression of the Ionian Revolt the satrap of Lydia Artaphrenes measured the land of Ionia to determine 
the tribute which was to be exacted from each city. Herodotus adds that Artaphrenes’ assessment remained 
fixed until his own days (ἐκ τούτου τοῦ χρόνου αἰεὶ ἔτι καὶ ἐς ἐμὲ ὡς ἐτάχθησαν ἐξ Ἀρταφρένεος). Several 
scholars have taken this statement as another indication for the enduring Persian claim to Ionia. See: Wade-
Gery 1958, 212; Cook 1961; Murray 1966, 142, 146; Meiggs 1972, 61–62; de Ste Croix 1972, 313; Lewis 
1977, 87; Hornblower 1982, 22 with n. 126. Scott (2005, 193) adds that Herodotus may have sought to remind 
his audience that “the Athenians, whose efforts rendered the Great King incapable of imposing tribute on the 
Ionians, deserved their hegemonic position in the Aegean.” A slightly different interpretation is offered by 
Cary (1945, 90) who argues that Herodotus was referring to the few Greek cities that were still under Persian 
control. 
899 Isoc. 4.120. The authors of the ATL (1950, 275) argue that in 450 BC Athens “was able through her power 
and influence to interfere in the affairs of the King sufficiently to restrict his powers of taxation over Greeks 
within his own realm,” that is “to dictate some of the tributes which the king should receive” from cities that 
were will within Persian domain such as Magnesia on the Maeander and the Cypriot Greek cities. While I 
am inclined to accept the notion that Athens was in a position to negotiate the status of the Ionian city-states, 
I find it hard to believe that the Persians would have allowed the Athenians to interfere in regions that were 
well beyond Athens’ reach. We should not forget that Athens’ influence was limited to coastal cities of 
Anatolia while its achievements beyond the Aegean were ephemeral. Therefore, an attempt to force a taxation 
policy on all of the Great King’s Greek subjects would have only antagonized the Persians, and as such is 
unlikely to have been made.  
900 Thuc. 8.5.5, 6.1. 
901 I agree with Hornblower (2008, 771), who maintains that this passage suggests that the Greek cities of 
Asia Minor paid tribute to both the Persians and the Athenians. Moreover, Meiggs (1972, 148) argues that 
the territorial dispute over Ionia could have been easily resolved by a Persian acknowledgement of the Greek 
cities in Asia as autonomous and tributary. In other words, each city would be allowed to regulate its own 
affairs without external intervention in exchange for tribute. According to Xenophon (Hell. 3.4.25), The 
Persians offered a similar arrangement to Agesilaus in 396 B5 in exchange for the evacuation of the 
Peloponnesian forces from Asia Minor.  
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Athenians and the satraps of western Anatolia to enforce them,902 especially in regard to 
the issue of tribute.  
 It should be emphasized that the satraps of western Anatolia were probably in favor 
of a truce with Athens. As we have seen in chapter three, peace and security were a 
prerequisite for a prosperous satrapy, which had a direct impact on the satrap’s ability to 
collect tribute and send the expected portion to the King. Since a timely collection of tribute 
was the first and foremost satrapal duty, the satraps of western Anatolia were likely ready 
to establish a workable arrangement with the Athenians in respect to the division of the 
revenue. But what would have been the nature and character of this hypothetical 
arrangement?  
 Several hypotheses have been offered regarding the manner in which the satraps 
and Athenians divided the tribute that was generated by the Asiatic Greeks. Cook points 
out that while the coastal cities of Ionia were allies and subjects of Athens, they also 
possessed substantial tracts of land which stretched deep into the Asiatic hinterland. 
Accordingly, Cook posits that each city paid tribute to Athens as a corporate body, but 
individual landowners paid a tithe or rent to the Persian authorities.903 While this model 
seems attractive, the impracticality of a mechanism designed for individual tribute 
assessment renders it highly unlikely.904 An alternative model has been offered by Murray, 
who suggests that several Greek cities preferred to send tribute to Athens and Persia in 
order to maintain amicable relations with the regional imperial powers. Murray adds an 
alternative scenario in which prominent Ionian oligarchs wanted to garner Persian support 
in their struggle against pro-Athenian democratic factions. Accordingly, when the 
oligarchs were in power, they may have thought that it would be politically prudent to 
demonstrate their allegiance to Persian rule by sending tribute.905  
Murray’s suggestion has been further developed by Balcer, who places an emphasis 
on the impact of local political strife on the issue of tribute. In cases of stasis, Balcer argues, 
one of the factions, whether oligarchic or democratic, was in control of the urban center 
(ἄστυ) while the rival faction established a power base in the rural districts (χώρα). Each 
faction could organize politically, militarily, and economically in these opposing nodes. 
The outcome was a political bipolarity, in which the urban and rural centers functioned as 
two distinct political units, each paying tribute to its political allies, either Athens or 
Persia.906 This seems to be the case in Miletus in the late-450s BC, when the pro-Athenian 
democrats, who established themselves in Leos and Teichioussa, continued to send tribute 
to Athens, while the city of Miletus was most likely controlled by oligarchic factions which 
may have been supported by the Persians.907 It seems rather likely that while in power the 
Milesian oligarchs sent tribute to the Sardis in order to gain Persian support. If that was the 
case, both Athens and Persia received a share of the Milesian tribute. 
                                                 
902 Briant 2002, 580. 
903 Cook 1961. 
904 Murray 1966, 143. 
905 Murray 1966, 146–47 with n. 19.  
906 Balcer 1985. Hornblower (1994, 213) notes that “many of those cities also suffered in the fifth century 
from being squeezed between two tribute-levying empires, Athens as well as Persia; it seems likely that they 
were assessed for tribute simultaneously by both, and perhaps they actually paid twice over”. 
907 See n. 885 above. 
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 A reversed scenario is equally plausible. In the aforementioned Erythrae decree, 
dated to 453/2 BC, we are informed that there was a group of citizens who fled to the Mede, 
i.e. the Persians.908 It is almost certain that those who fled to the Mede were pro-Persian 
oligarchs who lost their power once Athens intervened and established a democracy. In a 
similar fashion to the pro-Athenian democrats from Miletus, the exiled oligarchs of 
Erythrae may have established themselves in the periphery and continued to send tribute 
to the Persians in hope of obtaining their support in a future attempt to retake Erythrae.909 
Although the factional disputes in Miletus and Erythrae occurred before 449 CB, they set 
a plausible framework for Balcer’s political bipolarity model. 
One must admit, as noted by Thomas, that the evidence for the double tax 
hypothesis remain circumstantial.910 Nevertheless, the feasibility of the aforementioned 
models for the division of tribute and the apparent peaceful resolution of the issue of tribute 
suggest that the Athenians and the satraps found a way to divide the revenue of the Greek-
city states of Asia in a manner which satisfied both parties. 
5.3 Satrapal Initiative and Royal Indisposition 
Despite the above mentioned détente between Artaxerxes and Athens, the satraps of 
western Anatolia and the Athenians continued to play a central role in backing rival 
factions in several Ionian cities. Accordingly, several scholars have argued that the 
conclusion of the truce in 449 BC did not result in an equilibrium but in a cold war and that 
“the Persians hovered on the fringes, anxious to injure Athens, giving indirect assistance 
and support, acting just as those who break treaties by subterfuge should.”911 It has also 
been asserted that this policy originated from Artaxerxes himself, who instructed his 
satraps in the west to profit as much as possible from Athenian setbacks.912 Such 
interpretation, however, not only overstates the Great King’s involvement in the affairs of 
western Anatolia but also fails to recognize that Artaxerxes and his satraps had little to gain 
and much to lose from renewing the war against Athens. Therefore, in what follows I 
demonstrate that the series of clashes which occurred in western Anatolia after 449 BC 
were local and sporadic in nature, and that they were manifestations of satrapal 
opportunism rather than a cold war between the Great King and the Athenians. Such 
interpretation, I argue, can be explained by the unofficial nature of the peace, which created 
a grey area in which Persian and Athenian spheres of influence overlapped. The ambiguous 
distinction between Athenian and Persian domain in western Anatolia resulted in a limited 
struggle between the satraps and the Athenians, a struggle which was incited and fueled by 
the desire of ambitious Ionian individuals to assert their political dominance in their 
respective cities. In contrast to the Persian central authorities, which were interested in 
keeping the peace and in an uninterrupted collection of tribute, the satraps were willing to 
exploit the rise of anti-Athenian sentiment in Ionia to increase their power and influence. 
                                                 
908 See n. 884 above.  
909 Such a scenario is implied in the above mention Sigeum Decree (see n. 886 above), in which the Athenians 
promised to assist the people of Sigeum against enemies hailing from the hinterland, which could be the 
Persians or perhaps Persian-backed oligarchs. 
910 Thomas 2000, 14. 
911 Eddy 1973, 245. See also: Thonemann 2009, 173. 
912 Kagan 1987, 17; Stadter 1989, 245, 247; Briant 2002, 581; Brock 2006, 88; Waters 2010, 823. 
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Pissuthnes and the Samian War (440/39 BC) 
The earliest known instance in which a satrap sought to increase his power at Athens’ 
expense occurred in the context of the Samian revolt.913 In 441/0 BC Samos and Miletus, 
both members of the Delian League, vied for control over Priene.914 After the Samians 
defeated the Milesians, the latter appealed Athens for help, and the Athenians responded 
by sending Pericles with forty ships to Samos. The Athenians imposed a democratic 
constitution on the Samians, installed a garrison, and transported Samian hostages to 
Lemnos to ensure future obedience. But in spite of these measures, a group of Samian 
oligarchs fled to the Asiatic continent and forged an alliance (συμμαχία) with Pissuthnes 
son of Hystaspes, the satrap of Lydia. The oligarchs soon returned to Samos accompanied 
by 700 mercenaries supplied by Pissuthnes, rescued the hostages from Lemnos, recaptured 
the city and declared war on Athens. In response, the Athenians sent Pericles and nine of 
his colleagues with sixty ships, of which sixteen were dispatched to Chios and Lesbos to 
muster reinforcements and from there to sail to Caria to look out for a possible intervention 
of the Phoenician fleet. The Athenians defeated a Samian fleet off the island of Tragia and 
then laid siege to Samos itself. During the siege Pericles departed with sixty ships to Caria 
due to news about an incoming Phoenician fleet, but these rumors turned out to be false. 
While Pericles was away, the Samians launched a successful counterattack, but once he 
returned, the siege was reinstated, and after nine months the Samians capitulated. 
The Athenian response to the clash between Samos and Miletus is not surprising. 
An armed conflict between two members of the Delian League posed a threat to the 
stability of the Athenian-led confederacy.915 Moreover, allowing Samos, a capable ship-
providing ally, to grow stronger jeopardized Athenian superiority in the Aegean.916 
Therefore, the Athenians had no choice but to force the Samians into submission.917 But 
what motivated Pissuthnes to side with the Samian oligarchs? According to one 
interpretation, by assisting the Samian oligarchs Pissuthnes was following a royal directive 
                                                 
913 On the Samian revolt, see: Thuc. 1.115.2-117.3; Diod. 12.27-8; Plut. Per. 25-8. Compare: Ar. Wasps 281-
284; Duris of Samos FGrH 76 F66. For the chronological sequence of the war between Samos and Athens, 
see: Fornara and Lewis 1979; Meritt 1984. 
914 It has been suggested that the rivalry between Samos and Miletus was prompted by a Samian attempt to 
exploit the weakened state of Miletus in order to take over the Peraia (See: Meiggs 1972, 188; Stadter 1989, 
242-3). In addition, the ongoing dispute over the Aegean trade routes probably contributed to the animosity 
between the two cities (Cf. Waters 2010, 822 n. 22).  
915 Quinn 1981, 12. Legon (1972, 148) suggests that the Athenians felt obligated to protect Miletus since they 
had confiscated the Milesian navy a few years earlier and because Miletus was democracy. He also posits 
that the Athenians anticipated that the conflict between Miletus and Samos might induce a Persian 
intervention.  
916 Kagan 1969, 171; Balcer 1984, 344; Stadter 1989, 243; Green 2006, 206 n. 122. Thucydides (8.76.4) notes 
that Samos came close to depriving the Athenians of the command of the sea, while Plutarch (Per. 25.3) 
claims that the Samians were determined to contest Athens’ supremacy of the sea. 
917 The ancient sources (Plut. Per. 24.1, 25.1; Athen. 13.589d; Duris of Samos FGrH 76 F65) record a 
tradition in which Pericles was accused by his political rivals for favoring Miletus over Samos due to the 
influence of his Milesian mistress Aspasia. Even if this tradition contains a kernel of truth, I agree with Green 
(2006, 206 n. 122) who concludes that “the relationship can only have encouraged the decision he took on 
other grounds.” For further discussion: Stadter 1989, 233–34; Martin 2016, 183–85. 
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which instructed the satraps to seek opportunities to weaken Athenian supremacy in the 
Aegean.918  
Yet, a close examination of the actions of Pissuthnes highlights the flaws of such 
interpretation. The ancient sources ascribe two actions to Pissuthnes. The satrap’s first 
action, according to Plutarch, was attempting to persuade Pericles to prevent the 
introduction of a democratic constitution in Samos through bribery,919 an offer that was 
clearly aimed at allowing the oligarchs to stay in power. The second action of Pissuthnes 
was making a pact with the disenfranchised Samian oligarchs and supplying them with 700 
mercenaries.920 The direct involvement of Pissuthnes comes to an end at this point.921 
There is, of course, the issue of the Phoenician fleet. The deployment of the Persian 
navy on behalf of the Samian oligarchs would have been an unequivocal proof for that the 
Great King was behind Pissuthnes’ intervention.922 But there is no substantive evidence for 
the presence of a Phoenician fleet in the region. The sources merely tell us that the 
Athenians sent a small squadron to Caria to look out for the possibility of Persian 
interference and that ultimately the Phoenician fleet was nowhere to be found. But why did 
the Athenians dread such a scenario? It has suggested that there was a Phoenician fleet 
mooring near Phaselis as a ploy which meant to distract the Athenians prior to the Samian 
counterattack.923 In light of the available evidence, however, such a suggestion is mere 
speculation. Moreover, it is unlikely that the Persians were able to deploy their fleet so 
quickly,924 and that Artaxerxes would have embarked on such a costly venture in order to 
allow the Samian oligarchs to remain in power. And even if we accept the possibility that 
Artaxerxes wanted to detach Samos from the Delian League, how can we explain the 
inactivity of the Phoenician fleet?  
 The most cogent answer to this conundrum is that there was no Phoenician fleet. It 
is possible that the Samians expected that Pissuthnes’ support would constitute more than 
                                                 
918 Stadter 1989, 245, 247; Briant 2002, 581; Klinkott 2005, 337 n. 131; Waters 2010, 824. Several scholars 
(e.g. Eddy 1973, 250 with n. 51; Rhodes 2006, 68; Rhodes 2014, 261) assert that the involvement of 
Pissuthnes in the Samian revolt constituted a breach of the peace between Athens and Persia. 
919 Plutarch (Per. 25.2) notes that Pissuthnes added 10,000 staters to the bribe the anti-democratic Samian 
party had offered Pericles to hinder Athenian intervention in Samian politics. 
920 Thucydides (1.115.4) employs the term ἐπίκουροι when referring to the soldiers furnished by Pissuthnes, 
while Diodorus (12.27.3) identifies them as στρατιῶται. On the nature of term ἐπίκουροι in Thucydides, see: 
Lavelle 1989. 
921 Plutarch (Per. 25.3) says that Pissuthnes was directly involved in the liberation of the hostages from 
Lemnos, but Thucydides (1.115.5) and Diodorus (12.27.3) report that the Samian oligarchs retrieved the 
hostages from Lemnos themselves. Perhaps the hostages were rescued by the mercenary force supplied by 
Pissuthnes, which explains why Plutarch reports that the satrap was responsible for the successful rescue 
mission. 
922 Meister 1982, 36 with n. 79 for references to earlier scholarship; Kagan 1987, 17. 
923 Eddy 1973, 250; Kagan 1987, 17 with n. 81. Balcer (1974, 31) asserts that the Phoenician fleet retreated 
to Cyprus due to Pericles’ advance. 
924 The arrival of a Phoenician fleet would have to be preceded by back and forth exchange between 
Pissuthnes and Artaxerxes, perhaps only after Pissuthnes’ bribe attempt had failed, followed by deliberation 
at the royal court, the mustering of a fleet, and a westward voyage. Lewis (Lewis 1977, 59–60 with n. 60), 
who argues that there was no Phoenician fleet operating in the region, rightly notes that the arrival of the 
Phoenician at this point “would have been by far the fastest Phoenician naval mobilization on record.”  
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700 soldiers.925 It is equally plausible that either Pissuthnes or the Samians deliberately 
misinformed the Athenians about the whereabouts of the Phoenician fleet in order to 
weaken the Athenian siege prior to the Samian counteroffensive.926 Perhaps the reports 
concerned with the Phoenician fleet were the result of Athenian paranoia, since Pissuthnes’ 
attempt to bribe Pericles must have informed the Athenians about the collaboration 
between the Samian oligarchs and the satrap. Accordingly, the Athenians may have 
suspected that the Persians were planning to strike while they were preoccupied in Samos, 
and therefore chose to take the necessary precautions to prevent a Persian sneak attack.927 
Be that as it may, the fact that no Persian fleet was deployed or even seen means that the 
Phoenician phantom fleet cannot be used to validate the notion that Persian central 
authorities were behind Pissuthnes’ intervention in the Samian revolt.928 
There is no other evidence, direct, indirect, or circumstantial, which suggests that 
the Great King instructed Pissuthnes to undermine the Athenians in the context of the 
Samian revolt. Furthermore, if the Great King was determined to reassert his authority in 
the Aegean, one wonders why he remained inactive for almost a decade since the 
conclusion of the truce and why such a feeble attempt was made while the Athenians were 
preoccupied in Samos. In fact, that the involvement of Pissuthnes did not end with an open 
war between Athens and Persia suggests that both sides were determined to maintain the 
peace. Accordingly, the Great King’s position regarding Athens seem to have remained the 
same, namely that Artaxerxes had no desire to see the renewal of Athenian operations in 
the eastern Mediterranean and was content with a pacified western frontier. 
Therefore, it is far more likely, as Meiggs maintains, that Pissuthnes acted without 
the authority of Artaxerxes.929 Yet, the satrap must have known that his satrapy would 
probably be the first to suffer if the Athenians would renew their attacks against Persian 
domain and that he would have incurred the Great King’s resentment for destabilizing the 
peace in the west. Pissuthnes, I argue, acted independently in order to further his own 
interest, but he did so with caution and prudence which hindered the possibility of 
unwanted escalation. On the one hand, the objectives of the satrap were rather modest. The 
attempt to bribe Pericles reveals that the satrap’s primary objective was to hinder the 
downfall of the Samian oligarchy. Plutarch notes that Pissuthnes forged a relationship with 
the Samian oligarchs that was based on goodwill, which suggests that the satrap interacted 
                                                 
925 This explains the actions of a Samian named Stesagoras who, according to Thucydides (1.116.3), evaded 
the Athenian blockade and went on to bring the Phoenician fleet. Furthermore, Thucydides (1.140.5) reports 
that the Samian oligarchs hoped that the Peloponnesians would join the fight against Athens, but such 
expectation, just like in the case of the Phoenician fleet, never materialized. 
926 Briant 2002, 581. 
927 Gomme 1945, 352; Rhodes 2014, 261. Brock (2006, 88) maintains that the rumors and uncertainties 
regarding the possible involvement of the Phoenician fleet suggest a continuing fear of an outright attack 
from the east. Such a sentiment reflects, in my opinion, the mutual suspicion between Athens and Persia, 
especially if the peace was predicated on an unofficial agreement that lacked clear and concrete mechanisms 
of enforcement. 
928 Rung (2008, 33) concludes that the absence of Persian naval forces is a clear sign for Artaxerxes’ 
reluctance to intervene in the Samian revolt.  
929 Meiggs 1972, 189–91. See also: Kagan 1987, 17; Wiesehöfer 2006, 660. 
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with the Samian in the past.930 We have seen that cultivation of connections with men of 
note in the adjacent regions was the modus operandi of Artabazus, the aforementioned 
satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia who collaborated with Pausanias. Any prudent satrap who 
ruled a frontier province must have sought to cultivate amicable relations with neighboring 
powers in order to better protect the borders of his domain. By forging a benign relationship 
with the oligarchic leadership of Samos, a capable maritime nation, Pissuthnes was 
probably seeking to achieve that very purpose. 
On the other hand, Pissuthnes probably knew that siding with the Samian oligarchs 
would not be taken kindly by the Athenians. Pissuthnes’ caution is manifested in his initial 
attempt to resolve the conflict between Samos and Athens with money rather with 
troops.931 When bribery failed, he tried to conceal his involvement in the restoration of the 
Samian oligarchy and to block potential escalation. The 700 mercenaries Pissuthnes 
provided were enough to enable the oligarchs to retake Samos, but this fighting force was 
far from sufficient to challenge Athens. Furthermore, it has been postulated that these 
mercenaries were of Greek origin,932 a possibility which suggests that Pissuthnes employed 
Greek mercenaries in order to obscure his involvement and to allow himself to claim that 
he had neither knowledge nor responsibility for the actions of the Samians oligarchs.933 
The turning point, however, was the Samian decision to declare war on Athens. 
Pissuthnes must have failed to anticipate the determination of the Samian oligarchs to hold 
on to their position as well as the extent of Athens’ retaliation. From the moment matters 
escalated into open war, Pissuthnes backed down and the Samians oligarchs were left to 
fend for themselves. In addition, the fact that Pissuthnes’ early intervention did not merit 
an Athenian response indicates that the actions of the satrap were not perceived as a 
violation of the truce and that Pissuthnes was not regarded as an enemy of Athens.934 
In sum, the cautious conduct of Pissuthnes, his calculated actions, his disappearance 
once open war was declared, and the absence of Athenian retaliation suggest that neither 
Pissuthnes nor the Athenians wished to violate the unofficial peace. If such analysis carries 
conviction, we can conclude that the Persian central authorities were not involved in this 
incident, and that Pissuthnes was neither following nor ignoring royal directives when he 
intervened on behalf of the Samian oligarchs. On the contrary, the actions of Pissuthnes 
were the outcome of his own initiative rather than a purported Persian policy of disruption. 
                                                 
930 Plut. Per. 25.2: ἔχων τινὰ πρὸς Σαμίους εὔνοιαν. Badian (1993, 33) argues that the agreement between 
the Samian oligarchs and Pissuthnes was not a formal treaty.  
931 Lewis 1977, 59 n. 65. Lewis adds that there is no tangible evidence that these mercenaries came from 
Pissuthnes’ territory. 
932 Seibt 1977, 39–45; Miller 1997, 101. 
933 Lewis 1977, 61. Moreover, several scholars (Roy 1967, 322 n. 141; Eddy 1973, 250 with n. 51; Badian 
1993, 33) argue that Pissuthnes merely allowed the Samian oligarchs to hire mercenaries from his domain 
rather than mustering them himself. If that was true, it can be deemed as another way by which the satrap 
tried to distance himself from the Samian uprising against Athenian rule. 
934 Thucydides (1.115.5) reports that the Samians handed over the Athenian garrison to Pissuthnes. Badian 
(1993, 33–34) points out that, on the one hand, there is no reason to believe that they came to any harm, while 
on the other, there is no indication that this action led to any sort of Athenian retribution against Pissuthnes. 
Therefore, he posits that some sort of exchange occurred with Pissuthnes’ help, a possibility that is predicated 
on open communications between the satrap and the Athenian authorities. See also: Meritt, Wade-Gery, and 
McGregor 1950, 307–8. 
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Pissuthnes merely made a careful attempt to allow his allies in Samos to remain in power, 
but once his involvement became too dangerous, he preferred to cut his losses. In short, it 
would be better to envision the eruption of hostilities between Samos and Athens as a local 
power struggle between pro-Athenian democrats and pro-Persian oligarchs rather than an 
episode in the cold war between Athens and Persia.935  
5.4 The Archidamian War 
The durability of the peace between Athens and Persia was put to the test in the first phase 
of the Peloponnesian War, better known as the Archidamian War. From the moment it 
became clear that war between Athens and Sparta was imminent, both sides resolved to 
send embassies to the Great Persian King to ask for his support.936 But despite the fact that 
numerous Athenian and Peloponnesian delegations made the journey to the King’s court 
at Susa, the Persians remained neutral. But in contrast to the disinterest of Artaxerxes, 
Pissuthnes was willing to take advantage of the situation. Since the Athenians were 
preoccupied with the Spartan challenge in the Greek mainland, several Athenian subject 
states, discontent with Athens’ overbearing imperial conduct, were in a better position to 
regain their independence. Consequently, western Anatolia and the adjacent islands were 
in a constant state of flux, as anti-Athenian factions sought ways to cast away the yoke of 
Athenian rule. And just as in the case of the Samian revolt, the enemies of Athens appealed 
Pissuthnes, seeking his friendship and assistance in their struggle. The satrap of Lydia, 
once again, took calculated risks in order to strengthen his position vis-à-vis Athens. 
The Reluctant Artaxerxes 
The Abortive Peloponnesian Embassy (430 BC) 
At the end of the summer of 430 BC a Peloponnesian embassy arrived at the court of the 
Thracian king Sitalces. The purpose of the embassy was to persuade Sitalces to abandon 
his alliance with Athens and to collaborate with the Peloponnesian League in relieving 
Potidaea, which was hard-pressed by an Athenian siege at the time. But the final destination 
of the delegation, was the Persian court. We are told that the Peloponnesian ambassadors 
hoped that Sitalces would supply them with means of transportation to cross the 
Hellespont, and that the arrangements for the remainder of the journey inland were made 
by Pharnabazus I, the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia. The embassy, however, never made 
it to Asia. Athenian representatives who also happened to be present at Sitalces’ court 
convinced the king’s son Sadocus to hand the Peloponnesians over to Athenian custody. 
The envoys were promptly sent to Athens where they were executed without trail.937 
                                                 
935 Holladay (1986, 505) defines the Samian revolt as “minor tensions that developed locally”. 
936 Thuc. 2.7.1; Diod. 12.41.1. Moreover, According to Thucydides (1.82.1-2), in the winter of 432 BC the 
Spartan king Archidamus encouraged the Peloponnesians to seek the alliances of both Greeks and Barbarians 
(βαρβάρων), an alliance which would allow Sparta and her allies to procure funds and ships. While the term 
βαρβάρων certainly includes the Persians (Brunt 1965, 262; Lewis 1977, 63), this designation probably 
encompasses all of the non-Greek nations that were involved in the conflict (Hornblower 1991, 127; Munson 
2012, 256 n. 66). 
937 Thuc. 2.67. Herodotus (7.137.2-3) mentions this incident as well. For an analysis of this episode in the 
context of Herodotus’ account, see: Munson 2001, 191–93. 
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The Intercepted Embassy of Artaphernes 
But the Spartans were not discouraged. Several Peloponnesian embassies made it to the 
King’s court in the following years.938 The purpose of the Peloponnesian diplomatic effort 
becomes clear due to a diplomatic incident which occurred in 425 BC. According to 
Thucydides (4.50), the Athenians intercepted a Persian embassy in Eion while en route to 
Sparta. The embassy was redirected to Athens, where the Athenians got hold of a letter 
carried by the Persian ambassador Artaphernes,939 whose content revealed that many 
Peloponnesian embassies made it to the royal court, but because each told a different story 
Artaxerxes had no idea what the Spartans desired.940 If the Spartans wish to clarify their 
intentions, the Great King added, they should send ambassadors to accompany Artaphernes 
in his eastward journey. 
The King’s confusion in regard to Spartan intentions demands clarification. It is 
generally agreed that Artaxerxes demanded the Spartans to relinquish any territorial claims 
in Asia Minor in exchange for money and ships,941 and that the Great King’s confusion 
was caused by either deliberate Spartan ambiguity,942 or even self-contradiction,943 since 
the Spartans were uncomfortable with the price that Artaxerxes demanded for his support. 
It should be noted that collaborating with Persia, let alone abandoning the Asiatic Greeks, 
created a major difficulty for the Spartans. From the onset of the war, the Spartans appealed 
to the goodwill of their fellow countrymen by presenting themselves as the champions of 
Greek liberty944 who fought against the oppressive Athenian Empire.945 Consequently, 
collaboration with the Persian Great King would have rendered Sparta’s liberation 
propaganda as senseless and would have branded the Spartans as hypocrites who sold the 
Asiatic Greeks for Persian gold.946  
                                                 
938 For instance, in Aristophanes’ Acharnians (646-51), produced in 425 BC, a meeting between the Persian 
King and Spartan envoys is mentioned. Oddly enough, we are told that the Great King first asked the envoys 
whether Athens or Sparta were superior at sea and then demanded to know which of them was mocked by 
Aristophanes. Olsen (2002, 240) deems, rightly in my view, the claim that Artaxerxes was familiar with the 
work of a particular Attic playwright as “patent fantasy”, but it still revels, as noted by Lewis (1977, 64), that 
the Athenians knew of at least one Spartan embassy which had got through before 425 BC. 
939 Thucydides states that the script of the letter was in Assyrian characters. Conversely, Gomme (1956, 498) 
has suggested that the letter was actually written in Old Persian, but it generally agreed that the script was 
probably in Aramaic. See: Olmstead 1948, 354; J. A. O. Larsen 1958, 124; Nylander 1968, 112 n. 16; 
Momigliano 1975, 9; Lewis 1977, 2; Hornblower 1996, 207. 
940 Thuc. 4.50.2: οὐ γιγνώσκειν ὅτι βούλονται: πολλῶν γὰρ ἐλθόντων πρέσβεων οὐδένα ταὐτὰ λέγειν. 
941 de Ste Croix 1972, 154; Lewis 1992a, 390; Cawkwell 2005, 150; Munson 2012, 257. 
942 Brunt 1965, 262. 
943 Moxon 1978, 21. 
944 For the Spartan liberation, see: Thuc. 1.122.3, 124.3, 139.3, 2.8.3-4, 3.13.7, 4.85, 87, 120-21, 8.46.3; Xen. 
Hell. 2.2.3-4. Hornblower (2011a, 159–60) adds that the Spartan claim to act as the guardians of Greek 
freedom related to the notion of Sparta program as the traditional opponent of tyranny. Further on Sparta’s 
liberation program see: Nichols 2015, 78–106. 
945 For Athens as the oppressor of Greeks, see: Thuc. 1.124.3, 2.8, 2.63.2, 3.37.2, 5.85. Lewis (1992a, 383) 
notes that Thucydides uses “the language of subjugation” whenever he addresses Athens as an imperial 
power. Moreover, Tuplin (1985, 352–57) points out that in Archaic period tyranny was personified by 
individuals but the rise of Athens brought about the emerging concept of a tyrant city. 
946 Hornblower 1991, 127; Hornblower 2011a, 102, 127; Munson 2012, 257. The problem of Spartan 
collaboration with Persia is addressed in the aforementioned speech of Archidamus. The potential alliance 
with the barbarians is described in the speech as ‘something that cannot be reproached’ (ἀνεπίφθονον). Lewis 
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 The complaint of Artaxerxes’ suggests the Spartans changed their mind that with 
each embassy. The Spartans’ frequent change of heart can be explained by the utter 
collapse of Archidamus’ war strategy, which consisted of period invasions to Attica. The 
Peloponnesians expected that these invasions would have provoked the Athenians to march 
out and meet their enemies in the field, a scenario in which the superior Peloponnesian land 
army would have surely won a decisive victory.947 Yet, in spite of the general expectation 
for a swift Peloponnesian victory,948 the Athenians demonstrated unprecedented 
determination to avoid a pitched battle,949 which rendered the Peloponnesian strategy as 
ineffective.950 The cumulative disappointments the Peloponnesians endured during the first 
years of the war made them realize that Athens could not be defeated as long as its maritime 
empire remained secure. Consequently, a change in policy took place as the Spartans were 
more inclined to make the necessary concessions in order to obtain sufficient funds to 
muster a sizable fleet.951 Nevertheless, it seems plausible that in 425 BC the Spartans were 
still hesitant to abandon the Asiatic Greeks.  
 But the fact that Artaxerxes encouraged the Spartans to make up their mind implies 
that he was interested in collaboration with Sparta against Athens. But what drove 
Artaxerxes to assume a more active stance in regard to Greek affairs? It has been argued 
that Artaxerxes took the initiative because he was alarmed by the Athenians’ success at 
Pylos and feared lest Sparta’s defeat would allow the Athenians to apply their expansionist 
aspirations in the east.952 This seems highly unlikely, since this suggestion is predicated on 
the belief that the Great King was well informed about each and every development in a 
war that took place well beyond the borders of his realm, and that he was unnerved by an 
Athenian victory on a relatively insignificant island off Pylos that was more coincidental 
than premeditated by any of the warring parties. Moreover, for two decades the Athenians 
refrained from operating in the eastern Mediterranean in spite of the fact that they were not 
embroiled in a total war against Sparta. Why, then, would the Great King be alarmed at the 
prospect of Athenian aggression? Therefore, it seems likelier that Artaxerxes was intrigued 
by the prospect of using the Spartans to push the Athenians out of Asia Minor rather than 
                                                 
(1977, 63) suggests that such articulation makes it clear that collaboration with barbarians was far from a 
popular course of action. It is also possible, as argued by Gomme (1945, 248), that despite removing 
themselves from the war against Persia after the recall of Pausanias, the Spartans and their Peloponnesian 
allies were still reluctant to partner up with an old enemy. Yet, the diplomatic exchange between Sparta and 
Persia reveals that the Spartan authorities were ready to put past grievances aside due to the necessity to 
curtail Athenian ambition. 
947 For the precepts of Archidamus’ war strategy, see: Thuc. 1.81.1, 82.4-5, 2.11.6-8. According to 
Thucydides (5.14.3, 7.28.3) Archidamus’ strategy was popular not only among the Spartans but also among 
the Peloponnesians allies. 
948 Thuc. 4.85.2, 5.14.3, 6.11.5, 16.2. 
949 de Ste Croix (1972, 207) points out that the Athenians “devised an entirely new strategy, which no Greek 
state that was not an island or situated right on the sea-coast had ever tried to employ before.” 
950 For a detailed study of the failure of Archidamus’ strategy, see: Brunt 1965; Moxon 1978. 
951 de Ste Croix 1972, 154; Lewis 1977, 63 with n. 86. In addition, the unexpected Athenian victory at Pylos 
and Sphacteria in the summer of 425 (Thuc. 4.3-23, 26-41) unnerved the Spartans, who sued for peace but 
were rebuffed by the Athenians (Thuc. 4.19.1, 21, 41). Since the Athenians had the advantage, the Spartans 
must have been even more eager to conclude an alliance with the Great King.  
952 Kagan 1987, 19; Cawkwell 2005, 142–43. 
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dreading an incoming Athenian assault. Furthermore, the fact that Artaxerxes made no 
effort to see that an alliance with Sparta came into existence suggests that his proposal was 
nothing more than “a diplomatic way of saying that if the Spartans wanted financial help, 
which was surely the object of the various embassies, they must make clear that they had 
no territorial claims in Asia Minor.”953  
The Athenian Diplomatic Effort 
The Athenians, on their part, were not idle. In the decades following the conclusion of the 
truce in 449 BC, Athens kept an open channel of communication with Artaxerxes,954 and 
when war seemed certain they too approached the Persian King, as well as other barbarian 
nations, in their search for allies in the war to come.955 The frequent exchange of embassies 
strengthens the notion that the Athenians were on friendly terms with Persia throughout 
the reign of Artaxerxes,956 and it is more than reasonable to assume that the Athenians were 
utterly surprised when they learned that the Spartans were trying to negotiate an alliance 
with Persia, a sentiment which is confirmed by Athens’ decision to send their own embassy 
to Susa, probably with the purpose of expressing their disapproval.957 But the Athenian 
diplomatic delegation never reached its destination. Having arrived at Ephesus, the 
Athenian ambassadors received news that King Artaxerxes had died. So, they decided to 
return home.958  
The King’s Interest 
Artaxerxes’ reply to the Spartan appeal and the fact that the Persians remained neutral until 
the winter of 413/2 BC makes it evident that the Persian central authorities were reluctant 
to intervene in the conflict between Sparta and Athens. From the Great King’s viewpoint, 
nothing had changed on the western frontier, and as long of the war in mainland Greece 
had no impact on Persian affairs, royal intervention was unnecessary. Moreover, as long as 
the Spartans refused to acknowledge Persian authority over the Greeks of Asia Artaxerxes 
had nothing to gain from siding with the Peloponnesians besides alienating the Athenians, 
who demonstrated time and again their capacity to threaten Persian possessions in the 
                                                 
953 Hornblower 2011b, 102.  
954 In Aristophanes’ Acharnians (61-127), a play which was produced in 425 BC, an Athenian diplomat, who 
has just returned home after serving as an ambassador at the Great King’s court, accompanied by a Persian 
dignitary named Pseudartabas who is denoted as the King’s Eye. It has been argued (Raubitschek 1964, 155; 
Raaflaub 2009b, 90) that this passage reveals that regular diplomatic exchange with Persia was far from 
unusual. In addition, Strabo (1.3.1) recounts an Athenian embassy to Susa, led by a certain Diotimus, who 
participated in the expedition against the Corinthians in 433 BC (Thuc. 1.45.2), while Plato (Charm. 158a) 
mentions Pyrilampes, a friend of Pericles according to Plutarch (Per. 13.10), who frequently journeyed to 
the Persian royal court as a representative of Athens. For a possible connection between the Samian revolt 
and the embassy of Diotimus, see: Miller 1997, 23–24. 
955 Thuc. 2.7.1. Munson (2012, 257) suggests that the Athenians sought to obtain financial support from the 
King. In contrast, Cawkwell (2005, 142–43, 145 n. 45) argues that “at the start of the War Athens needed 
neither Persian gold nor Persian naval power”, and that their diplomatic effort was aimed at persuading the 
King to remain neutral. See also: Kagan 1987, 19; Rung 2008, 34. 
956 Hornblower 1996, 209. 
957 Raubitschek 1964, 156. 
958 For the problems regarding the date of Artaxerxes’ death, see: Lewis 1977, 69–76; Stolper 1983; 
Hornblower 1996, 207–8. 
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west.959 The Great King’s motive to stay out of Greek affair is logical, and the same can be 
said in regard to Pissuthnes’ opposite decision, namely to exploit the conflict in the Greek 
mainland for his own benefit. 
The Brazen Pissuthnes 
While Athenian and Spartan embassies made their way to and from the royal court at Susa, 
minor skirmishes took place in western Anatolia. These conflicts took the form of factional 
strife in Ionian city-states and clashes between Athenian contingents and unspecified local 
forces. But since Pissuthnes’ interventions in Ionian politics seem to have posed no threat 
to the status quo between Athens and Persia, Pissuthnes’ actions and motivation merit a 
reappraisal. 
In 430 BC stasis broke in the city of Colophon. One of the warring factions took 
control over the city with the assistance of a Persian named Itamenes, while their political 
rivals fled to Notium.960 It has been suggested, correctly in my view, that Itamenes was a 
subordinate of Pissuthnes and that he was following the satrap’s orders.961 Soon after, 
Thucydides continues, at the beginning of winter 430/29, six Athenian triremes under the 
command of Melesander were sent to Caria and Lycia to collect tribute and to protect 
Athenian merchantmen from Peloponnesian privateers,962 who operated in these regions.963 
At some point Melesander decided to march up into the Lycian hinterland. But the 
Athenian force was attacked and suffered heavy casualties, among them was Melesander. 
                                                 
959 In the aforementioned passage from Aristophanes’ Acharnians (646-51) the Persian King is depicted as 
utterly ignorant of Greek affairs since he did not know whether Sparta or Athens were stronger on the sea. It 
has been argued by Olsen (2002, 240) that such a question “leaves little doubt that the advantage in the war 
lies entirely with Athens and explains why he grants the Spartans nothing.” While Olsen’s emphasis on naval 
power is correct, I argue that Artaxerxes’ reply reveals that the Persian King could not care less about the 
conflict between Athens and Sparta but was aware of the challenge of Greek naval power. The deficiencies 
of the Spartan diplomatic effort are summarized by Munson (2012, 258).  
960 Thuc. 3.34.1. For the Mytilenian revolt, see: Thuc. 3.2-6, 18-19, 25-33.  
961 Wade-Gery 1958, 219; Eddy 1973, 254; Lewis 1977, 61; Kagan 1987, 18; Chaumont 1990, 591; Badian 
1993, 34. Hallock (1969, 391 n. 1389) has suggested that the Iddamana, which is attested in the Persepolis 
Fortification Tablets (PF 1389), might refer to the Itamenes mentioned by Thucydides, while Lewis (Lewis 
1977, 61 n. 76) points out that a Persian man of the same name appears in Xenophon’s account (An. 7.8.15). 
962 While some scholars accept Thucydides’ identification of the privateers who terrorized Athenian merchant 
ships as Peloponnesians (e.g. Buschmann 1988, 6; Pritchett 1991, 328–29), others (Ormerod 1924, 111; Keen 
1993a, 153) have argued that these privateers were in fact local pirates who were mistaken as Peloponnesians 
simply because their actions happened to be beneficial to the Peloponnesian war effort. An alternative 
explanation has been offered by Hornblower (1991, 355), who suggests that the attacks against the Athenian 
trade ships constituted “a Peloponnesian-sponsored piratical activity.” 
963 Thuc. 2.69.1-2. This passage suggests an ongoing and free trade between Athens and the Levant. Despite 
the high probability that the Phoenike (Φοινίκης) mentioned by Thucydides was not Phoenicia but a Lycian 
port (Dickinson 1979; Buschmann 1988; Hornblower 1991, 355–56), the existence of trade relations between 
Athens and the eastern Mediterranean basin is confirmed by the Athenian playwright Hermippus (Athen. 
27d-e), who mentions that in 425 BC one could find in Athens dates and semidalis from Phoenicia, hanging 
gear, sails, and papyrus cables from Egypt and frankincense from Syria. Accordingly, it has been argued 
(Miller 1997, 25; Briant 2002, 583) that in spite of the above mentioned skirmishes commerce between 
Athens and the eastern Mediterranean continued. Thus, one can infer that the Persian central authorities did 
not consider the limited clashes in western Anatolia to be significant. 
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The information from the Xanthus Pillar reveals the Melesander was attacked at Kyaneai 
by a Lycian dynast by the name of Trbbênimi of Lymeria.964 
The next clash occurred in 428/7 BC when the Athenians who were sent to suppress 
the Mytilenian revolt on Lesbos dispatched a squadron of twelve ships under the command 
of Lysicles and four other commanders to collect money from their allies.965 After exacting 
tribute from several unspecified settlements, Lysicles marched up the country from Myus, 
across the plain of the Meander as far as the hill of Sandius,966 where he was attacked by 
certain Carians and the men of Anaia.967 Lysicles was slain along with many of his soldiers. 
It has been argued that the forays of Melesander and Lysicles into Caria and Lycia 
constituted an Athenian retaliation for the rise of the medizers in Colophon,968 and that 
Athens’ aim was to reassert its authority in the region and to deter the locals from siding 
with Persia through a demonstration of force.969 Yet, one wonders why the Athenians 
waited for three years to dispatch a relatively small fleet that could hardly exhibit Athenian 
military might.970 The notion that the Athenians wanted to retaliate for the events in 
Colophon is pure speculation, especially since Thucydides explicitly states that the primary 
objective of both expeditions was to collect tribute. Therefore, it seems likelier that 
Melesander and Lysicles, determined to collect sufficient funds for the war effort, made 
the ill-advised decision to march inland on their own accord.971 But what was the role of 
the Persians in these incidents? In contrast to the incidents in Samos and Colophon, 
                                                 
964 TAM I 44a, lines 44-45. Cf. Thonemann 2009, 175–76.  
965 Thuc. 3.19.1-2. 
966 Robert (1959, 19–22) suggests that the hill of Sandius is probably the hill of Yürüklü, north-east of the 
modern town of Söke. 
967 Anaia was a coastal city south to Ephesus, and it has been argued (Shipley 1987, 35; Hornblower 1991, 
405; Miller 1997, 25–26), that it was inhabited by Samian exiles who fled Samos after the Athenian victory 
in 440/39 BC, which explain their hostility toward the Athenians. Moreover, the participation of a Carian 
force suggests that they had some sort of Persian support. In addition, Thucydides (5.1.1) reports that 
sometime before the summer of 422 BC the Athenians expelled the Delians from Delos under religious 
pretext, while Diodorus (12.73.1) claims that the cause for the Delian expulsion was secret negotiations 
between the Delians and Spartans. In any case, some of the Delian exiles were settled by Pharnaces, the 
satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, in Atramyttium, situated on the Asiatic continent opposite to Lesbos. It 
seems that the satraps of western Anatolia were happy to provide shelter to Greeks who had been wronged 
by Athens, and it is possible that the Samian exiles settled in Anaia after received permission and perhaps 
assistance from the Persians.  
968 Eddy 1973, 254. 
969 Eddy 1973, 254; Keen 1993a, 143–54; Briant 2002, 583. 
970 If the Athenians were trying to give a show of force, one would have expected the deployment of a fleet 
similar in size to the armada commanded by Cimon during the Eurymedon campaign. In addition, Kagan 
(1974, 97) points out that a squadron of six ships was unusually large for a tribute collection, and the same 
can be said regarding the fact that Lysicles commanded twelve ships. Yet, the size of these squadron can be 
easily explained by the presence of the above mentioned privateers that must have merited an augmented 
fleet. 
971 According to Thucydides (3.19.1), shortly before these tribute collection expeditions took place the 
Athenians were desperate for money and consequently imposed a war tax (εἰσφορά) upon the citizens of 
Athens. This is the first instance in which Thucydides mentions a financial measure, which indicates that it 
was one of significance.  
Further on this tax, see: Thomsen 1964; J. G. Griffith 1977; Kallet-Marx 1993, 134–36. On the financial 
hardships the Athenians grappled with at this period, see: Kallet-Marx 1993, 137–38. 
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Thucydides does not mention Persian involvement, and in the case of Melesander, the 
involvement of the Lycian dynasts does not necessary mean that they were following 
Persian directives.972 Lysicles, however, probably encountered satrapal contingents. 
Thonemann convincingly argues that, according to information provided by the Xanthus 
Pillar (TAM 44a 54-55), Amorges, the illegitimate son of Pissuthnes (Thuc. 8.5.5), 
commanded the detachment which defeated Lysicles.973 But even if the satrapal authorities 
were directly involved in some way or the other, these incidents were not followed by 
further escalation.974 Hence, it seems reasonable to assume that while the King may have 
received reports regarding these events, he discounted them as a local problem that had 
been resolved by the satrapal authorities and required no further action on his part.975  
The last known clash between Athenians and Persians in the context of 
Archidamian War occurred in 427 BC. 976  A pro-Persian faction tried to take over Notium, 
and this time the involvement of Pissuthnes is evident. According to the ancient sources, 
one faction took over the city with the assistance of the medizers who took over Colophon 
in 430 BC and a force of Arcadian and barbarian mercenaries supplied by Pissuthnes.977 
But the rivals of the medizers appealed the Athenian general Paches for help. Paches 
captured the city through deception, ordered the execution of the mercenaries, and gave the 
city back to the pro-Athenian faction. In a similar fashion to the involvement of Pissuthnes 
in the Samian revolt,978 the satrap’s role in rise of the pro-Persian factions in Notium and 
Colophon has been considered to be another chapter in an alleged cold war between Athens 
and Persia.979 Such a conclusion, however, is not convincing. Again, the limited nature of 
Pissuthnes’ actions and the lack of escalation speak in favor of a local political struggle in 
which the satrap played a secondary role. As the opposing factions in Colophon and 
Notium were seeking to overpower their rivals, it was only natural that they sought to enlist 
the support of either Athens or Persia. Accordingly, it has been argued that all that 
Pissuthnes did was merely supporting one side in an internal strife.980 Moreover, that lack 
                                                 
972 Briant 2002, 583. 
973 Thonemann 2009, 176–78. 
974 Badian (1993, 34) states that the clash in Notium is “the clearest example of an incident of this kind which 
was not regarded as an act of war or a breach of any peace.” 
975 It has been suggested (Meiggs 1972, 437; Keen 1993a, 155) that the failure of Melesander in Caria led to 
a revolt against Athenian rule Caunus, an event which is reported by Ctesias (FGrH 688 F14 §45). Due to 
the role played by the Persian deserter Zopyrus in the suppression of the revolt, Hornblower (1982, 28 with 
n. 176) speculates that the Persians encouraged the people of Caunus to rebel, while others (Eddy 1973, 255; 
Briant 2002, 975) assume that Pissuthnes was directly involved. Badian (1993, 36) notes that there is no 
evidence for the satrap’s involvement, and in any case the episode ended with minimal impact of the status 
quo between Athens and Persia. In a recent study Thonemann (2009, 176–82) employs information derived 
from the Xanthus Pillar (TAM 44a, lines 51-55) to argue that the Athenian attack on Caunus occurred due to 
the use of the city as a Persian administrative center. 
976 Thuc. 3.34.2-4; Polyaen. Strat. 3.2. 
977 Wade-Gery (1958, 219) speculates that the barbarians mentioned were definitely Persians, but it seems 
likelier that the barbarian element in this force consisted of soldiers of Anatolian stock that may have been 
under Persian service.  
978 See n. 912 above. 
979 Eddy 1973, 254. Wade-Gery (1958, 219) deems the actions of Pissuthnes as a clear breach of the peace 
of Callias.  
980 Lewis 1977, 61; Badian 1993, 34, 38; Hornblower 1991, 416. 
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of any evidence for Athenian retaliation against Pissuthnes indicates that Athens did not 
consider him to be an enemy in spite of the support he provided for the medizers in 
Colophon and Notium,981 and that Paches was content with regaining Notium and leaving 
Colophon to the medizers. Once again, matters seem to have cooled down rather quickly 
and the status quo endured.982 
In summary, the ongoing exchange of embassies between Athens and Susa 
indicates that the Persian central authorities ascribed little importance to the local 
skirmishes in western Anatolia. One must admit that Pissuthnes was actively involved in 
at least two power struggles in cities which were associated with the Delian League but the 
assertion that his actions were the outcome of grand Persian strategy to undermine 
Athenian supremacy in Ionia has little force. All in all, the clashes between Athens and 
Persia which were recorded after 449 BC are scarce, sporadic, limited, and local. There 
was no cold war, only an opportunistic satrap who could not pass on the opportunity of 
enhancing his position in the Ionians cities at Athens’ expense.983 Pissuthnes anticipated 
that his encroachments would not be taken kindly by the Athenians, and so he was cautious 
enough in his conduct, never fully committing himself or his armed forces.984 The 
Athenians, on their part, dreaded a scenario in which Persia joined the war on Sparta’s side 
and while they were not shy of reasserting their dominance in Ionia, they did not view the 
actions of Pissuthnes as violation of the truce,985 and therefore refrained from mounting a 
punitive attack against the satrap.  
Conclusion 
In spite of Athens’ role in the Egyptian uprising and Cimon’s Cypriot campaign, 
Artaxerxes showed little interest in reasserting Persian supremacy in the Aegean. The 
establishment of a détente in 449 BC, which suited the interest of the Great King as well 
as Athens, marked the beginning of a new era in Greco-Persian relations, one of peace and 
limited military friction. The peace in western Anatolia, however, was not absolute, as local 
clashes involving the Athenians and the satrapal authorities still occurred, but at no point 
was the modus vivendi between the two empires truly jeopardized. Despite the changing 
circumstances throughout the decades, the Athenians and Persians had little to gain and 
much to lose from renewing hostilities. In fact, the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War and 
the Peloponnesian attempt to conclude an alliance with Persia probably strengthened 
Athens’ desire to see that the peace with Persia continued. As for the Great Persian King, 
as long as the satraps of western Anatolia made sure that the tribute kept on flowing and 
                                                 
981 Badian 1993, 34–35. 
982 In addition, the reaffirmation of peaceful relations between Athens and Pissuthnes is corroborated by the 
arrival of the aforementioned Athenian embassy at Ephesus in 425 BC. 
983 When assessing Eddy’s notion of a cold war between Athens and Persia, Cawkwell (2005, 142) points out 
the problematic reliance of this reconstruction of the Athenian tribute lists and rightly concludes that “if states 
did not pay, there is no reason to presume that Persia was egging them on or that every time an Athenian 
general is found seeking to collect tribute or in some other way enforcing imperial discipline, a technical 
breach of the Peace of Callias was being committed.” For similar assessment of Eddy’s hypothesis, see: 
Lewis 1977, 59–61; Badian 1993, 194–95 n. 45.  
984 Cawkwell 2005, 142. 
985 Badian 1993, 33. 
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that Persian authority remained unchallenged the Persian central  authorities had no reason 
to intervene in local skirmishes that occurred in the far west. 
 The position of the satraps of western Anatolia, however, was different. The 
emergence of a détente which ended hostilities meant that the satraps could administer their 
domains in peace. But peace came with a price. As we have seen, the satraps and Athens 
presumably found a way to divide the revenue which was generated by the Greek city-
states of Asia in a way that satisfied both parties. From the satraps’ viewpoint, a reduced 
income must have seemed as an acceptable alternative to a disastrous and expensive war 
against the Athenians. Still, the satraps probably had to meet the same tribute quotas even 
if their sources of revenue were cut short. Therefore, local disputes fueled by anti-Athenian 
sentiment brought about lucrative opportunities. Pissuthnes, who was a member of the 
Achaemenid royal household,986 demonstrated his inclination to act independently in an 
attempt to increase his influence and probably to create new sources of revenue. There was 
no overarching royal policy of disruption, only satrapal opportunism. Albeit these local 
clashes, the equilibrium in western Anatolia was able to last as long of the war in the Greek 
mainland had not spilled over the Aegean. In the following chapter we shall see that in 
spite of the fact that Darius II, the successor of Artaxerxes I, was willing to reaffirm the 
unofficial truce that was established in the reign of his predecessor, the equilibrium that 
held on for more than a quarter of a century came to an abrupt end. However, while the 
circumstances in western Anatolia changed dramatically, Darius II followed the footsteps 
of his predecessors and showed limited interest in the west. But the satraps could not remain 
idle. The causes for and the events of the outbreak of the Ionian War, the final phase of the 
Peloponnesian War, served as a backdrop for an unprecedented level of satrapal 
intervention in Greek affairs. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
986 According to Thucydides (1.115.4), Pissuthnes was the son of Hystaspes, and it is generally agreed that 
this Hystaspes was the son of Darius I and Atossa who commanded the Bactrians and Sacae in Xerxes’ Greek 
campaign (Hdt. 7.64). See: Lewis 1977, 55; Balcer 1984, 168, 176; Chaumont 1990, 591 with n. 82 for 
references to earlier literature. Dusinberre 2003, 39; Kuhrt 2007, 329 n. 3; Dusinberre 2013, 44.  
146 
 
6. THE SATRAPS AND THE IONIAN WAR 
 
The accession of Darius II marked the beginning of a tumultuous period in western 
Anatolia. During his reign Pissuthnes, the satrap of Lydia, rose in rebellion, and even after 
the rogue satrap was dealt with, his bastard son Amorges continued to challenge Persian 
rule. At the same time, the war between Athens and Sparta had finally spilled over the 
Aegean. Ionia became the main theater of war in the last phase of the Peloponnesian War, 
better known as the Ionian War, which raged on from the winter of 413/12 BC until the 
annihilation of the Athenian fleet at the battle of Aigospotami in 405 BC.  
While there is little doubt that Sparta’s victory in the war was facilitated by Persian 
financial support, it is less clear who was the guiding hand in respect to Persian policies in 
the west during this eventful period. At the present, it is widely held that it was Darius II 
who, in the wake of the Athenian disaster in Sicily, ordered his satraps to forge an alliance 
with Sparta with the intention of reasserting Persian authority over the Greek cities of Asia 
Minor.987 However, when taking into consideration how differently the conflict between 
Sparta and Athens was viewed from the Achaemenid royal court at Susa in comparison to 
the view from the satrapal capitals of Sardis and Dascylium, a different picture emerges. 
Accordingly, in the present chapter I argue that (1) the interest of Darius II in the western 
satrapies was similar to his predecessors, i.e. limited to the issues of peace and tribute, and 
(2) that the satraps of western Anatolia were the true driving force behind the decision to 
forge an alliance with the Spartans. I demonstrate that throughout this tumultuous period 
Tissaphernes, the satrap of Lydia, and Pharnabazus, the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, 
were given considerable leeway to formulate and execute policies. The manner in which 
the war was to be pursued was to decided and altered by the satraps, while Darius remained 
largely in the background. 
Two preliminary remarks should be made in regard to the role of the Great King 
and his satrap in the decision making process. First, satrapal actions, even those initiated 
by the aforementioned satraps, were well within the boundaries of royal policy and at no 
point went against the King’s wishes or interests. Second, the King was not ignorant of the 
state of affairs in the west. On the contrary, as we shall see, Darius was well informed of 
the developments in western Anatolia, probably due to regular reports sent by the satraps 
themselves. Even still, the actions of the Great King serve as a clear indication that he had 
full confidence that the satrapal authorities in the west were up to the task and that he 
expected his satraps to contain and resolve the problems in the western satrapies.  
6.1 The Peace of Epilycus 
The final diplomatic exchange between Athens and Persia in the context of the 
Archidamian War occurred early in the reign of Darius II. In a speech entitled ‘On the 
Peace’, which was delivered in 391 BC, the Attic orator Andocides recalls how Epilycus, 
his maternal uncle, brokered a treaty (σπονδαἰ) with Darius.988 Despite doubts regarding 
                                                 
987 Dundas 1934, 168; Olmstead 1948, 359; Brunt 1965, 263; Lewis 1977, 85, 87 with n. 25; Westlake 1977a, 
328; Burn 1985, 343; Holladay 1986, 506; Kagan 1987, 28–32; Cawkwell 1997b, 48; Keen 1998b, 99; Briant 
2002, 592; Wiesehöfer 2006, 662; Rung 2008, 35; Ruzicka 2012, 35. 
988 Andoc. 3.29. 
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the reliability of Andocides,989 the authenticity of this speech,990 and the fact that no other 
source mentions such a treaty,991 the historicity of the so-called Peace of Epilycus is 
generally accepted, and it is widely held that it was ratified shortly after the coronation of 
Darius II, which occurred before February of 423 BC.992  
But what were the terms of the treaty negotiated by Epilycus? Those who believe 
in the Peace of Callias argue that the embassy of Epilycus resulted in the ratification of the 
stipulations both sides agreed upon in 449 BC.993 Others have suggested that the Athenians 
sought to replace the Peace of Callias with a treaty that entailed a clause which prevented 
the Persians from aiding Sparta in the war.994 Both suggestions, it should be emphasized, 
correspond with the Athenian diplomatic effort to keep Persia out of the war. Accordingly, 
since the Peace of Callias probably constituted an unofficial agreement, it seems likely that 
the Athenians thought it was necessary to ensure that the new Great King intended to 
uphold the informal understandings concluded with his predecessor.995 Thus, just like in 
the case of the Peace of Callias, the informal nature of the agreement concluded with Darius 
II explains the silence of the sources and the absence of any public commemoration of the 
Peace of Epilycus in Athens.  
6.2 Enter Tissaphernes 
The Rebellion of Pissuthnes 
After Thucydides mentions the abortive Athenian embassy to the Persian court in the 
winter of 425/24 BC,996 the Persians vanish almost entirely from the narrative until the 
winter of 413/12.997 Fortunately, Ctesias sheds some light on the dramatic developments 
in western Anatolia which were glossed over by Thucydides. The Cnidian physician reports 
                                                 
989 Cf. de Ste Croix 1972, 245; Meister 1982, 76–94; Rutishauser 2012, 97 n. 98. In contrast, Steinbock (2013, 
74–75) maintains that Andocides probably drew the information he used to compose his speech from his 
family memories, which led to the production of an account which was unsurprisingly different in comparison 
to the official Athenian version. Therefore, I agree with Meiggs (1972, 134), who argues that while it is clear 
that Andocides refashioned certain facts to suit his interests, it is difficult to believe that he would have 
fabricated an embassy to Persia. 
990 Harris (2000) asserts that ‘On the Peace’ is a Hellenistic forgery. 
991 The relevancy of Theopompus’ fragment (FGrH 115 F153) to the Peace of Epilycus has been generally 
denied, see: Krentz 2009. Moreover, Harris (1999) convincingly demonstrates that the treaty Athenians 
concluded with an unspecified king with the aid of Heracleides of Clazomenae, as recorded in IG I3 227 
[=ML 70] and IG II2 65, not connected in any way to the embassy of Epilycus. 
992 Ulrich Köhler 1892, 74–75; A. B. West 1935, 72–76; Sealey 1955, 328–29; Wade-Gery 1958, 207–9; 
Andrewes 1961, 2–3; Mattingly 1965; Meiggs and Lewis 1969, 201–3; Meiggs 1972, 134–38, 493–95; 
Westlake 1977a, 325–26; Kagan 1987, 20; Shrimpton 1991, 79–81; Edwards 1995, 107–8; Miller 1997, 27; 
Rhodes 2006, 113–14; Moreno 2007, 87 n. 42; Rung 2008, 35; Hunt 2010, 274. Several commentators have 
expressed their reservations regarding the chronological difficulties that such reconstruction requires and 
consequently date the embassy to 422/1 BC or sometime before the Athenian armada embarked to Sicily in 
415 BC. See: Gomme 1945, 332–34; Raubitschek 1964, 156; Thompson 1971; Blamire 1975. 
993 E.g. Wade-Gery 1958, 210–11; Andrewes 1961, 5; Brunt 1965, 262; Meiggs 1972, 134–38; Wiesehöfer 
2006, 661; Hornblower 2008, 770. 
994 Raubitschek 1964, 156–57; Kagan 1974, 306 n. 8; Blamire 1975, 22–23. 
995 Holladay 1986, 506. 
996 Thuc. 4.50.3. 
997 The only exception occurs at the beginning of book 5 (Thuc. 5.1), where Thucydides notes that Pharnaces 
allowed the Delian exiles to settle in Atramyttium. 
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that Pissuthnes rose in rebellion sometime after the accession of Darius II, probably in the 
late 420s BC.998 Since the death of Artaxerxes I was followed by a violent dynastic 
struggle,999 it is quite possible that Pissuthnes, who was an Achaemenid by blood, may 
have thought that he could dethrone a bastard of Artaxerxes I who usurped the throne.1000 
Regardless of Pissuthnes’ motive, Darius II dispatched Tissaphernes, Spithradates, and 
Parmises with an army to suppress the rebellion.1001 The Persian generals used bribes to 
persuade the Greek mercenaries who served under Pissuthnes to desert the rogue satrap. 
Shortly after, Pissuthnes was executed and his satrapy was given to Tissaphernes.1002 
The Embassy to Sparta 
Now let us return to Thucydides. When he begins recounting the events of the winter of 
413/12 BC Thucydides reports the following:1003  
[8.5.4] καὶ ὁ μὲν τοῖς Λεσβίοις ἔπρασσε, Χῖοι δὲ καὶ Ἐρυθραῖοι ἀποστῆναι καὶ αὐτοὶ 
ἑτοῖμοι ὄντες πρὸς μὲν Ἆγιν οὐκ ἐτράποντο, ἐς δὲ τὴν Λακεδαίμονα. καὶ παρὰ 
Τισσαφέρνους, ὃς βασιλεῖ Δαρείῳ τῷ Ἀρταξέρξου στρατηγὸς ἦν τῶν κάτω, πρεσβευτὴς 
ἅμα μετ᾽ αὐτῶν παρῆν. [8.5.5] ἐπήγετο γὰρ καὶ ὁ Τισσαφέρνης τοὺς Πελοποννησίους καὶ 
ὑπισχνεῖτο τροφὴν παρέξειν. ὑπὸ βασιλέως γὰρ νεωστὶ ἐτύγχανε πεπραγμένος τοὺς ἐκ τῆς 
ἑαυτοῦ ἀρχῆς φόρους, οὓς δι᾽ Ἀθηναίους ἀπὸ τῶν Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων οὐ δυνάμενος 
πράσσεσθαι ἐπωφείλησεν: τούς τε οὖν φόρους μᾶλλον ἐνόμιζε κομιεῖσθαι κακώσας τοὺς 
Ἀθηναίους, καὶ ἅμα βασιλεῖ ξυμμάχους Λακεδαιμονίους ποιήσειν, καὶ Ἀμόργην τὸν 
Πισσούθνου υἱὸν νόθον, ἀφεστῶτα περὶ Καρίαν, ὥσπερ αὐτῷ προσέταξε βασιλεύς, ἢ 
ζῶντα ἄξειν ἢ ἀποκτενεῖν. 
[8.6.1] οἱ μὲν οὖν Χῖοι καὶ Τισσαφέρνης κοινῇ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ἔπρασσον, 
Καλλίγειτος δὲ ὁ Λαοφῶντος Μεγαρεὺς καὶ Τιμαγόρας ὁ Ἀθηναγόρου Κυζικηνός, 
φυγάδες τῆς ἑαυτῶν ἀμφότεροι παρὰ Φαρναβάζῳ τῷ Φαρνάκου κατοικοῦντες, 
ἀφικνοῦνται περὶ τὸν αὐτὸν καιρὸν ἐς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα πέμψαντος Φαρναβάζου, ὅπως 
ναῦς κομίσειαν ἐς τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον, καὶ αὐτός, εἰ δύναιτο, ἅπερ ὁ Τισσαφέρνης 
προυθυμεῖτο, τάς τε ἐν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ἀρχῇ πόλεις ἀποστήσειε τῶν Ἀθηναίων διὰ τοὺς φόρους 
καὶ ἀφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ βασιλεῖ τὴν ξυμμαχίαν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ποιήσειεν. 
While [Agis] was engaged with the Lesbians, the Chians and Erythrians, who were also 
ready to revolt, approached not Agis but the Spartan authorities. They were accompanied 
by an ambassador of Tissaphernes, the general of Darius son of Artaxerxes of the maritime 
                                                 
998 Ctes. FGrH 688 FF14 §53. For the date of Pissuthnes’ rebellion, see: Wade-Gery 1958, 222 n. 1; 
Andrewes 1961, 5 with n. 11; Woodhead 1970, 146; Lewis 1977, 80 n. 198; Westlake 1977a, 321; Gomme, 
Andrewes, and Dover 1981, 12; Hornblower 1982, 37; Briant 2002, 591; Trundle 2004, 149; Rhodes 2006, 
143; Hornblower 2008, 769; Thonemann 2009, 173; Waters 2010, 823; Manning 2013, 20. For a different 
view, see: Olmstead 1948, 358; Roy 1967; Meiggs 1972, 349–50. 
999 For the turmoil which followed the death of Artaxerxes I, see: Ctes. FGrH 688 F15 §47-52; Diod. 12.64.1, 
71.1; Paus. 6.5.7. For modern accounts, see: Lewis 1977, 70–79; Stolper 1985, 114–20; Kagan 1987, 20–23; 
Briant 2002, 588–91.  
1000 Woodhead 1970, 146; Westlake 1977a, 321; Kagan 1987, 21; Briant 2002, 591; Kuhrt 2007, 337 n. 2; 
Waters 2010, 823; Manning 2013, 19–20. 
1001 The date in which Tissaphernes came to the west is unclear. It has been argued (e.g. Wade-Gery 1958, 
222 n. 1; Andrewes 1961, 5 with n. 2; Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover 1981, 12) that Tissaphernes’ arrival 
occurred sometime before 421 BC. For a more cautious view, see: Lewis 1977, 80 n. 198; Hornblower 2008, 
769. 
1002 For the possibility that Tissaphernes was connected to the Achaemenid household, see: Lewis 1977, 83–
84; Westlake 1985b, 43 n. 6; Jacobs 1994, 103 n. 61; Dusinberre 2003, 39 n. 45; Klinkott 2005, 56; Kuhrt 
2007, 337 n. 3; Dusinberre 2013, 44. 
1003 Thuc. 8.5.4-6.1. 
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districts,
1004
 who invited the Peloponnesians [to Ionia] and promised to pay for their 
expenses. For just recently Tissaphernes happened to be called upon by the King for the 
tribute he owed, which he was unable to collect from the Greek cities within his domain 
because of the Athenians. He thought that after he would weaken the Athenians [by 
bringing the Spartans to Asia], he would be able to exact the tribute with ease; in addition, 
he would affect an alliance between the King and the Spartans and capture, dead or alive, 
Amorges the illegitimate son of Pissuthnes who was in rebellion in Caria, as he was 
instructed by the King.  
[8.6] While the Chians and Tissaphernes acted jointly in regard to the same issue, 
Calligeitus son of Laophon of Megara and Timagoras son of Athenagoras of Cyzicus, both 
exiles who resided at the court of Pharnabazus son of Pharnaces, came at about the same 
time to Sparta having been sent by Pharnabazus in order to procure ships for the Hellespont. 
[Pharnabazus] was eager to achieve, if it was in his power, the very same objectives as 
Tissaphernes’, namely to induce the cities within his domain to revolt from the Athenians 
in order to receive tribute from them and to conclude an alliance between the King and the 
Spartans. 
Persia, Athens, and Amorges 
Amorges, so it seems, continued his father’s rebellion.1005 But while there is no evidence 
that the Athenians assisted Pissuthnes,1006 it is certain that by the summer of 412 BC they 
collaborated with Amorges.1007 Still, it is unclear when exactly the Athenians entered into 
an alliance with Amorges. Due to Thucydides’ silence on the matter, two particular scraps 
of evidence have received ample attention. The first is a list of payments made from 
Athena’s treasury for public purposes, according to which a payment of unknown amount 
was made to a general stationed in Ephesus in the spring of 414 BC.1008 Several scholars 
have suggested that the Athenian general was dispatched to Ephesus in order to assist 
Amorges.1009 Conversely, it has been argued that the wavering loyally of the Ephesians 
caused the Athenians to install a garrison in the city,1010 or that the general arrived at 
Ephesus on a tribute collection mission.1011 The other piece of evidence is a passage from 
Aristophanes’ Birds, in which an Athenian inspector (ἐπίσκοπος) hurries to the assembly 
in order to report on some interaction he had with Pharnaces, the satrap of Hellespontine 
                                                 
1004 While this title suggests that Tissaphernes was the highest ranking official in the western satrapies, his 
interaction with Pharnabazus shows that it was not the case. For further discussion on this matter, see: Lewis 
1977, 86 with n. 21 for previous scholarship; Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover 1981, 13–16; Hornblower 2008, 
776–768. 
1005 Beloch 1914, 377; Wade-Gery 1958, 222. For a more cautious view, see: Lewis 1977, 86; Westlake 
1977a, 321. 
1006 The fact that Pissuthnes’ Greek mercenary contingent was led by an Athenian named Lycon led several 
scholars (e.g. Wade-Gery 1958, 222; Keen 1998b, 99; Wiesehöfer 2006, 660–61; Kuhrt 2007, 313; 
Hornblower 2011a, 168) to assume that Athens supported the rogue satrap. In contrast, Andrewes (1961, 4 
n. 10) maintains, correctly in my view, that Lycon’s nationality cannot be taken as proof for Athenian 
policies. Cf. Westlake 1977a, 321; Cawkwell 2005, 145 n. 6. 
1007 Thuc. 8.19.2, 28.2, 54.3; Andoc. 3.29. Cf. Andrewes 1961, 4; Lewis 1977, 85; Westlake 1977a, 320–21. 
1008 IG I2 320 = ML 77, line 79. 
1009 Olmstead 1948, 359; Meritt, Wade-Gery, and McGregor 1950, 356; Wade-Gery 1958, 222–23; Andrewes 
1961, 4–5; Meiggs and Lewis 1969, 236; Lewis 1977, 86; Holladay 1986, 506; Gomme, Andrewes, and 
Dover 1981, 17; Andrewes 1992, 465; Cawkwell 2005, 145 n. 6; Wiesehöfer 2006, 657; Kuhrt 2007, 338 n. 
4; Hornblower 2008, 771. Contra: Thonemann 2009, 187 n. 58. 
1010 Meritt 1936, 382; Westlake 1977a, 323. 
1011 Westlake 1977a, 323; Kagan 1987, 30. 
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Phrygia.1012 Since the play was produced in the City Dionysia in early 414 BC, some 
commentators have argued that Athens’ dealing with a satrap who remained loyal to the 
King indicates that the relations between Athens and Persia at this point were still amicable 
and that the Athenians had yet to enter an alliance with Amorges.1013 Others, however, have 
offered a different interpretation, namely that the Athenians were trying to persuade 
Pharnaces to join the rebellion.1014 As it stands, we cannot conclude with certainty when 
the Athenians began collaborating with Amorges.  
 Despite the chronological ambiguity, one wonders what drove the Athenians to 
provoke Darius by joining forces with Amorges. Andocides blames the Athenians for 
making the disastrous decision to side with Amorges but he does not clarify why such a 
decision was made.1015 Several scholars have hypothesized that Athens’ ill-fated decision 
was driven by anti-Persian sentiment, a false belief that the Persian Empire was weak, as 
well as Athenian arrogance and recklessness.1016 Such explanations, however, strike me as 
unsatisfactory. Others have argued that Athens’ alliance with Amorges was a response to 
Persian aggression, manifested through the aforementioned proposition Tissaphernes made 
to the Spartans in the winter of 413/12. This interpretation is predicated on the assumption 
that Darius was emboldened after he learned about the Athenian disaster in Sicily and 
therefore instructed his satraps to recover the Greek cities of Asia Minor. Hence, once the 
Athenians learned about Tissaphernes’ proposition to the Spartans they had no choice but 
to ally themselves with Amorges.1017  
Such a reconstruction suffers from two critical flaws. First, since we have no 
concrete information about the exact date in which Athens concluded an alliance with 
Amorges, the suggestion that the Athenians began collaborating with Amorges as a 
response to Tissaphernes’ proposition remains purely hypothetical.1018 Second, the 
Athenians violated the truce well before the envoy of Tissaphernes arrived at Sparta. 
According to Thucydides, Darius sent a notice to Tissaphernes in order to remind him of 
the tribute he owed, probably the arrears accumulated either since his appointment as the 
satrap of Lydia,1019 or perhaps the tribute that had not been collected in the two or three 
years prior to the arrival of the satrapal delegations to Sparta.1020 Either way, it is clear that 
the Athenians were the first to breach the truce by preventing the Persians from collecting 
tribute from the Greek cities and that Athenian aggression began the chain of events which 
led to Tissaphernes’ attempt to effect an alliance with the Spartans.1021 
                                                 
1012 Aristoph. Birds 1028-30.  
1013 Westlake 1977a, 324–25; Sommerstein 1987, 268. 
1014 Meiggs 1972, 586; Lewis 1977, 85. 
1015 Andoc. 3.29. 
1016 Busolt 1893, 1417; Lewis 1977, 86; Andrewes 1992, 465; Cawkwell 2005, 142–44. 
1017 Woodhead 1970, 147; Westlake 1977a, 326–29; Kagan 1987, 29; Ruzicka 2012, 35–36. 
1018 Cf. Thonemann 2009, 187 n. 59. 
1019 Murray 1966, 148–49; Lewis 1977, 87; Kagan 1987, 29 n. 18; Hornblower 2008, 771. If we believe 
Herodotus (6.59), any arrears which may have been accumulated prior to the accession of Darius II were 
remitted following his coronation. 
1020 Cf. Wade-Gery 1958, 223; Andrewes 1961, 4. Gomme et al. (1981, 16–17) have placed an emphasis on 
the adverb νεωστὶ which suggests that something new had recently changed the situation. 
1021 Wade-Gery 1958, 223; Murray 1966, 148–49; Rhodes 2006, 143; Wiesehöfer 2006, 657. 
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But if the Persians were not the aggressors, why then did the Athenians decide to 
go back on their truce with Darius? As discussed in chapter 4, the conclusion of the truce 
in 449 BC must have entailed an agreement regarding the division of the revenue generated 
by the Greek city-states of Asia between Athens and Persia. Accordingly, the fact that the 
Athenians prevented Tissaphernes from exacting tribute from his Greek subjects suggests 
that they were presumably no longer satisfied with the previous arrangement and resolved 
to usurp the Persian share of the tribute as well.  
The Athenians were not driven by greed but by financial stringency. According to 
Thucydides, the first Athenian expeditionary force to Sicily, which was dispatched in the 
summer of 415 BC, consisted of 100 triremes, 4,000 hoplites, and 300 cavalry.1022 
Thucydides proclaims that a vast amount of resources was spent and that the Athenian 
armada which set sail to Sicily was the most splendid expedition that had ever been sent 
by a single city up to that time.1023 But while Thucydides does not provide concrete figures 
regarding the cost of equipping such a large armament, a fragmentary inscription suggests 
that the Athenians allocated no less than 3,000 talents in preparation for the Sicilian 
campaign.1024 But despite the massive financial investment, the Athenians soon learned 
that additional forces were needed in order to subjugate Sicily. In the winter of 415/14 BC, 
shortly after an indecisive battle against the Syracusians and a failed attempt to capture 
Messana, the Athenian generals sent to Athens for cavalry and money,1025 which arrived at 
the beginning of the summer of 414 BC.1026 Later in the same summer Nicias sent for 
additional reinforcements,1027 which were mustered during the winter of 414/13 BC and 
consisted of 75 ships, 1,200 hoplites, unspecified allied forces, and 120 silver talents.1028 
Notwithstanding the enormous investment of funds and manpower in the Sicilian front, the 
Athenians continued to carry out operations elsewhere.1029 It is evident, therefore, that 
already in the winter of 414/13 BC the Athenian financial reserves were critically low, that 
is well before the Spartans fortified Decelea (summer 413)1030 and the military disaster in 
Sicily (September of 413 BC).1031 In essence, severe shortage of money which jeopardized 
                                                 
1022 Thuc. 6.25. The Athenian contingents were reinforced with fifty Lesbians and Chian ships along with 
numerous unspecified allied contingents. 
1023 Thuc. 6.31.2-4. 
1024 IG I3 93, lines 47-49. Cf. Blamire 2001, 114. On the mechanism by which the Athenians financed their 
fleets, see: Gabrielsen 1994. 
1025 Thuc. 6.74, 93.4. 
1026 Thuc. 6.94.4: 250 equipped horsemen but without horses, 30 mounted archers, and 300 talents of silver. 
See also: IG I3 370, lines 73-74. 
1027 Thuc. 7.8.  
1028 Thuc. 7.16.2, 20.2; IG I3 371, lines 6-8. 
1029 In the summer of 414 BC Athenian forces were sent to raid Spartan territory (Thuc. 6.105), and an 
Athenian task force failed at retaking Amphipolis (Thuc. 7.9), which was an important source of ship-
building timber and revenue (Thuc. 4.108.1). For Athenian operations which took place in the summer of 
413 BC, see: Thuc. 7.17.2, 20.1, 31, 34.  
1030 Thuc. 7.19.1-2. For the financial implications of the Spartan presence at Decelea:  Thuc. 7.27.3-5, 28.1. 
Cf. Thorne 2001 (esp. 239-40); Moreno 2007, 77–143; Hornblower 2008, 591–92.  
1031 The financial difficulties created by the Sicilian expedition and the Spartan hold on Decelea probably 
caused the Athenians to change their system of taxation (Thuc. 7.28.4). Cf. Westlake 1977a, 323; Figueira 
2005; Hornblower 2008, 594–96. 
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the entire war effort probably drove the Athenians to violate the truce in order to procure 
additional funds which were crucial for Athens’ survival. 
 According to Andocides, it was Amorges who appealed to the Athenians.1032 Thus, 
we can assume that the Persian rebel had to entice the Athenians with a compelling offer 
in order to persuade them to provoke the Persian King. In the context of Athens’ financial 
difficulties, it seems reasonable that Amorges had offered the Athenians complete and 
undisputed control over the Greek cities of Asia Minor. In return, Amorges may have 
requested the Athenians to protect his position in Caria from hostile ships and the 
permission to use Athenian bases in Asia.1033 Such a reconstruction, if accepted, explains 
(1) the lack of evidence for direct military cooperation between Amorges and the 
Athenians, and (2) the fact that Athenian operations against Persia were limited to the 
collection of tribute from the Greek cities of Asia. On the one hand, that the Athenians 
deprived Tissaphernes of considerable sources of revenue meant that the satrap had fewer 
resources available which could be used to suppress Amorges’ rebellion. On the other hand, 
it is not out of the question that the Athenians thought that as long as the Persians were 
preoccupied with Amorges, the consequences of their limited encroachment would not be 
severe. One can hypothesize that the Athenians deemed their actions as parallel to those 
staged by Pissuthnes in the 420s BC, and may have thought that Darius would send an 
embassy to protest rather than initiate an alliance with Sparta.1034 The Athenians 
miscalculated and instead of a peaceful diplomatic resolution of a dispute over tribute, they 
watched as their old and new enemies joined forces.  
6.3 The Appeal to Sparta as a Satrapal Initiative 
Satrapal Competition at Sparta 
It is widely held that it was King Darius himself who instructed Tissaphernes and 
Pharnabazus to reassert Persian authority over the Greek cities of Asia Minor and to assist 
the Spartans in their war against Athens.1035 Presumably, in the wake of the Athenian 
disaster at Sicily the Great Persian King, driven by lust for vengeance due to Athens’ 
collaboration with Amorges, saw an opportunity to strike. The seemingly unanimous 
assumption that Darius was the driving force behind the alliance with Sparta is imprecise. 
The inception and execution of this initiative, I argue, was satrapal through and through. 
First, the alliance with the Spartans was clearly Tissaphernes’ brain child. Thucydides 
recounts two specific instructions Tissaphernes received from King Darius: (1) pay the 
                                                 
1032 Andoc. 3.29: Ἀμόργῃ πειθόμενοι. Cf. Westlake 1977a, 328 n. 30. 
1033 Keen 1993a, 156; Keen 1998b, 98–99 with n. 35. 
1034 A possible parallel is the aforementioned Persian embassy to Sparta in 425 BC which was intercepted by 
the Athenians (Thuc. 4.50). Artaxerxes I sent his representative to ask the Spartans to clarify what exactly 
they wanted from him. Since the Athenians responded by sending their own embassy to the Persian royal 
court, probably to protest the King’s negotiations with the Spartans, it is not out of the question that they 
expected to King to react in the same way when he heard about their effort to prevent the satraps from 
collecting the tribute from the Greek cities of Asia Minor. 
1035 Dundas 1934, 168; Olmstead 1948, 359; Brunt 1965, 263; Lewis 1977, 85, 87 with n. 25; Westlake 1977a, 
328; Burn 1985, 343; Holladay 1986, 506; Kagan 1987, 28–32; Cawkwell 1997b, 48; Keen 1998b, 99; Briant 
2002, 592; Rung 2008, 35; Ruzicka 2012, 35. Wiesehöfer (2006, 662), while maintaining that Darius ordered 
Tissaphernes to approach the Spartans, still concedes that “the satrap may well have had substantial leeway 
in carrying both of these orders out.” 
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arrears of tribute and (2) to apprehend Amorges. The intention to do damage to the 
Athenians by joining forces with the Spartans is presented by Thucydides not as a direct 
royal directive but as a consequence of it.1036 In other words, there was no change in royal 
policy. The satrap received notice that he was failing at fulfilling his satrapal duties, and 
that he was expected to renew the flow of tribute and to pacify his satrapy. As we have 
seen, collecting the tribute and maintaining the peace were the first and foremost duties of 
any given satrap. But the notification regarding the necessity to capture Amorges should 
be viewed as an applied royal directive, which is defined by Waters as an order issued by 
the King which allowed the satrap to figure out how to accomplish it within the means at 
his disposal.1037 Accordingly, while Darius knew that Amorges was still causing trouble 
and may have been informed that the Athenians were the cause for the disruption in the 
flow of tribute, he was content with sending a notice rather than replacing Tissaphernes or 
supplying him with funds or soldiers. Therefore, it is clear that Darius was confident that 
Tissaphernes, who had already proven his capabilities by successfully suppressing 
Pissuthnes’ revolt, was up to the task, and that the manner in which these issues were to be 
resolved remained at the satrap’s discretion. The appeal to Sparta, then, was Tissaphernes’ 
own solution to the troubles in his satrapy. 
Second, the Persian envoys who came to Sparta represented particular regional 
interests rather than proper royal ones.1038 When Artaxerxes I wished to induce a war 
between Sparta and Athens in the early 450s BC, he dispatched an embassy to Sparta with 
an offer to finance a Spartan invasion to Attica. This was clearly not the case in the winter 
of 413/12 BC. Not one but two delegations arrived at Sparta. The satrap of Lydia was 
represented by an anonymous ambassador who accompanied Chian and Erythrian 
delegations,1039 while the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia was represented by two Greek 
exiles, a Megarian named Calligeitus son of Laophon and Timagoras son of Athenagoras 
from Cyzicus. Both satraps invited the Peloponnesians to send their fleet to their respective 
satrapies with an offer to pay the wages of the sailors. Moreover, Thucydides states that 
Pharnabazus “was eager to achieve, if it was in his power, the very same objectives as 
Tissaphernes”,1040 an articulation which suggests that Pharnabazus approached the 
Spartans only after learning about Tissaphernes’ initiative and that he hoped to receive 
credit for affecting an alliance with the Spartans at the expense of his Sardian colleague. 
With the two offers set before them, the Spartans negotiated separately (χωρίς) with each 
satrapal delegation and a keen contest (ἅμιλλα) ensued. Eventually, the Spartans accepted 
the proposition of Tissaphernes.1041 If Darius himself desired to use the Spartans against 
the Athenians, we would have expected the arrival of a single royal embassy headed by a 
Persian dignitary who would have carried with him a letter bearing the King’s seal and 
which contained the King’s proposition. Instead, we hear of two separate embassies which 
hailed from Sardis and Dascylium and that at least one of them was headed by Greek 
                                                 
1036 Lewis 1977, 87, 89; Cartledge 1987, 187; Hyland 2004, 75. 
1037 Waters 2010. 
1038 Rung (2008, 36) maintains that “the two Persian satraps pursued rival policies.” But it seems to me that 
the term ‘particular’ would be more suitable. 
1039 Thuc. 8.5.4. 
1040 Thuc. 8.6.1: αὐτός, εἰ δύναιτο, ἅπερ ὁ Τισσαφέρνης προυθυμεῖτο… ποιήσειεν. 
1041 Thuc. 8.6.3-5. 
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envoys.1042 Furthermore, the competition between the satrapal representatives serves as a 
clear indication that the satraps were not following a uniform policy dictated by the Persian 
King but were acting independently within the boundaries of their office.1043  
Lastly, Thucydides reports that the anonymous representative of Tissaphernes came 
to Sparta and the same time when envoys from Chios and Erythrae informed the Spartans 
that the Chians and Erythrians were prepared to revolt against Athenian rule. It should be 
emphasized that the decisive factor which led to the Spartan decision to choose the Ionian 
option was not the promise of Persian gold but the possibility of procuring the powerful 
fleets of Chios and Erythrae.1044 Tissaphernes knew that the war between Athens and 
Sparta had been renewed and was aware of the growing unpopularity of Athens in Ionia. 
Accordingly, the satrap probably concluded that under such circumstances the best course 
of action would be to procure the assistance of the Peloponnesian fleet and assumed that 
the Spartans would not refuse a promise of financial aid coupled with the prospect of 
considerable local support. In short, Tissaphernes’ appeal to Sparta was opportunistic in 
nature. 
All of the above considerations indicate that the appeal to Sparta was a satrapal 
initiative. The Great Persian King expected his satraps to fulfill their responsibilities and 
gave them considerable leeway to devise a plan by which they were to live up to the King’s 
expectations. As we shall see, Tissaphernes had the ultimate authority to determine, 
execute, and reconsider Persian policies regarding the war against Athens while the Persian 
King continued to play a secondary role. 
6.4 Tissaphernes and the Peloponnesians 
The First Treaty 
The alliance between Tissaphernes and the Peloponnesians became official in the summer 
of 412 BC when the first of a series of three treaties had been concluded.1045 The first treaty, 
which is defined by Thucydides as an alliance (συμμαχία) between the Great King and the 
Spartans, was concluded by Tissaphernes and the Spartan nauarch Chalcideus. The terms 
of the agreement stipulated that both parties were (1) to join forces in the war against 
Athens, (2) to brand those who might revolt from the King or from the Peloponnesian 
League as enemies, and (3) to hinder the Athenians from exacting funds or anything else 
from the territories and cities which belonged to the King.1046 While it seems highly 
unlikely that anyone expected Persian forces to be deployed against a rogue member of the 
                                                 
1042 Since later on Tissaphernes used a bilingual Carian to interact with the Peloponnesians (Thuc. 8.85.2), it 
is difficult to determine if his representative was Greek or not. Cf. Cawkwell 2005, 157; Hornblower 2008, 
773. 
1043 It is more than plausible that Pharnabazus received a similar royal notice regarding the tribute he owed, 
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1044 Thuc. 8.6.3-5. 
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1046 Thuc. 8.18.1: καὶ ἐκ τούτων τῶν πόλεων ὁπόσα Ἀθηναίοις ἐφοίτα χρήματα ἢ ἄλλο τι, κωλυόντων κοινῇ 
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Peloponnesian League, there is little doubt that the clause regarding insubordinate allies 
refers to Amorges.1047 Moreover, there is no mention of Persian financial aid, but the efforts 
to hinder the Athenians from extracting resources from Asia Minor were a necessary 
preliminary step aimed at enabling Tissaphernes to reassert his authority over the Greek 
cities of Asia.1048 Thus, the terms of the first treaty correspond closely with the objectives 
of Tissaphernes. 
Soon after the conclusion of the first treaty, Tissaphernes deployed his own cavalry 
and mercenary contingents and fought alongside the Peloponnesians against the Athenians 
near Miletus.1049 Though the Athenians emerged victorious, the satrap demonstrated his 
commitment to his Peloponnesian allies. Not long after, the Peloponnesians demonstrated 
their gratitude when, at the request of the satrap, they attacked Iasus and captured Amorges 
and handed him over to Tissaphernes.1050 We do not hear of Amorges again though it is 
certain that Tissaphernes informed Darius about his recent success. 
The First Reduction of the Wages 
Early in the winter of 412/11 BC Tissaphernes fulfilled his promise by paying the wages 
of the Peloponnesian sailors at a rate of one drachma a day per sailor. The satrap, however, 
informed the Peloponnesians that future payments would be made at a rate of three obols, 
i.e. half of the previous rate,1051 and explained that giving a full drachma was pending on 
royal approval.1052 It has been argued that Tissaphernes was actually bluffing due to his 
reluctance to spend his own money,1053 and that he was in a position to renegotiate the 
terms of the treaty because Amorges had already been captured.1054 While these 
observations might be true, Tissaphernes was in need financial relief. We should not forget 
that Tissaphernes was already in arrears before he approached the Spartans. The 
commencement of the Ionian campaign meant that Tissaphernes was required to pay the 
wages of his own soldiers, including mercenaries, and provisioning the Peloponnesian 
fleet, which must have accumulated into a considerable financial expenditure.1055 
Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that when Tissaphernes approached the Spartans in 
the winter of 413/12 BC he was of the opinion, which was prevalent throughout the Greek 
world, that the Athenians were at the brink of defeat due to the catastrophe in Sicily and 
that they would capitulate in the following summer.1056 But the determination of the 
resilient Athenians prolonged the war. Therefore, since the end of the war was not in sight 
and the Peloponnesian fleet kept growing in numbers, Tissaphernes was faced with 
unexpected expenses, which must have put a strain on his dwindling financial resources.1057 
                                                 
1047 Lewis 1977, 91; Kallet 2002, 251 with n. 76; Wiesehöfer 2006, 662. 
1048 Lewis 1977, 91. 
1049 Thuc. 8.25.  
1050 Thuc. 8.28. 
1051 30 talents = 1,080,000 obols. A month pay for sixty ships (200 men per ship) at a three obol rate: 3 [obols] 
X 60 [ships] X 200 [men per ship] X 30 [days] = 1,080,000 obols. 
1052 Thuc. 8.29.1. 
1053 Lewis 1977, 92.  
1054 Rood 1998, 265. 
1055 Hyland 2004, 91. 
1056 Thuc. 8.2.2, 24.4-5; Plut. Lys. 3.1. 
1057 Kagan 1987, 73–74; Hyland 2004, 92. 
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Realizing that his financial reserves were not sufficient to maintain the Peloponnesian fleet 
for long at a rate of one drachma, Tissaphernes decided that the wages had to be reduced 
until he received a reply to his request for financial aid. 
More importantly, Tissaphernes’ reply sheds light of the King-satrap relations in 
regard to policy-making in the west. The satrap clearly reported to the King about his 
agreement with the Spartans and requested for financial assistance. Thus, Tissaphernes’ 
reply indicates that the satrap had little to no doubt that the King would sanction his 
agreement with the Spartans, but that the prospect of receiving financial relief was not 
certain. In other words, the Lydian satrap seems to have had the authority to forge an 
alliance with the Spartans, or any other foreign entity on that matter, in order to protect 
Persian interests.  
In any case, the Peloponnesians were not pleased to hear about the reduction of 
their wages, and after a push back a compromise was made. Tissaphernes agreed to pay 
thirty talents for fifty five ships, which equals to a rate of a little over three obols a day per 
sailor.1058 The fact that a compromise was reached suggests, on the one hand, that the 
Peloponnesians believed Tissaphernes and that the new rate was sufficient, while on the 
other, that Tissaphernes was willing to show flexibility in order to see that the collaboration 
with the Peloponnesians continues. 
The Second Treaty 
After Tissaphernes and the Peloponnesians agreed upon a reduced rate operations resumed. 
The satrap of Sardis sent Tamos, the hyparch of Ionia, to assist Astyochus, the new Spartan 
nauarch, in a Peloponnesian attack on Clazomenae.1059 Soon after Tissaphernes himself 
went to Cnidus and instigated a revolt against Athens.1060 Thucydides then reports that 
although the Peloponnesian fleet was sufficiently provisioned,1061 the Peloponnesians 
thought that the agreement Chalcideus made with Tissaphernes was defective (ἐνδεής) and 
asked Tissaphernes to renegotiate the terms of the alliance.1062 The second treaty, 
concluded by Tissaphernes and Therimenes, included several alterations: (1) the Great 
King and his sons were mentioned as participants in the treaty, (2) the Spartans were 
explicitly forbidden from exacting tribute from the territories and cities which belonged to 
the King, and (3) Darius’ responsibility to pay the wages of the troops who were operating 
in Persian domain had been stipulated.1063 But in spite of the fact that the King’s financial 
liability became formal, no hard figures are provided.1064 Thus, it seems reasonable to 
assume that Tissaphernes, although authorized to negotiated the clauses of the treaty, had 
yet to receive news from Susa about Darius’ willingness to furnish the funds needed for 
provisioning the Peloponnesian fleet, and therefore it was preferable to refrain from 
including fixed rates until the satrap received further instructions. 
                                                 
1058 Thuc. 8.29.2. Such a rate meant that each sailor received a little over three obols per month. Cf. Thompson 
1965; Pearson 1985; Hornblower 2008, 836–38. 
1059 Thuc. 8.31. Tamos was an Egyptian, a native of Memphis, in Persian service. See: Thuc. 8.87.1, 3; Diod. 
14.19.5-6, 35.3-5; Xen. An. 1.2.21, 4.2. Cf. Lewis 1977, 92–93 with n. 48; Ruzicka 1999, 23–24. 
1060 Thuc. 8.35.1. 
1061 Thuc. 8.36.1. 
1062 Thuc. 8.36.2. 
1063 Thuc. 8.37.2-4. 
1064 Lewis 1977, 94. 
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The Alliance under Crisis 
The harmony, however, was soon disrupted. A delegation of eleven Spartan commissioners 
arrived at Cnidus and notified Tissaphernes that they demand to renegotiate the treaty he 
concluded with Therimenes.1065 Tissaphernes was infuriated by the Spartan protest and 
departed without settling anything.1066 As noted above, Tissaphernes reported to the King 
about his dealings with the Spartans, which was presumably framed as a means to resolve 
the problem with the flow of tribute and Amorges’ rebellion. Therefore, Tissaphernes’ 
reaction shows that he was fed up with Spartan indecisiveness,1067 which compelled the 
satrap, who probably had sent the first and second treaties to be ratified by the King, to 
explain why the deal with the Spartans kept getting worse.1068  
 After the breakdown of the negotiations at Cnidus, both parties seem to have 
thought that the alliance was over. The Peloponnesians sailed to Rhodes with the intention 
of instigating a Rhodian revolt and procuring provisions from the Rhodians, thus ending 
their dependency on Persian money.1069 Tissaphernes, presumably at the instigation of 
Alcibiades,1070 began negotiating an alliance with the Athenians, who wanted to secure the 
satrap’s financial aid for their own purposes.1071 An Athenian delegation travelled to 
Cnidus to negotiate with the satrap, but despite the fact that the Athenians were willing to 
make considerable concessions, inter alia acknowledging the Great King’s claim over the 
whole of Ionia,1072 the talks never came to fruition. Thucydides recounts a tradition 
according to which Alcibiades sabotaged the talks by making unacceptable demands in the 
name of Tissaphernes.1073 Alcibiades allegedly suspected that the satrap had no intention 
of concluding an alliance with the Athenians due to his fear of a Peloponnesian 
retaliation.1074 Yet, since Thucydides himself states that at this point the Athenian fleet was 
still superior in comparison to his Peloponnesian counterpart,1075 Thucydides’ claim 
appears less than persuasive. 
                                                 
1065 The main point of contention was the clause which stipulated that Darius had claim over all the territories 
that belonged to his ancestors (Cf. Thuc. 8.18.1, 37.2). Lichas, the only Spartan commissioner who is 
mentioned by name, pointed out that such a clause meant that the Peloponnesians and their allies recognized 
Persian suzerainty over the island of the Aegean, Thessaly, Locris, and Boeotia, which were briefly occupied 
by Xerxes during his Greek campaign. 
1066 Thuc. 8.43.2-4.  
1067 Cawkwell 2005, 151. 
1068 Nỳvlt 2014, 42. Aidonis (1996, 100) suggests that Tissaphernes grew tired of being treated as a mere 
treasurer and wanted to remind the Spartans that his financial support should not be taken for granted. 
1069 Thuc. 8.44. 
1070 Thuc. 8.46.1-3. 
1071 For the negotiations between Tissaphernes and the Athenians, see: Thuc. 8.47-54, 56. 
1072 Thuc. 8.56.4. 
1073 While the Athenians were willing to accept most the demands presented before them, they refused to 
allow the King’s fleet to sail along the coast of western Anatolia with no restrictions whatsoever. 
1074 Thuc. 8.56.2-4. See also: Thuc. 8.48.4, 52, 56.2-3. Tissaphernes’ fear of a Peloponnesian backlash due 
to shortage of resources came true shortly before the Peloponnesian fleet sailed to the Hellespont (Thuc. 
108.4-109). 
1075 When Thucydides (8.57.1) attempts to explain why Tissaphernes sought to repair his relations with the 
Peloponnesians after the negotiations with Athens miscarried, the Athenian historian notes that the satrap 
feared a scenario in which the Peloponnesians, due to lack of provisions, would decide to engage the 
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An alternative explanation has been offered by Lewis, who postulates that 
Tissaphernes may have been reluctant to conclude an alliance with the Athenians because 
he was unenthusiastic to explain to Darius such a dramatic change in policy.1076 Although 
such an argument seems compelling, it fails to consider the advantages of such a policy. 
Yes, the King would not have been pleased to hear about the rift between Tissaphernes and 
the Peloponnesians. Nevertheless, the King’s anger would have been mitigated when 
hearing that Tissaphernes made an agreement with the Athenians according to which they 
acknowledge Persian claim to the Greek cities of Asia Minor. We should not forget that 
the Athenians maintained diplomatic relations with Darius and his predecessor Artaxerxes 
I, and that Darius himself may have agreed to ratify the truce with the Athenians early in 
his reign. Moreover, the satrap must have been aware of the Spartan liberation 
propaganda1077 and may have thought that an alliance with the Peloponnesians would 
become a liability in the long run.1078  
In short, Thucydides’ assertion that Tissaphernes never meant to switch sides is 
nothing more than guesswork. Hence, as noted by several scholars, we cannot exclude the 
possibility that the satrap was genuinely thinking about concluding an alliance with the 
Athenians.1079 Consequently, the notion that Tissaphernes could apply a shift in policy 
serves as another indication that the satrap had the liberty to decide which course of action 
would be most beneficial to Persian interests in the west. 
The Third Treaty: Enter Darius  
Immediately after the talks with the Athenians came to a dead-end, Tissaphernes sought to 
improve his relations with the Peloponnesians. The satrap travelled to Caunus and supplied 
the Peloponnesians with their wages. Consequently, a third and final treaty was concluded 
between Tissaphernes and the Peloponnesians.1080 In this instance the involvement of the 
Persian central authorities is evident. In contrast to the previous treaties, the terms of the 
agreement are preceded by a prescript which states the date in which the treaty was 
concluded, namely in the thirteenth regnal year of Darius II, when Alexipippidas was ephor 
in Sparta. Moreover, the list of Persian participants includes not only Darius and 
Tissaphernes but also Hieramenes, Darius son-in-law,1081 and the sons of Pharnaces, a 
phrase which almost definitely refers to the aforementioned Pharnabazus.1082 That 
Pharnabazus, the governor of the satrapy of Hellespontine Phrygia, and Hieramenes, a 
                                                 
Athenians and as a result would suffer a decisive defeat. It seems, therefore, that at this point the Athenians 
still posed a greater threat to Persian domain. 
1076 Lewis 1977, 98, 101. 
1077 Thucydides (8.46.3) credits Alcibiades with informing Tissaphernes about the Spartan slogan of freedom 
to all Greeks. On the Spartan liberation program, see p. 138 above. 
1078 Wiesehöfer 2006, 663. 
1079 E.g. Hatzfeld 1951, 239; Lewis 1977, 102; Wiesehöfer 2006, 664. 
1080 Thuc. 8.57-58. 
1081 Xen. Hell. 2.1.9. 
1082 Lewis 1977, 104; Erbse 1988, 60. The decision to mention the sons of Pharnaces instead of Pharnabazus 
suggests that his brother Bagaius may have been present as well, perhaps, as postulated by Krumbholtz (1883, 
39 n. 3), as a witness. For Bagaius, see: Xen. Hell. 3.4.13; Plut. Alc. 39.1-2 (where he is called Μαγαίος); 
Nepos, Alc. 10.3. We cannot exclude the possibility, as pointed out by Gomme at al. (1981, 139), that 
Pharnaces had more than two sons.  
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member of the Achaemenid household and possibly the Great King’s representative,1083 
were involved in the conclusion of the treaty indicates that Darius had finally gave his 
approval to the alliance with the Spartans. In addition, while Caunus seems to be the 
location in which Tissaphernes met the Peloponnesian representatives,1084 the treaty was 
actually concluded in the plain of the Meander.1085 Accordingly, it has been argued that 
while negotiations took place in Caunus, the official conclusion of the treaty occurred in 
the plain of the Meander after the terms of the treaty had been ratified by Darius and the 
Spartan authorities.1086 Lastly, the clearest indication that the King was involved in the 
conclusion of the third treaty is the clause which stipulates that Tissaphernes was obligated 
to provision the Peloponnesian ships which were presently in Ionia until the arrival of the 
King’s fleet. Once the Persian armada had arrived at the scene, the Peloponnesians were 
expected to use their own resources to maintain their fleet or, if they wished, to receive 
funds from Tissaphernes which would be considered as a loan to be paid back at the end 
of the war. There is no doubt that Tissaphernes had to obtain royal approval before 
committing the King’s fleet to the war against the Athenians.1087  
All in all, I am inclined to accept the widely held conclusion that the first two 
treaties were in fact drafts, which constituted “a preliminary working arrangement between 
the forces on the spot,”1088 and that only the third treaty was properly sanctioned by Darius 
and the Spartan authorities.1089 But in spite of clear royal involvement in the conclusion of 
the third treaty, the last clause states that Tissaphernes, together with the Spartans and their 
allies, shall carry on the war against Athens jointly and in the manner which they deemed 
best. The satrap was even given permission, pending on Spartan consent, to make peace 
with Athenians.1090 In other words, Tissaphernes received full and complete mandate to 
carry out the war against the Athenians as he saw fit. 
The Alliance in Crisis 
Thucydides states that following the conclusion of the third Treaty the Peloponnesians 
were confident that Tissaphernes would bring up the Phoenician fleet and fulfill his other 
promises, presumably the payment of the wages.1091 But the satrap proved to be a bad 
paymaster by providing insufficient funds irregularly. The satrap also hindered the 
                                                 
1083 Lewis 1977, 104. In contrast, Badian (1993, 44, 97 n. 68) posits that Hieramenes held a permanent 
position in Asia Minor. It should also be noted that Hieramenes is mentioned in the Xanthus Pillar (TAM I 
44c, line 12; cf. Thompson 1967, 105–6). 
1084 Thuc. 8.57.1. 
1085 Thuc. 8.58.1. 
1086 Brunt 1952, 72 n. 2; Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover 1981, 138–39; Strassler 1996, 514 n. 8.57.2a; 
Cawkwell 2005, 148. Conversely, Wilamowitz (1908, 597–98) suggests that the discrepancy in the locale 
was the outcome of Thucydides obtaining access to the text of the treaty only after he wrote chapter 57. But 
see Erbse 1988 for the shortcomings of Wilamowitz’ hypothesis. 
1087 Lewis 1977, 58, 104; Petit 1990, 140 with n. 138.  
1088 Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover 1981, 40. See also: Lévy 1983, 227; Cartledge 1987, 188; Keen 1998b, 
99; Nỳvlt 2014, 41–42 with notes 14 and 15. Contra: Debord 1999, 210 n. 58. 
1089 Lateiner 1976, 274 n. 17; Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover 1981, 143; Lévy 1983, 222 with n. 13, 227; 
Cartledge 1987, 188; Erbse 1989, 96; Cawkwell 1997b, 135 n. 15; Keen 1998b, 99; Debord 1999, 205, 210, 
213; Cawkwell 2005, 149; E. Heitsch 2006, 34–35; Ernst Heitsch 2007, 57 n. 54; Hornblower 2008, 801–54. 
1090 Thuc. 8.58.7. 
1091 Thuc. 8.59.1. 
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Peloponnesian fleet, which was mooring at Miletus, from engaging the Athenians by 
claiming that they should wait for the arrival of the Phoenician fleet. Short of provisions 
and forced to remain inactive, the disgruntled Peloponnesians sailors began accusing the 
Spartan nauarch Astyochus of conspiring with Tissaphernes to ruin the fleet and demanded 
to engage the Athenians. Astyochus finally caved under pressure and ordered the fleet to 
sail to Samos with the purpose of coercing the Athenians to fight. But after learning that 
Athenian reinforcements had arrived from the Hellespont, the Peloponnesian fleet returned 
to Miletus.1092 
The satrap’s alleged misconduct, however, was not without consequences. In light 
of Tissaphernes’ failure to fulfill his obligations, the Peloponnesians decided to send forty 
ships to the Hellespont to assist Pharnabazus.1093 This decision was not surprising since the 
Hellespontine option had never been taken off the table. According to Thucydides, after 
the Spartans accepted Tissaphernes’ proposition, the representatives of Pharnabazus, the 
above mentioned Calligeitus and Timagoras, remained in Sparta in hopes of convincing 
the Spartans to send another expedition to the Hellespont.  Accordingly, the Spartans 
resolved to send a fleet first to Chios, then to Lesbos, and lastly to the Hellespont.1094 Then, 
in the winter of 412/11 BC, twenty seven Peloponnesians ships sailed to Ionia with the 
aforementioned commissioners, who were authorized to direct as many ships as they 
thought necessary to the Hellespont.1095 Yet, Tissaphernes’ efforts to repair his relations 
with the Spartans seem to have led the commissioners to order the fleet to remain in Ionia. 
Nevertheless, in the summer of 411 BC Dercylidas, a Spartiate, marched by land with a 
small force and instigated revolts in Abydos and Lampascus.1096 Eventually, the Spartan 
commissioners decided that it was time to send a portion of the fleet to the Hellespont.1097 
This decision was made not only because Tissaphernes proved to be unreliable but also 
because Pharnabazus’ offer to provision the fleet was still open and because the Byzantines 
informed the Spartans that they were eager to rebel against Athens.  
Things got worse for Tissaphernes once the Peloponnesians who remained in 
Miletus learned about Alcibiades’ recall. They believed that the satrap was conspiring with 
the rogue Athenian general in order to undermine the Peloponnesian war effort.1098 The 
crews of the ships threatened to desert, unless they received their pay, and rumors that 
Tissaphernes had bribed Astyochus began to circulate to the point that the Spartan nauarch 
was almost lynched by his own men.1099 Matters escalated even further when the Milesians 
captured a fort which was built by Tissaphernes in Miletus and expelled its garrison.1100 At 
this point, when the Peloponnesians camp was in a state of disorder, Astyochus was 
succeeded by Mindarus as the new nauarch. Soon thereafter, Tissaphernes informed the 
Peloponnesians that he was about to go to Aspendus to bring up the Phoenician fleet. But 
                                                 
1092 Thuc, 8.78-79, 80.1 
1093 Thuc. 8.80.1-2.  
1094 Thuc. 8.8.1-2.  
1095 Thuc. 8.38.1-2. 
1096 Thuc 8.61.1, 62. 
1097 Thuc. 8.80.1-3. 
1098 Thuc. 8.83.1, 85.2. 
1099 Thuc. 8.83-.3-84.1-3. 
1100 Thuc. 8.84.4. Later on Thucydides (8.109) reports that a Persian garrison was expelled from Cnidus. 
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while the Peloponnesians were waiting for Tissaphernes provisions were not supplied by 
those Tissaphernes left in charge. Finally, after receiving another invitation from 
Pharnabazus and a report that the Phoenician fleet was still mooring in Aspendus, Mindarus 
decided to sail with the rest of the fleet to the Hellespont.1101 
It seems that the last straw was Tissaphernes’ failure to bring up the Phoenician 
fleet. The Peloponnesian disappointment was probably predicated on the belief that 
together with the Phoenician vessels they would be able to defeat the Athenians and win 
the war.1102 As noted above, although the Peloponnesians amassed a sizable fleet in Ionia, 
they still refused to engage the Athenian fleet after it received reinforcements,1103 and they 
must have been even more reluctant to face the Athenians in battle after forty 
Peloponnesians ships were redirected to the Hellespont. Therefore, it was clear to all that 
without the Phoenician fleet there could be no Peloponnesian victory, and the seemingly 
empty promises made by Tissaphernes earned him nothing but the hatred and suspicion of 
the Spartans and their allies. 
6.5 Tissaphernes and the Phoenician Fleet 
In contrast to the phantom Phoenician fleet which caused Pericles to sail with sixty ships 
to Caria during the Samian revolt, there is little doubt that a sizable Phoenician fleet was 
present as Aspendus in the summer of 411 BC. Thucydides claims with full confidence 
that 147 Phoenician vessels sailed as far as Aspendus.1104 But we need not rely solely on 
the authority of Thucydides. Before Tissaphernes departed to Aspendus he invited Lichas 
to accompany him so that the Spartan could personally witness the preparations of the 
fleet.1105 In light of Tissaphernes’ growing unpopularity among the Peloponnesian sailors 
such an invitation should be viewed as the satrap’s attempt to demonstrate to the Spartan 
high command that he was doing his very best to hasten the arrival of the Phoenician 
armada. In response to the satrap’s invitation a Spartiate named Philip was dispatched with 
two triremes to Aspendus.1106 While confirming that the Phoenician fleet was in fact in 
Aspendus, Philip reported that the ships, presumably at the instigation of Tissaphernes, 
remained inactive.1107  
The Explanations of Thucydides 
The fact that the Phoenician fleet was never deployed is puzzling. Even Thucydides was 
unsure why Tissaphernes had not returned with the fleet from Aspendus. The Athenian 
historian recounts, in a Herodotean fashion, four explanations that he was aware of for 
Tissaphernes’ motives on this matter.1108 Thucydides begins by stating that some think that 
Tissaphernes was merely pretending to be earnest about deploying the Phoenician fleet and 
                                                 
1101 Thuc. 8.99; Diod. 13.38.4-6. For Mindarus’ journey to the Hellespont, see: Thuc. 8.99, 101; Diod. 
13.38.7-39.1. 
1102 Thuc. 8.46.5.  
1103 Thuc. 8.79, 80.1. 
1104 Thuc. 8.87.3. Plutarch (Alc. 25.3, 26.7) reports that the Persians mobilized 150 ships, Diodorus (13.36.5, 
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1105 Thuc. 8.87.1. Cf. Plut. Alc. 26.7, Diod. 13.36.5.  
1106 Thuc. 8.87.6. 
1107 Thuc. 8.99. 
1108 Thuc. 8.87.3-4.  
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that he actually wanted to force the Peloponnesians to exhaust their own resources. That 
this was the intention of the satrap, Thucydides continues, is verified by the fact that Tamos, 
Tissaphernes’ viceroy who was in charge of paying the Peloponnesians while the satrap 
went to Aspendus, proved to be an even worse paymaster than the Sardian satrap.1109 
The second explanation also casts Tissaphernes as a liar who never intended to 
deploy the fleet, but the impetus was economic rather than strategic. Thucydides notes that 
there are those who assert that Tissaphernes’ ultimate goal in bringing the Phoenician fleet 
to Aspendus was to extort money from the sailors in exchange for their discharge. Such a 
hypothesis, however, is highly problematic. Although Tissaphernes must have looked for 
additional sources of revenue due to his financial stringency, it is hard to believe that that 
satrap asked the King to mobilize a fleet, a costly enterprise, just to make a profit.1110 Such 
a course of action is based on the assumption that Tissaphernes had decided to disregard 
completely the King’s Interest,1111 which would have certainly angered Darius and may 
have been followed by royal sanctions.  
According to the third hypothesis, it was the Spartan hostility toward Tissaphernes 
which motivated the satrap to demonstrate to his allies that he was living up to his promises. 
But while it explains why Tissaphernes wanted to bring the fleet, it fails to explain why he 
was unable to do so.  
The fourth and final explanation, which is considered to be true by Thucydides, 
rejects any explanation which assumes that Tissaphernes was sincere in his intention to 
fulfill the Persian promise to deploy the Phoenician fleet. The Athenian historian asserts 
that Tissaphernes never intended to bring the fleet because he was determined to weaken 
both Athenians and Peloponnesian by protracting the war. The promise to bring up the 
Phoenician fleet and the journey to Aspendus were all a ploy meant to deceive the 
Peloponnesians and to force them to waste away their resources. 
Keeping Both Sides Equal? 
Thucydides’ explanation for the Phoenician fleet conundrum, which is accepted by several 
modern commentators,1112 fits well with his overarching assumption that Tissaphernes, 
allegedly through the influence of Alcibiades, decided to do whatever it takes to prolong 
the war in order to allow the Athenians and Spartans to exhaust each other. The first 
appearance of this hypothesis occurs in chapter 46 when Thucydides breaks the diachronic 
sequence of events with a flashback to an earlier point in the narrative. According to 
Thucydides, sometime after the battle of Miletus Alcibiades, having been condemned to 
death by the Spartans, fled to the court of Tissaphernes and became the satrap’s trusted 
advisor. The rogue Athenian general, Thucydides claims, persuaded Tissaphernes that his 
best course of action was to force Athens and Sparta to exhaust each other through 
continuous fighting. Accordingly, in order to keep both sides equal and prevent a 
Peloponnesian victory, Alcibiades told Tissaphernes to reduce the wages of the 
Peloponnesians sailors, to pay irregularly, to evade contributing to the defense of Ionian 
                                                 
1109 See also Thuc. 8.89. 
1110 Grote 1850, 136; Lewis 1989, 231. 
1111 Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover 1981, 291; Cawkwell 2005, 154. 
1112 E.g. Bloedow 1973, 36; Lateiner 1976, 189–90; Kagan 1987, 82; Davies 1993, 139; Aidonis 1996, 101–
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cities which revolted from Athens, and to refrain from deploying the Phoenician fleet, 
which was still being equipped at this point in the narrative.1113 
On the basis of this hypothesis, Thucydides asserts that (1) Tissaphernes never 
intended to conclude an alliance with the Athenians,1114 that (2) he concluded the third 
treaty with the Spartans in order to hinder a rash Peloponnesian assault which could have 
ended with an Athenian victory,1115  and (3) that the satrap never intended to deploy the 
Phoenician fleet.1116 But what is the evidence Thucydides employs in order to substantiate 
his theory? It has been argued that one of Thucydides’ main sources for book 8 was 
Alcibiades himself1117 or members of his entourage.1118 Therefore, it is possible that 
Alcibiades or one of his confidants informed Thucydides that this was Tissaphernes’ 
intention and that the originator of such a policy was Alcibiades. Conversely, it has been 
argued that the entire conversation between Alcibiades and Tissaphernes constitutes a 
hypothetical reconstruction of Thucydides,1119 which was, as the Athenian historian 
himself admits, predicated solely on the subsequent actions of Tissaphernes.1120 In any 
case, while Thucydides expresses his critique about the motives of Alcibiades for urging 
the satrap to adopt such a policy,1121 he still believed that he had sufficient evidence, i.e. 
the actions of Tissaphernes, to conclude that Tissaphernes had in fact adopted Alcibiades’ 
advice. In addition, Thucydides rejects the excuse Tissaphernes used to justify the 
inactivity of the Phoenician fleet, namely that the number of ships that had been fitted was 
less than Darius had ordered, and asserts that Tissaphernes would have enhanced his 
reputation in the eyes of Darius by accomplishing his objectives with a smaller fleet, since 
it would have reduced the King’s expenses.1122 
On the whole, Thucydides’ entire theory about the satrap’s design to wear out both 
sides is ultimately predicated on Alcibiades’ word and the acts of Tissaphernes. But while 
the reliability of Alcibiades is questionable, the actions of Tissaphernes can be used to 
substantiate an alternative interpretation, one which takes into consideration the satrap’s 
immediate objectives as well has his financial constraints.  
Thucydides’ determination to impose his preexisting theory on the matter of the 
Phoenician fleet exposes several critical flaws. First, it has been pointed out that 
Tissaphernes could not have expected to maintain the equilibrium between Athens and 
Sparta by making the Peloponnesians completely hostile to him.1123 By the time 
                                                 
1113 Thuc. 8.45-46.4. Xenophon (Hell. 1.5.9) seems to accept Thucydides’ theory wholeheartedly. See also: 
Isoc. 16.20; Diod. 13.37.4, 41.4, 42.4; Plut. Alc. 23.3-25.2, 25.7; Plut. Lys. 4.1; Nepos, Alc. 5.2. 
1114 Thuc. 8.56.2. 
1115 Thuc. 8.57. 
1116 Thuc. 8.87.4. 
1117 Brunt 1952; Delebecque 1965, 144–53, 226–27; Bloedow 1973, 80–81 with n. 479; Kagan 1981, 256–
57; Brunt 1993, 22–34; Cawkwell 1997b, 142–43 n. 17, 144 n. 22; Cawkwell 2005, 152. 
1118 Westlake 1968, 231–233 with n. 1 for earlier scholarship; Lewis 1977, 92 n. 44; Gomme, Andrewes, and 
Dover 1981, 94, 105, 121; Westlake 1985a; Erbse 1989, 77–82; Aidonis 1996, 90; Kallet 2002, 216 n. 108; 
Ernst Heitsch 2007, 76 n. 76. 
1119 Erbse 1989, 36. 
1120 Thuc. 8.46.5.  
1121 Thuc. 8.47.1 
1122 Thuc. 8.87.5. See also: Thuc. 8.45.6, 109.1. 
1123 Westlake 1985b, 47; Aidonis 1996, 101. 
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Tissaphernes went to Aspendus the Peloponnesians had already dispatched forty ships to 
the Hellespont, and the satrap must have known that he was at the brink of losing the entire 
Peloponnesian fleet to Pharnabazus. Since it is difficult to believe that the satrap failed to 
see that such a policy, if there was such a policy, was becoming detrimental to his 
overarching objectives,1124 it seems likely that Tissaphernes had done whatever he could 
to bring up the Phoenician fleet in order to appease his disgruntled allies. 
 Second, the protest of Lichas at Cnidus may have convinced Tissaphernes that he 
could not rely on the fickle Peloponnesians.1125 Accordingly, the arrival of the Phoenician 
fleet would have freed Tissaphernes from depending on Peloponnesian naval power and 
which would have allowed the satrap to dictate the manner in which the war was to be 
conducted.1126 Third, Athens’ success against all odds may have led Tissaphernes to 
question the effectiveness of the Peloponnesian fleet, and the satrap probably thought that 
the deployment of the Phoenician fleet became a strategic imperative in the war against 
Athens. Fourth, as noted above, Tissaphernes was using his own resources to provision the 
Peloponnesian fleet. But according to the third treaty, the arrival of the Phoenician fleet 
meant that Tissaphernes would have been relieved of his financial liability to the 
Peloponnesians. Therefore, with every day that the Phoenician ships remained at 
Aspendus, Tissaphernes’ financial resources were being further exhausted.1127 It is evident, 
therefore, that the deployment of the Phoenician fleet aligned perfectly with the interests 
of Tissaphernes. 
Redeeming Tissaphernes 
At this point I would like to offer an alternative explanation for the reason behind 
Tissaphernes’ deficiencies as a paymaster and his failure to deploy the Phoenician fleet. 
The fact that the earliest instance in which Tissaphernes is accused of being a bad 
paymaster occurred only after the conclusion of the third treaty has been largely ignored. 
We have seen that from the onset of the campaign against the Athenians Tissaphernes was 
using his own financial resources to provision the Peloponnesian fleet as well has his own 
operations. Once the satrap began to realize that the war was to be longer than expected, 
he reached a compromise with the Peloponnesians which kept both parties satisfied. The 
capture of Iasus probably supplied the satrap with considerable financial relief,1128 and soon 
after we are told that the Peloponnesian fleet was well provisioned,1129 which suggests that 
                                                 
1124 Keen 1998b, 100. 
1125 Lewis 1977, 107. 
1126 Hyland 2004, 89. The fact that Tissaphernes wanted to bring up the Peloponnesian fleet to Ionia is 
predicated on the assumption that he had no access to Persian naval power. 
1127 For instance, according to Thucydides (8.81.3), after the conclusion of the third treaty Alcibiades came 
to Samos and told the Athenians that Tissaphernes was willing to coin his own silver couch in order to 
provision the Athenian fleet. Such a phrase, which obviously meant to convey the satrap’s devotion to the 
cause, implies that Tissaphernes’ cash reserves were running low. 
1128 Thuc. 8.29. Tissaphernes paid the Spartans the figure of 1 Daric, i.e. 20 Attic drachmas (see: Xen. An. 
1.7.18), per captive, which is significantly less in comparison to other recorded instances in which ransom 
was given (see: Pritchett 1991, 247–48). The satrap, therefore, made a considerable profit, see: Lewis 1977, 
91; Kallet 2002, 252. 
1129 Thuc. 8.36.  
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the conclusion of the second treaty had nothing to do with the issue of wages.1130 Similarly, 
the objections of Lichas in regard to the treaties concluded by Chalcideus and Therimenes 
were about the territorial definition of the Persian Empire rather than the funds supplied by 
the satrap.1131  
The ambiguity regarding the exact time in which Alcibiades advised Tissaphernes 
to reduce the wages of the Peloponnesians sailors and to pay irregularly had spawned two 
conflicting interpretations. There are those who argue that the first (Thuc. 8.29) and second 
(Thuc. 8.46) reductions of wages were in fact the same.1132  Others, however, have pointed 
out the discrepancies between the two reductions and concluded that these were two 
distinct events.1133 But whether there was one reduction or two, the Peloponnesian sailors 
began complaining about their wages only after the conclusion of the third treaty.1134  
With all things considered, it seems more probable that Tissaphernes began paying 
insufficiently and irregularly because of the unexpected duration of the war rather than a 
sophisticated strategy instigated by Alcibiades.1135 To our best knowledge, the Persian 
central authorities provided Tissaphernes with neither financial nor military assistance, 
which indicates that Tissaphernes had limited resources at his disposal.1136 Keen suggests 
that Thucydides may have misinterpreted the intentions of Tissaphernes because of “his 
prejudices about Persian satraps’ wealth,” and therefore failed to consider the possibility 
that the satrap had finite financial reserves.1137 In other words, the satrap used his own 
resources to finance the Peloponnesian fleet and other operations for over a year. Since we 
know of numerous instances dated to the fourth century in which Greek cities and generals 
paid their soldiers irregularly due to financial difficulties,1138 Tissaphernes’ failure to 
furnish sufficient funds should not be deemed as different.1139 
It is not out of the question that Alcibiades may have overstated his influence over 
Tissaphernes. Accordingly, the Athenians general may have fabricated a story in which he 
urged the satrap to deprive the Peloponnesians of Persian gold. In this way Alcibiades 
depicted himself as an Athenian hero who made sure that his countrymen were given 
                                                 
1130 Thuc. 8.37.  
1131 Thuc. 8.43. 
1132 Wilamowitz (1908, 588–89) argues that Thucydides added chapter 29, which was based on more 
complete information, only after he wrote chapter 45. Erbse (1989, 36) maintains that in chapter 49 
Thucydides adds an additional motivation to the reduction of wages mentioned in chapter 29. 
1133 Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover 1981, 96–97; Rood 1998, 265 with n. 50; Hornblower 2008, 887. 
1134 Thuc. 8.78. 
1135 Keen 1998b, 100. Lewis (1977, 92; 1989, 231) acknowledges that Tissaphernes had “financial reasons 
for not giving the Spartans too much help.” Kagan (1987, 74) notes that Tissaphernes was experiencing 
financial hardships, but he still considers the strategic factor as primary in Tissaphernes’ decision to reduce 
the wages. 
1136 The Oxyrhynchian historian (Hell. Oxy. 19.2 [=McKechnie and Kern 1988, 94–95]) claims that the Great 
King habitually provided his lieutenants with insufficient funds at the start of military campaigns. This 
principle seems to explain why Tissaphernes received not financial assistance from the Persian central 
authorities. 
1137 Keen 1998b, 100. 
1138 Pritchett 1974, 24–29. 
1139 Hyland 2004, 92. 
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enough time to recover from the Sicilian expedition.1140 We cannot exclude the possibility 
that Tissaphernes was aware of the long term strategic benefits of allowing Sparta and 
Athens to waste away their resources by extending the war. Nevertheless, as noted above, 
by the time Tissaphernes went to Aspendus his alliance with the Peloponnesians was 
hanging by a thread and his financial resources were probably close to exhaustion. More 
importantly, the Great King’s interest should not be overlooked. The satrap had no new 
achievements to show for, and we can safely assume that the expensive campaign did not 
allow Tissaphernes to pay the arrears for which he received a notice from the King in the 
winter of 413/12 BC. Hence, it seems reasonable that by the summer of 411 BC 
Tissaphernes was eager to end the war and collect the tribute as he was ordered by the 
King.1141 In summary, since the cost of provisioning the Peloponnesian fleet was constantly 
on the rise, the end of the war was not in sight, and the Persian central authorities had yet 
to supply financial relief, Tissaphernes was forced to pay irregularly and below the agreed 
upon rate in order to postpone the complete exhaustion of his financial resources. 
Solving the Phoenician Fleet Conundrum 
 If deploying the Phoenician fleet would have solved almost all of Tissaphernes’ problems, 
one wonders why it remained inactive at Aspendus. Several arguments have been made in 
favor of Tissaphernes’ claim that the delay in bringing up the Phoenician fleet was because 
the number of ships mobilized was still lower than the figure the King dictated. For 
instance, Grote has pointed out that according to Diodorus the Phoenician fleet at Aspendus 
consisted of 300 ships.1142 Accordingly, Grote suggests that the standard size of a given 
Persian fleet was 300,1143 and that Tissaphernes had to wait for the fleet to reach this figure 
before he received clearance to deploy it.1144 A supplementary explanation is provided by 
Lateiner, who argues that past naval engagements have proved that the Athenian fleets 
were vastly superior in comparison to their Persian counterparts, even in instances when 
the Persians had considerable numerical advantage. Lateiner concludes that the Phoenician 
fleet’s inferior fighting capacity led the King to order the admiral of the fleet not to engage 
the Athenians before the fleet was in full strength.1145 It is apparent that Tissaphernes had 
yet to receive direct command over the fleet, and even if he did the satrap was aware of the 
poor track record of the Phoenician fleet when engaging Greek fleets and must have 
dreaded a scenario in which the Phoenician fleet was prematurely deployed and defeated 
by the Athenians. If such a scenario had transpired, Tissaphernes would have faced dire 
consequences.1146 
But if Tissaphernes was waiting for additional ships, we can assume that at some 
point enough ships would have been mustered. How then can we explain the fact that the 
                                                 
1140 Thucydides (8.88, 108.1) himself suspected Alcibiades’ claim that he managed to persuade Tissaphernes 
to keep the Phoenician fleet at Aspendus. Compare: Plut. Alc. 26.6-7. Cf. Delebecque 1967a, 125; 
Delebecque 1967b; Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover 1981, 355; Hornblower 1987, 107 n.42; Keen 1998b, 
101; Cawkwell 2005, 152. 
1141 Keen 1998b, 100. 
1142 Diod. 13.38.4, 42.4, 46.6 
1143 Cf. Ctes. FGrH 608 F13 §37; Xen Hell. 3.4.1; Diod. 11.77.1. 
1144 Grote 1850, 135 with n. 1. 
1145 Lateiner 1976 (esp. 281-85). 
1146 Petit 1979, 69–70. 
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Phoenician fleet was never deployed? An explanation is provided by Diodorus, who reports 
that the Phoenician fleet was redirected to Egypt due to a rebellion,1147 a claim which is 
corroborated by several contemporary documents which mention unrest in Egypt.1148 
Several scholars have accepted the developments in Egypt as the reason behind 
Tissaphernes’ inability to bring up the Phoenician fleet.1149 Others, however, have argued 
that Thucydides would have mentioned an important event as an Egyptian uprising and 
therefore reject Diodorus’ account as a fourth century invention.1150 But basing an 
argument on Thucydides’ silence on this issue is precarious. The general principal which 
Thucydides seems to follow is that events which occurred elsewhere in the Persian Empire 
and had no direct impact on the war between Athens and Sparta could be glossed over. 
Such a principal is understandable, but if Thucydides was inclined to ignore the problems 
the Persian central authorities grappled with beyond the Aegean, we should be careful of 
using his silences to automatically reject reports which are not narrowed to the boundaries 
of the Greek world. Furthermore, we should not forget that Thucydides believed that 
Tissaphernes was doing everything in his power to protract the war and that he deemed the 
satrap as ultimately responsible for the inactivity of the Phoenician fleet. Consequently, the 
centrality of Tissaphernes and his own motives in the narrative may have rendered Persian 
imperial considerations as secondary in Thucydides’ view.1151 
As we have seen, the conduct of Artaxerxes I in the context of the Athenian alliance 
with the Egyptian rebels in the early 450s demonstrates that Egypt was more important to 
the Persian royal authorities in comparison to western Anatolia, and it seems to be 
considered as such in 411 BC. Therefore, we can conclude that Tissaphernes was willing 
to deploy the Phoenician fleet, but while the satrap was patiently waiting for enough ships 
to be mobilized, the Persian central authorities decided against him and redirected to fleet 
to Egypt.1152 
It is also important to note that even if the Phoenician fleet was never made 
available to Tissaphernes, the fact that Darius intended to send a fleet to western Anatolia 
suggests that the King was willing to make a considerable investment, in funds and 
manpower, in the western frontier. Yet, under the assumption that the third treaty was 
ratified by Darius, even if the Phoenician fleet had been deployed in Ionia, the Persian 
                                                 
1147 Diod. 13.46.6. 
1148 See: AP no. 27; AD nos. 5, 7, and 8. Several scholars (e.g. Briant 1988, 143; Briant 2002, 597; Cawkwell 
2005, 155) have rejected the interpretation that these documents serve as an indication that Egypt was in a 
state of revolt. 
1149 E.g. Mallet 1922, 82; Olmstead 1948, 364–66; Hatzfeld 1951, 252–53; Lewis 1958; Meiggs 1972, 355; 
Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover 1981, 290; Keen 1998b, 101; Munn 2000, 144. 
1150 Brunt 1952, 81; Lateiner 1976, 288–281; Petit 1979, 68 n. 4; Kagan 1987, 212–213 with n. 10; Bleckmann 
1998, 50; Debord 1999, 216. 
1151 Hyland (2004, 91) suggests, correctly in my view, that Thucydides’ silence in regard to occurrences of 
some importance which occurred far from the Greek sphere may have been omitted due to “Thucydides’ 
focus on the Greek players in his narrative. It should be noted that in 410 BC Evagoras managed to seize the 
throne in Cyprus (Diod. 14.98.1; Lys. 6.27-28; Theopom. FGrH 115 F103 §1-2; cf. Costa Jr. 1974, 42 with 
n. 13), and a number of modern commentators (e.g. Olmstead 1948, 367; Munn 2000, 144) suggest that 
trouble in Cyprus may have been another factor in Darius’ decision to redirect the fleet from Ionia. 
1152 Wilamowitz-Moellendorff 1908, 606; Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover 1981, 101; Keen 1998b, 101. 
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admirals would have answered not to the King but to Tissaphernes, to whom the mandate 
to pursue the war against Athens was explicitly granted in the third and final treaty. 
6.5 War in the Hellespont 
Pharnabazus and the Peloponnesians  
Upon hearing that the Peloponnesian fleet had sailed to the Hellespont, Tissaphernes 
rushed from Aspendus to Ionia, seeking to explain his actions.1153 But it was too little and 
too late. Pharnabazus finally managed to snatch the Peloponnesian fleet from his colleague 
and rival. But Pharnabazus’ collaboration with the Spartans was far from a success. 
Preceded by minor skirmishes,1154 the Peloponnesians engaged the Athenians near Point 
Cynossema. The Athenians not only defeated their enemies but also regained the 
confidence which they had lost following the debacle in Sicily.1155 Immediately after, the 
Athenians captured Cyzicus,1156 while Mindarus sent envoys to Sparta to ask for 
reinforcements.1157 A few months later, in the winter of 412/11 BC, two naval engagements 
ended with an indecisive outcome,1158 though in the latter engagement the Peloponnesians 
were saved by Pharnabazus, whose cavalry squadrons prevented the Athenians from 
cutting down the retreating Peloponnesians.1159  
 The Athenian string of military victories continued in the following year. At the 
battle of Cyzicus, the Athenians managed to completely annihilate the Peloponnesian fleet 
and to defeat the land forces of Pharnabazus.1160 Soon after, the Athenians asserted their 
control over a number of cities in the region1161 and even established custom houses in 
Chrysopolis with the intention of exacting a ten percent tax on all vessels sailing from the 
Black sea. 1162 The desperate position of the Peloponnesians in the aftermath of the battle 
of Cyzicus is succinctly described in a letter sent by the Spartan vice admiral Hippocrates 
to Sparta, which was intercepted by the Athenians: “Ships gone. Mindarus dead. The men 
are starving. We don’t know what to do.”1163 Surprisingly, it was Pharnabazus who tried to 
lift the spirits of the Peloponnesian sailor by promising to provide the materials and funds 
needed for the construction of a new fleet. The satrap even supplied each man with a cloak, 
weapons, and two months’ pay.1164 After his exhortation speech, Pharnabazus went to help 
the Chalcedonians against the Athenians.1165 
 In next campaigning season, that is the summer 409 BC, the Athenians dispatched 
Thrasyllus with a new fleet to assume command over the Athenian forces in the 
                                                 
1153 Thuc. 8.108.3. 
1154 Thuc. 8.102; Diod. 13.39.2. 
1155 Thuc. 8.104-106; Diod. 13.39.3-40.5. 
1156 Thuc. 8.107.1; Diod. 13.40.6. 
1157 Thuc. 8.107.2; Diod. 13.41.1-3. 
1158 Xen. Hell. 1.1.1-7; Diod. 13.45-46. 
1159 Xen. Hell. 1.2.6; Diod. 13.45.6, 46.5. 
1160 Xen. Hell. 1.1.16-18; Diod. 13.49.5-51.8. 
1161 Xen. Hell. 1.1.19-21. 
1162 Xen. Hell. 1.1.22; Diod. 13.64.2. 
1163 Xen. Hell. 1.1.23: ἔρρει τὰ κᾶλα. Μίνδαρος ἀπεσσύα. πεινῶντι τὤνδρες. ἀπορίομες τί χρὴ δρᾶν. 
1164 Xen. Hell. 1.1.24-25. Pharnabazus saw that the construction of new ships commenced in Antandrus, 
though the Peloponnesians began building ships in the Peloponnese as well. See: Xen. Hell. 1.4.11. 
1165 Xen. Hell. 1.1.26. 
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Hellespont.1166 Thrasyllus first sailed to Ionia and began ravaging the countryside in the 
vicinity of Ephesus. The Athenians then mounted a direct assault on Ephesus, but 
Tissaphernes gathered a large army and defeated the Athenian forces.1167 After the setback 
in Ephesus, Thrasyllus joined the rest of the fleet in Sestos and then moved to Lampascus, 
where the Athenians spent the winter. 1168 Throughout the winter the Athenians repeatedly 
plundered the Persian King’s territory and even took over Abydos after they vanquished 
the forces of Pharnabazus which marched against them.1169  
In the spring of 408 BC the Athenians resumed operations. A portion of the fleet 
besieged Chalcedon while the rest laid waste to the territory of Pharnabazus.1170 The 
Spartan garrison in Chalcedon, reinforced by a detachment sent by Pharnabazus, launched 
an abortive attack against the Athenian besiegers.1171 After seeing his forces being defeated 
by the Athenians again and again, Pharnabazus resorted to diplomacy. The satrap offered 
the Athenians twenty talents in exchange for breaking off the siege and promised to 
personally escort an Athenian embassy to the King.1172 After a truce had been established 
with Pharnabazus, the Athenians lifted the siege and began operations against 
Byzantium.1173 In the meantime, Pharnabazus met the Athenian envoys at Cyzicus, from 
which they continued to Gordium where they spent the winter of 408/7.1174 The string of 
military setbacks may have compelled Pharnabazus to bribe the Athenians to accept a truce, 
but his offer to escort an Athenian embassy to the Persian court suggests that he had no 
authority to negotiate a peace treaty with the Athenians. This can be explained by the fact 
that in the third treaty the mandate to conduct the war is given to Tissaphernes rather than 
Pharnabazus. The Athenians, on their part, probably aimed at persuading the King to order 
his satraps to pull out of the war, which would had doubtlessly crippled the Peloponnesian 
war efforts. 
The Embassy of Boeotius 
But the Athenians and Pharnabazus were in for a surprise. When the Athenian envoys and 
Pharnabazus were en route they encountered a Peloponnesian embassy, led by a certain 
Boeotius, which was returning from the Persian court accompanied by Cyrus the Younger, 
the Great King’s son.1175 The Spartan ambassadors boasted that “the Spartans had won 
                                                 
1166 Xen. Hell. 1.2.1-4. 
1167 Xen. Hell. 1.2.5-11; Hell. Oxy. Cairo Fragments [=McKechnie and Kern 1988, 30–33]; Diod. 13.64.1; 
Plut. Alc. 29.1. 
1168 Xen. Hell. 1.2.11-13. 
1169 Xen. Hell. 1.2.16-17. 
1170 Xen. Hell. 1.3.1-4; Diod. 13.64.3, 66.1; Plut. Alc. 29.3. 
1171 Xen. Hell. 1.3.5; Diod. 13.66.2; Plut. Alc. 30.1. 
1172 Xen. Hell. 1.3.8-12; Diod. 13.66.3. In addition, the people of Chalcedon agreed to pay tribute to Athens 
as they did in the past and the arrears they owed to the Athenians. 
1173 Xen. Hell. 1.3.14-22; Diod. 13.66.4-67; Plut. Alc. 31.2-4; Nepos, Alc. 5.6 
1174 Xen. Hell. 1.3.13-14. 
1175 Xen. Hell. 1.4.2-7. It should be noted that when Xenophon (Hell. 1.3.13) recounts the names of the 
members of the Athenian embassy which was escorted by Pharnabazus, he notes that at about the same time 
a Spartan embassy, led by a certain Pasippidas , also travelled to the King. Bommelaer (1981, 62–65) argues 
that this is in fact the embassy of Boeotius, which continued its journey to the King while the Athenians 
chose to spend the winter in Gordium. Conversely, Krentz (1989, 125) argues, correctly in my view, that 
there were two Spartan embassies, the earlier one, which was led by Boeotius, went to the King perhaps after 
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from the King everything they asked for,”1176 and that Cyrus, who was to be appointed as 
the general of all those by the sea who fought alongside the Spartans, intended to fight 
together with the Spartans .1177 In addition, Xenophon notes that Cyrus was carrying a letter 
bearing the King’s seal, in which Darius proclaimed that he was sending down Cyrus as 
the κάρανος, i.e. commander-in-chief, of all those who muster as Castolus.1178 While it is 
generally agreed that Boeotius and his colleagues did not conclude a new treaty with 
Darius,1179 the arrival of Cyrus entailed a considerable administrative reorganization of the 
western satrapies which had considerable implications on the trajectory of the Ionian War. 
Cyrus superseded Tissaphernes as the satrap of Lydia but the administrative district under 
the Persian prince’s authority was expanded to include Greater Phrygia, and 
Cappadocia.1180 Tissaphernes was demoted to a lesser position,1181 while Pharnabazus, who 
continued to preside as the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, had to answer directly to 
Cyrus.1182 
Why was Tissaphernes replaced?  
It is evident that the main impetus for the appointment of Cyrus was the failure of 
Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus in the war against Athens. Darius must have been displeased 
to learn that the Peloponnesian fleet proved to be as ineffective as his Phoenician 
counterpart, and that his senior officials in the west were unwilling to collaborate against 
the Athenian menace. But why was Tissaphernes removed from office while Pharnabazus 
was allowed to continue governing his satrapy? It has been suggested that Darius sent 
Cyrus to the west as a way to mitigate the forthcoming succession struggle in the 
                                                 
the battle of Cyzicus in 410 BC, while the embassy of Pasippidas left at about the same time as the Athenian 
delegation. The rationale behind sending a second embassy, Krentz maintains, was that the Spartans would 
have wanted to send fresh representatives along with the Athenians, since they did not know what Boeotius 
had achieved, and feared lest the King would be persuaded to ally himself with Athens. 
1176 Xen. Hell. 1.4.2: Λακεδαιμόνιοι ὧν δέονται πάντων πεπραγότες εἶεν παρὰ βασιλέως. 
1177 Xen. Hell. 1.4.3: καὶ Κῦρος, ἄρξων πάντων τῶν ἐπὶ θαλάττῃ καὶ συμπολεμήσων Λακεδαιμονίοις. 
Compare: Plut. Art. 2.3. The geographical element in Cyrus’ title resembles the title which Thucydides 
ascribes to Tissaphernes (Thuc. 8.5.4: στρατηγὸς ἦν τῶν κάτω). 
1178 Xen. Hell. 1.4.3. Compare: Xen. An. 1.1.2, 9.7. On the office of κάρανος, see: Bivar 1961, 123 n. 5; 
Haebler 1982, 1982; Petit 1983; Bernard 1994, 500 with n. 53; Keen 1998a; Rung 2015. 
1179 Lewis (1977, 124–25) have argued that following the misconduct of Tissaphernes, the Peloponnesians 
deemed the third treaty as nullified and that Boeotius and his colleagues concluded a new treaty with Darius. 
Although several scholars (e.g. Lotze 1980, 178; Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover 1981, 142; Andrewes 1992, 
489) have accepted Lewis’ conclusion, Tuplin (1987b) convincingly refutes Lewis’ hypothesis and concludes 
against a new treaty between Sparta and the Great King. Following Tuplin’ conclusion: Cartledge 1987, 189–
90; Keen 1998b, 103; Briant 2002, 981; Cawkwell 2005, 290–91. 
1180 Xen. An. 1.1.2, 9.7; Diod. 13.70.3-4; Plut. Art. 2.3; Justin 5.11.2. 
1181 Several scholars (e.g. Olmstead 1948, 369; Andrewes 1971, 208; Lewis 1977, 119 with n. 78; Hamilton 
1979, 36, 101–2) have suggested that Tissaphernes was appointed as the satrap of Caria. But since it has been 
established that Caria was reorganized as an independent satrapy only in the 390s BC, is seems more likely 
that Tissaphernes received the territories which were previously ruled by Amorges. Cf. Woodhead 1979, 444; 
Hornblower 1982, 19, 32, 38 n. 12; Hornblower 1994, 216; Debord 1999, 120 n. 38; Cawkwell 2005, 155; 
Hornblower 2008, 772. 
1182 Lewis 1977, 131 with n. 136. 
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Achaemenid court.1183 This hypothesis seems to be corroborated by the fact that Darius 
reorganized the administrative structure in western Anatolia in order to allow Cyrus to rule 
over a domain suitable for a prince. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable that Tissaphernes 
was held as responsible since, according to the third treaty, he was ultimately in charge of 
the war against Athens. In addition, the Spartan’ complaints against Tissaphernes may have 
contributed to the decision to remove him from office. Under the aegis of Pharnabazus we 
hear of no complaints concerning the wages of the Peloponnesians sailors while the satrap 
personally fought alongside his Greek allies on numerous occasions. We can assume that 
Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus sent reports to the royal court, in which each satrap 
reproached the conduct of his colleague. Therefore, it is possible that the accusations issued 
against Tissaphernes by Boeotius and he colleagues may have served as a tie breaker.1184 
Moreover, if Darius wanted to use the Peloponnesians against the Athenians, and there is 
no reason to think that he did not, replacing Tissaphernes became a necessity. Thus, by 
demoting Tissaphernes and assigning considerable executive powers to Cyrus the Great 
King repaired the relations with the Spartans, neutralized the satrapal competition which 
became detrimental to Persian interests in western Anatolia, and may have reduced 
dissension in the royal court. 
6.6 Turning the Tide 
Cyrus and the Peloponnesians 
Cyrus pursued the war against the Athenians with impressive rigor and zeal. His first action 
was to order Pharnabazus to arrest the Athenian envoys he was escorting to the King.1185 
According to Xenophon, Cyrus wanted to prevent news of his arrival reaching his enemies. 
At the same time, the new satrap of Lydia may have been determined to block any Athenian 
diplomatic initiative which could have jeopardized his prestigious appointment. Soon after, 
Lysander, the new Spartan nauarch, arrived at Ephesus and hurried to Sardis to meet 
Cyrus.1186 Lysander spoke against the actions of Tissaphernes and beseeched Cyrus to be 
earnest in the war against Athens.1187 The Persian prince responded by stating that Darius 
had ordered him to do just that and even provided 500 talents to subsidize Spartan 
operations. Cyrus even expressed his willingness to use his own funds if necessary.1188 We 
                                                 
1183 Lewis 1977, 134–135 with n. 154; Cartledge 1987, 190; Keen 1998b, 103; Briant 2002, 600; Wiesehöfer 
2006, 664 n. 33. 
1184 Cf. Xen. Hell 1.5.2; Plut. Alc. 27.5. 
1185 Xen. Hell. 1.4.5-7. The Athenian envoys were detained for three years and were eventually released due 
to the repeating entreaties of Pharnabazus.  
1186 Xen. Hell. 1.5.1. 
1187 Xen. Hell. 1.5.2; Plut. Lys. 4.1. 
1188 Xen. Hell. 1.5.3. Andocides (3.29) says that the King supplied the Spartans with 5,000 talents, while 
Isocrates (8.97) claims that the sum was even higher. These figures, as Lewis (1977, 131 n. 138; 1989, 232) 
convincingly notes, are wild exaggerations. Diodorus (13.70) and Plutarch (Lys. 4.6) report that Cyrus gave 
Lysander 10,000 darics, the equivalent of 43.3 talents, on the spot.  Busolt (1893, 1573 n. 1) have argued that 
this payment represents a month’s pay at a rate of 4 obols, but Lewis (1977, 131 n. 138) convincingly 
demonstrates that this sum was not enough to support Lysander’s fleet, which consisted of seventy ships at 
that time (Xen. Hell. 1.5.1; Diod. 13.70.2;). Therefore, I agree with Green (2010, 228 n. 81) who maintains 
that the 10,000 darics were either a down payment or Cyrus’ attempt to ensure Lysander that he would be a 
reliable ally.  
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are also informed that the King ordered Cyrus to pay thirty minae per month to each ship, 
i.e. a daily pay of three obols to each sailor, though there was no limitation on the number 
of ships the Persians agreed to provision.1189 Lysander, however, was able to convince 
Cyrus to increase the pay to a rate of four obols, as the extra obol came from Cyrus’ private 
coffers.1190 Consequently, the aforementioned 500 talents could support the Peloponnesian 
fleet for a limited period,1191 but the fact that at the end of the war Lysander brought to 
Sparta a surplus of 470 silver talents, procured from Cyrus’ φόροι, makes it evident that 
Persian prince was true on his promise and that he committed the resources which were at 
his disposal for the Peloponnesian war effort.1192 
 The Athenians, on their part, tried to see Cyrus, but he refused to give them 
audience.1193 Thus, with the generous financial support of Cyrus, Lysander led the 
Peloponnesians through a series of victories.1194 But the collaboration with Cyrus 
encountered an obstacle when Lysander was superseded by Callicratidas.1195 Nevertheless, 
in spite of being reluctant to provision the Peloponnesian fleet due to his disapproval of 
Callicratidas,1196 Cyrus eventually transferred the funds.1197 Then, in the campaigning 
season of 405 BC, following the bitter defeat at Arginusae,1198 at the behest of the 
Peloponnesian allies and Cyrus, Lysander returned to western Anatolia as vice admiral.1199 
In a similar fashion to his first tour in Ionia, Lysander went to Sardis to ask Cyrus for funds. 
Cyrus informed his Spartan friend that the funds provided by the King had ran out, but he 
still gave Lysander money. Furthermore, Lysander was also informed that the Persian 
prince was about to depart for the royal court due to his father’s illness. Nevertheless, Cyrus 
made arrangements which ensured that the Peloponnesian fleet was well provisioned 
during his absence: he gave to Lysander the tribute generated by unspecified cities which 
were considered to be Cyrus’ personal property.1200 Not long after, Lysander managed to 
                                                 
1189 Xen. Hell. 1.5.5. 
1190 Xen. Hell. 1.5.6-7. 
1191 Lewis (1977, 131 n. 138; 1989, 231–32) shows that the 500 talents would pay for a fleet of 100 ships for 
ten months at a rate of 3 obols, or 11 months for 70 ships at a rate of 4 obols. As noted above, Lysander had 
seventy ships when he conferred with Cyrus, but the Peloponnesian fleet grew in numbers as the war 
continued. For instance, according to Xenophon (Hell. 1.6.26) by the battle of Arginusae the Peloponnesian 
fleet consisted of 170 vessels. 
1192 Xen. Hell. 2.3.8. Cf. Thuc. 2.65.12; Xen. Hell. 2.1.14. 
1193 Xen. Hell. 1.5.8-9. 
1194 In 406 BC Lysander defeated Antiochus, Alcibiades’ vice admiral, in a naval engagement near Ephesus 
(Xen. Hell. 1.5.11-14; Diod. 13.71; Plut. Alc. 35.4-6; Lys. 5.1-2). Soon after, Alcibiades led the Athenian 
forces into a failed operation at Cyme, which resulted in the removal of Alcibiades from his position as 
admiral (Xen. Hell. 1.5.16-17; Diod. 13.73.3-74.1; Plut. Alc. 36.1–2; Nep. Alc. 7.2–3). 
1195 Xen. Hell. 1.6.1-5; Diod 13.76.2-3; Plut. Lys. 6.1-3. 
1196 Xen. Hell. 1.6.6; Plut. Lys. 6.4 
1197 Xen. Hell. 1.6.6-7, 18. 
1198 Xen. Hell. 1.6.22-35; Diod. 13.97-100.4; Plut. Lys. 7.1. 
1199 Xen. Hell. 2.1.6-7; Diod. 13.100.7-8; Plut. Lys. 7.1-2. 
1200 Xen. Hell. 2.1.11-14; Diod. 13.104.3-4. Plutarch (Lys. 9.2) adds that Cyrus even promised that he would 
return with a fleet. 
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annihilate the Athenian navy as Aegospotami.1201 Consequently, the Athenians had no 
choice but to surrender.1202 
A Change in Policy?  
According to Thucydides, the funds furnished by Cyrus allowed the Peloponnesians to 
emerge victorious in their long war against the Athenians.1203 The omission of Tissaphernes 
and Pharnabazus suggests that Thucydides deemed their contribution to the final outcome 
of the war as secondary in comparison to that of Cyrus. In the same vein, it has been argued 
that Cyrus’ arrival marked a change in Persian policy in the west, i.e. that Darius decided 
to abandon Tissaphernes’ strategy aimed at wearing out the Greeks by prolonging the war 
and ordered his son to provide unqualified assistance to the Spartans.1204  
It seems likely that the string of Athenian victories in the Hellespont, especially 
those which led to Athenian forays against Persian territory,1205 convinced Darius that the 
Athenians were the true obstacle to Persian rule in the west.1206 Moreover, the King may 
have thought that the Peloponnesians, after they had lost their entire fleet at the battle of 
Cyzicus, would be more amenable to fulfill their promise to acknowledge Persian rule over 
all of Asia, as stipulated in the third treaty.1207 Even so, the assertion that the appointment 
of Cyrus as the new satrap of Lydia signaled a dramatic change in Persian policy is not 
convincing. 
I have demonstrated above that Tissaphernes probably turned into a bad paymaster 
not due to a long-term strategy set to exhaust the Greeks but due to an unfortunate outcome 
of his limited financial resources. In contrast, Cyrus came to the west with a substantial 
grant from the King and had access to far greater resources in comparison to his 
predecessor. Consequently, Cyrus was perceived as a true ally of the Peloponnesians while 
Tissaphernes was branded as deceitful and unreliable by the Spartans. Therefore, it seems 
reasonable that Cyrus was instructed to uphold the terms of the third treaty, i.e. to pursue 
the war against Athens in tandem with the Peloponnesians, which is exactly what 
Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus had been doing up to this point only with lesser resources. 
Interestingly, when Tissaphernes sailed to the Hellespont in the summer of 411 BC, as he 
sought to explain why he failed to bring up the Phoenician fleet, he was visited by 
Alcibiades. But the satrap imprisoned his former advisor and claimed that he received 
                                                 
1201 Xen. Hell. 2.1.22-29. 
1202 Xen. Hell. 2.2.10-23. 
1203 Thuc. 2.65.12. Compare: Hell. Oxy. 19.2 [=McKechnie and Kern 1988, 94–95]. 
1204 E.g. Lewis 1977, 124, 131; Wiesehöfer 2006, 66. It should be noted that several scholars (e.g. Lewis 
1977, 134; Keen 1998a, 90; Keen 1998b, 103) have argued that the fact that Cyrus received the satrapy of 
Lydia along with Greater Phrygia and Cappadocia instead of Hellespontine Phrygia indicates that Cyrus’ 
objectives were not confined to settling the war in the Aegean front and that the Persian prince was expected 
to move against the unruly tribes of the Anatolian hinterland.  
1205 Xen. Hell. 1.2.4, 16, 3.3. 
1206 Lewis 1977, 132. 
1207 Lewis (1977, 133–34) has argued that the Spartans had considerable leverage because Darius was 
preoccupied with revolts in Media (Xen. Hell. 1.2.19), Cadusia (Xen. Hell. 2.1.13), Egypt (see p. 166 above), 
as well as Pisidia and Mysia (Xen. An. 1.2.1, 9.14). In addition, Briant (2002, 596) argues that there was 
unrest in Babylon in 407 BC. In contrast, Tuplin (1987b, 139–42) convincingly demonstrates that these 
disturbances had little to no effect on Darius’ policies regarding the situation in western Anatolia and 
observes that at this point the Spartans could not even threaten the King with a Greek coalition against Persia. 
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orders from the King to make war on the Athenians.1208 Plutarch claims that Tissaphernes 
turned his back on Alcibiades because he feared lest the Spartan accusations against him 
would jeopardize his standing with the King and therefore sought to reconcile his 
disgruntled allies. But even if Plutarch is right, his explanation does not exclude the 
possibility that Tissaphernes had received explicit order from the King to support the 
Spartans. The likeliest point in which the Athenian option was abandoned is the conclusion 
of the third treaty, which was ratified by the King. The alliance with Sparta became official 
and the subsequent Athenian incursions against Persian domain only emphasized the 
necessity to collaborate with the Peloponnesians. 
Thus, the only apparent difference between the conduct of Cyrus and Tissaphernes 
is the fact the former had the financial resources to fulfill the promises made by the King 
in the third treaty.1209 Moreover, the embassy of Boeotius, as noted above, probably did 
not result in a new treaty between Darius and the Spartans. Even still, since the Spartans 
claimed to have received all they asked from the King, one can speculate that the terms of 
the third treaty remained valid, while Darius, as compensation for failing to deploy the 
Phoenician fleet as promised, agreed to allocate 500 talents for the Peloponnesian war 
effort, gave Cyrus access to greater resources so as to be able to bankroll the Peloponnesian 
fleet after the 500 talents had been spent, and obliged the Spartans by removing 
Tissaphernes from his position as the satrap of Lydia. There was no new policy, but merely 
a change in personnel coupled with an administrative restructuring of the western satrapies. 
 That there was no dramatic shift in Persian policy in the west is corroborated by the 
fact that the appointment of Cyrus and the allocation of 500 talents sums up Darius’ 
intervention in the war. Indeed, Darius had sent his own son to deal with the troubles in the 
west, but we should not forget that Cyrus was not the crown prince and, as suggested above, 
the removal of Cyrus from the royal court had allowed Artaxerxes II to establish himself 
as the successor without interferences. In addition, Cyrus was given money and authority 
over additional local military forces, but Darius never sent additional land or sea forces.1210 
The King, so it seems, was confident that the alliance with the Spartans would suffice to 
bring the Athenians to their knees and that the military expenses would be financed by the 
tribute extracted from the recovered territories.1211 In sum, King Darius, just like his 
predecessors, intervened in the affairs of western Anatolia in a limited fashion. It is true 
that a pro-Spartan policy became considerably more conspicuous after the arrival of Cyrus, 
but such a development was the outcome of Cyrus’ own ambition and the greater resources 
which were at his disposal. 
                                                 
1208 Xen. Hell. 1.1.9; Plut. Alc. 27.4-5. Cf. Lewis 1977, 114–15 n. 42. 
1209 It has been suggested (e.g. Olmstead 1948, 369; Cawkwell 1997b, 49; Cawkwell 2005, 157–59) that 
Cyrus’ zeal of to lend considerable financial assistance to the Spartans was driven by the Persian prince’s 
hope of garnering the gratitude of the best professional army in the world before he was to make his bid for 
the throne. 
1210 Cawkwell (2005, 156–57, 159) argues that the real proof that Darius’ attitude toward the west had not 
changed is the fact that the Great King never sent naval forces to aid Cyrus in his war against the Athenians. 
1211 Briant 2002, 599.  
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Conclusion 
The relative wealth of information on the deeds and exploits of Tissaphernes and 
Pharnabazus in the context of the Ionian war is illuminating. We have seen that the satraps 
had the leeway to formulate, change, and execute policies not only within their satrapies 
but also beyond the borders of the Persian Empire. The limited role of the Great Persian 
King in the course of this conflict serves as another indication that the Persian central 
authorities expected the satraps of western Anatolia to resolve the problems created by the 
mainland Greeks. Since Tissaphernes miscalculated the time frame and costs of the war 
against the Athenians, Darius had to intervene. But the acts of the Great King were limited 
to financial assistance and administrative reshuffling. Yes, Darius intended to deploy the 
Phoenician ships in the western frontier, but the fact that the fleet was eventually redirected, 
presumably to Egypt, indicates that the situation in western Anatolia was not considered a 
crisis which demanded immediate royal intervention. 
 In contrast to the predominant assumption in modern scholarship, I find it hard to 
believe that the Athenian disaster in Sicily had a profound impact on Darius’ attitude 
toward the western fringes of his kingdom. Are we to believe that news about a naval 
engagement which occurred in faraway Sicily drove the Great King into action? That he 
was driven by lust for vengeance and that he himself ordered his satraps to retake a few 
coastal cities which were of little importance to the stability and security of the Persian 
Empire? To me the answer is clearly no. From Darius’ standpoint, trouble in the west 
probably manifested itself through lighter shipments of tribute. Hence, the King’s primary 
interest was to see that the tribute kept on flowing and that his authority remained 
unchallenged. The satraps were expected to fulfill their duties, and were given considerable 
leeway to do so, and when they did not, the King would notify them that they performance 
was inadequate. The King did not, and I believe that he was unable to, dictate to each and 
every satrap the manner in which they were to resolve problems which prevented them 
from fulfilling their satrapal duties. Only in times of crisis, e.g. when a local rebellion got 
out of hand, was a royal army mobilized, and only then would the Great King or one of his 
trusted lieutenants assume command. The actions of Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus and 
those of Darius provide a clear demonstration that this principle determined the interactions 
between the Great Persian King and his satraps.  
Tissaphernes, who was evidently well informed when it came to Greek politics, 
sought to use Sparta as an instrument to weaken the Athenians. But while the satrap was 
able to effect an alliance with the Spartans and to win the Great King’s approval, his 
inability to anticipate Athenian resilience resulted in the failure of a sound and prudent 
strategy. As the war continued Tissaphernes saw his financial resources waste away along 
with the Great King’s patience. After Pharnabazus provided a similar unsatisfactory 
performance, Darius, prompted by Spartan complaints, intervened and appointed his son 
Cyrus as the overlord of the western satrapies. The events which led to the decision to 
appoint Cyrus highlight the complexity of the diplomatic interaction between Greeks and 
Persians while demonstrating the key role of the satraps, who facilitated the exchange of 
embassies between the Persian royal court and the Greek mainland. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The tendency of both ancient authors and modern scholars to cast the Great Persian Kings 
as the originators of Persian policy in the west is convenient but misleading. Closer 
observation from the satraps’ viewpoint reveals that though royal and satrapal interests 
overlapped they were by no means identical. Therefore, a different model has been offered 
in the present study, one which aims to highlight the central role of the satraps in the 
interactions between Greeks and Persians.  
The Great King’s Viewpoint 
The notion that the Great Persian Kings were especially attentive to Greek affairs is not 
convincing. The depiction of an Achaemenid King sitting on his throne in one of his 
capitals, his gaze constantly turning to the west, eager to receive news regarding events 
which took place beyond the western borders of his vast empire seems improbable if not 
farfetched. Such an image is clearly the outcome of the Hellenocentric vantage point of the 
ancient Greek authors. But modern historians should not allow the predominance of the 
Greek literary traditions to obscure the fact that the Great Persian Kings had an enormous 
empire to rule, defend, and administer. Accordingly, envisioning Greco-Persian relations 
as a direct interchange between the Persian King and the various Greek polities is too 
simple. Such an image fails to reflect the agency of the satraps, who were the true driving 
force behind Persian policies in the west. A preferable model is based on the assumption 
that the satraps had the authority, the means, and the will to use the extensive prerogatives 
of their office to fulfill their duties. Thus, when necessary the governors of the satrapies 
were authorized to formulate, execute, and reformulate foreign and domestic policies.  
Satrapal Independence 
The difficulties Darius I experienced during his rise to power had consequences. The 
multiple rebellions and the audacity of Oroites made it evident that further measures were 
needed in order to ensure obedience and loyalty. Accordingly, the primary aim of Darius’ 
grand reform was to tighten the control of the Persian royal authorities over the satrapies. 
Through the presence of officials of royal status in the satrapies, yearly inspections, and an 
informal network of spies, Darius was able to monitor the provinces and to respond to 
subversive activities and any other issues which may have required the Great King’s 
attention.  
Royal oversight, however, did not discourage the satraps from acting 
independently. There is no doubt that the institutions and protocols established or expanded 
by Darius I enabled an early detection of satrapal misconduct or lacking performance. This 
does not mean that the enhanced royal supervision deterred the satraps from showing 
initiative. On the contrary, it seems that a satrap who exhibited resilience and ingenuity 
was more likely to gain royal favor. The actions of Pissuthnes in the context of the Samian 
rebellion and the Archidamian War suggests that the satrap of Lydia wished to demonstrate 
his value by exploiting opportunities to further Persian interests in Ionia. Similarly, the 
impetus for the competition between Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus over Sparta’s 
friendship at the onset of the Ionian War was the eagerness of the satraps to impress the 
King.  
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But ambition was not the only motive for satrapal resourcefulness. Instances in 
which the King issued an applied royal directive encouraged the satraps to act. For instance, 
while Darius II instructed Tissaphernes to apprehend the rebel Amorges, he did not dictate 
a particular course of action which would bring an end to Amorges’ rebellion. Tissaphernes 
was shrewd enough to take advantage of the declining popularity of Athens in Ionia and 
the enmity between the Athenians and the Spartans for his own purpose. It is evident, 
therefore, that Tissaphernes was given a mission but that the manner in which this mission 
was to be accomplished was at the satrap’s discretion. 
None will deny that the satraps received unlimited authority. The satraps had to 
follow royal directives when such were issued, were required to obtain of royal approval 
when they wished to use royal resources or when they concluded a binding agreement with 
foreign political entities. In other words, while the satraps were aware to the fact that the 
King was watching and knew that they should refrain from transgressing the boundaries of 
their office, they still had the discretion to decide which course of action served Persian 
interest best even and perhaps especially when explicit royal instructions were lacking. 
The Circumstances in Western Anatolia 
The satraps of western Anatolia operated under extraordinary Circumstances. The 
transition from a policy of expansion to a policy of entrenchment in the wake of Xerxes’ 
Greek campaign had profound impact on the attitude of the Persian Kings toward the 
western satrapies. As we have seen, royal intervention in the west was limited to diplomatic 
interchange, the removal (Megabates) or demotion (Tissaphernes) of satraps, the allocation 
of funds (500 talents), and administrative reorganization (the expanded satrapy governed 
by Cyrus the younger). The limited extent of Persian retaliation to Greek aggression in the 
northern Aegean, Egypt, Asia Minor, and Cyprus suggests that the Persian central 
authorities were not alarmed by Athenian operations against Persian domain and were 
confident that the satrapal authorities were up for the challenge. Such policy was 
reasonable since Athens was a maritime superpower and as such it lacked the capacity to 
truly undermine Persian rule in the eastern Mediterranean. With the exception of the 
northern Aegean, the impact of the campaigns of the Delian League in Asia Minor and 
beyond the Aegean was only ephemeral. Thus, since there is no evidence for the revival of 
Persian imperialistic aspirations in the west, a grand mobilization of troops and ships for 
the purpose of containing what was viewed by the King as a nuisance was neither 
financially nor strategically sound. The conclusion of a détente in 449 BC brought the war 
between Athens and Persia to an unofficial end, but political strife in several Ionian city-
states contributed to the friction between Athens and Persia. Therefore, since the western 
satrapies were exposed to incursions staged by the European Greeks, Artabazus, 
Pissuthnes, Tissaphernes, Pharnabazus, and Cyrus the Younger were compelled to find a 
way to fulfill their satrapal duties while managing a continuous low-scale conflict with 
Athens and its allies.  
The Impact of Satrapal Independence 
In light of the above, it is evident that the satraps played a decisive role in Greco-Persian 
relations in the fifth century BC. In an ongoing effort to fulfill their duties, the satraps often 
acted on their own accord, seeking to capitalize on Greek infighting, both in Asia Minor 
and European Greece, with the purpose of furthering their interest. To some degree, each 
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satrap constituted an independent political unit, whose interests were framed by the 
necessity to govern the satrapy in a manner which pleased the Great King while at the same 
time determined by competition with other satraps and developments in mainland Greece 
which could have implications on the state of affairs in western Anatolia. 
So What? 
One question remains: does the conduct of the satraps of western Anatolia reflects the 
overarching nature of King-satrap relations in the Persian Empire? As I have noted above, 
the circumstances in western Anatolia were particular. But it is highly unlikely that the 
challenges the satraps of the western satrapies faced were unique. Though the Persians 
demonstrated impressive administrative flexibility as they absorbed preexisting institutions 
and practices to facilitate a peaceful establishment of Persian rule in various regions, the 
responsibilities that came with the office of satrap were probably identical regardless of the 
region which the appointed satrap governed. Thus, the case of the western satrapies 
provides us with a viable model for the problems and difficulties Persian governors of 
frontier satrapies faced and the attitude of the central Persian authorities toward trouble in 
the periphery. There is no doubt that in times of relative peace royal intervention in the 
provinces, whether on the frontier or not, was redundant since the duties and 
responsibilities assigned to the satraps already centered on the King’s demand for tribute 
and obedience. All the while, the satraps had the discretion to decide, especially when royal 
policy on a certain matter was lacking, which policies would safeguard and promote the 
King’s interest. The Great King may have prioritized certain regions over others. It is not 
out of the question, for instance, that Persian responses to news about dissent in the Persian 
heartland or wealthy Babylonia might have been more assertive. We know of numerous 
instances in which the Persian Kings sent armies to suppress local rebellions. To name a 
few, a major investment in resources and manpower was made in order to preserve Persian 
rule in Egypt, Media, Syria, Bactria, and probably other regions as well. Athens’ limited 
capacity to undermine Persian rule in the west never provoked the full wrath of the Persian 
Kings. Yet, the participation of a Persian fleet at the battle of the Eurymedon River and the 
Phoenician fleet as Aspendus demonstrate that the Persian central authorities were willing 
to divert significant forces for the protection of Persian interests in the west. A late but 
forceful demonstration of Persian determination to safeguard Persian rule in Asia Minor 
occurred in the last quarter of the fourth century, when the Persian response to Alexander’s 
invasion showed that Asia Minor was as viewed as an integral and important part of the 
Persian Empire. In summary, in spite of the particular challenge brought about by the bond 
between the Asiatic and European Greeks, the interaction of the satraps of western Anatolia 
can and should be viewed as a case study which reflects the true nature of King-satrap 
relations not only in the west, but in other satrapies which were located on the fringes of 
the Achaemenid Persian Empire. 
Prosthesis 
The events of the fifth century BC constitute only half of the story. The fourth century BC 
proved to be even more tumultuous for Greeks and Persians alike. The political 
fragmentation in mainland Greece exacerbated while several large-scale rebellions, some 
of which led by local satraps, impaired the authority of Persian King in the west. It is 
evident, therefore, that the extent of satrapal independence and the inner workings of the 
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Persian Empire in this pivotal period of crisis merits reinterpretation. The result of such 
study could strengthen the conclusions offered in this study and shed additional light on 
the nature and character of the Achaemenid Persian Empire. 
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